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Abstract 
This thesis investigates Kenya's approach to the privatization process through an exploration of 
Telkom Kenya's (TKL) unfolding privatization. The thesis research identifies outlines and 
documents the developments in Kenya's approach to the privatization programs in a developing 
economy of the COMESA region. In the process, the analysis contributes to an approach of 
privatizing and restructuring in Kenya. It has also helped explain new phenomena in privatizing 
in an environment with no institutional infrastructure and in the process has generated and 
contributed to new knowledge whose detail is discussed in chapter five. 
The research took an exploratory approach because there are few or no earlier studies in which a 
secondary data analysis solely was to be analyzed. The empirical data was based on observing 
and experiencing the real world with a focus to gain insights and familiarity on approaches to the 
privatization process. Although there is a variety of privatization literature and studies, these have 
tended to focus on developed and emerging economies and lately specific sectors of their interest. 
The analysis uses field primary and secondary data sources and an extensive literature review on 
privatization focusing on specific elements of approaches and developments in the less 
developing countries (LDCs) and in Kenya. The data collection and analysis focused on outlining 
Kenya's actual process of choosing and implementing sectors, objectives, methods, techniques 
and strategies of transacting Telkom Kenya as a strategic enterprise under the GOK's 
privatization program. 
In attempting to respond to the central research question raised in chapter one (page 9), the thesis 
undertakes an in-depth mixed method analysis (majorly qualitative) of approaches to the 
privatization process. The research is driven by the central research question (s): "What are (why 
and how) the approaches and strategies of Kenya's privatization program in a developing 
economy?" 
The research outcome identifies and outlines a 'sketch approach' to Kenya's privatization 
program and process. The research analysis concludes that efforts to institutionalize (i.e. 
regulatory framework) the process, in order to make Kenya's approach more tangible, effective, 
efficient, and accountable need further attention. Evidence further shows that privatisation of 
Kenya's strategic state enterprises (SSE, s) raises concerns of the socio-political dynamics of the 
management of the selected approaches, methods, processes, and objectives of privatization by 
GOK. Indeed 80 % of the respondents argued that privatization is crucial in enabling the 
government divest from business. However, the political control remains an impediment to 
independent and fair strengthening and building of privatization institutions. In this regard, this 
thesis' major contribution of identifying Kenya's approach provides a first attempt at a 'guide' to 
the privatization process that is clear, accountable and open to checks and balances. 
Table of Contents 
Declaration 
Abstract 
Table of Contents ii 
List of Tables and Figures 
Acknowledgements 
Thesis Structure 
v 
Viii 
X 
Acroynms and Abbreviations 
List of Appendices 
Xii 
Xiv 
1:0 
1:1 
1:2 
1:2:1 
1:2:2 
1:2:3 
1:2:4 
1:3 
1:3:1 
1:3:1:1 
1:4 
1:4:1 
1:4:2 
1:4:3 
1:5 
1:5:1 
1:5:2 
2:0 
2:0 
2:1 
2:1:1 
2:1:2 
2:2 
2:2:1 
2:3 
2:3:1 
2:3:2 
2:4 
2:4:1 
2:5 
2:5:1 
2:5:1:1 
2:5:1:2 
2:5:2 
2:6 
2:7 
Chapter One............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................................... 1 
Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 
Research Motivation and Study Area.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 2 
Research Motivation ......................................................................... 2 
Study Area and Justification.............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................... 3 
Research Problems and Statement..... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. ............. 5 
The Research Strategy ......................................................................... 6 
Purpose, Aims and Objectives of The Research .......................................... 8 
Central Research Questions ................................................................ 9 
The Research Question ....................................................................... 11 
Justification of The Study .................................................................... 13 
Practical Justification for Kenya ............................................................ 15 
Why not a Comparative Study ............................................................. 17 
Why not A Study on the Government of Kenya, The World Bank and IF Is ......... 18 
Methodology and Research Design ......................................................... 19 
The Research Design ......................................................................... 19 
Data Gathering and Analysis ................................................................. 21 
Chapter Two ............. .................................................................... 22 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework: Introduction..................... 22 
Theoretical Elements ofPrivatisation: An Overview ..................................... 27 
An overview of Literature and Theories ................................................................. 37 
Reasons, Objectives, Goals, and Rationalizations for Privatization . . . . . . . . . .... . . . ... 41 
The Role of Liberalisation and SAPs to Privatisation......................... ...... 45 
SAPs and Privatization ....................................................................... 50 
Privatisation: Public and /or Private Ownership ............................................ 54 
State Intervention and Free Markets ........................................................ 54 
Consequences of (Market Reforms) and Privatization ................................... 59 
Applications of Privatization Strategies and Approaches ............................... 63 
Privatization, Approaches, Strategies, Methods, Techniques and Current Trends.. 63 
l'rel'ldsaridlmpact of:Privatization ........ · ................................................. 67 
Privatization in East and Southern Africa .................................................. 77 
Monopolistic Tendencies: A Brief Evolution of Parastatals in The East Africa 
Sub-Region ..................................................................................... 79 
Rate oflndustrialization and Privatisation In Africa:" A Catch-22"7 .................... 83 
The Political Dimensions of Privatisation ................................................. 85 
Restructuring and The Cost Benefit Analysis- A Performance Process .............. 88 
Summary and Conclusion .................................................................... 91 n 
3:0 Chapter Three: . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. .. .... . . .. . . .. .. . . . . . .. .. . .. . .. . . .. . . .... . . . . .. 97 
3:0 Research Approach Methodology: Introduction and Overview ................... 97 
3:1 Research Methods ............................................................................. 99 
3:1:1 A Qualitative Research Design ............................................................. 99 
3:2 Process of Investigation ................................................................... 102 
3:2:1 Sample and Sampling...................................................................... 102 
3:2:2 The Sample Actors ............................................................................ 105 
3:3 The Case Study Approach ....... ........................................................ . 107 
3:3:1 Applications of Case Study Research- A scientific Approach .......................... 1 07 
3:4 Field Research Methods ..................................................................... 113 
3:5 Data Collection ................................................................................. 115 
3:5:1 Methodology Used in Conducting Interviews ........................................... 116 
3:5:2 Interviews: Types oflnterviews ............................................................ 117 
3:6 Data Analysis and Interpretation .......................................................... 120 
3:7 Validity ......................................................................................... 124 
3:7: 1 Conformability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 
3:7:2 Transferability .................................................................................. 126 
3:7:3 Triangulation and Multiple Data Sources .................................................. 127 
3:7:4 Reliability ....................................................................................... 127 
3:8 Limitations, Constraints and Problems in the Field and Thesis Study ........... 129 
3:9 Summary Conclusions ......................................................................... 132 
4:0 Chapter Four: ................................................................................... 134 
4:0 Developments in the Privatization Process of Telecoms: The Case ofTelkom 
4:1 
4:1 
4:2 
4:2:1 
4:2:2 
4:2:3 
4:3 
4:3:1 
4:3:1:1 
4:3:2 
4:3:2:1 
4:3:2:2 
4:4 
4:4:1 
4:5 
4:5:0 
4:5:1 
4:5:2 
4:5:2:1 
4:5:2:2 
4:6 
4:6:1 
4:6:1:2 
4:6:1:3 
4:6:1:4 
4:6:2 
4:6:2:1 
4:7 
4:8 
4:8:1 
Kenya Company ................................................................................................ 134 
Introduction and Background ................................................................. 134 
Telecommunications and The Postal Sector Policy Environment............ . . . . .. 138 
Liberalization and Restructuring of The Communication Industry .............. 139 
Status of the Telecommunications Industry in Kenya: A Historical Evolution ....... 143 
Restructuring of Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC) ........ 145 
Telecommunication Network Development .............................................. 148 
Objectives of Restructuring before Privatisation .....•................................ 150 
Demographic Assumptions................................................................. 153 
Population Growth Rate ...................................................................... 155 
Market Structure and Liberalization ..................................................................... 156 
Telecommunication Services .................................................................. 157 
Customer Premises Equipment & Wiring; Internet-backbone and VSAT ............. 160 
Telecommunication Services in the CO MESA Sub-region ........................... 162 
Telecommunications Infrastructure -(Carrier Systems) .......................................... 171 
Market Structure and Privatization of Telkom Kenya .....•........•..•.............. 172 
Sector Overviews .............................................................................. 172 
Sector Segmentation ................................................................................. 177 
Efficient and Effective Market Structure Operation: Issues ofF ocus...... .... .. . 179 
Interconnection and Market Structure ........................................................ 180 
Price Regulation ....................................................................................... 181 
Telkom Kenya Valuation Process ......................................................... 182 
Considerations for Financial restructuring and Privatisation of TLK ...................... 186 
The Investor and the Investors in a Trade Sale ............................................. 1'88 
The Investor in an IPO .......................................................................... 189 
The Company ......................................................................................... 190 
The Criteria Used to assess the financial restructure ofTelkom Kenya ................ 190 
Demand and Network rollout ..................................................................... .192 
Regulatory Policy ............................................................................... 196 
Overall Objectives Used For Financial Restructuring of TLK ....................... 198 
Financial Restructuring: Loans and Other Liabilities: Options ................................ 200 iii 
4:8:2 Option 1: Invest the liability in Telkom Kenya ..................................................... 204 
4:8:3 Option 2: GOK Assumes Liability ......................................................................... 204 
4:9 Progress in The Privatizations of Telecoms Sector ............................................. 205 
4:9:0 Privatization Telkom Kenya Transaction: Policies, Process and Negotiations ........ 205 
4:10 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 211 
5:0 Chapter Five: .............................................................. ................... 213 
5: 1 Major Field Findings and Data Analysis .................................................................. 213 
5:1:0 General Findings: The Insitutional and Framework Regulatory ................................ 213 
5: 1 : 1 Kenya's Approach to the Privatization Process ...................................................... 215 
5: 1: 1: 1 The Privatization Process: Steps in A Transaction -An overview ................................. 219 
5:1:1:2 Te1kom Kenya's Strategic Option: Privatization Roadmap ....................................... 225 
5: 1 :2 Market and Institutions in The Privatization Process: Findings Overview ...................... 228 
5:1:2:1 Characteristics of The Market.. ...................................................................... 231 
5:1:2:2 Market Structure and Trend ............................................................................. 234 
5:1:2:3 Telkom Kenya Monopolies ................................................................................. 236 
5: 1 :3 Providing an Institutional Framework Context. ........................................................ 240 
5:1 :3:1 The Communications Regulatory Structure and Sector Legislation ................................. 242 
5: I :3:2 Major Telecoms Licences and The Kenya Communications Act.. .................................... 243 
5:1:3:3 Major Issues and Critical Overview The Privatisation Bill 2003 .................................... 247 
5: I :3:3:1 Structure of The Privatization Bill: The Legal Framework ........................................ 247 
5:1:3:3:2 Capacity and Effectiveness? ........................................................................... 255 
5: I :3:3:3 The Bill Flawed on Globalisation And Trade Issues .............................................. 257 
5:2 Policy and Operational Strategy: Critical Issues ................................................ 258 
5:2:2 Financial and Strategic Decisions-Reform Consequences .......................................... 260 
5:4 
5:4:1 
5:4:2 
5:5 
5:6 
5:6:1 
5:6:2 
5:7 
5:7:1 
5:7:2 
5:7:3 
5:7:4 
5:7:4:1 
5:7:4:2 
5:8 
5:8:1 
5:8:2 
6:0 
6: I 
6:1: I 
6: I :2 
6:2 
6:2:1 
6:2:2 
6:3 
6:3: I: 1 
6:3:2 
Major Field Findings and Data Analysis: ............................................................. 268 
Challenges of the Restructuring Process: Performance Versus Retrenchment: 
A Human Resource Debate ................................................................................. 268 
Downsizing, New Employees and Performance Issues: Restructuring ................................. 271 
Approaches and Process: Impact and Importance of Objectives, Methods and Techniques .. 279 
Financial Restructuring, Debt, Liability Process in TKL: Who inherits the debt? ........ 293 
What Telkom Kenya Has to do to Survive the Competition: TKL Options ........................... 296 
Postal and Telecommunications Services ................................................................. 301 
Expansion and Performance ofTelkom Kenya ......................................................... 305 
New Products, Services and Market Share............................................................. ..305 
Expenditure and Payments .................................................................................... 307 
Financial Strategic Plans Planned Options .................................................................. 31 0 
Financial and Business Performance ......................................................................... 311 
New Products and Competing Market Share: TKL's Dilemma .......................................... 315 
Staff Rationalization Strategy ................................................................................ 316 
Third Mobile Operator and Second National Operator ............................................... 319 
The Parent- Child Relationship Between TKL and Safaricom? ........................................ 320 
The Conclusions .............................................................................................. 326 
Chapter .................................................................................................................................. 330 
Summary, Conclusion and Policy Implications .................................................... .330 
Contribution of the Research to the Field of Privatization ............................................. .330 
Summary and Conclusions on Policy, and Transactional Issues .................................... 332 
Policy Implications and Future Research Agenda ....................................................... .339 
Summary Implications ................................................................................... 339 
Future Policy Agenda ...................................................................................... 342 
Limitations and Future Research ........................................................................... .343 
Limitations of the thesis ....................................................................................... 343 
Future Research - Recommendations .................................................................... 344 
References ............................................................................................................ 346 
Glossary 
Appendices 
IV 
Tables and Figures 
Figures- Chapter Two 
Figure 2-1: Total Privatization Revenue in Developing Countries, 1990-99 ($billions)............. 68 
Figure 2-2: Total Privatization Revenue in Developing Countries, by Region 1990-99 ($billions). 69 
Figure 2-3: Total Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries, 1990-2000 ($billions) 70 
Tables-Chapter Three 
Table 3-1: Sample Size and Response Rate................................................................. 104 
Table 3-2: Sampling Frame and Interviews.................................................................. 106 
Figures-Chapter Three 
. Figure 3-1: Logic ofResearch Process....................................................................... 133 
Figure 4-1: Privatization Revenues in Developing Countries by Sector 1990-1999 ($billion)....... 140 
Figure 4-2: Indicative Enterprise Valuation ofTelkom....... ......... ... ... ...... ...... ....... ...... ..... 152 
Figure 4-3: Demographic Data................................................................................. 154 
Figure 4-4: Population Growth Assumptions................................................................. 155 
Figure 4-5: KPTC's Principal Balances....................................................................... 186 
Tables - Chapter Four 
Table 4-1: Total Privatization Transaction Proceeds........................................................ 141 
Table 4-2: Kenya's Total Reform Privatization Transaction Proceeds.................................. 141 
Table 4-3: Service Penetration Projections................................................................... 14 7 
Table 4-4: Growth in Number of Mainlines in operation ( 1993 to 2000).............. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 148 
Table 4-5: Growth in Cellular Subscribers (1997 to 2000)...... ...... ...... ...... ........ ...... .......... 148 
Table 4-6: Eight Regional (Telecoms) Operations........................................................... 159 
Table 4-7: Market and Competition Structure of the Expected Framework............................. 173 
Table 4-8: Core and Non-core services. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .... .. .. . .. . .. .. 176 
Table 4-9: Elements oflnterconnection and relationship among network Operators.,................ 180 
Table 4-10: The Restated Balance sheet for TKL as atJune 1996 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 183 
Table 4-11: Tele-density Projections......................................................................... 193 
v 
Table 4- 12: Tele-density Projections by Region. . .. . .. .. .... . . . . ... . . . . ... . . .. . .. . . . .......... . .... ... ..... . 194 
Table 4-13 : Impact of Efficiency Targets on Redundancies . . ......... . . ..... . . ............ . .. . .. . ....... 195 
Table 4-14: Regulatory Scenarios... . .. . .. . . .. . .. .. .. .. .. ......... ... .. ........ . ... . ........... . ......... . . . . 197 
Table 4-15: GOK Benefits Medium to Long-tenn......... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 
Table 4-16: The Pros and Cons of Guaranteed Loan Liability by GOK... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 
Figures - Chapter Five 
Figure 5-1: Kenya 's Privatization Transaction Structure.................. ...... .. . ... ...... .. ............ 223 
Figure 5-2: Schedule Approach- Timetable For a Strategic Sale..... .. .. ... .. . . ... . . . .... . ... .. ...... . . 224 
Figure 5-3: Privatization Approach: Legal/Regulatory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 
Figure 5-4: Progression of Approaches to Privatization .. ....... ... . . . .. .. . .. .. ....... . .......... .. ....... . 245 
Figure 5-5: The Impact of Privatization and Service Provision .. .. ......... ... ........ . .. ......... . ..... 286 
Figure 5-6: Approaches to 'Good' privatization. . . ... . .... ... .... . .......... . ... ..... .... .. .. ... .. .......... 289 
Figure 5-7: Growth in Fixed Lines........ . . . ... .. . ......... . .. ... ...... .. ... .. . .. .. .. .. .. . ... . . ..... . .. . ... .. . 290 
Figure 5-8: Growth in Mobile Lines..... .. ...... .... ... ..... . ...... . .. . ... .. ....... .. .... . ... . .... .... ........ 29 1 
Figure 5-9: Telkom 's Growth Progress by Indicators............................ . . .. ... . . ........... . . . .. 292 
Figure 5- 10: Revenue Trends 1999-2002 (Kshs . billion) . ..... ... ... ... .. ... .... .... . ....... . . ..... .. ... .. 305 
Figure 5- 11 : Business Portfolio Management........... ..... ........ .... .. .. ... ..... .. ... ............. ... ......... ......... .... 3 13 
Figure 5- 12: Business Portfolio 2000/2002.. . .. ..... .. .... ... .. ...... .. .......... .. . ....... . ... ... .... ..... .... .... 3 15 
Figure 5- 13 : Fault Response rate ... ... .. ..... . ....... ... ........ .... .. .. . . ... .. .. ... ... ........ ..... .. . ....... 316 
VI 
Tables - Ghapte,r Five 
Table 5-1: List of Up-coming Privatization Transaction.......... . ..... . ......... .. ...... . .. ...... ........ 224 
Table 5-2: Growth in Cellular Subscribers............ .. .. .... .. ................ ............................ . 233 
Table 5-3 : Charges per Unit.... .... ... .. .............. . ........ . .. . .... .. ....... . ... .... .............. ...... .. . 235 
Table 5-4: Long Distance Calls........... ......... ...... .... ...... .... ...... ...... ..... .. .. .. . .. . .. .......... 235 
Table 5-5 : Telkom Kenya Monopolies .. ...... .... ...... .... .......................... .. .................. .. .. 238 
Table 5-6: Cellular and Fixed line subscribers during the Reforms and Privatization Periods..... ... 267 
Table 5-7: Levels oflmportance of Major Objectives by Sector.. ........................ .. .... .. .. .... .. 278 
Table 5-8: GOK Approach and Strategy: Performance Levels to Privatization Transactions.. .. .. ... 279 
Table 5-9: Major Objectives for Privatization .. ... ........ .. ..... .... .. . .. ......... .. .... ............. ..... 282 
Table 5-10: TKL's Quality, Quantity and Speed of Service Provision During Privatization... ...... 287 
Table 5-11 : Levels of Investments by TKL Safari com and Kencell...... .. .... .. .......... .. .... .. ...... 300 
Table 5-12: Performance of Postal and Telecommunications Services............................ .. .... 302 
Table 5-13: Expenditure Statement and Modernization of the Network Systems 1999-2003.... ... . 308 
Table 5-14: Telkom Kenya (TKL) Financial and Business Performance (Kshs. Million).... .. ...... 311 
Table 5-15: Staff Rationalization & Growth in Lines.......... .. .................... .. ...... .. .. .... ....... 317 
Table 5-16: Staff Rationalization Versus Growth in Lines Connected .. ............................... 317 
Table 5-17: Comparative Lines Per Employee .. ............... .. .... .... ...... . ... ... ...... ... .. .. .... .. ... 318 
Table 5-18: Ratio of Director Appointments.. . ....... .. ... .. .. ............... ................... .. ...... . .. 321 
Vll 
Acknowledgements 
My Sincere thanks goes to my scholarship sponsors, the Commonwealth Association of 
Universities (ACU) and the Award administrators, Commonwealth Secretariat (CSC) and 
the British Council for the Financial and moral support. Specific mention goes to the 
former award Administrator Vikii Chen and the then ACU Secretary Terry who 
encouraged me to take up the award in the U.K, when bereavement in the family was 
overwhelming. Without their encouragement, this thesis would not have materialized. 
Gratefulness unmatched with any words goes to Ms. Claudette Coke and Helen Newsome 
of the British Council and Karen Langdon and Nick Barker of Garden Villa Durham who 
were pillars of hope and emotional support. Thanks to Mr. Kajumbi of Ministry of 
Education Kenya, for moral and financial support and Mr/Mrs Urquhart of Sherburn 
village Durham 
My sincere thanks go to my Supervisors at Durham Business School especially Prof. Tony 
Cockerill, for his valuable guidance and advice during the thesis research and PhD process. 
I am grateful to the graduate school team for their concern and help in expediting the 
examination process, it was an unforgettable experience. 
I am greatly indebted to Prof. Kiamba (V.C) and Prof. Karani (DV A) of the University of 
Nairobi for their encouragement and support in pursuit of the PhD programme. Their 
continued support and encouragement (after my father's demise) made this PhD thesis 
possible. I am indebted to the public and private sector officials in Nairobi, Mombasa, 
Zambia and Uganda, who were able to provide me with primary and secondary (data) 
Information that was valuable and formed the basis of this thesis. Joseph Ogutu of TLK, 
Jan Mutai of ATU, Dr. Ngeno (Ps Trade), Mkanadawire of COMESA, Mr. Ikiara (Ps 
Transport), Mr. Kipng'etich of Investment promotion Centre deserve special mention, for 
their insight Knowledge, advice and discussions. Special thanks to my relatives and friends 
who provided support, encouragement and took care of my baby in my absence. Special 
thanks to Albert Musasia of the office of the President who was instrumental in helping 
with the research logistics in the field and for his support and encouragement. I am greatly 
indebted to Mukhwana, Khakali, B, auntie Kabibi Ngala-Keah, and Uncle Mathias Keah, 
auntie Inyanji, Omurembe, Echessah, Dr. Taracha, Eddy, Catherine, Dorica, Violet and 
Marita. Their love, care, moral and financial support made this thesis possible. 
Lastly, and more importantly Thanks to God the Almighty who saw me through all the challenges 
and opportunities and all the hard work. May his name be praised! 
Vlll 
Dedication 
To My baby Son Kofi Kitiabi who had to endure 
Long periods of separation and pressure, 
From his "Mamaa" 
For his Unconditional 
Love, encouragement, Cheer, 
And 
Prayers 
*** 
To My late Father Chibuyi Kitiabi, who died 
During the write-up of this thesis. 
He was immensely 
Proud of My 
Accomplishment. 
*** 
To my late Siblings; 
Butsili, Jennifer 
And Shole, 
All who died 
During my pursuit 
Of this PhD Thesis. 
*** 
To My late Uncle M'msaba, who 
Died 12.12.01. For Educating 
And loving me dearly. 
His believe and 
Trust in me Made 
This PhD. 
He is 
Proud in Spirit 
*** 
To My Mother who had to endure 
Long periods 
Of worrying about my health and 
Well being for her 
Unconditional Love 
And 
Daily Prayers, 
Thanks Mum 
lX 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into two parts containing seven chapters as follows: 
Chapters one, two and three whose major themes are the introduction to the thesis 
Research Design, Conceptual Framework Research Methods, and field study 
methodology. 
Chapters One and three: - lay out the thematic area of the thesis. Outlining the study area, 
motivation and purpose of the research, overview of the study, a brief theoretical basis, and the 
justification of the Study to the thesis and to Kenya's privatization program. These two chapters 
also outline the aims, objectives of the study and briefly discus the research design and 
methodology, introducing the central research questions. Chapter three specifically discusses the 
methodology of the field study, the methods used for questionnaire application, data analysis 
and the problems experienced in data collection process 
Chapter two:- develops an overview analyses of the theoretical concepts and practical 
experiences of the privatisation Processes. Discussing the conceptual framework and 
literature review- of the privatization concepts, perspectives, methods, objectives, 
approaches and processes. It outlines the impact, reasons, trends and spread of 
privatisation, in transition and developing economies. It lays out a conceptual framework 
for understanding policy approaches to privatization and their institutionalization, their impact 
and role in building a case for analysis of the developments in the telecommunications sector. It 
reviews liberalization and reform approaches, and how these relate to the Privatisation of 
Telkom Kenya and telecoms in the COMESA region. It further lays the foundation for the 
interactions in chapters four, five and six. 
Chapter four, chapter five (sections one and two), and chapter s1x constitute the 
research analysis and findings. Their analyses is based on primary and secondary data 
collected in Kenya Sections 1 and II is contained in chapter five, and it is an analysis of 
findings of the Field survey data of the case Study of privatization of Telkom-Kenya . 
X 
Chapter Four: - gives a detailed analytical overview of the developments in the Privatisation 
of telecommunications Sector, with special focuses on the Challenges and Opportunities of 
privatizing Telkom Kenya. This analysis is based on secondary data field research, undertaken 
in Kenya. It details the unbundling of Kenya Posts and Telecommunications, its valuation 
process, and discusses the business options TLK might need to strategise on , as it transits into 
from a monopoly to a competitive environment. This chapter is the foundation for the empirical 
primary study and analysis of chapters five and six 
Chapter Five:- Section I & II: outlines Research Findings, Evidence, and Data 
analysis On Kenya's Privatization program and the case study of Telkom Kenya's 
privatization process. It critically analyses the evidence against the research questions, 
using empirical data collected. Showing the relationship between the field evidence 
presented, and its contribution to a "new model" for privatising in a developing country. 
It concludes with the presentation of the overall findings and their implications to the 
Kenya's approach to privatization, and reveals a case approach to Privatization in the 
regwn. 
Chapter six:- is a summary and conclusion of the thesis findings and conclusions ofthe 
secondary data analysis, the literature review, and the analysis of the primary 
(empirical) data analysis in chapter six. It gives an overview of the policy implications 
of the privatisation process to divestiture and investment programs. It outlines options 
and recommendations to proceed in policy and in research. It concludes with the 
implications of policy findings and policy conclusions made in preceding chapters two, 
four and five. 
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1:0 CHAPTER ONE 
1:1 INTRODUCTION 
The major objective and overall focus of this thesis is an exploratory exposition of 
Kenya's approach to the privatization process from 1993 to 2003. The analysis is based 
on the program as described in the Kenyan government divestiture strategy of 19961 and 
that of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) 2 using the case 
study ofTelkom Kenya Company Ltd (TKL). 
This chapter briefly introduces the concept of privatization, Kenya's program and 
research problems, the area of study and justification of choice of sector, country, as well 
as a discussion of its focus. The research purpose, aims and objectives setting out the 
central research question and extended research questions as guided by the data collection 
and analysis are also laid out. In addition, the problem statement - outlining a search for 
an approach and strategy towards the privatization process, their interactions with 
variables (addressed in chapters two, three, five and six) and in the divestiture programs 
of Kenya and COME SA sub-region are introduced. 
The study is intended to analyze the approach to the process of privatization utilizing the 
case of Telkom Kenya's privatization as the major focus of the thesis. The research 
period is that of the implementation of the Government of Kenya (GOK) divestiture 
program from 1993 to 2003.3 This thesis did anticipate but did not necessarily require 
witnessing a 'definite' conclusive outcome to TKL's sale transaction closure within the 
research period and academic thesis. The completion of TKL' s transaction originally 
scheduled for December 29 2002 was however brought forward (to June 2005t and all 
the transaction steps indicated in figure 5-2 in chapter five were undertaken. Central to 
this thesis is the unfolding research whose outcome was not to produce 'clinically testable 
theoretical conclusions' on the issues under study5 but to explore an approach to the 
process that can stimulate debate and generate theory that can identify the approaches to 
privatization in less developed countries (LDC). In addition, the theories and practice are 
investigated in a way that identifies new issues, new challenges and raises new research 
questions and redefines old ones. 
I GOK, (1996) 
2 The East and Southern Africa economic region involving 21 countries 
3 This period excludes the agenda setting period of the World Bank's global privatization imitative 
4 Note that the finalization ofTKL's transaction sale had not taken place when this thesis document was concluded 
5 The proposition of any firm hypothesis could not be attained due to lack of knowledge and documentation on the 
unfolding case hence use of one central and four research question section I :3 
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1:2 Research Motivation and Study Area 
The following section explains further this design by discussing the research interests and 
processes, the rationale for the selection of the study area and the units of analysis. 
1:2:1 Research Motivation: 
This research was motivated by the desire and interest to investigate Kenya's 'model, 
pattern' 6 approach to the privatization process in the COMESA region.7 The study is also 
a commitment and desire to analyze study and document the various approaches to 
privatizing Public Enterprises (PE's) in the Eastern and Southern Africa region. Along 
with this is an interest in investigating the relative benefits and challenges of the socio-
political and economic elements of the privatization approaches as theorized in sections 
2:1 and 2:1:2 of chapter two. Some of these include the process as a source: of 1) 
liberalization and restructuring; 2) business/job creation and investment opportunities; 3) 
revenue to the government; 4) access to service and new technology; 5) an opportunity 
for extensive enterprise and internal restructuring and 6) opportunities for the 
redistribution of national wealth, coupled with a curiosity to investigate whether 
approaches to privatization transactions and management of the processes, as in TKL, 
form a pattern for an approach 'model-case'. 
In spite of globalization, interest is drawn to the differences in economic, social and 
political environments between developing, transitional and industrialised countries. This 
existing 'gap' provided a challenge and dilemma of exploring, analyzing and recording in 
this thesis a "case" for an approach to the privatization process in a developing country 
and may be unique. 
6 As perceived and practised in western countries and as advocated by international donor agencies 
7 COMESA has 21 member states. Its major mandate is regional trade, investments and integration. Active members 
include Egypt, Mauritius, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia 
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1:2:2 The Study Area and Justification 
The Study Area- Why 
The choice of the area of study was determined by several factors; primarily my own 
interests as a researcher; secondly an interest in the sub-regional debates on issues of 
privatization, trade, and investments; and thirdly a need to answer specific questions and 
add to the body of knowledge in the area of privatization in the CO MESA region. 
This research is an academic research; its scope, study context, field preparation and data 
collection are based on the time and resources available during the two phases of field 
study and data collection which took less than five months in total over a two year period. 
The investigator operated within a limited timeframe and personal resources for the major 
part of the field research that pragmatically determined these choices. 
The privatization of telecommunications provides a umque opportunity to examme 
privatization in a growing and popular service sector. Besides this, the thesis's case study 
uses new datasets instead of existing old data sets from the internet which although 
desirable and easy to analyse are unavailable. Kenya has been studied as a 'case' because 
the research problem was conceptualised by the author within the Eastern and Southern 
African context, with an envisaged applicability of the findings to other developing 
countries. More importantly, conformity to the requirements and resource limitations of 
the financial sponsors of the thesis program made it logical to situate the study in Kenya. 
The election of Kenya's divestiture program was based on Kenya's leadership and 
commitment to market liberalization, investment and trade in the region, as well as on the 
strength of her economy in the sub-region. More importantly, Kenya's comparatively 
large divestiture program, her consistency in liberalisation reforms, enterprise 
restructuring and the establishment of a regulatory framework (GOK, 1996; Wallsten, 
2002, p.l9) are factors that make it ideal for theory generation. 
While the Telecommunications sector is a challenging selection for the study for several 
reasons, four are paramount. First, due to its rapid growth globally and regionally and an 
increase in the number of privatizations in the sector, it provides an exemplar case for an 
3 
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approach to the privatization process in the sub-region. Hence, findings can easily be 
generalised directly with those in the telecoms sector in COMESA and other developing 
economies. Secondly, divestiture trends show that telecoms leads other sub-sectors with 
better opportunities for expansion and growth (Shirley, Tusubira, Gebread and Haggarty 
2002); (Africa-America Institute, 2002). Thirdly the sector is large, employing 15% of 
Kenya's total workforce and accounting for the creation of between 50-200% in jobs, 
employment and business opportunities in the COMESA region as indicated in chapter 
two section 2:5, in the findings in chapter six and as stated by the Investment Promotion 
Centre (IPC) managing director: 
I would as a matter of fact estimate that 200% of jobs and businesses created in the 
COMESA region directly were related to reforms, restructuring and privatization of 
telecommunications in my capacity as the current chairman of the CO MESA Regional 
Investment Promotion Centre (CIPC), and over 150% jobs and businesses created in 
Kenya directly as a result of the privatization of Telkom Kenya ... (Julius Kipng'etich-
Managing Director Investment Promotion Centre, December 2003). 
Furthermore, its fast growing nature opens the sector to levels of technological change 
(Wallsten, 2002, p.5; Laffont and Tirole 2000) important to Kenya's industrialisation as 
argued in GOK's 1997 Sessional Paper, (pp.55-84). This also provides clear candidacy 
for an interesting case study of an approach to the privatization process in a sector that is 
attractive to investors due to its perceived potential quick and high returns despite its high 
risks. Fourthly, investors globally realize that positive changes that take place in telecoms 
account for efficient gains in related sectors in the transportation industry (air, water, 
road, and rail), banking, insurance, computers, communications and broadcasting 
(Wallsten, 2002). 
Consequently, the importance of this sector to industrialized, transitional and developing 
economies is reflected in the literature review and in chapters five and six showing clear 
linkages between sister industries. Developing countries of the COMESA recognise the 
importance of telecoms as a major ingredient in other service areas such as the reduction 
of transportation costs, linking up regions and ultimately reducing the cost of business 
transactions in order to improve competitiveness and increase trade and investment 
opportunities (GOK, 2001; 2003). 
4 
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1:2:3 Research Problem and Statement 
This thesis seeks to investigate how and in what ways Kenya has approached the 
privatization process in implementing its public enterprise divestiture program.8The 
approaches and strategies in the privatization process are defined in this thesis as 
comprising of all elements of the implementation process of GOK's divestiture program. 
These include; defining objectives of the program and enterprises, institutionalizing and 
developing a privatization framework, selecting and enlisting enterprises and methods for 
disposal (GOK, 1996) and creating legal economic and political institutions that ensure 
fairness and good governance of the process. A transaction is the systematic process9 and 
technique of sale, transfer or disposal of a public enterprise (PE) and is one of the 
elements and often the last task, of a privatization process. Divestiture is defined as the 
act of a government's withdrawal of ownership and control of a public enterprise targeted 
for disposal. Privatization is one form of change of ownership and control from the 
government to private or public interests. 10 The terms divestiture and privatization are 
occasionally used here interchangeably 11 • It is important to note that the implementation 
stage of the GOK's divestiture program is the starting point for this research. 
To view the research analysis in context, a brief discussion of the wider problem 
statement is necessary. For over two decades (1985-2003), Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) or deregulation, economic reform programs, liberalisation and the 
privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) have been in progress in Africa (Kikeri, 
Nellis and Shirley 1999; 2002). Large-scale privatizations pursued through complex 
programs combining several approaches and strategies with various methods are 
underway. Some of these include: outright sales, stock flotation, foreign investment, 
marketing of shares to local investors (public offerings), voucher or coupon exchanges, 
negotiated sales, stock distributions, management contracts, management buyouts 
(MBOs), employee buyouts (EBO), commercialization, mass privatization, strategic 
8 and the COMESA 
9 see steps in a transaction process in chapter five section 5:6-5:7 and chapter six 6:3:5 
10 
see section of 2: I and 2:7 chapter two and chapter five findings on definition of privatization 
11 
see glossary for detailed definitions for Divestiture, privatization and Transaction 
5 
Chapter One: Introduction, Research, Design and Justification of Study Area and Focus 
partner sales, and tailor made investment programs designed to attract government 
employees' local savings. 12 
However, an approach that includes institutions, sectors, pace, timing, methods, 
techniques, forms, and quantities of firms may differ from country to country and from 
one administration to another. In this respect, the wider problem area, purpose and 
outcome of this research is the critical examination of the approaches and strategies taken 
to dispose of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Along with this are the subsequent 
implications for the elements in the privatization process outlining characteristics and 
steps of the Kenyan (approach) 'model' replicable to the general COMESA sub-region. 
In addition, analyzing the social-political and economic implications of undertaking 
privatization provides an opportunity to draw useful conclusions for an approach to 
privatization in a developing economy while contributing to the generation and expansion 
of theory of privatization, bearing in mind that little or no empirical research exists which 
explicitly evaluates specific approaches and strategies to divestiture programs in the 
COMESA region. 
1:2:4 Research Strategy 
As the aim of the research is theory building rather than theory testing and verification 
(see Lincoln and Guba, 1985), the thesis research drew on grounded theory methodology 
and the research methods were triangulated. The research strategy, methods and data 
analysis employed involved a case study of TKL where the researcher conducted field 
research. The method comprised qualitative and quantitative research involving 
secondary and primary data collection and analysis using a questionnaire of structured 
and semi-structured interviews amongst organizations that dealt with the privatization 
process. The questionnaire research strategy was designed to build a profile of Kenya's 
approach 'culture' to the privatization process. 
The research design is cross-sectional. Questionnaire and interview data was collected 
once over a short period (Hussey and Hussey, 1997) of less than two months, before it 
was analyzed and presented here in this thesis. This explains why many of the interesting 
12 These are known as the "Golden Handshake" in the East African downsizing language. 
6 
Chapter One: Introduction, Research, Design and Justification of Study Area and Focus 
correlations in the findings of chapter six might not have been pursued further. In total, 
28 different institutions and firms involved with the privatization process were 
investigated. This includes 14 face to face interviews with a total of 36 respondents at 
every level of each institutions and enterprise as shown in tables 3: 1 and 3 :2. Forty 
questionnaires were distributed, 22 were self-administered mixed with telephone 
interviews and the rest were face-to-face interviews carried-out by the investigator. In this 
research, the survey served to provide broad and quantifiable background data in which 
to contextualize the case study and did not play a subsidiary role often associated with 
surveys (erroneously so) in relation to the qualitative research. 
The study methodology adopted is an unfolding exploratory mode of inquiry, with a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods left open to possibility. This research 
takes an exploratory approach because there are no earlier studies from which a solely 
secondary data analysis could be undertaken. In view of this, the aim of this study was to 
look for patterns and ideas and maybe a hypothesis, as argued by R. Hussey and J. 
Hussey ( 1997: p.1 0), rather than testing or confirming a hypothesis. A qualitative analysis 
of primary data collected was undertaken using in-depth, semi-structured interviews as 
proposed by Punch, K. (2000) and Brannen, ( 1992), with the randomly selected 
representative sample of13 institutions and individuals numbering n = +-40 (out of a list of 
a number of 50) from the public and private sectors. The full research strategy and 
methodology including data collection and analysis that takes the survey form of a case 
study ofTKL (annex 1) are outlined in chapter three. 
13 The random sampling is discussed in detail in section 3 in chapter three. 
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1:3 Purpose, Aims, and Objectives of the Research 
The purpose of this study is to explore and discover approaches and their appropriateness 
to the privatization process in Kenya and in the COMESA region, using an in-depth case 
study of Telkom Kenya's transaction. The research used triangulated or mixed methods 
of data collection and analysis with 40 respondents involved in interviews and 
questionnaire responses. 
To achieve this objective this research utilizes field data collected using questionnaires 
and face-to-face interviews developed from research questions in a cross-sectional study. 
General and specific country and regional data was collected on: (1) policy issues in 
approaches to divestiture, restructuring and privatization by examining the GOK strategy-
techniques, methods, forms, objectives and motives applied during the transaction of 
TLK; (2) interviewees' knowledge, facts, assessment and opinions on the approaches and 
strategies for privatization; and (3) information and opinions from managers in the 
industry on the approaches and 'best practices' in Kenya. Further information of 
investments, costs and sales in telecommunications and specific data on number two 
above; (a) the similarities of approach for ongoing and finalized transactions; (b) 
discussion on importance and public ratings of GOK performance in achieving major 
objectives, and motives for the divestiture of PEs in completed or scheduled 
transactions;(c) policy and practice assessment of the levels and importance of the 
institutional and legal (regulatory) framework that add to a solid approach to privatization 
by thorough analysis of the privatization act as a major step towards the building oflegal, 
regulatory and operational institutions, as raised in number one. 
The study purpose and central research question determine the expected outcome of this 
research, which was the identification and documentation of an approach was motivated 
by both the researcher's desire to move away from the prevailing temporary explanations, 
debates and descriptions, to a critical exploration of a dynamic unfolding approach. An 
approach that is likely to have a broad scope of application as an example for 
privatizations in the COMESA sub-region in general and for the telecommunications 
sector in particular. It is important to note that the outcome (as indicated in the study 
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justification) is that of the process rather than that of a completion of a single transaction, 
that ofTKL's sale to a strategic partner. 14 
In the process, this thesis contributes to theory generation; it also contributes to records 
and documentation as well as to increase the overall knowledge and understanding of 
approaches to the privatization of public enterprises in Africa. The study also contributes 
to the generation of a new empirical data set and new information on privatization that is 
likely to initiate dialogue on 'best approaches' in the process of privatization in the 
COMESA region and thus providing opportunities for further challenging research and 
publication on major issues. 
1:3:1 Central Research Question 
The central research question (CRQ) that drove this research as a major thesis was/is 
'what, and why are the approach(es) and strategies of Kenya's Privatization program in 
a developing economy and how is it applied' In order to achieve what is outlined in the 
purpose and aims of this research, the study uses the central research question and four 
supporting questions to generate theory at both policy and practice levels and contributes 
to the body of knowledge through an identified and documented approach to 
privatization. The CRQ was backed up by four extended research questions (RQs) or 
statements that helped in the secondary and primary data collection (questionnaires and 
interview), analysis and conclusion (chapter three, four, five and six). 
These four supporting research questions included (but are not limited to): RQ/1-how 
does GOK implement the privatization program in an environment of social-political and 
economic uncertainty? RQ/2-how do choices (approaches) made in liberalizing and 
restructuring in an enterprise like TKL enhance the privatization process? RQ3 -what are 
the roles, goals, objectives and techniques of the GOK or/and COMESA towards policy 
formulation, building necessary institutional frameworks and priorities in the 
privatization process? Is it to increase economic efficiency, increase competition, 
increase access to services, reduce costs, create and distribute wealth, create jobs and 
businesses, facilitate the process or to transfer productive activities to the private sector? 
RQ4-what are the major objectives, goals, motives, techniques and implications for 
14TKL underwent all the various procedures and steps except the last step of closing the sale rescheduled to 2005. 
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privatization in the telecommunications and related sectors in an environment of 'infant' 
institutional and regulatory frameworks? 
The central question covers the whole policy process, while research questions I to 4 
address the specific policy and transactions elements that help the data collection and analysis 
and the conclusions made in the following chapters. The privatization of the service industry 
and revealing its radical or unique characteristics would be guided by the central research 
question and supporting questions whose aim is to generate a theory rather than test a 
theory; hence, this thesis study focus is on the major question. 
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this research is a specific group of public and private sector 
institutions, individuals and enterprises (determined by the closed nature of the process) 
involved in the privatization program and process at policy, management and operational 
levels. These include the case study of TKL, policy-makers officials, managers, 
employees, technical persons, committee members, regional advisory experts and 
manager-employee relationships, as the sample size in table 3: I in chapter three 
delineates clearly. An initial interest of including three COMESA15 countries in the study 
was scaled down in the interest of time and resources; however, for the academic thesis, a 
case study of TKL offered a full-length exploratory and explanatory analysis of Kenya's 
approaches to the privatization process that is generalisable. 
15 Egypt, Uganda and Zambia 
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1:3:1:1 The Research Question 
Research Questions and Theoretical Framework 
This thesis has as its central research question 'what and why are/is Kenya's approach 
( es) to the privatization process'. It takes a more general form, that Werner and Schoepfle 
(1987) called 'a grand tour question'. Four sub-questions supplement the major question 
and help to outline the focus of the study to the lower levels of units of analysis and not 
restrict the enquiries. This is important in the case of the unfolding and still-emerging 
nature of the case study of Telkom Kenya. Hussey and Hussey (1997) concur when they 
state that the central research question should be in a general form. The sub-questions 
also help in shaping the questions for data collection tools in order to answer the central 
question. 
By doing this, the researcher does not block off any other potential lines of 
enquiry. This is particularly necessary where the methodology is considered to 
be of an emerging nature and where one phase of the research guides the next 
stage, as in grounded theory ... some phenomenologists pose one grand tour 
question and follow it with some four to eight sub-questions. These are not 
intended to constrain the research, but merely to delineate the focus of the 
study (p.l27) 
Therefore, the four supplementary research questions all share a basic common goal - the 
delineative exploration of the approaches of Kenya's privatization program (see page 
12).The four extended sub-questions focus mainly on the variables in the privatization 
process and their interactions to the central issues of restructuring, and privatization 
activities as outlined in section 1:3, 1:3:1 and 1:3:1:1 16 
Due to complications in social science theory, it has been advanced by Bulmer ( 1977, 
P.276) that it is important to 'clarify issues related to methods used in order to understand 
the limitations' and implications of each. A principal assumption of this study is that 
governments (countries) have different approaches to privatization and that all 
respondents in this study possess some knowledge and information about the 
privatization program and process. That is, they are able to communicate at some level on 
major privatization policy and operational issues and have the experience and ability to 
16 See definitions chapter two, page 21 and fmdings in chapter six 
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interpret them correctly. This assumption is based on a specific sample size drawn from 
the 'closed' process of actors in the privatization 'sample population' in Kenya. 
The theories and assumptions used in this research are derived from the theoretical 
framework in chapter two and further supported by data analysis in chapters five and six. 
In addition, Hussey and Hussey (1997, p.123) argue that although the theoretical 
framework is very important in a purely quantitative or positivistic research study, it is 
less important in a qualitative or phenomenological types of studies like this one. 
However, they further suggest that this indeed does not imply that theory is not important 
when they state that: 
Some researchers attempt to approach research with no prior theories, as they 
believe that to do so would constrain and blinker them. However, even in 
wanting to escape theory, to be open-minded or wanting to believe that 
theorising was unimportant to science, we would be practising a theory (Slife 
and Williams, 1995, p.9. in R. Hussey and J. Hussey 1997, p.123) 
In view of the foregoing, this thesis's theoretical framework makes references to theories 
advanced by academicians and analysts as discussed in detail in the literature review in 
chapter two. Similarly, the discussion on the research questions strategy and methods that 
follow developed from the purpose of this research guided by the literature review or 
theoretical framework which partly shaped the research questions. These evolved and 
were refined during the course of the secondary and primary field research process that 
was broadly examined. Explanations and clarifications of the research questions were 
sought through the development of theory rather than the replication of previous studies 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985) that did not exist in this case. This allowed for investigations 
into influences and dynamics embedded in the approach to the process that otherwise 
would be hidden. Gummesson ( 1991) maintains that because individuals in similar 
situations are unique, it is also possible for existing theory to prove inadequate for new 
investigations. In view of this perspective, this research adopts Glaser's and Strauss' 
(1967) preposition which argues that categories and concepts developed should emerge 
from data and research experience, and in cases where new relationships emerge during 
the study the categories are complemented by the reality being researched. It is in 
recognition of this fact that this thesis is heavily reliant on the findings as a basis of its 
analysis rather than the literature or existing theories. 
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1:4 Justification Of The Study 
The privatization of Telecommunications in Kenya allows for the generation of an 
explorative theory analysis of the approach that Kenya has taken in implementing its 
overall privatization program. A rigorous case study ofTKL's divestiture provides for new 
literature and adds to theory on approaches to privatizing telecommunications in a 
developing economy. As per the time of this study, published and unpublished literature on 
Kenya's privatization approach has been so far scarce and unavailable. This was evident 
during the first phase of this research. This study is further justified for four practical 
aspirations. First, the desire to contribute to a body of knowledge and theory on the 
specific approaches to the process of privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
using the transaction of TKL as an unfolding case. Second, the quest for a 'model case' 
approach for the sub-region. Third, to contribute to the gap of records and documents of 
Kenya's approach (es) to the privatization process. 
Lastly, to contribute to the field of academia and business with a 'systematic analysis of 
the approaches and strategies to privatization transactions in developing countries' as 
exemplified in the TKL case study. The case study used to explain the factors in the 
process as well as in a particular sale, is reviewed through a rigorous qualitative analysis of 
data on why, how, when, and what, approaches and strategies direct the privatization 
process. This exploration provides practitioners and academicians with an introduction to 
understanding the complex process of Kenya's (and indeed the sub-region's) 
privatizations. In response to filling in this gap, the case study highlights the impact of 
approaches on restructuring, regulatory issues, sale methods, downsizing, ownership 
issues, job and business creation and regional integration. 
Why the case study ofTelkom? 
To accomplish the study of Kenya's approach to the privatization process, the 
telecommunications industry was selected as a focus of the study for reasons described in 
the justification. However, the choice of Telkom Kenya as a case study was significant 
Firstly, as an unfolding case and still in a state of being privatized and in a sector that plays 
a leading role in driving other industries into investments and trade integration zones in 
Kenya's economy and in the region. Secondly, it is listed as GOK's strategic enterprise 
"not to sell" but to restructure and commercialize (GOK, 1996, p.S). Thirdly, Telkom 
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Kenya is a major driver of Kenya's plans to strengthen the regulatory framework and 
technology in the communications and transport sectors. This framework acts as 
COMESA's example for regional telecom regulatory frameworks for member states 
undertaking reforms in telecommunications. Fourthly, the intricate unfolding political and 
business dynamics of the sector led by Telkom Kenya as a national operator and three 
mobile operators generate new and unique data in Kenya and in the COMESA sub-region. 
Fifthly, Telkom Kenya's potential for growth, expansion and profitability based on its size, 
and level of technological change requirements (Wallsten, 2002, p.5; Laffont and Tirole 
2000) makes it an attractive study and investment case. Additionally, the unbundling of 
Kenya Posts and telecommunications (KPT &C) Parastatal as the biggest SOEs in Kenya, 
producing three large companies (CCK, POSTA17 and TKL), provides new data that raises 
the stakes of the discussion on restructuring and new company creation that are of major 
interest to this research as (discussed in detail in sections 5: and 6:) 
Furthermore, Telkom Kenya (TKL) itself as a new enterprise created out of the unbundling 
of KPTC has three large business subsidiaries in one (i.e. telecommunications as a fixed 
telephony provider, Safaricom, the Gigil communications and equipment firm. It is also the 
largest employer in Kenya employing well over 30,000 workers. 18 The selection ofTKL as 
a case study provides this thesis with an opportunity to explore actual 'real world' 
approaches, and strategies using the basis of other corresponding privatization case studies 
and theory developed in industrial and transitional economies 19 (as discussed in chapter 
two). 
17 CCK stands for Communication Commission of Kenya, which is the regulating institution, while POSTA is the 
official operation name of the Postal Corporation of Kenya -(PCK) 
18 See various World Bank and GOK reports 
19 Megginson W. and Netter, J. (2000: 2001); Masoor, A. (1988); Shirley, M. (1988); Stiglitz, J. (2003:2002) Shirley, 
M. and Nellis, 1.(1991): Shirley, M. and Wash, P.(2001); Shirley, et al. (2002), Ramanadham, V. (ed), (1993) 
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1:4:1 Practical Justification for Kenya 
The practical justification and context for this study lies in Africa's and indeed Kenya's 
search to develop a clear and effective approach to the implementation of the privatization 
program/process (GOK, PRGS 1996). Kenya before 1993 assented to the global World 
Bank/IMF reforms agenda that included a continuation of the failed Structural Adjustments 
programs of the 1970s and 80s (Ake, 1993 and Mugrewa, 1996.) and by the 1990s, Kenya 
had graduated to reforms, liberalization and privatization as an important vehicle for 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. However, as B. Samuel 
(1999) has argued, the dynamics of attracting investments in an environment with weak 
institutions and governance, weak economic business structures as well as poor physical 
and fiscal infrastructures can be overbearing even to World Bank operatives. Having set 
the agenda for the privatization program and process, the World Bank often 'retreats', 
leaving regional governments to embark on the implementation of the set agenda. This 
rationale should be understood in the context of Kenya's program outlined below in brief. 
A Brief Overview ofKenya's Privatization Program 
To contextualize the wider area of study, purpose, objectives and outcome of this research 
discussed earlier, a brief expose of Kenya's privatization divestiture is necessary. 
Privatization proceeds accounted for 15% of the total FDI and almost 50% of merger and 
acquisition (M&A) sales in developing countries (World Bank report, 2000) in the year 
ending 2000. Kenya has engaged in a wide-ranging structural liberalization and reform 
program over a period of ten years from 1993 to 2003 but a lot still remains to be done in 
improving the investment climate as per the World Bank measures. After accepting 
privatization as part of its reform agenda, Kenya's re-orientation of its public expenditure 
has been focused on economic growth and poverty reduction outlays geared towards 
improving, monitoring and strengthening transparency in public finances. It further seeks a 
strengthening of tax administration and revenue collection, procurement procedures and 
application, as well as restructuring public sector enterprises in readiness for privatization. 
Strengthening of the financial and banking sector and working towards improving the 
exchange market have been on course (World Bank report, 2000; UNDP, 2000). 
The program was interrupted by four major events; the constitutional review process of 
2002; the December 2002 election that changed Kenya's administration to that of the 
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National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) under Mr. Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party as 
President and the late Mr. Michael Wamalwa of Ford Kenya Party as Vice-President; 
sudden catastrophic world events namely the 1998 Nairobi bomb blast, the September 11 
bombings in the US, and the invasion oflraq by USA/British forces in March-April 2003. 
Some of the challenges to the program included the GOK using these events as an excuse 
for delaying or halting the privatization process or diverting the funds for the program. 
Much more damaging to the privatization program was the use of these events as an excuse 
for parliament to shelve and delay the enactment of a privatization law, in favour of what 
the GOK termed more urgent matters related to these events. The change of administration 
after the elections meant that the new administration changed the individuals dealing with 
the process, causing further delays in the process. 
However, the new administration quickly got the program back on track, by first enacting a 
legal framework for the privatization program and taking steps to hasten the process. The 
government modified and published the Privatization Bill in November 2003 and 
developed a draft plan with a view to streamlining the process?0 High ticket items like 
telecommunication, oil and gas, the power sector, along with finance and banking, were 
earmarked for strategic investor sales. To achieve this, internationally reputed firms like 
Schroeder, Solomon, Smith, and Barney (SSSB), JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch and Price-Waterhouse Coopers were actively involved as financial advisors in 
Kenya's Privatization program. 
The NARC administration took further steps to place emphasis on additional dimensions of 
governance that affect investments and privatization environments. These included 
strengthening, assessing and reviewing the overall institutional and legal frameworks of 
existing regulation and procedures that affect the interaction between the public sector 
administration and the private sector, with a view to eliminating red tape and corruption. In 
addition, the government also undertook judicial refo{llls aimed at strengthening the rule of 
law, enhancing transparency and accessibility ofthe legal system by modernizing the court 
system at all levels, and strengthening the capacity, effectiveness, and accountability of 
law enforcement agents. All these reforms are directed towards improving the investment 
. ·. oclim.ate)n. the .. country. Jt .is_anticipated. that. over aS..cyear~,period'<·from"''2002--to 2007)' 2 1. ·· ·· 
20 see Daily Nation, March, and April (2003). 
21 led by Mr. Mwai Kibaki an economist educated in Makerere University and US with 30years public sector experience 
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reforms are expected to continue and act as an impetus for consistency and transparency in 
economic policies that affect the privatization process positively. It is evident from the 
literature that the World Bank research group (which includes Samuel, 1999; Shirley, et 
al., 2002; Shirley, 1991:1994:1995:2001; Shirley and Elliot, 1987; Nellis and Shirley, 
1997; 2001; Wallsten, 2001:2002; Weiss, 1998) and Wellenius, 1992) amongst others 
believe that any and all the approaches adopted for the privatization programs need to 
match local challenges and the socio-economic environment. 
In the process of restructuring, there has been a recognition of the complementarities 
within the various privatization approaches and sector linkages in relation to social and 
political programs, institutional and legal frameworks, firm sizes, and the strategic 
importance of sectors earmarked for privatization to the overall economy growth, corporate 
governance and regional integration. Yet, the approaches adopted for the privatization 
program have been sporadic, non-committal and slow. They have focused on the listing of 
potential divestiture enterprises, rather than development of a solid inclusive approach to 
restructuring specific, strategic and growth sectors and enterprises for the full benefit of the 
economy. In addition, Kenya and COMESA conscious of the effects of the dominance of 
large privatizations as discussed earlier need to encourage periodic studies on divested 
firms. As yet little research exists which explicitly investigates, records, documents, 
catalogues, evaluates and analyses the systematic approaches to the privatization processes, 
as advanced by this thesis. 
1:4:2 Why Not A Comparative Study? 
As stated in the introduction- for the justification of this thesis's choice of field, there were 
various reasons why an unfolding, case study of Telkom Kenya was preferred. Similarly, the 
reasons for not engaging in a comparative study have been discussed in the justification. However, 
more importantly for an academic thesis with a limited period of 36 months academic study and 
funding for international students in Britain, it was not possible to undertake large-scale field 
research. This would have involved collecting primary data in each of the countries, and with the 
time and resources allocated to this thesis it would have been an impossible task. In addition, there 
are no existing datasets for COMESA countries on privatizations under study i.e. Egypt, Kenya, 
Uganda and Zambia. 
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1:4:3 Why not a Study on the Government of Kenya, The World Bank and IFI's?22 
First, it is important to note that this thesis begins its analysis in the implementation period 
of the privatization program for the region and Kenya in particular. This is the period 
between 1993 -2003. This is the stage when all the negotiations disagreements and so on, 
have ended and Kenya has agreed 'whether reluctantly or not' to implement the 
privatization program. 
Secondly, basing this thesis on the relationship between the World Bank and Kenya would 
have provided difficulties in terms of time, resources and access issues. Specifically the 
question of accessibility to the resources at the World Bank in Nairobi and in Washington 
was not guaranteed. It would have been vital to interview those involved in the planning 
and negotiation stages of the pre-privatization process. Most of them are based in 
Washington or have since left the Bank. Indeed, an effort was made to try to pursue this 
line of study but the staff on Kenya's privatization program has since left the Bank. The 
one manager, who was in charge of initiating the KPTC divestiture from government, was 
still with the Bank but is no longer on the Kenyan desk and was unwilling to discuss 
anything related to the unbundling of the KPTC and Telkom Kenya's restructuring and 
privatization. 
Thirdly and finally, the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) are 
involved in the privatization program as a an element of Kenya's financial aid from 
international financiers. UNDP and other donors are involved in fostering the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) and poverty eradication strategies in all other sector levels. 
The World Bank demands that liberalization and reforms that take place are in conformity 
with MDGs and the opening-up of markets. Furthermore, there are instances where the 
national Legislative Assembly 'prescribes' what laws to pass and when. The scale of such 
a research project involving the entire service sector would require enormous resources and 
time and would be unsuitable for an academic thesis with a limited mandate. More often 
than not, there are conflicting messages from financial donors and development agencies 
that are either involved or opposed to privatization. To undertake an investigation of these 
agencies would require more time, resources and access to preliminary factual data, which 
did not exist before this thesis research. 
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1:5 Methodology and Research Design 
Three reasons guided the methodology preference. First the paucity of major and sub-
research questions about the approaches and strategies of privatization programs, their 
linkage to implementation realities and implications for success and performance of 
enterprises, especially in a developing country setting made it necessary to generate 
information inductively. Secondly, the politically sensitive nature of privatizations viewed 
by governments as strategic in general and viewed by the public as a conspiracy against 
citizens calls for a qualitative, explorative and unfolding method of proceeding. Thirdly, 
the phenomenological nature of a study with empirical data collection and analysis coupled 
with serious logistical, time, and resource constraints makes it necessary to limit the scope 
and methodology of the study. 
1:5:1 The Research Design 
There were two phases and four stages to this research. The first phase involved two 
stages; the preliminary stage- concept inception and literature review, and the secondary 
data collection which established and scaled down the scope of the study. This helped in 
the formulation of relevant questions for the second phase which was the empirical 
investigation, which included preparation of data collection tools, data collection, analysis 
and presentation as detailed in chapter three. Although the case study was the focus of the 
investigation, two stages of the overall empirical study in the same period were planned 
and undertaken. In the third stage of the study, the overall investigation of approaches and 
processes of the privatization program was surveyed in detail.23 
In the second phase (primary data collection), the empirical research and in-depth analysis 
were of the strategies and approaches of the privatization of SOEs, using theoretical 
frameworks derived from the literature review and secondary data analysis. This analysis 
forms a part of the findings analysis in chapter five. 
The sample of interviewees was selected from a fixed number of CEOs of SOEs in the 
privatization program that included Telkom Kenya totalling 40 public and private sector, 
22 International Finance Institutions (IFI) 
23 
see field research methods 
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regional and national institutions and individuals that were involved in the process. The 
interviews focused on the goals, objectives, methods, motives and strategies for Kenya's 
privatization program. The data collection tools used to support this research consisted of 
two sets of questions contained in one questionnaire with three sections each containing 
structured and semi-structured questions and one questionnaire of 'guiding' questions used 
for face to face interviews, as detailed in chapters three and six and appendix 1 : annex I. 
The empirical research tool24 used to support interviews and discussions included use of e-
mail conferencing and postage system to minimize on telephone, fax and postal costs. 
Additional qualitative and quantitative analysis was undertaken on the Public Enterprises 
(PEs) earmarked for privatization/or already privatised to support evidence of the case 
study of the approach to the process. Out of a total of 40 sampled respondents a total of 36 
respondents responded to the research. The findings are discussed in chapter three and 
listed in annexes Ilia and lllb. The research questions indicated in section 1:4 focused on 
approaches and strategies of Kenya's privatization program as manifested in the GOK's 
divestiture process of Telkom Kenya Company Ltd (TKL). The central research question 
entailed the exploration and analysis of the 'explanations' and 'descriptions' for the 
approaches and strategies for privatization of telecommunications in the region and in 
Kenya. Therefore, the research question entails more than a mere quantification of 
phenomena (Yin, 1984). It involves an exploration of underlying reasons for the selection 
of objectives, methods, forms, techniques, and activities of the privatization programs. 
Hence, because of the exploratory nature of the study, the unfolding nature of the telecom 
privatization, the closed and controlled process of divestiture programs by the Kenyan 
government and the lack of time and resources, the case study approach was an appropriate 
choice. 
24 Chapter three outlines the detailed field research methodology 
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1:5:2: Data Gathering and Analysis 
During this stage, an in-depth case study of Kenya's privatization program, TKL's 
privatization process and its subsidiaries was conducted using interviews. The sample 
selection was based on the pre-determined (participating PEs and other stakeholders) but 
random participants of the closed 'divestiture' process as detailed in annexes Ilia and Ilb. 
It has been argued by several researchers and scholars (Pidgeon and Henwood, 1996; 
Turner, 1981) that one of the most important aspects of theory generation is the full 
documentation of the analytical process. It is said that this serves as a prompt for further 
analysis and is an important part of forcing the tacit, implicit or subliminal to the surface of 
awareness (Turner, 1981 ). The documentation of data results in the generation of an "array 
of concepts, categories and theoretical observations, which provide the building blocks for 
subsequent theorizing" Pidgeon and Henwood, (1996, p.87) and delineating of study 
results using qualitative analysis as presented in chapter six of this thesis. 
Ultimately Pidgeon and Henwood (1996) maintain that success in generating theory that is 
well grounded in data depends upon maintaining a balance between the full use of the 
researcher's own subjective understandings, and concept matching. For example, in the 
analysis of the quantitative data a series of non-parametric tests were performed. In 
addition, descriptive statistics provided a further source of analysis and helped to identify 
the prevalence of emerging issues and trends when combined with the qualitative data. 
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2:0 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Privatization 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the privatization processes all over the 
world, which gives a background to the development of thought in this field. Following 
from this the literature reviews more recent thinking, touching upon and led by the 
contribution of two major influential schools of thought and researchers in this area, 
namely the World Bank group of researchers (past and present) and academic based 
publications. These include various publications of Mary Shirley, Kikeri and Nellis, 
Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Cook and Kirkpatrick, George Yarrow, and John Vickers and 
Wellenius, and Wallsten Scot, discussed in this chapter and referenced throughout this 
thesis. The main locus for discussion rests upon the research based works for 
developing countries and Africa in particular, prominently Paul Cook, Shirley, 
Kirkpatrick, Yarrow and specifically Shirley, Samuel, Stiglitz and Wallsten who each 
recognize that developing a local-based model of approaches and strategies to 
privatization has become necessary for developing countries competing in regional and 
global markets. The aim of this chapter is to review literature appropriate to local 
economic, social and political structures and circumstances in developing countries and 
to see how far recent thinking may inform or influence understanding of the approach 
Kenya has taken to privatize Telkom Kenya. 
In the late 1990s, the literature in the field of privatization of SOEs discussed in this 
chapter began to reflect a growing uncertainty and disenchantment with globaly 
prescribed approaches to the privatization process. The World Bank and IFC traded 
Structural Adjustment programs along with deregulation, liberalization, globalization 
and democratization created uncertainties in public and private organizations (Adepoju, 
1993). Governments in Africa were finding it difficult to manage and plan parastatal 
reform, particularly using classical and p~escriptiye approaches that were based upon 
-.. . . . . . . - - - - . .. ~ ·' - '- . . . . . -
future prediction as an extension of past performance. 
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The failure of parastatals to perform was seen to rest in a failure of markets, the 
monopolistic nature of the enterprises and the government's poor record of enterprise 
management as argued by Vickers and Yarrow, (1988: 1991) and Cook and Kirkpatrick, 
(1988). These are reasons why governments should divest from public enterprises in the 
developing countries. At the same time other commentators continued to debate on the 
switch that the World Bank had made to failed SAPs programs and privatization, at the 
expense of economic growth and 'controlled' market liberalization (Loxley, 1990, p.8; 
Olukoshi, 1993). This school of thought argues that liberalization and privatization had 
been introduced too soon after the SAPs with equally negative consequences for poverty 
reduction and industrialization for developing countries (Ake, 1981 ). Others such as 
Samuel, (1999), Kikeri, et. al (1992) have sought to defend privatization. 
This conceptual framework seeks to point out this dynamism in the debates, by 
reviewing literature trends in the shifts of the best approaches, strategies, and methods 
of divestiture as well as their costs and benefits. The outcome of this thesis is expected 
to close the current policy 'gap' in a developing country and provide a case for 
privatisation (chapter five). The study survey's connection to the literature is direct, 
juxtaposed with current theories in the literature, which are almost entirely focused on 
developing approaches, forms and processes of privatisation in either industrialised, 
transitional, or developing countries. The thesis focuses on seeking to find 'unique' 
strategies and approaches while acknowledging implementation challenges in the wake 
of globalisation difficulties (Stiglitz 2003, pp.8-88). More importantly, this thesis moves 
beyond previous work and what is already known, by detailing an exploration of the 
unfolding case of privatization approaches and strategies in a developing economy. 
Several descriptive studies exist on privatisation in developing countries describing 
post-privatisation effects (Al-obaidan, 2002)1• While the merits of a market-based 
economic system are well established under certain theoretical frameworks- i.e. various 
theorists of economics led by Keynes (1936) and his works (Moggridge 1973); Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz ( 1971 ); Hoff and Stiglitz (200 1 ), the various theories of economics and of 
politics, development economics, public choice,- business, markets and the neo-
dassic~ls-are far ies~ kno\vn (Mukandawire, 1995; sah. and Stig'titz,· 1992; K~mssa, 
1996 and Ake, 1993). They are also far less researched in the empirical studies of 
1 Vodopivec and Orazem ( 1995); Hadi and Mookherjee. ( 1995) 
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developing countries; most studies concerned with privatisation often limit themselves 
to the impact of privatisation at the firm and country levels, often only to a few 
companies. 
Thus this analysis moves away from descriptive genenc presentations and 
generalisations of a global view of privatisations in transitional, industrial and 
developing economies as detailed by Cook and Kirkpatrick (eds), (1988;1998; 1995); 
Wright, (1995); Berg and Shirley, (1987) and Shirley, (1994). The review and analysis 
for this study rely on this extensive global analysis as a theoretical framework, while 
exploring the unique case of privatising SOEs in a developing environment (Megginson, 
et. al., 1994: 1998; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998) 
Discussions and arguments on privatisation as a form of enforcing political, market, 
economic and business policy reforms are in their thousands and this chapter selectively 
outlines a conceptual framework for general privatisation theories and practices relevant 
to the analysis in chapter five. It then proceeds to focus on literature relating to 
privatisation approaches and strategies in SOEs that yield business opportunities in a 
developing economy (Common Market for East and Southern Africa- Free trade Area-
COMESA-FTA) for the last decade (1993-2003). In so doing the relevant literature 
helps this research by drawing selectively comparisons from Asia, the UK and Eastern 
Europe. 
While this review outlines arguments on various approaches it is evident from the 
analysis in chapter five that there is no single global "best" approach to privatization; 
the appropriate privatization path depends on the goals that the government seeks to 
attain, the individual circumstances facing the enterprise and the economic and political 
context of the country. Conclusions emerge from most studies in transitional and 
developing countries by Babai, (1988); Berg, and Shirley, (1987); Bienen, and 
Waterbury, (1989) that: i) "efficiency and competition" are not the main driving forces 
of privatisation if compared to "distribution and conflicts" and political "ideology". ii) 
the process of privatisation requires more than the theoretical term "privatization" 
- -
suggests, i.e. it goes beyond merely establishing private property rights and iii) 
institutional change approache's depend on shared models structuring peoples 
behaviour and stabilising actors' expectations. 
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It should be noted that privatization is fundamentally a political process as well as a 
commercial and economic process. Privatization changes the distribution of power 
within a society as it diminishes control of the economy by the state and government 
appointed managers. Workers often feel threatened by the potential changes inherent in 
privatization, although employees frequently benefit from the process. As a result, 
public support is a major consideration in any privatization program and many of the 
choices made in designing and implementing transactions reflect the need for such 
support. Two consequences flow from this factor. 1) Firstly, the choice of approach is 
sometimes altered due to "political" considerations, meaning that equity must be 
promoted in the privatization strategy and 2) secondly, program implementation must be 
objective and fair to avoid adverse publicity. 
The popularity of the concept of privatisation is varied in the literature. Young (1991) 
contends that the divesture of public enterprises has become an increasingly salient 
issue in Africa. He argues that given the diverse national, class and regional interests it 
touches upon, divesture remains not just technically difficult but also a politically 
sensitive issue for African regimes. Although there were multiple obstacles in practice 
during the implementation of privatization programs, these proved an important marker 
to the shifting balance occurring between states. This has allowed for privatisation, 
liberalization, restructuring and regional trade integration that provide capital, new 
technologies and new opportunities in Africa and particularly in the Free Trade Areas 
(i.e. COMESA-FT As, ECOW AS, EAC and so on). 
This literature review assesses the impact (Gayle and Goodrich 1998) of the 
privatization perspectives which dominate the literature with the arguments on free 
markets, public and private sector performance, and objectives and structures of 
ownership and management (Bojnec, ( 1999). It also covers the impact of restructuring, 
globalisation, (Friesen, (2003); Daouas, (2001) technology and the financial 
interventions of the IMF, the World Bank and donor agencies, (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 
1995), and the impact of privatization methods on enterprise performance in Eastern 
Europe particularly in the Czech Republic. 
The exploratory approaches and impact of privatization provide a basis for the vast and 
numerous theoretical perspectives that exist in the literature that cannot all be reviewed 
herein. The first perspective is that of the strategies and methods employed in 
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privatisation programs by industrial, developing, and transitional economies. These 
three environments apply the same methods differently, from free distribution to the 
direct sale of state assets. The second is the way to proceed; approaches and strategies 
that include political feasibility and creation of ownership incentives that do not 
contradict each other. Recent empirical comparisons of enterprises seem to support this 
second view (Bennett, Estrin and Maw, 2001). 
In conclusion, it is clear that there exists a vast body of literature and that for any study 
to acquire a suitable focus, one needs to narrow the scope of the literature to the 
manageable interests of the researcher and the study. It is also evident that forms, 
processes, approaches, and strategies have received considerable attention in the 
literature cited herein. While acknowledging the value of the literature, especially in 
assessing previous research, an analytical approach in dealing with the literature is taken 
(Brink and Wood, 1994). It is particularly difficult to narrow the organisation, 
completeness, coherence, and consistency of the above expansive literature in an area as 
vast and as extensively analysed as privatisation. It is clear that more than one body of 
literature might be relevant, for example the theoretical literature versus the research 
literature and findings. The literature varies in its degree of relevance to the study; some 
of it is centrally relevant, some only peripherally relevant thus making the levels of 
focus and relevance to this thesis extremely difficult. This literature review highlights 
these variations while its relevance to this research is mixed. 
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2:1 Theoretical Enements of Privatisation, An overview 
Selecting literature on the overall importance of privatisation of PEs and the exploration 
of the unfolding case study of Telkom Kenya's privatization restricted the choice to 
approaches and strategies that lend lessons to developing economies in Africa, the 
COMESA region and Kenya in particular. Literature on unique factors to gain an 
understanding of the approaches and successes of privatization programs in Africa is 
reviewed. In an attempt to maintain a coherent focus to approaches and strategies, it is 
hoped that coverage is not sacrificed. Clearly, for this thesis to be focused within the 
research mandate and its major questions, it has to be limited to the most relevant 
literature of the research agenda. 
The period between 1993-2003 witnessed a significant global shift away from state 
socialism or control towards entrepreneurial capitalism. This is particularly so in the 
transitional economies of Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa. One of the most important 
and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all 
political persuasions have divested state owned enterprises, hoping that the general 
unsatisfactory economic performance of firms can be improved by introducing 
disciplined private sector ownership into the public sector (Butler, 1991 ). The 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks have been held up within these perspectives 
(Butler, 1991; Wright and Perrotti 2000, p.3). 
This form of divesture and denationalisation, which is said to have originated from 
Germany after World War II, gained momentum in 1979. It was defined by Hemming 
and Unnithan (1996) as " an ideological principle that supports smaller governments, 
fewer taxes and less state involvement in society." Denationalization as argued by 
Megginson and Netter (200 1) and Megginson, et. al ( 1996, p.406-408), was first 
referred to as 'privatisation' by the former conservative government of Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979. However, other researchers attribute the terminology to earlier studies 
done and that Margaret Thatcher's government. merely operationalized the term. 
Privatization however, remains a fuzzy concept (Starr, 1988, p.lOl) that evokes sharp 
political reactions. The term has been used to cover a range of policies from those of 
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governmental disengagement and deregulation to the sale of publicly owned assets? 
However, several scholars in trade and business economics agree as to when the term 
privatisation showed-up in the business and private sector literature. In the late 1970s, 
and early 1980s Heald D., (1980: 1985), and Henry (1990)3 wrote about privatisation. 
Condoy-Sekse and Palmer ( 1988) indicate the initial patterns of privatisation drawn 
from the first inventory of privatisation in a worldwide sector, published in 1988. 
Privatization represents a counter movement to the growth of government that 
characterized much of the post-World War II period. Privatization gained momentum in 
the 1980s and acceptance in the 1990s in industrial, developing and transitional 
economies. 
Privatization may mean reducing all forms of state control over resource allocation. 
Whatever its effects and impact, critics of privatization agree that it has transformed the 
role of the state in all economies.4 In spite of its early 'entry' the term and process of 
privatisation have continued to dominate economic and political debates. There is 
continued debate on which of the privatization approaches, forms, and strategies make a 
successful privatization, rather than a definitional debate on privatization. Definitional 
theorists agree that privatisation is generally defined as a divesture of the government 
from public enterprises (PEs) by transferring majority ownership equity from state to 
private hands including the contracting out of publicly provided services (World Bank). 
It is also defined as: 
. . . . the sale or leasing of assets in which the state has a majority interest, and the 
contracting out of publicly provided services. Privatization is in part a response to the 
need for fiscal austerity .... (Bienen and Waterbury 1989, p.617) 
A more extensive and encompassing but similar definition is found in the American 
literature: 
... as any process aimed at shifting functions and responsibilities, in whole or in part, 
from the government to the private sector. (US Government, 1997) 
2 See Hemming and Mansoor, (1988, p.l ). 
3 ibid 
4 Pushkar and Rajan, (2003 and Bayliss, (2002) 
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In the COMESA regional literature as indicated by study survey in chapter five, 
privatization is defined as; 
.... a process geared towards bringing in resources in order to restructure by separating 
the core functions in order to sell. Restructuring and privatization is thus the same 
process and cannot be separated ... " (Investor Promotion Centre and Investment 
Secretariat, Kenya (2003i 
Whatever its definition, approaches, effects and impact, critics of liberalization and 
privatization agree that it has and continues to transform the role of the state in all 
sectors of the economy as argued by Aggarwal, and Harper, (2000); Bayliss (2002); 
Newbery, D.(1999, p.134) and Pushkar and Ranjan (2003). They all contend that 
countries might experience less profound but equally dramatic shifts in the balance of 
power between the state and the private sectors after they adopt liberalization and 
privatization programs. They further argue that depending on the levels of impact, these 
dramatic shifts are defined differently by each group, country and individual. 
Furthermore, Sticker (2001); Kirkpatrick and Cook (1995) and Kunda (2001)6show that 
there is a tendency to narrow the definition to specifics. However, the overall literature 
tends to dwell on the various trends, approaches, outcomes and impact of privatization 
rather than its definition. The definitions are varied but not different. 
More recent assessments of post-privatisation performance outlined by Sohn and Hayes, 
(1999), Megginson, and Netter (2001), specifically report on telecommunications 
privatization emphasizing its economic, political and technological benefits (Wallsten, 
1999; 2002 ; Wellenius, 1993 and Wellenius, et al 1989). Among those most frequently 
cited are Galal, et. al ( 1992), Megginson, et.al ( 1996) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998). 
However, these studies have largely concentrated on financial measures of performance 
and have incorporated industrialised countries and higher income developing countries 
in their relatively small databases. In recent years, there have been a few attempts to 
measure the direct impact of privatisation on economic growth in a cross-country 
context as argued by Plane, (1997); Cook and Uchida (2001) Barnett, (2000) and 
Samuel, (1999) which have concluded that privatisation has had a sizeable and positive 
effect on economic growth. 
5 Chief Economist, 2003, Investment Secretariat Kenya. 
29 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review: Theoretical Elements of Privatisation 
However, the payoffs from privatization are also relatively small as indicated by 
Kenya's total revenues in tables 4-1 and 4-2. There is high opportunity cost in time and 
management for the complicated task of preparing public assets for sale. Capital market 
thinness characterizes developing economies (DEs) and "popular capitalism" does not 
appear to be a realistic option. Shleifer and Vishny, (1994, pp.1-5) argue that in 
situations where privatization is likely to be entangled in regional, ethnic and political 
conflicts the gains have been small and the process has been highly partisan, 
complicated and slow, as evidence in chapter four and five indicates. Indeed, many 
privatizations may be implemented in the absence of a commitment to market forces but 
where the state seeks to redefine the instruments and scope of its interventionism 
(Bienen and Waterbury, (1989, p.617), efforts to improve markets and investor 
environment should be undertaken, as evidence of TKL' s privatization indicates in 
chapter five. The relationship between the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and 
the influence of a government in restructuring efforts and managerial behaviour is 
analysed by Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny (1996). The authors develop a model in which 
the efficiency gains resulting from the transfer of control from politicians to private 
managers and the 'depoliticization' of the generation of market information is 
explained, using the assumption that state-owned enterprises are not able to produce as 
efficiently as private ones owing to the predomination of political goals over profit 
maximisation. 
A bird's eye-view of the current literature reveals that there is little hard evidence (data) 
on the privatisation approaches of PEs that confidently chart the way forward for a 
developing economy. A lot of the literature has been so far been what Keynes refers to 
as an 'essay in persuasion', an elegant term that allows one to proceed in the absence of 
evidence (Patinkin, 1982). Moreover, whatever data exists bears conclusions that can 
hardly be generalised to every kind of setting as they are based on the experiences of the 
world's richest economies with sufficient resources to undertake high-risk experiments 
and to devise new strategies in relation to state intervention and market efficiency, 
revealing interplay at the heart of the privatisation process. Different experiences from 
Eastern Europe and Africa (Wright and Perroti, 2000) have shown that privatisation 
approaches in the context of transition economies transpires under unique 
circumstances. The theoretical and practical preconditions for implementing 
privatisation in Britain or France are found in an analysis by Wright and Perroti, (2000) 
6 See also Schusselbauer (1999); Kirkpatrick and Cook (1995);Yarrow, & Jasinski (1996) and Vickers and Yarrow (1991) 
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to be lacking in economies in transition (EIT). This does not invalidate the attempt to 
privatize in EIT or in developing economies (DE) but it does require that any attempted 
measures should be well suited to local conditions and it calls for a rethinking on the 
part of those outsiders offering prescriptions argued by Shirley (1988) and Nankani 
( 1990). This is the basis of the major objective of this research as stated in chapter one, 
page one. 
A majority of empirical work has been based on the weak assumption that privatisation 
methods were/can be applied on a randomly selected sample of enterprises, allowing for 
a direct comparison as argued by Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley, (1994); Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994). The evidence on the ground suggests the contrary as the dynamics of 
privatization in telecommunications reveal in chapter five. However, governments 
indeed select enterprises non-randomly and therefore the resulting selection bias should 
be incorporated into any analysis. The main point argued by Bennett and Maw (2003) 
and Estrin (1994) is that the selection process influences performance and that a 
combination of disposal methods that include vouchers/mass privatization and partial 
state ownership of firms in transition economics is preferred due to their potential to 
involve the general citizenry. 
The other perspective, examining the justifications and advocates for privatisation (Cook 
and Kirkpatrick, 1995; Galal et al., 1994: 1992; Gupta, et al., 1999) found that the 
widespread belief in a prerequisite of privatisation by other reforms is largely well 
founded. They noted that there were economic, political, and technological benefits with 
investors bringing in money that reduces government subsidies (Gupta, et al., 1999; 
Sohn and Hayes, 1999). However, many problems and weaknesses of privatization are 
associated with implementation, and changing nominal ownership as argued by Gayle 
and Goodrich (1998); Boratav, (1993) and Cook and Kirkpatrick (1995) is certainly not 
a sufficient basis for creating a market economy. Privatisation therefore, is likely to be 
economically beneficial only when accompanied by other contributory changes. This 
thesis addresses these changes through research questions 3 and 4 stated in chapter 1 
page 12. It is highly likely to take several years for the effects of many of these reforms 
to be measurable. As Schusselbauer (1999, p.5) and the World Bank (1996) argue, the 
creation of flexible labour markets has to confront various facts that contribute to drastic 
7 See definition of methods in glossary 
31 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review: Theoretical Elements of Privatisation 
mcreases in long-term unemployment. Institutional imperfections (dynamics) exist 
owing to labour regulations and increasing resistance on the part of the losers in the 
transition process. Those who were laid off because of massive over-employment and 
labour hoarding by the government (i.e. in the TLK case in chapter five), contribute to 
the imperfections. Along with this is the strengthening of financial markets8 that are 
crucial in the process. More importantly the process depends on the existing social-
political and economic rapport between the public and private sectors. For example, as 
Musgrave ( 1983) and Samuelson's ( 1981) work indicates, the supply of public goods 
and social services would still have to be provided by the public sector in cases of 
successful and non-successful privatizations. This reality complicates approaches to 
privatizations in LDCs, which as discussed here are highly politicised and closed to the 
public. The challenges of providing social services to a public that are unemployed or 
live below the poverty line is enormous and this determines the approaches and choice 
of specific goals, objectives, and techniques. The major research question and research 
question three and the results of the field work reveal that the challenge to balancing 
provision of affordable public services to all citizens continues to be a major problem in 
Kenya and in the sub-region. How does the government for example, continue to 
provide telecommunications, water and electricity services in rural areas where it is not 
profitable for private companies? 
The concepts of privatization, liberalization reforms and restructuring in the analysis of 
privatisation so far presented by economists are those of a process that fits into the 
economic analysis models of market efficiency and state functions (The Economist, 
February 5, 1994). This, however is not the case from a public policy and private sector 
point of view. Privatisation is seen as, and manifests itself in, a more complicated 
interplay of inter-relationships between the theoretical elements of the state; the 
custodians of policy instruments; the 'market' as an operational device; and the private 
sector stakeholder, as the implementers of production. Indeed, the analysis of the 
privatization of TLK in chapter five reveals these dynamics. Civil society acts as 
custodian of social welfare elements that have long been a major component of public 
enterprises (Shirley, 2000) and has to be seen as a major partner in economic reforms 
that involve privatization. These stakeholders' combined efforts determine approaches 
to a privatization process and how the process helps maintain the delicate role of 
8 Schusselbauer, (1999); Shirley, ( 1988); 
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government in social welfare, wealth creation and distribution in the provision of an 
enabling environment for the private sector to invest and make profit. 
Inherently, the first generation of reforms for the transition to market-led growth has 
produced enormous benefits in those countries where they are most advanced and not 
necessarily complete. Yet second generation reforms are necessary to re-align fractured 
relations between the institutions of the state, the market and civil society to sustain 
market-led growth and to boost privatisation and social welfare, often caused by the 
mistrust and divergent views of privatisation transition from state-led to market led and 
the subsequent Pareto efficiency effects (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 1986). An allocation is 
Pareto efficient if there is no way by which some individuals can be made better off 
without making at least one individual worse off (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 1986, p.234). 
This process is far from complete and far more complicated, and is not well depicted in 
the existing literature. The literature on second generation reforms seems to suggest that 
there is discomfort in dealing with the first generation of reforms which focused on 
revitalizing market functions through economic liberalization and opening markets, 
including withdrawal of the state from ownership and from intervention in market entry, 
market exit and pricing. 
However, in developing countries (including Asia and Eastern Europe), this transition 
from first generation to second generation reforms has proved much more difficult. 
Ironically, most of the reforms are needed as a preparation for privatisation i.e. 
economic liberalization and opening of markets came at a time when most of these 
economies were experiencing downturns. More importantly, the IMF/World Bank 
agenda does attach political liberalization and opening "social-political markets" to 
economic liberalization programs (Stiglitz, 2003; GOK/WB, 1991; Nyong'o 2000 
p.111 ). The results here are similar to those of the colonization/post colonial era. An 
example of this is found in the literature from the early 1970s and 80s (Ake, 1981, p.88) 
focusing on the structural perspectives of Africa's economies with a narrow resource 
base. This means that the bulk of the export earnings come from a limited range of 
economic activities, in most cases agriculture (as in Kenya and Uganda) and in few 
cases, manufacturing (Egypt) and mining (Zambia). Within this framework, the range of 
specific products is very limited and in most cases the bulk of the earnings come from 
two products which are dependant on external markets. The economies have undergone 
structural differentiation, which gives organic unity and resources through 
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complementarity, making linkages in these economic activities largely external. It is 
also significant with few exceptions, such as palm oil and tea, to note that the domestic 
consumption of these products ranges from insignificant to zero, underlining the 
external orientation of these economies. In the event that external demand for their 
products weakens considerably, they would experience economic difficulties (Ake, 
1981, p.90). 
This scenario of over reliance on external demand for its products and the total labour 
force indicates that African economies have made very little progress towards 
overcoming market forces that slow their efforts to industrialize in order to compete, 
with Japan, India, Malaysia and Singapore. This problem is worsened by weak markets 
caused by disarticulation, which is a distorted form of economic growth under which 
there exists weak or missing linkages among economic sectors/industries, with different 
sectors having radically different levels of development and productivity. Highly 
developed sectors tend to produce goods for export, rely heavily on foreign investment 
and often monopolize available capital leaving others underdeveloped. 
This scenario contrasts sharply with countries such as India, China, Japan and the 
United States. For instance, Japan exports cars but the internal demand for cars in Japan 
itself is so strong that a drastic reduction of external demand will not matter so much. 
This illustrates the fundamental problems experienced with first generation reforms and 
will continue to second-generation reforms that include tourism, services, coffee, tea, 
cocoa, tobacco and cotton. The small share of manufacturing in Gross Domestic Product 
is affected by a drastic decline in major economic activities. Most African economies 
cannot sustain reforms in the same industries that are in decline, due to a decline in 
external /internal demand. This affects decisions made on how to implement reforms 
leading to increased trade, investment and privatization. 
Ake (1981) submits that, it is indeed the complex network of forward and backward 
linkages that comes from industrialisation that would make the postcolonial African 
economy completely capable of self-sustained growth. Of course, there are other 
internal and extraneous reasons as to why the rate of industrialisation is so sluggish, 
including the rigidity of the international division of labour not to allow African 
economies to break out ofthe role of primary producers. 
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This role in itself prohibits access to technology and the ability to have a comparative 
and competitive advantage with the industrialised nations in manufacturing. More so, 
the inconsistent WTO rules that provide advantage to industrialised countries to give 
non-tariff subsidies to their agriculture and manufacturing sectors, constrains domestic 
markets. These and other constraints are so powerful that the attempt at industrialisation 
has sometimes been self-defeating (WTO, 2000: 2003).9 For instance, the attempt to 
industrialise by import substitution led to very heavy importation of inputs, which 
created debt burdens and balance of payments problems and in tum encouraged the 
intensification of primary production to pay for imports. Recent efforts to promote 
industrialisation (GOK, 1997)10 by enhancing export capacity have not been successful. 
Part of the problem has been restrictions to the markets of industrialised countries and 
the tendency for the competitive advantages of the developed countries to compel 
retreat from the idea of exportation to that of inefficient production for domestic 
consumption behind protective tariffs. 
Several pieces of development literature and commentators Ake, (1981: 1985: 1993) 
Mkandawire (1988), Nakani, (1990); Kiggundu, (2002:1989); Hyden, (1970:1983); 
Vinaya, (1994) and Mugerwa, (1996) conclude that in the final analysis, the problem 
will be resolved by the development of productive forces or, to be more specific, by 
industrialisation. With industrialization, the issue of efficiency and fair distribution of 
resources and opportunities remains an issue that persists in second-generation reforms 
that include privatization as indicated by the works of Dallago, et al. (1992); Bruno, 
(1992) and Csaba, (1993). The survey evidence of this thesis (chapter five) and 
Schusselbauer ( 1999) further emphasize that the speed of reforms (and ownership) 
depends not only on the solution of this conflict (i.e. efficiency versus fair distribution) 
but also decisively on the coherence of the legal and institutional framework and the 
abandonment of interventionist policies by governments and international agencies. 
This discussion detailed in chapter five provides an expose of the importance of 
institutionalising the legal framework by enacting a privatization law. Therefore, as 
evidence from the literature and field findings show, a more balanced view, which 
emphasizes rapid macroeconomic stabilisation, the building of an institutional 
framework and an elaboration of approaches to a privatization program, is preferable. 
9 i.e. WTO Seattle and Cancun reports on Trade negations between industrialized and developing countries 
10 The GOK's Sessional Paper No.2 of 1997 on industrialisation 
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The main conclusions that emerge in the literature and in the findings indicate that the 
central conflict in the privatization approach raised by the two distinct objectives, 
efficiency and fair distribution, can only be resolved if a comprehensive privatization 
cum-restructuring approach is employed as articulated in the Kenyan /COMESA 
definition of privatization. 
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2:1:1 An Overview of Literature: Theories 
A snap shot of the privatization and restructuring literature indicates that while there are 
no universally accepted explanations, the poor economic and financial performance of 
public enterprises and the effects resulting from cases of successful privatization have 
been used as convincing arguments for widespread privatization by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Indeed, World Bank studies and others such as 
Megginson et. al (1996), Rama and Macisaac ( 1999) and Parker (200 1) show 
overwhelming support for privatisation Megginson and Netter (200 1) state 
unequivocally that; 
. . . . The evidence is now conclusive that privately owned finns outperfonn 
SOE's ... empirical evidence clearly shows that privatization significantly (often 
dramatically) improves the operating and financial perfonnance of divested finns 
( p.5) 
Privatization is in part, a response to the need for fiscal austerity. Its pace, scope and 
strategy is determined importantly by the way in which the public sector was built; 
(Bienen and Waterbury 1989). The forms, varied methods, techniques and types of 
transfer Wright and Perrotti (1999) argue are triggered by many factors such as 
technological change, political considerations and budgetary pressures. Privatisation 
problems and paradoxes seem to happen everywhere, to every country and every nation 
and it affects all countries equally, rich or poor, underdeveloped or developed, the 
difference is in the approaches and strategies taken to adopt the privatisation process. 
Furthermore, considerable research and theory highlights the importance of divesture 
and privatisation (Kikeri, 1999) programs across the world and Africa in particular on 
trends, goals, objectives, efficiency levels and impact, in reference to Kirkpatrick and 
Cook (1995) and Gayle and Goodrich (1990). On the increasingly growing public 
policy perspective, Wright, (1995) and Wright and Perrotti, (2000) examine a public 
policy perspective in detail, covering privatization methods , techniques and types, 
trends, rationalization and strengthens and weaknesses. Samuel (1999, p.2.) argues on 
the dynamics of public versus private perspectives and its interplay with implementation 
issues. He details the "do and don'ts" 11 of the process. Discussions on privatisation 
11 
see page 60 for details of the ten commandments 
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finance and private sector participation involvement, infrastructure finance and the role 
of international financial institutions are ongoing and contentious, as indicated by 
Borish and Noel, (1996); Hadi and Mookhejee (1995); Gomulka, (1994); and Guislain 
and Kerf, (1995). 
Further overviews on the lessons and strategies of privatisation programs in the three 
economic contexts of industrial, transitional and developing economies are gtven a 
prominent expose by Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley, (1994) and Stephan (1994). 
Macroeconomic stability discussion and issues, and growth effects, are given 
prominence by Easterly, ( 1999) and Easterly et. al ( 1994 ). Meanwhile, on-going debates 
on shocks experienced because of structural adjustment strategies and their effects on 
the African economy are advanced by Ake, (1989), Hyden (1983) and Vinaya (1994) 
and Mugerwa-Kayizzi, (2003). Arguments for and against the effects of downsizing on 
poverty reduction, blamed on the divesture programs, are advanced 12 and have 
increasingly dominated the current discourse and literature on privatization. This debate 
provides the theoretical framework for the analysis of the field data on objectives and 
choices of methods of privatising that tend to exclude downsizing issues. It also 
illuminates the political nature of privatization approaches with delays in the sale of 
Telkom Kenya pointing to the reluctance of politicians to give power to the regulator to 
effect reduction of workforces and to effect privatization timetables. 
Lipton, and Sachs, (1990); Hinds, (1990), and Nuti, (1995), discuss the unique nature of 
privatisation strategies in transitional economies and how they affect the performance 
and success of privatization programs, depending on the appropriateness of methods and 
techniques. Aharoni (1991); Ramamurti and Vernon (1991), pursue the never-ending 
debate on the role of various privatization methods and forms (i.e. voucher and contract 
method) in divestiture of public enterprises and their subsequent outcomes especially in 
utility privatization. They examine the integration of the build-operate-own and build-
operate-transfer techniques within national privatization strategies. Along with big 
infrastructural projects, is the application of mass privatisation approaches as presented 
by Shafik's (1993) work in the Czech republic and by other analysts in transitional and 
developing economies. They argue that their appropriateness and varied results imply a 
cautionary application. 
12 
see also Lipton, (1990). Dieter, (1991); Megginson, et.al, (1996); Ayubi, (1992); Kiss, (1994) 
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The discourse on various techniques is examined critically by Vickers and Yarrow, 
(1985) Cook, and Kirkpatrick, (1988); Nankani, (1988); Vuylsteke, (1988); Mayer, and 
Meadoweroft, (1985) in their application of 'case-by-case' methods dominating this 
literature especially in Africa. Their pace, speed and scope are advanced by a large 
spectrum of analysis by OECD (1993:1995) and the World Bank (1989: 
1994: 1999:2002:2005) working papers that outline their current status. This body of 
literature suggests an increase in the pace of privatisation and a cautionary approach to 
the effects of speed and approach to catalytic approaches. Choudhury (1999) and 
Falstaff (1996) voice long held doubts on whether privatisation is or should be the 
answer. Anderson (1996), along with Aharoni (1991), cast doubt and urge caution on 
the impact and success of privatisation, at various levels of enterprise and economy. 
Abdala (2000) provides an expose of institutional and regulatory outcomes of 
privatisation emphasizing the view that there is need to increase the capacity (and 
political attitude) of African governments to privatize and evaluate the performance of 
their strategies (Ake, 1989: Danso 1990). 
In addition, the World Bank, OECD and others13 spearhead the lengthy, often repetitive, 
and sometimes well-targeted research studies, discussions, program/project reports, 
outcomes, and general reviews on privatisation trends, role of market structures, 
performance, and best practices in privatization in transitional and developing 
economies. The World Bank and OECD working publications update some of this 
literature periodically and are now getting into post privatization analysis of firms as 
shown by the studies by Shirley et al (2002); and Wallsten, (2001a: 2001b:2002); 
Yarrow, (1994) and McNary, (2001) and discussed herein. Aharoni, (1991), Ramamurti 
and Vernon (1991 ), and Dieter ( 1991) uphold the discussions on measuring the success 
of privatization, and on control of state-Owned Enterprises. Arguments on privatization 
and its theories are advanced by Rocha ( 1994) who redefined the role of the bourgeoisie 
in dependent capitalistic economies and their interactive roles in privatization and 
liberalization programs. 
13 See the extensive analysis by the World Bank research group on privatizations in LDCs and telecommunications 
39 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review: Theoretical Elements of Privatisation 
Central to the public choice argument, as advanced by Wolf, (1979), Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988, pp.7:125) and Andie (1992), that favours privatization, is the notion that 
everyone involved in decision-making in the public sector seeks to maximize his or her 
own stakes, which in general is not identical to the public interest. Indeed, in what 
seems like conflicting objectives they advance the argument that explanations for the 
poor performance of public enterprises have been theorized from a variety of 
perspectives, which are collectively referred to as the theory of government failure. At 
the very minimum, the necessary transformation from a state-administered ownership 
system to some form of private ownership and the underdevelopment of market 
economy institutions are stressed here (Wyplosz, 1993, p.382; Begg and Portes, 1993). 
Cook and Fe bella (2002, p.1) argue that the majority of theories on privatization in 
developed countries have placed a focus on the effects of ownership as entailed in 
property rights issues. Vickers and Yarrow (1988); Cook and Kirkpatrick, (1995, pp.5-
8) further argue that state ownership may be superior to private ownership when the 
'ownership effect' is absent. Such an outcome assumes public enterprises operate in a 
competitive market, and other non-welfare and political inducing influences are not 
considered (Gayle and Goodrich, 1998 pp.1-11 ;395) 
On the other hand, studies and reviews focusing on public enterprises have been limited 
and unwelcome by the governments of the day. In addition the balancing of economic 
and non-economic factors in the privatization process has not been closely monitored, 
as argued by Cook and Fabella, (2002, pp.1-3), and its consequences or impact 
contribute to poorly managed and implemented privatizations and approach models. 
Indeed it, has become apparent that there is a need to model socio economic and 
political factors holistically that have a major impact on the trends, approaches and 
process of privatization in developing countries. As Cook and Fabella (2002) argue, this 
may require a refocus from a limited focus by governments on budget constraints, 
subsidies, inefficiency of public enterprises and budgetary constraints and their impact 
financial on gains to the aforementioned factors. 
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2:1:2 Reasons, Objectives, Goals, and Rationalizations for Privatisation 
There is a body of literature examining the reasons, objectives, goals and rationalization 
of privatization. This body of literature is important to the success of privatization 
programs and to the major research question of this thesis. This is because the 
privatization concept and programs are viewed by a majority of governments, citizens 
and some development organizations as 'foreign' by developing and transitional 
economies (Whitfield 1983: 1992). 
Privatization in developing and transitional countries has indeed taken its own direction 
as discussed at length by Commander and Killick (1988) and Killick (1995). Ilori, et. al 
(2003) also discuss the impact of post-privatisation business performance in transition 
and developing economies. The arguments by Colin (1990),Cook and Kirkpatrick 
(1998), Schusselbauer (1999); Hashi,(2000) and Yarrow (1999) provide a broad survey 
of the basic issues, values, reasons, objectives, rationale, modalities, goals, constraints 
and problems involved. 14Typically, privatization has several objectives or goals, 
including increasing service provision, quality, and efficiency of enterprises, draining 
public subsidies, which represent scarce public resources needed elsewhere. Creating 
employment and business opportunities and introducing new technology through 
restructuring and generating revenue for government coffers (Wallsten, 2002, pp.2-3) 
are also important objectives. 
In their conclusion scholars and researchers offer an expose that deals with privatization 
led economic development in developing countries, which raises both country specific 
and general issues that provide a theoretical basis for the empirical analysis of the 
Telkom Kenya (TLK) case study. There are several reasons that explain why some 
governments have embraced privatisation as a tool in the reform of the public sector. 
Multiple and potentially conflicting as they may be, amongst the widely given reasons 
and objectives are; the need for immediate cash income or foreign exchange and the 
need for settling foreign debt: and control of budget deficits and the debt burden. 
Additionally, privatization is used to encourage industrial development and foreign 
investment; to encourage the creation of an active and efficient 'stock exchange' in 
14 see also Berg Report, (1989); Ramanadham (l989b ); Heath (1989) 
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order to widen capital markets and to aid the introduction of efficiency in creating a 
market economy. The key objective in developing and transitional economies is 
promoting a political philosophy geared towards macroeconomic and sectoral policy 
reforms, such as financial stabilization, deregulation, and liberalization, and the desire 
for the reduction of the state's role in managing the economy. Thus, this encourages 
private enterprise and the expansion of the private sector in general (Kiggundu 
2002:1989, Nakani, 1990), in order to create wealth, and increase regional integration 
opportunities by attracting regional and international Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
In the privatization literature it is often argued that the varied goals pursued in 
privatization programs can be categorized along two dimensions; a) those based on 
macroeconomic and social goals; and b) those based on public enterprise with 
microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions. In each of these dimensions the 
governments work on the basis of the ultimate goal which is to promote the private 
sector and maintain public sector social goals. 
An in-depth privatization overview report of more than five regional states' 
governments in the US (US Government 1997)15 argues that these goals can be 
categorized into: 1) larger social macroeconomic goals and (2) specific macroeconomic 
goals. As stated earlier, the major goal is to reduce the government's role in the larger 
economy and in specific enterprises because increasingly governments have not been 
good at doing business. An important aspect of the specific macroeconomic goals of 
privatization is developing, strengthening and promoting the private sector, in order to 
create an enabling environment as argued by Waddell (1994, pp.l-2) and Taylor and 
Blair (2002). Along with these broad goals are the various objectives that help in the 
achievement of these goals. Some of these objectives include controlling unfair 
competition through a strong independent regulatory framework (as discussed in chapter 
five), spreading the share holding ownership through IPO sales and efficient utilization 
of privatization proceeds to create wealth through business creation. 
The enterprise specific goals that include the broadening of share ownership in order to 
encourage public savings and investment is revealed by the survey findings as a major 
15 US Report of the House of Representatives on Privatization 
42 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review: Theoretical Elements of Privatisation 
objective for the GOK's divestiture from KQ and KCB, unlike the TLKs objectives as a 
new enterprise. 
However, the motives of the privatizers are multiple and often contradictory as 
indicated above, with different constituencies defending privatization for different and 
often conflicting reasons (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishiny 1995, p.194); the field findings 
in chapter five confirm this argument. As an example, Kenya's privatization motives for 
privatizing telecoms changed from revenue and national jewel to greater access to 
services and restructuring of the enterprise. Second, motives may change over time - as 
was the case in the United Kingdom (Moore, 1989). Indeed, as has been argued, the 
reasons for many of the privatizations in Britain followed rather than preceded the 
programs. They were invented after the privatization in the search for a rationalization 
for them. The privatization of British Rail is an example (Moore, 1989). 
Then there are the unspoken motives (often political) unravelled from declared reasons 
(Grossman and Hart 1986). Broadly speaking, however, they may be distinguished 
between the (i) ideologically and politically inspired privatization ambitions of, for 
example, the conservative governments of Chile, Britain and France (1986-88), Portugal 
and Norway;(ii) pragmatic, budgetary-driven programmes elsewhere in Europe; (iii) the 
programmes imposed on developing countries by international financial institutions as 
part of a wider package of economic restructuring; and (iv) strategic approaches as part 
of wider privatization programs. 
A good example of this difference is in the privatisations of Britain and Chile. In 
Britain, privatisation marked such a decisive change of policy that it is still worth 
asking: Why it happened? Privatization in Britain was different, in that it gradually 
emerged as the decisive instrument to achieve the objectives of the Conservative 
government under Thatcher, signalling a clear change in direction of government's 
economic philosophy. Chile had re-privatized companies that had been taken into state 
ownership by the Allende government but Chile's privatization hardly marked a 
decisive change in policy, it was merely a restoration of the previous status quo. There 
is also the case of developing economies whose programs are mainly directed by World 
Bank and IMF agenda. Thus, reasons range from the systemic benefits to be derived 
from privatization to the advantages to be gained by a particular industry or a particular 
sector, in particular market liberalization. 
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A second ideological underpinning is the belief that public sector industries and services 
limit consumer choice and Megginson and Netter (2001) advance this monopolistic 
argument. Furthermore, it is argued that public ownership deprives individuals of 
economic freedom by forcing them to hold 'implied shareholdings' in public enterprises 
that they might not choose to have if given the choice. 
The third ideological strand in the privatization argument lies in the desire to create a 
'property-owning democracy' or 'popular capitalism'(hence, the incentives often 
employed to induce citizens to buy shares at the time of privatization). In other 
countries - notably in Latin America - privatization has been perceived as a means of 
creating or strengthening the bourgeoisie as a necessary precondition for breaking the 
tradition of state-led economic development (Aarts,1999, pp.917-920). A set of 
arguments in favour of privatization may be described as based on an economic firm 
and system efficiency model by for instance, increasing competition, facilitating 
incentives, introducing a tougher labour market and enterprise culture among the 
general population (Ake, 1985). 
Fourthly, a set of financial reasons has been advanced to justifY privatization. 
Privatization, it is alleged, provides easier access to firms involved in international 
capital markets and fosters the growth of domestic stock exchanges - widening capital 
markets by introducing new investors and deepening them by bringing in mature 
companies with strong market positions. Privatization also distances states from the 
financial plight of ailing enterprises (the fate of many state-owned companies) and 
perhaps more importantly, raises money for cash-strapped governments. It should be 
noted, however, that asset sales may improve short-term cash flows in a once-and-for-
all manner in general but they do not enhance a government's long-term net worth, and 
may even cause it to deteriorate if profitable assets are sold off too cheaply. Examples 
are evident in the case with Kenya's hotel and transport disposals in the early 1990s that 
were sold under liquidation, fetching little revenue for the exchequer (Mwale, 2000). It 
follows from the above that the motives for privatization are multiple and can be 
potentially conflicting as this review has argued. 
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2:2 The Role of Liberalisation: From SAPs16to Privatisation 
The literature on privatisation and liberalization in Africa focuses on the principles and 
practice of privatisation, various modes of privatisation in developing economies (DEs) 
and an examination of the performance and shortcomings ofthe public enterprise sector, 
as exemplified by Davis and Sanders (1993), Killick (1980), Ramanadham (1995), and 
Cook, (2001). Bates and Krueger, 1993) discuss comprehensive coverage on the 
efficiency of firms after changes of ownership in terms of their economic, financial and 
distributional aspects and conclude that there is a noticeable change. Other writers 
emphasize the process of restructuring liberalisation: Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988), 
Crook (1988) and Gibbon, et. al (1992) and lately the effects of deregulation on 
privatisation related policies: Jilberto and Mommen (1998), Haggard and Webb (1994) 
particularly in GOK's parastatals under privatization. During this process of 
restructuring, pertinent issues of resource allocations (i.e. Pareto efficiency), ownership, 
structure, labour and methods to be applied are major parts of the negotiation agenda. 
Change of ownership does not necessarily mean efficiency. Researchers see the 
government's role as being that of a 'better government, not necessarily a smaller' 
government (Champy, 1996). 
Liberalisation in the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), in the context of 
domestic agricultural markets in Africa which abolished marketing boards was done 
with mixed results. In most countries except for Nigeria (Akanji 1992), the withdrawal 
of the state has not left in place a free and competitive market (Rapley, 1994). 
Agriculture markets all over the developing world, especially in Africa, are often 
fraught with imperfections (Harriss and Crow 1992; Guillaumont and Guillaumont 
1989) in such cases, small groups may end up absorbing the price gains, perhaps even 
depositing them abroad. Not all African agricultural markets work so badly (Beyond 
1992, p.8: Ake, 1981) but when they do deregulation rather than liberalisation appears a 
better way to increase output (Harriss and Crow 1992). 17 Again, better rather than less 
state intervention is what is needed since it has been established through experience in 
cooperatives marketing boards in EAC (Mugerwa-Kayizzi (1996) and Kenya that apart 
from reducing market distortions, marketing boards can perform other functions. Some 
16 Structural Adjustments Programs 
17 See glossary definitions on deregulation versus liberalization 
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sub sectors in Africa, examples include cotton and bulk food crops, rely on public 
marketing because they are unattractive to private traders (Gibbon, et. al 1992, p.58). 
More important is the role of marketing boards in price stabilisation. A completely free 
market in primary goods will reflect the vagaries of world commodity markets, with 
their sometimes-violent price swings. Peasant producers are often more concerned with 
risk than with price, and will retreat from the production of crops in which the risks of 
price fluctuation are very high (Ake, 1981). Many theorists argue for the retention of 
marketing boards (Guillaumont and Guillaumont 1989; Beyond 1992 p.7) though 
reform remains an option. 
In addition to the liberalisation of markets for primary products, neo-classical theory has 
advocated financial liberalisation and labour market deregulation. Although financial 
liberalisation can free up credit, especially that available to small firms (Oyejide 1993 
on the Nigerian experience), it can equally increase rather than lower capital costs if the 
banks choose to lend money to firms rather than invest in them. Whereas in a more 
regulated market, in which banks are required to invest directly in firms, (Megginson, 
and Netter, 2001) 18 one can add in long-term bonds rather than stocks, so as to 
maximize the efficient use of capital (Taylor 1993a, pp.585-86) and Fitzgerald (1997, 
pp.385-386) 19 effectively reducing the cost of capital. 
The growing criticism of liberalisation policies (which have been encouraged by SAPs) 
has not gone unnoticed by neo-classical theorists. Among other things, they have 
recognised that structural adjustment has tended to fall rather hard on the poor 
(Adepoju, 1993). The World Bank itself admits that there is a political element to 
adjustment and citizens (World Bank et.al, 2000 and 2001i0 must be sheltered from its 
hardest effects if regime stability is to be preserved (Davies and Sanders 1992 p.81 ). 
With this in mind, the World Bank has come to advocate targeted programmes of 
assistance to the poor (i.e. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, PRSPs, based on 
sustained economic growth), which are said to have achieved partial if not complete 
success in Jamaica (Grosh 1992), Chile (Barrientos 1993) and India (Chellaraj, Brorsen 
and Farris 1992). In Kenya, the "dream team" package of infusing into the government 
private sector personnel in order to revitalize the economy and reduce poverty was 
18They discuss banking and telecoms in a Survey of empirical studies on privatization 
19 
see also Haggblade, et. at (1990 p67); Azam, (1995) 
20 World Bank et. at (2000) 
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abandoned in late 2002 and its impact is yet to be assessed. Yet underlying such 
'externally grown' programmes is a continuing mistrust of the state. Grudgingly, neo-
classical theorists accept that state intervention is a good idea but only for a while. For a 
better/ more efficient state, the mandate is changed fundamentally, the neo-classical 
faith in the market remains unshaken, even if one can detect clear shifts away from 
earlier radical free-market approaches, e.g. the World Bank's call for an increased state 
role in its 1991 World Development Report (Perkins and Roemer, 1991). 
The state continues to play an important, and often essential role in the development of 
third world countries and as the influential work of Lance Taylor has shown, more state 
does not necessarily entail less market. The two may expand and contract together even 
though Taylor acknowledges that state investments can sometimes 'crowd out' private 
investment Taylor (1993a, p.5). It is now apparent that there is no firm evidence to 
suggest that less government leads to faster economic growth. If there is any 
relationship between the two, it may be that on aggregate more government leads to 
more growth (Sattar, et. al 2002). Moreover, many of the successes attributed to the 
increased role of markets may in fact have stemmed from other factors, as Bramall 
(1993) argues with regards to the "de-collectivisation" of Chinese agriculture. 
But this argument defeats the 'regulate the financial and labour markets' argument 
advanced in favour of regulating financial markets in order to involve the banks in 
investments as less regulation means less government (Wyplosz, 2002, Stiglitz, (2001), 
O'pon, (2001). What this research is pointing to is not more government, as the 
evidence elsewhere shows that more government causes economic stagnation, and 
therefore this research views the alternative of defining rather the role and effectiveness 
of government in the privatisation process, as a relevant theoretical basis to proceed. 
The government's role has been identified as that of an enabler, a custodian of the 
infrastructure that makes it possible for entrepreneurs to save and invest and enables 
firms to compete on a level playing field. Evidence outlined in chapter five emphasizes 
the importance of the role of government as a facilitator of privatization activities. 
Effectively, both the structural economists and developmental state theorists will hardly 
be shocked to hear that the state has a vital role to play in the development process. 
What is perhaps surprising is that many neo-classical economists are now coming 
around to the view that the size of the state is not significant but its role and 
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effectiveness that is the key to development (Singer and Roy 1993, p.23). Indeed, even 
the World Bank appears sensitive to the renewed importance of the state in its 
approaches to privatisation and development. The current literature on globalization and 
trade from the World Bank by for example Stiglitz (2003:2004), and Samuel, (1999) 
suggests that the bank is rethinking its past mistakes. 
What is also emergmg m the current development debate is a subtler and more 
sophisticated view of the state than the traditional state-market dichotomy allowed for. 
It is concerned not so much with the quantity as with the quality of state intervention. 
This theoretical framework will drive this research. In other words, the quality of 
interventions determines successful privatisations in the world, in Africa and 
particularly in the privatisation of state owned enterprises in CO MESA. This is with the 
full realisation that the capacities of states to implement development and privatisation 
programmes and policies differ widely, and can have serious implications on the impact 
of programs (Ake, 1989). As regards Africa, many Africanists are coming to the gloomy 
conclusion that many states are simply not up to the task of development (Rothchild and 
Chazan 1988; Seidman 1992, p.l 0). Some, yearning for the elusive 'governance' that 
has become the World Bank's "Holy Grail",21 have looked to the recent wave of 
democratisation as a means to improve the functioning of African governments. Half-
heartedly, they hope that the increased accountability forced on political leaders by 
liberal democracy will yield results such as a reduction of corruption (The East African 
Standard newspaper, December 10, 2004; Mkandawire 1992). Unfortunately, a good 
many Africans are pessimistic as to what democratisation can achieve and are more 
interested in building corporate structures and institutions that can sustain good 
governance in SOEs and privatized firms. The issue of democratization and good 
governance is important to privatization and is a continuing debate.22 However it is not 
the focus of this research. 
However, it should be recognised that for effective privatisation to be realised and for 
markets and social policy to co-exist (i.e. where the private sector is called upon to pay 
for social costs; e.g. schools, hospitals and community services), governments have to 
be transparent and invest in developing the physical and communications infrastructure 
21 i.e. "Buss-word" 
22 In some quarters privatization is viewed as one element of democratization and introduction of good governance 
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in order to enable private sector to invest and make profit; only then can the benefits be 
shared on both sides. 
Governments in East Africa have realised that the newfound 'public private 
partnership' 23 is paramount to not only achieving a strong private sector but also to 
achieving economic growth and as a result, social and political growth (GOK, 
Economic Survey. 2003), (GOK investment conference, March, 2004). In that category, 
there have been cases of good, and even outstanding, state performance in Africa, like 
Botswana, Uganda, South Africa and recently Kenya. They have made long strides in 
changing the political landscape by holding elections thus disproving those such as 
Shaw (1993); Clapham (1993: 1996); Bratton and de Walle (1992); and (Jeffries 1993) 
who have been unfairly sceptical on the impact that political changes have made on the 
operation of government's policy. 
23 See defmition in glossary 
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2:2:1 SAPS and Privatization 
Privatisation programs started after various African governments adopted the drastic 
political, social, and economic changes designed by the IMF and World Bank 
(Commonwealth, 2002). These programs known as Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs), have had far reaching consequences for and influence on, social-economic 
sectors of development in all countries that implemented SAPs. The effects of their 
design and impact have had devastating effects and are well documented (Adepoju, 
1993i4. Inevitably, dramatic structural changes in the form of SAPs (deregulation) and 
privatisation were widespread phenomena in the late 80s and early 90s not only in 
Africa but also in North America and Europe. 
An anatomy of SAPs helps explain why they (i.e. SAPs programs) elicited more 
negative effects making them be evaluated as having failed. Different elements of 
structural adjustment programs have met with differing degrees of success (Loxley, J. 
1990, p.8). Beginning with economic deregulation or liberalization of trade, investment 
and finances to actual privatisation, agreement is emerging that such policies aimed at 
restructuring developing economies have changed little. Not only does the basic 
assumption underlying them, that private ownership leads to improved firm 
performance, not stand to reason, the growing body of evidence believes it based on the 
economic models that are widely acceptable globally (Loxley, 1990). To the contrary, it 
is questionable that public firms can always be assessed by the same criteria as private 
ones, with the standard measures being financial performance and efficiency in the 
developing countries when they don't perform the same functions. Doubts have been 
raised about the principles of structural adjustment. Even its supporters admit that while 
SAPs restore macroeconomic stability, it is not entirely obvious that macroeconomic 
stability on its own leads to growth (Frenkel and Khan 1992; and Doroodian 1993). 
Africanists can easily point to countries that have faired badly under structural 
adjustment (Guillaumont and Guillaumont 1989), while where the policy has produced 
more positive results, expectations still remain unfulfilled (on Nigeria see Oyejide 1993; 
on China and Tanzania see Shao et. al 1997). In the case of Ghana, for example, 
arguably Africa's test case for structural adjustment, most observers say there have been 
24 See various country reports evaluating the effects of SAPs in developing countries 
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clear gains, but hasten to add that these gains relied on strong donor backing, which is 
unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in Africa25 while the long-term sustainability of the 
programme remains in doubt (Rothchild 1991; Loxley 1990, p.8). 
After the SAPs, governments are examining ways of giving a greater focus to poverty 
alleviation in their design of market reform programs and dealing with the question of 
'ownership' (through deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation), an important 
determinant of their sustainability. The African experience with structural adjustment 
has generally pointed to one conclusion: while yielding short-term improvements, the 
policy was jeopardising long-term development (Adepoju, 1993). Indeed, quite apart 
from the moral and political critique of structural adjustment, the fact that SAPs have 
concentrated benefits while impoverishing a substantial part of the population (Jamal 
1992; Guillaumomt, 1997) makes them undesirable. A cursory glance at the evidence 
from Africa, as well as from some Asian economies (see, for instance, Rahman, (1992) 
on Bangladesh) could lead one to conclude that structural adjustment and with it the 
neo-classical approach to development, has generally been an unmitigated failure. 
Indeed, this failure created apprehensive governments and citizens moving into 
privatization in the mid 90s. 
That conclusion would be hasty. For turning to Latin America, we find that structural 
adjustment yielded some considerable gains, even if the benefits remained unevenly 
distributed (on Chile, see Ritter 1990, and Diaz and Korovkin 1990). This contrast points 
us towards an emerging consensus in development studies: liberalisation works best in 
those economies which have first been through a phase of infant industry promotion 
before proceeding to an industrialization status (Ake, 1989). Indeed, South Korea export 
led growth was pushed towards industrialization by governmental measures and prepared 
by direct investment infrastructure. After the Korean War, the country was partitioned 
and economic links were severed between the industrialised north and the agricultural 
south. South Korea had to rely on American aid to overcome its underdevelopment (Kim 
and Roener 1979). In addition, Japan was responsible for 65.5% of all direct investment 
(McCormack 1992 p.94). Africa was not so lucky after World I and II, apart from the 
sporadic donor agency developmental aid Africa has had to create its own miracle. For 
example, in the early 1970s, Mauritius received food aid from donor agencies, but by 
25ln Kenya, IMF, World Bank and Multilateral Donors withdrew Support during the Privatization program 
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2004 it had a surplus budget and is leading in levels of FDI in Telecoms with a strong 
economy and is a strong member of COMESA.26 Privatisations done well along with 
industrialization (GOK, 1997) could provide the opportunity for a miracle of sustained 
economic growth through regional opportunities, entrepreneurial growth, infrastructure, 
manufacturing and financial services respectively. 
It is also notable however, that the prevailing thinking, strategy, and literature especially 
from the World Bank and IMF (Dhonte 1997 and Kapur 1995; Camdessus 1999, and 
Mauro 1996) discuss issues of corruption and governance in investment structures, in 
the process of developing a market economy and strengthening private sector initiatives. 
Tanzi, 1994:1997); Sheetal and Chand (1999) and Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) reflect 
a move to include other standards of measurement necessitated by the social-political 
environments such as good governance, corruption, capital discipline, entrepreneurship, 
labour and the capacity to reform. 
One of the common themes that has arisen from critiques of neo-classical theory has 
been that government and markets are often symbiotic rather than conflictuatl7• In other 
words, to make the market more efficient one need not so much reduce the state's role 
in the economy as alter it. Given that structural adjustment has been the practical 
manifestation of neo-classical theory in the developing world, it is telling that much of 
the empirical research on structural adjustment points to a similar conclusion. Structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) aim to remove blockages believed to thwart the 
efficient operation of markets. Typically, these blockages are seen to result from 
government intervention. Therefore, SAPs have usually included such elements as the 
removal of price and other controls on enterprises, the removal of quantitative barriers 
to trade and the streamlining of taxes on imports (import liberalisation), the abolition of 
marketing boards (market liberalisation), exchange rate devaluation, the privatisation or 
denationalisation of state-owned enterprises and the encouragement of new industrial 
private foreign investments. 
The SAPs however introduced the issues of sustainability, ownership, and control into 
the subsequent privatisation debate. The programs engaged by governments (under the 
26 In the early 1970s, Mauritius received food aid from donor agencies as by 2004 it has a surplus budget and is leading in 
levels of FDI in Telecoms with a strong economy and is a strong member of CO MESA. 
27 (see, for example, Commander and Killick 1988; Stewart 1985; Taylor 1992, 1993a, 1993b; Toye 1992 
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World Bank) were required to "produce" efficient firms from the public enterprise.s that 
had been inefficient for years. In that regard, in the privatisation-based production of 
new efficient firms from inefficient ones, large SOEs (a focus of this study) emerged 
and have aroused a great deal of interest amongst practitioners and scholars alike. For 
over a decade (1993-2003) now in Africa south ofthe Sahara and indeed the world over, 
governments increasingly utilize the concept of transforming public sector entities into 
efficient private sector led companies. 
In the COMESA region, SAPs paved way for privatisation. Bromley, (1995), Bromley 
and Bush (1994) examine the nature of SAPs in Egypt and the impact and influence of 
IF Is within the context of Egypt's economic and political crisis. They also evaluate the 
effectiveness of policies of liberalisation in agriculture and economic growth and the 
IFI's promotion policies for reducing the Africa's state role. However, in this case, the 
IFI did not consider issues of 'good governance' and democratisation. The experience 
from failed SAPs for IMF and World Bank has shown that that issues of good 
governance and democratisation are crucial in making markets function, and are now 
included as a preliquisite for all privatisation Programs in continental Africa. The 
conclusion has been that since crucial issues of 'good governance and democratisation' 
were not addressed, the IFI' s strategy for economic reform merely repeats failed 
policies attempted byEgypt's government twenty years ago. 
The SAPs experiences in the 1980s and 90s, characterized by important changes in the 
policy orientation of many mixed economies in the developing world; privatization 
approaches; weak economic performance; and mounting debt, have prompted a 
rethinking of strategy. The emergence of the so called "South-East Asian Miracle" of 
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, discussed by Jilberto and 
Mommen(1996:1998); and Haggard (1994, p.222), as an integrated regional area of 
development has provided a model of what could be achieved through strategies 
founded on export promotion. Also important is an active private sector, and a public 
sector "bureaucracy" that was supportive and facilitative of the growth and expansion of 
enterprises; this allowed Hong Kong to emerge as the top supplier to China, as argued 
by Goodman and Chongyi (1994). 
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2:3 Privatisation: Public and/or Private Ownership 
2:3:1 State Intervention and Free Markets 
Historically, state owned industry was largely created about forty years ago (in Kenya) 
due to the perceived market failures of the 50s and 60s, leading to strong government 
intervention which culminated into giving power to the state to balance 
macroeconomics. While traditional literature characterized market failures as exceptions 
to the general rule that decentralized markets led to efficient allocation, in the new view 
the presumption is reversed. It is only under exceptional circumstances that markets are 
efficient; Stiglitz (1989); Hyden, (1983).This makes the discussion on what the 
appropriate role of government should be a difficult one. The issue becomes one of not 
identifying market failures, for these are pervasive in the economy, but of identifying 
large market failures where there is scope for welfare-enhancing government 
interventions. In modern mixed capitalistic economies, such as the USA, Canada, 
Western Europe and Japan, these rules typically involve the legal enforceability of 
contracts, provisions for bankruptcy, and law defining property rights and liabilities. 
This basic framework has much to do with how the economy performs, and have the 
other functions of government are affected by the kind of ground rules under which the 
private economy operates. Its primary function is that of "preserving and stabilizing the 
property relations ofthe capitalistic economy"; Gordon (1972a, p.322i8 
African governments south of the Sahara, experienced this wave (i.e. government 
intervention) through an inherited English, French and Germany colonial past, in 
particular from England. The motivation to nationalize originally was political, 
economic and philosophical. It was believed that bringing industries into state 
ownership would instil a sense ofthe 'public good'29 (Grimstone 1990) in management 
and employees. The state provides and produces 'public goods' because the market 
would under produce. Other arguments to justify this intervention, in a mixed or 
capitalist-oriented economy include issues of 'natural monopolies'; that is that 
intervention is based on the need to exploit economies of scale that would be derived 
28 Atkinson and Stiglitz ( 1980) 
29 Grimstone (1990 P.3) 
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from only one producer in the industry30• The introduction of various producers/ or 
operators is likely to result in a less socially efficient solution in output, qualitatively 
and quantitatively. 
'Externalities': governments must examine issues of externalities:- as their its impact is 
vital to any privatisation program. These are factors that are not included in gross 
national product (GNP) or transaction price but which have an effect on human welfare. 
Pollution is a prime example of an external cost imposed on society. National output 
which may only be maintained by allowing a certain degree of pollution is a prime 
example, which detracts from the quality of life. A firm will include the private costs of 
materials, labour and capital used in producing goods and services but will not count the 
social costs of pollution involved (Abu and Osama 1991). On the other hand, positive 
externalities such as social benefits conferred by firms in training workers who become 
available for employment elsewhere are again not counted in national output. In this 
case, private costs and benefits that diverge considerably from social costs and benefits 
and state intervention are needed to internalise both for the benefit of society (Abu, and 
Osama, 1991 and Brett, 1988, p.4 7)31 . 'Inequality reduction' is also critical as the 
distribution of income that arises from the operation ofthe market place may be entirely 
at variance with that which society regards as appropriate, and the state intervenes to 
reduce the inequality that would otherwise materialise. An Australian government 
statement sums-up this scenario; 
" Where the government has entered into the arena of trade, the object has not been 
to secure monopoly or to squeeze out of business legitimate private traders, but to 
protect the latter on fair and efficient lines" (Australian Government , 1978) 
Ownership Matters: the question posed by a spectrum of literature that reveals the 
reluctance to privatize is why privatize? The answer very often is because ownership is 
said to be a significant determinant of enterprise performance. In both developed and 
developing countries, good SOE performance has been very difficult to bring about and 
even harder to sustain, especially in telecoms (Wallsten, 1999). Governments facing 
financial crisis often try to improve performance by bringing in new and dynamic 
managers, and paying them incentive salaries, more often with the help of the World 
Bank (i.e. Kenya's recent "dream team" string of permanent secretaries and parastatal 
30 Atkinson and Stiglitz ( 1980) 
31 
also in Cook and Kirkpatrick ( 1988) 
55 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review: Theoretical Elements of Privatisation 
heads, on the World Bank pay-roll). These measures more often than not have a short-
term positive effect but inevitably these are edged out by partisan politics. However, as 
the crisis dissipates, so does political resolve. In Kenya's case, the "dream team" lasted 
less than two years and its impact has yet to be assessed. 
As the findings in chapter five illustrate political interference in SOE's reforms, 
restructuring and privatization programs limit the ability for countries to reduce their 
fiscal burden and maximize the positive effects of privatization. This argument is also 
advanced by Yarrow (1999 p.l62). Further evidence is the example of Stiglitz, (1996), 
as the then senior vice president of the World Bank, who took issue with the 
government-led reform drive. "A firm's life or death is something that its management 
will decide upon, not the government," and he stated that the views of the private sector 
should be reflected in the policy-making process; Stiglitz also stressed that the 
governments should not determine policy unilaterally. lgnazio Visco, (the chief 
economist for OECD) echoed his view too, when he reiterated; 
"With the crisis over and a strong recovery underway, the success of the reform 
program will depend on reducing the extent of government intervention," (in Len 
and Sung-Tae ( 1999)32 
In Kenya, the parastatal reform program has been on the table since 1993 with the 
government merely changing chief executive officers and deepening the non-
performance of the Public Enterprises (PEs)33. The privatisation of the banking, 
insurance and now telecommunications industries is a good example of this 
deterioration. It has taken the concerted effort of the private sector, the civil society and 
opposition lobbying for the government to move forward with the reform and 
privatisation program without interference. In 2003 and 2004 the 'new government' has 
been embroiled in court cases with chief executives officers who have mis-invested34 
public funds and deliberately withheld information on reforms and privatisation, leading 
to the international aid 'drought' of 1997 to 2002. This greatly affected privatisation 
revenue, strategy and pace. 35 
32 See also Nation Daily Newspaper, (2003) for a list amounts deposited and the individuals 
33 See Various NewspaJ)er references 
34 Kisero, (2003) , 
35 See World Bank/GOK 1991 Policy Framework agreement that started the privatization program 
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In addition, further evidence presented by Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1994) in support 
of privatization indicates that properly structured reforms/privatisation yield substantial 
and enduring benefits.36 Indeed, this perception could be at variance with instances 
where there has been little or no gain. In particular, chapter five evidence shows that 
there were new opportunities in the industries and there is re-employment taking place. 
These benefits outweigh the downsizing of Uganda Telecom, Kenya Telkom, and 
Senegal Telecom, companies in the process of privatization. For example, World Bank 
literature (Kikeri, et.al 1992)37 and evidence from the COMESA region in chapter five 
(i.e. Kenya, Uganda, and Mauritius) supports this view with field findings indicating 
increased numbers of new businesses and employment of over 50%. This 
notwithstanding, most privatization success stories come from high-income and middle-
income countries (Wallsten, 1999:2002). In the COMESA region, especially in East 
Africa, privatization has turned around telecommunication related companies. In 
addition, the introduction of new management and new technology in Kenya Airways 
(KQ) after its privatization in 1996 was associated with increased performance and 
profitability. The conclusion is straightforward, privatization, when done right, works 
well as Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1994) have stated. 
However, Privatization works best when it is part of a larger program of reforms 
promoting efficiency. New Zealand, the UK Mexico, and Chile are all successful 
privatizers. Their privatizations were accompanied by reforms to open markets, removal 
of price and exchange rate distortions and the encouragement of the development of the 
private sector through free entry (i.e. SAPs) (Vickers and Yarrow, 1995). Revenue 
maximization should not be the primary goal of privatization (see field interview 
findings in chapter five). Additionally, it is far better to eliminate monopoly power and 
unleash potentially competitive activities than to boost the sales price by divesting into 
protected markets. As discussed, regulation is critical to the successful privatization of 
monopolies. In the sale of Chile Telecom, for example, everybody won consumers, 
labour, government, buyers and the productive efficiency of the company increased 
because of a well developed, well-administered regulatory framework, which was able 
to protect consumers, as opposed to maximising on price to sell in an unregulated 
market (Wallsten, 2002), with a limited capacity for consumer protection. 
36 Privatization and reforms in Telecommunications in Kenya, Senegal and Uganda show this trend. In particular, chapter 
six evidence shows that there were new opportunities in the industries and there is re-employment taking place. 
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The problem with most privatisations in transition and developing economies is that 
programs are started without strong foundations in legal and regulatory frameworks.38 
Governments need to identify these issues (Nicoletti, Giciseppe (2002). The COMESA 
region and indeed Kenya, are now in the process of institutionalizing regional and 
national regulatory frameworks after their members states are well into their 
telecommunication privatisation programs (Wallsten, 1999 p.5, Shirley, et. al 2002). 
More importantly, field interview findings in chapter five indicate that both the private 
sector and the public sector rank a strong regulatory framework in telecommunications 
as an extremely important objective for privatizing PEs (especially telecoms). 
However, governments and the private sector agree that privatization cannot resolve all 
challenges in the management of public enterprises set-up to support a social-political 
agenda. Performance has to be reviewed within a changing and new environment. 
Evidently, there is a lot of debate regarding the differences between public and private 
management (Boyne, 2002). 
38 COMES A countries are now in the process of institutionalising regulatory and legal frameworks, within their membership. 
58 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review: Theoretical Elements of Privatisation 
2:3:2 Consequences of Market Reforms and Privatisation 
The complexity of divestiture and privatization functions makes their implementation a 
daunting task the world over, especially in relation to telecoms. Apart from the major 
objective of raising cash, which gives the government control and use of the cash, the 
large program of asset sales is counted as negative public spending which reduces the 
reported level of public spending and reduces tax revenues, so the budget gap remains 
the same thereby reducing the gap between revenues and expenditure. As Redwood et. 
al (1990, pp.54-55) have argued although some African governments have been against 
privatization the trend started changing in the mid 1990s, when they were forced to 
address debt burdens and thus foreign exchange proceeds. Since the political set-up sees 
privatization as a process that substantially transforms both the political and economic 
processes, the breaking up of SOEs into manageable entities is desirable since it affects 
economies of scale and scope, and may result in growth, merger or acquisition. This 
changes control and ownership patterns. In this regard, many countries in Africa are 
deciding when to start, in which sectors and how far to take the privatisation process, 
rather than why. 
The majority of current World Bank literature has emphasized the use of pragmatism in 
privatisation in view of the consequences that may arise. Samuel, (1999) outlined 'Ten 
Commandments' for how to approach privatisation in developing economies as part of a 
due diligence and pragmatism. This is an important reference list for policy makers 
summarized as; 
l.Thou canst lead thy horse to water, but verily ... Thou canst not make it drink.2. 
Know thy priorities: 3. And there shall come forth a host of thine enemies 4. 
Privatization must bringeth forth the benefits: 5. Money is NOT the root of all 
privatization: 6. Fatten thy calf before the slaughter: 7. Competitive bids bringeth 
better bargains 8. Involveth all stakeholders: 9. Privatization costeth money (a lot of 
it): 10. Thou shalt regulate and choose good advisers: (Samuel, 1999, pp.30) 
This in essence captures the cautionary approach to privatisation in developing 
countries, alluded to initially by Stiglitz, (2003), in his analysis of the contradictions 
between globalisation, development and political leadership in developing and 
transitional economies. This is also evident in the privatization literature for the period 
of 1996 to 2003. For the COMESA region, and indeed sub-Sahara Africa, privatisation 
is linked to the macroeconomic burden experienced by public sector enterprises. The 
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strategy has been to improve the private sector, by reducing the burden of financing 
public enterprises39, at the expense of developing infrastructure needed for a viable 
private sector to drive the economy. Privatisation should be done in such a way that it 
does not create private monopolies that are equally in- efficient and cause 'unnatural 
monopolies', Gayle and Goodrich (1990). 
Regulatory bodies have been used to 'keep an eye' on the performance of the 
enterprises, rather than to help the privatised entity not revert to an unnatural monopoly, 
predation, or unfair/unequal access condition. Some governments argue that they do this 
because domestic interest groups do not benefit in the same measure from policies of 
privatisation and deregulation. Some form of protection for existing income distribution 
patterns is required even in cases where it limits competition and potential efficiency 
gains (Corden, 1997). TLK privatization is an example, having ended its exclusivity 
(monopolistic) period in June 2004, and is now experiencing the challenges of 
competition (Wallsten, 1999, pp.3-5). 
The Canadian telecommunications sector is a case in point. Besides, this evidence 
shows that regulated natural monopolies can be difficult to privatise in a responsible 
manner because rate regulation typically involves pricing criteria, which allow cost 
recovery together with a return on capital (Gayle and Goodrich (1990). In this case, 
regulators may find themselves managing privatised utilities, or serving producer rather 
consumer interests; Kenya Power is a classic example of this (Mwangi, 2003). In the 
USA for example, since the divestiture of AT&T on January 1, 1984, seven regional 
holding companies that resulted from it have found themselves dealing with the 
inconsistent requirements of fifty state regulatory bodies, as well as those of the US 
Justice Department and the judge who oversees the divestiture decree. 
Privatisation of natural monopolies raises issues that relate to performance and reforms. 
The same governments who have to give up control of the pubic enterprises establish 
the regulatory bodies (Foster, 1992. p.4) in order to assure consumers that they are 
interested in the performance and subsequent service provision of the privatized entity; 
however, the governments are often the ones that resist change. In the process of 
resisting change and manipulating market forces, regulatory offences are committed. A 
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key economic regulatory offence is that of unnatural monopoly, where a monopoly or 
dominant firm is not more efficient, but only more profitable, because it can abuse its 
monopoly power (Wellineus, 1999, p.5; Wallsten, 1998). There are three key regulatory 
offences; unnatural monopoly, predation, and unfair or unequal accesses (Foster, 1992 
p.5). Where competition is not available or efficient, an effective regulatory system will 
be needed to prevent the abuse of monopoly; however, the same governments who want 
to maintain monopoles are the same one who are charged with creating effective 
regulatory institutions. 
Foster (1992) has argued that since most natural monopolies are intrinsically predations 
because they embody networks or grids, the most demanding process then becomes 
interconnection, that is, creating competitive access to those networks and TKL and 
Telecoms in COMESA is no exemption. By comparison with interconnection, yardstick 
competition is creating entities whose performance can be compared. Though useful to 
regulators, it is not a real extension of competition. To counter these offences of excess 
profits and inefficiency some regulators in the US have persisted with rate of return 
regulation. It is important to keep in mind that privatized monopolies' performances are 
not guaranteed, due to the creation of market imperfections and for reasons of 
monopolistic tendencies of PEs (N ewbery, 1999, p.13; Laffont, and Tirole, 2000, p.16). 
However, market imperfections make it impossible for market forces to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources, so it is safe to assume that regulation is supposed to 
recreate what market failure has destroyed. The pursuit of non-economic objectives of a 
regulatory body may in many circumstances weaken its ability to serve the objectives of 
economic regulation and be undemocratic. For example, this is so in addressing the 
challenge of whether a change of ownership is essential to overcome the problems of 
public enterprises, and how far such problems could have been and can be overcome 
without a change of ownership. Public enterprise reform (liberalization) as an 
alternative (or as a first step) to privatisation is advised by most practitioners as a 
response to the ownership debate (Foster, 1992). 
Besides, in most developing countries there is a tendency for management competence 
in theprivate sector to be low, capital is scarce, and thus domestic investors (bidders) 
may be non-existent. However, just as the widespread foreign ownership of enterprises 
in the late 1970s contributed to nationalization, privatisation will inevitably invite 
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charges of "recolonization." Although as discussed before, these charges are often 
rhetoric calculated to cloud the debate on privatisation by those with a stake in the status 
quo. The World Bank, trade analysts, African governments, and regional trade 
institutions40have come to the realisation that there is need to liberalise further and 
restructure enterprises (see field interviews) before privatisation especially where the 
politicians have entrenched themselves in the enterprise to be privatized as in the case of 
TKL as a major employer for 'voters.' This helps in addressing some of the conflicting 
objectives, interests, long term effects of imperfect markets and monopolistic tendencies 
in the utility sector as argued by Newbery, and Pollitt, (1997) and as confirmed by the 
findings in chapter five. 
40 These are: Common Market for East And Southern Africa- Free Trade Area (COMESA-FTA), 
East African Community, (EAC), and South African Development Corporation (SADC) 
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2:4 APPLICATIONS OF PRIV ATISATION STRATEGIES AND APPROACHES 
2:4:1 Privatization Approaches, Strategies, Methods, Techniques and Current 
Trends 
The underlying assumption in the literature outlined is that various theories explain why 
some methods of privatization may be preferred. A few examples of the impact of 
privatisation on the success of divesture programs and on enterprise performance 
(Marconi and Wijnbergen 1997) give an indication of why different methods are used 
by governments in developing and transitional economies alike. 
As the theoretical debate continues, small and large-scale privatisation has been taking 
place. Several units of property have been disposed of in Britain, Australia, Argentina, 
Canada, Asia, and the USA, Kenya Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia 
and South Africa, to mention a few (section 2:4:2). Large scale privatisation is pursued 
through complex programs combining several forms of privatisation (Edgren, 1987 
Cook 2001; Killick 1998); Cook and Kirkpatrick 1995) e.g. outright sales, public offer 
for sale or stocks, foreign investment, marketing of shares to local investors, and 
investment tailor made programs designed to attract government employees' local 
savings (these are dubbed the "Golden Handshakes" in Kenya). 
The privatisations' experience, practice and approaches are also very prevalent in the 
literature. Case studies undertaken by the World Bank Research Group specifically from 
Africa, Malaysia, Singapore, and Chile feature particularly heavily (Singapore Port 
Authority:2000; Loizos 1999). These cover almost every aspect of privatisation (on a 
case by case basis) in their respective countries, such as privatisations in Malaysia, 
performance in Singapore, and public enterprises before and after privatisation 
programs in Chile. They cover sectors like the water supply, waste removal, 
telecommunications and airlines (i.e. Singapore Airlines, and Malaysian Airlines) 
(World Bank, 2002: 1994: 1989). The case studies are well picked for the relevance of 
the privatisation experience of other LDCS. However, the Singapore case (as in the 
Telkom Kenya case) is unique as regards the programs for privatisation in Singapore. 
These are different compared with those of other LDCS like Kenya. The distinct 
difference is that the Singapore government explicitly stated that their major objective 
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was not to raise funds from their divestment programme to the exchequer, whereas 
financial consideration in the 1980s/1990s was the major factor for LDCS to privatise. 
This is still the major motive for privatisation for most African countries, and Kenya in 
particular, made it clear that its main motive for seeking a strategic partner in the 
privatisation of TLK was to raise funds and to acquire new technology for 
restructuring. 
Methods, forms, objectives and techniques41 for privatisation and expansion of the 
enterprise depend on the strategy and approach of each program. The literature has 
highlighted of why governments prefer various methods. The most spectacular 
privatisations worldwide have been those that aim at attracting large numbers of 
shareholders into partnership and co-ownership in what were state owned industries. A 
public offer for sale may include a majority or a minority of shares. Some governments 
like to retain some shares or require that local investors retain the majority of shares. A 
public offer often needs quite a substantial amount of background and preparatory work 
to be done. Due-diligence is required as a matter of private sector standards; this might 
involve: the accounts, legal title, legal structure of the industry, policy and review. This 
has to be undertaken, to ensure that the terms of trade and requirements placed on the 
businesses are clear to investors. All these have to be done before the sale 
(Schulssebaur, 2000). In the provision sector, load shedding could be used as a method 
of privatising. In this case, the state withdraws from the production of a service but does 
not redesign the program into a purchase-of -service arrangement. 
The trade sale, which is a technique where assets that do not have a good track record 
are disposed of, typically through a public offer, requires the preparation of a sale 
memorandum, which is usually more detailed than the prospectus which sets out details 
of a company in a public offer for sale. Once the memorandum has been prepared, 
several techniques are used to arouse interest and negotiation of the price (Welch, and 
Fremond, 1998). An auction is then used to dispose of the sale. The other forms of 
privatisation commonly used are, voucher or coupon exchanges, negotiated sales, stock 
distributions, management-employee buyouts (MEBO/EBO), leasing contracts, joint 
ventures and the contracting out of traditional state functions and are defined in the 
glossary section of this thesis. The latter is usually achieved through concessions and 
41 
see defmition of methods in glossary and fmdings in chapter five 
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attracting private capital into infrastructural projects (Shafik, 1993). Arrangements are 
based on build -own-operate (BOO), build-operate-transfer (BOT) or build-own-
operate-transfer (BOOT). Joint public and private investment based on BOO structures 
is particularly popular in Middle Eastern countries. 
It is however important to note that just as pragmatism and due-diligence is well advised 
to be custom made so are these methods. They differ according to the social, political 
and economic environments of each country, and sectors of operation. Classic examples 
of customized methods of application can be found in Eastern and Western European 
privatisation cases. Poland for example, used spontaneous versus centrally controlled 
methods to privatise the SOEs earmarked for privatising which were from the non-farm 
private sector. In 1989 this accounted for 10.3 per cent of industrial production and 
employed less than 14.1 percent of the non-agricultural workforce and consisted mainly 
of unincorporated businesses in crafts, service and retail trading. 
The real tum-around came when the private sector expansion was realised, with the 
coming into power of the Solidarity controlled government of 1989. Due to this rapid 
growth in the private sector, the most important practice and method in privatising the 
Polish economy became 'spontaneous uncontrolled privatisation'. Gomulka (1993), and 
Jermakowicz, (1993) defined it as 'organic privatisation' and suggests that the two 
terminologies are interchangeable. "The spontaneous or organic privatisation involves 
setting-up new private businesses and the autonomous growth of existing private 
businesses". The latter is due to asset privatisation, which encompasses the purchase of 
equipment, machinery, or means of transportation from the state-owned enterprises. By 
1993 spontaneous privatisation encompassed approximately 99.9 percent of all new 
private businesses (Balcerowicz, 1993). 
The other methods used in Poland were under one strategy of centrally controlled 
privatisation. This strategy assumed at implementation five main ways to privatise 
which were namely; a) commercialisation followed by privatisation; b) privatisation 
through liquidation (i.e. by dissolution of enterprises);c) foreign investment through 
joint ventures; d) re-privatisation or restitution and e) small- scale privatisation 
"program prywatyzacji". The Polish government found these methods and strategies of 
privatising to be more realistic in their view, recognising that privatisation would not 
only take time but would also require a multi-approach comprising separate paths for 
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the various categories of enterprises (Jermakowicz, 1993), often with a simultaneous 
use of different methods within a category. At that time, this was not the view of the 
consultants and experts as they used a 'customised approach'. Jermakowicz aptly states; 
... At that time, great optimism prevailed that privatisation and foreign investment 
would solve most of the country's economic problems and that the process would be 
accomplished relatively quickly. The illusionary nature of this view became apparent 
when the newly established office of plenipotentiary for transformation changes 
together with western experts began preparing the legal, regulatory, and institutional 
framework for privatisation. These foreign experts initially focused almost exclusively 
on a firm by frrm sale strategy, not unlike the program in which they participated in 
other parts of the world "this customised approach is," as Lipton and Sachs ( 1991, p.12) 
wrote, "likely to bog down for political, economic and fmancial reasons well before a 
significant portion of state frrms are actually privatised" (Jermakowicz, 1993, p.66). 
From this thesis review, forms and methods are therefore best dealt with on a case by 
case basis, furthermore new ways emerge as environments change and as social-
political circumstances intervene to re-shape economic paradigms. Allowing for new 
creative techniques as further discussion and empirical findings of the privatisation of 
Telkom Kenya in chapter five indicates an important step forward. 
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2:5 Trends42 and Impacts of Privatisation 
The impact of privatization is a popular topic in privatization analysis in the developing 
and transitional economy writings. This research addresses the impact of privatization 
only as it affects the choices made in approaching the privatization process rather than 
an evaluation of the approach and program and assessing its impact to the Kenyan 
Economy. 
Indeed many emerging economies have recently launched ambitious efforts to privatize 
their state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with the intention of replicating the success of 
these programs in industrialized economies (Megginson, et. al, 1994 ). The volume of 
privatization has increased in emerging economies, from $8 billion in 1990 to over $90 
billion in 1999 (OECD 2000). Nonetheless, research shows (Frydman et.al 1999, 
McDonald, 1993 and Park, 1997), mixed empirical evidence concerning the success of 
such efforts. For example, Frydman found that privatized firms outperformed SOEs in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Wright et.al (1998), further describe the 
experiences of many Polish and Russian firms that have failed to achieve efficiency 
after privatization. Furthermore, Park, (1997) found mixed support for privatization 
among fifteen Korean firms; six firms increased efficiency, two had decreased 
economic performance, and the seven remaining firms' performance did not change, 
indicating that the impact of privatization varies. 
An analysis of trends of privatization over a decade (1993-2003) reveals that private 
participation in the infrastructure of developing and transition economies has increased 
dramatically (figure 2-3). There have been over 1000 transactions in over 100 countries 
in the last decade (1993-2003). According to World Bank figures provided on its sister 
website the "Privatization Link," privatization proceeds as an indicator of the increased 
privatization activity all over the world have: 
"Risen from US$12 billion in 1990 to US$44.1 billion in 1999. After reaching peak 
revenues of $66.6 billion in 1997 privatization transactions slowed down 
considerably in 1998 and 1999 (see figure 2-l ). This trend was in part caused by the 
East Asian and Russian crises as well as the completion of major elements of the 
Brazilian privatization program. The World Bank data for 2000 suggest that 
privatization proceeds have risen again, reaching an amount of over 65 billion 
above the peak levels reported in 1997." (World Bank/Privatization Link: 2004) " 
As shown in figure 2-l 
42 See abstract on page (iii) 
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There is therefore every reason to believe that as African countries step up the speed to 
their privatization programs and the transitional economies, China, and Asia increase 
the sectors for privatization~ those volumes are expected to continue throughout the rest 
of this decade (2003-20 13) as indicated by Wright and Perrotti (1999). The empirical 
findings of this research show some of these trends, and volumes in the world, the 
COMESA region and Kenya. 
Figure 2:1 Total Privatization Revenues in Developing Countries, 1990-1999 (US $Billions) 
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Accordingly, as seen in the regional distribution figure 2:2 (of the World Bank) sub-
Saharan Africa accounted for just over $2.5 billion of the world's proceeds as the 
world 's total proceeds fell short of $70 billion in 1997, falling to just below $50 billion 
in 1998.While Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia 
fell to below $0.8 billion with the exception of Latin America and the Caribbean (figure 
2-2).43 
In 1997, Africa's increase in privatization revenues, activity and private sector 
participation could be explained in part by the increase in private capital flows to Africa 
that were responding to liberalisation reforms of the specific sectors,44 thus creating a 
better climate for the private sector. In 1993 for example, net private flows were still 
negative. In 1995, net private capital flows increased by 75% and by an estimated 30% 
in 1996, reaching $11.8 billion. There have been some notable foreign direct investment 
43 It is important to note that these privatization data include proceeds from domestic and foreign investors as well as direct and 
£ortfolio investments. 
4 i.e . Transportation, Banking and utilities sectors, involving the Air industry, Privatizations of Kenya Airways (KQ), Uganda 
Airways, Tanzania, Airways, and Zambia Airlines In ( 1993-1997). The 1996 Banking crisis in Nigeria and Kenya. 
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success stories. Uganda' s foreign direct investment rose by 38% in 1995 and an 
estimated 28% in 1996, Tanzania's foreign direct investment rose by 200% in 1995 and 
an estimated 27% in 1996. A further look at portfolio equity flows showed that Cote 
d' lvoire received $30 million in 1996 up from $3 million in 1995, and Kenya received 
$15 million in 1996 up from nothing in 1995 as indicated by Wallsten, (2002) and 
World Bank, (2000) respectively. 
Figure 2-2 Privatization Revenues in Developing Countries by Region, 1990-1999 
(US $ Billions) 
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In specific sectors, the transportation and infrastructure industries have taken up the 
largest share of revenues. According to the World Bank figures shown in Figure 2:3 , 
transactions in telecommunications raised overall revenues in the period 1997- 1998, 
while the primary sector rose in 1999, overtaking the infrastructure and the financial 
services and manufacturing during this period as shown in figure ( 4-1 ). 
The figures show that private activity in infrastructure rose within the decade of 1993 -
2003 , whilst between 1990 and 1997 private sector investments in infrastructure rose 
from US$16 billion to more than US$1 20 billion. At the same time, the financial crises 
in East Asia and Russia in the late 1990s caused an investment decline of 20 percent in 
1998 and 30 percent in 1999. 
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Figure 2-3 Total Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries, 
1990-1999 (US$ Billions) 
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In terms of the infrastructure by regional distribution, most developing countries have 
some private activity in infrastructure but Latin America and East Asia dominate 
investment. Consequently, Latin America and East Asia were most heavily affected by 
the downturn of private investment activity. World Bank figures for 2000 however, 
show a significant recovery, as noted in the regional private sector participation 
distribution chart (figure 2-3). In terms of sectoral distribution, telecommunications and 
energy account for the largest share of private participation. The downturn in activity in 
1998 and 1999 affected those two sectors most, but was also felt particularly in the 
transport sector and to a lesser degree in the water sector, as shown in the sectoral 
distribution figure 4-1 . More specific country and COMESA region trends discussed in 
the field findings show that the lead COMESA countries (i.e. Egypt, Kenya, Uganda 
and Zambia) were undergoing liberalization, restructuring and privatization in these 
sectors, that had affected revenue and performance ( Tables 4-1 -4-13 ) 
Despite the alternative view held on rising numbers as an indicator for well done 
privatizations, the rise in privatisations at regional, national and sectoral levels does not 
in itself suggest that all privatisations are done well and are beneficial to all. For 
instance, for the first time since 1994, global privatisation activity recorded a sharp 
decline in 1998. Proceeds dropped by 26 percent to around US$ 145.5 billion, from an 
all time high ofUS $ 153.8 billion in 1997 (figures 2:1-2:3). Kenya's proceeds dropped 
from a 1999 level of $10 billion to below $300 million. This coincided with the fall of 
private sector investments in all sectors (2-2) (i.e. manufacturing, primary sector, 
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infrastructure and the financial and service sectors). Consequently, the private sector 
and the progressive public sector view is that, privatisation through consistent 
stakeholder participation partnerships should be encouraged. This process can be 
carefully planned privatisation programs that target entities with the potential to boost 
the economy through increased savings and entrepreneurial investments. Inevitably, 
those monopolies that have not experienced growth for a long period of time will in the 
short run experience "bad" privatisations, due to job cuts and expensive and slow 
institutional restructuring that negatively affects employees and third parties. 
However, in the end, the research findings of this thesis (chapter five) show that they 
create a more robust and skilled workforce (Szymanski and Haskel 1992) especially in 
the telecommunication industry, where technology keeps changing, and employees seek 
to keep up with the changes in technology, growth, and expansion. Nellis (1999) points 
out that those countries that have implemented rapid programs of mass privatization 
show no signs of better economic performance than the countries that have undertaken a 
more gradual reform path. This suggests that the approach and not the pace is 
significant. 
In the United Kingdom the basis ofprivatisation's political debates was/is Thatcherism, 
in Australia it was the Labour government, and in the USA it was interest groups. In 
Africa, there are special cliques of "public interest groups" within governments whose 
management and operations have accumulated large budget deficits that are choking 
their economies and which are forcing the privatisation momentum upwards (Steel and 
Heald 1982, pp.14-15). Most governments have welcomed privatisation or the rolling 
back of public sector as a way of restricting the power and influence of the trade 
unions. The Thatcher government used this strategy quite openly and successfully. 
The privatisation of public enterprises (PEs) in Britain was seen by the government as 
contributing to four objectives; i) enhancing freedom by extending the sphere of the 
market and contracting that of the state; ii) improving efficiency through the private 
sector; iii) the reduction of the public sector in Britain and iv) the re-introduction of 
,;-·_·~:.: . ,.· ~' ---····-',"-;o,..._.:··::~--_:,~.,_,:·.":-- ~_,_ .- - ~ • '-T;C·· : •• r··--'~-.-.oF.·:,._-,.c-I':'-.· ·-:~'' ~·-:~ . .;..· ~-·-:=:::: ·,··:· .. •·· ,--_-;:; 
market disciplines missing in the determinance of public sector pay. It is/was common 
for these arguments to be deployed in Britain and in Africa without qualifications; 
however lately, this has changed. There is a now growing need and requirement for a 
careful balancing of the merits and demerits of public and private ownership, and of the 
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scope and clarity of efficiency and competition on a case by case basis (Heald, 1985). 
Increasingly, the state is confining itself to the role of exercising specific regulatory and 
fiscal functions, during the introduction of economic liberalization and deregulation 
policies in the process of facilitating economic reforms and privatisation, which are 
viewed by citizens of these countries as a way out of an economic mess. As Kisero, 
(2000)45 outlines: 
"... The darkest shadow looming over the economy is that of national indebtedness. 
This huge debt is the principal cause of upward pressures on interest rates in the 
economy. Debt service and the domestic debt has been crowding out the private sector 
from credit ... clearly, we must bring these debts down as we have no right to saddle the 
future generations with debt. The government should consider itself unauthorised to 
burden posterity with its debts, which is why privatisation ofTelkom Kenya and indeed 
other strategic parastatals must be allowed to go on smoothly and insulated from 
intrigues of powerful individuals bent on manipulating privatisation projects for 
personal aggrandisement". 
In Britain, the current 'New Labour' government seem to hold a flexible v1ew on 
privatisation and reforms as a member of the government retorted on a Radio 4 
program; 
" where markets work let us have the private sector - but where markets don't work 
(i.e. health) let us have public sector reform" ... (New Labour Government Minister on 
Radio 4 News February 2003) 
However, trends and approaches to privatization and their impact on socio-economic 
structure casts concerns suggesting that in some cases privatisation has promised more 
than it has delivered. There are many cases where privatisation has not led to efficiency 
improvement especially in situations where the degree of competition has remained 
unchanged before and after privatisation (Shusselbauer, 1999). In central Europe for 
example, market reforms have not achieved the intended objectives, instead it has 
hindered the development of entrepreneurs (Spicer, et. al 2000). When this occurs the 
more dramatic effects and impact related to unemployment caused by downsizing are 
highlighted and become the focus. 
In Tanzania, the debate and reluctance still lingers on, as do the fears of costs and 
-~repercussions of"unemployment caused 'by downsizing:-"Rama··and-Newman·c'(2002),- '"""' o c -·~ 
have addressed the public sector restructuring, including labour downsizing, and argue 
that it has been one of the main areas of policy activism in developing countries and 
45 Kisero J., The Daily Nation 2000 
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transition economies, but little is known about its actual effects. Rama and Newman 
used panel data on Colombian enterprises spanning more than one decade to assess the 
impact on several productivity indicators. The results suggest that the productivity gains 
from downsizing are larger in state-owned enterprises than in private enterprises. 
Chong, and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002, p.l) of the World Bank have argued that poor 
labour force restructuring is a key concern and that governments should establish better 
retrenchment programs. The field evidence in this thesis supports this argument with 
the analysis of TLK and KQs46which lacked a well set-up and organised program to 
address the challenging labour issues that arose during restructuring and after 
privatization (as discussed in chapters four and five in detail as the "union debt"). 
In most cases however, the governments in developing countries do not want to let the 
new owners retrench due to control and political implications. Infact, as the secondary 
data in chapter four shows, the main reason for the breakdown of the transaction 
negotiations was disagreement on the treatment of an "excess workforce" of an 
estimated ten thousand employees, that had been demanded by the investor (MKC) and 
the World Bank. This research found that if this is not done it leaves the privatized TLK 
with a downsizing problem that shows signs of a liability that will negatively affect its 
schedule and future operations in a new competitive market . 
Unfortunately, for markets to respond positively for a business to be privatised, issues 
of over-employment and underemployment (quite common in parastatals) must be 
addressed by the interested investors. In most cases, the investors find the burden of 
taking on a 'bloated' workforce unattractive. However, Kirkpatrick (1988) and Ghal 
(1985) disagree with this argument when they argue that privatization as a policy option 
has been greatly exaggerated and that an improvement in the economic performance of 
SOEs is more likely to flow from increased market competition rather than from a 
change in ownership of enterprises that involves downsizing unskilled employees. Ghal 
charges that Africa could not erect a private sector on the foundation of competitive 
forces in an economic system in which _comp~titive rn_at:kets were non-~xi§t~nJ. _ T.b.e . 
. :.....:;.:·~- ·---._ ·--·-· .' .. ~- -.'~.;·· ~~----·· .--. ·-··.--·:-- _.· . ; - -- 't--~ ".;.,' ;:. ~ . .:.. .. _._ ----- .... -- -'- -··-"'···---, 
solution to the current performance problems of the Public Enterprises (PEs) (defined 
on page 2) according to Ghal is one of restructuring and improvement, which _the GOK 
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demanded to do with strategic enterprises. Indeed, the findings show that the GOK and 
the TKL management preferred restructuring first before privatization The International 
Labour Organization (Powell, 1987), contends that this is the way to proceed, 
notwithstanding full recognition that privatization today is more acceptable in a 
growing number ofboth industrialized and developing countries (Nankani,1990). 
Retrenchment and downsizing have contributed to the unpopularity of privatization 
programs. There are still ongoing debates on the subject amongst the majority of the 
citizenry from Kenya to Uganda, Tanzania to Southern Africa and Central, North and 
West Africa. Privatisation is seen by the public sector and some sections of the 
population as a return to colonization (GOK 1997) 47 despite the poor economic 
performance experienced by these public firms. 
Generally, the impact of privatization has had mixed consequences. In some countries-
Chile, Britain, and Portugal - there has been an undeniable widening and strengthening 
of the private sector. Elsewhere, in Africa and the ex-communist bloc, lack of political 
will, lack of policy ambition and lack of financial capacity combined with constitutional 
and political obstacles have left public sectors more or less intact to the frustration of 
international funding bodies who insist upon structural change. 
Indeed, one of the major paradoxes of privatization may be enhanced indirect state 
control of privatized industry through regulatory agencies (Majone, 1994). For example, 
the British conservative government under former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher started and accelerated the privatization program. The British government also 
encouraged the world to privatize by example. Over seven major commercial airports48 
were divested. These included Heathrow, Gatwick, Aberdeen and Stansted. Over 1.4 
billion shares of stock in the airports were sold to over 2 million Britons raising 
revenues of over $ 40 billion.49 Whereas this provides good political mileage for the 
government, it does not however give the whole picture of the social and economic 
implications (Reed, 1992). 50 
47 Sessional Paper No. 2 on industrialization 
48 Airport Privatization: (GAO/OECD 1996). 
49 One of the privatization objectives under Thatcher was to encourage the public employees to be supportive and buy stocks at 
discounted prices 
50This approach has not worked in Kenya and CO MESA because ownership is still disputed and politicized 
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In summary, due to the intrigues and varied approaches to privatization, the study of its 
impact exhibits variation too. It has been plagued by several difficulties, some of which 
are explicitly explored by Aharoni (1992) and Wright and Perrotti (1995). The first 
complication lies in the extremely varied scales, forms and techniques of privatization. 
Different governments have pursued privatization with very different degrees of 
enthusiasm and success. The second complication is the distinction between its 
financial, economic, political and social consequences. Third, even if we restrict 
ourselves to the economic level, the effects of the enterprise have to be explored at both 
sector and system levels. The fourth complication arises from the fact that it is not 
always easy to unravel the impact of privatization 'per se' from that of the change of 
management, the technological transformation of the sector reforms in the labour 
market and in the regulatory environments. Fifth, the criterion for assessing the impact 
of privatization is exploring the consequences for 'efficiency'. 
There are, of course, great problems in comparing the performance of public and private 
enterprises because the criteria for evaluating performance are varied. Private sector 
management has, in principle, a basic duty to maximize profits for shareholders (the 
reality may be messier); that is not the case with public sector firms. Difficulties of 
comparing have not prevented comparison but the evidence is confused and far from 
conclusive. Several studies51 however, suggest that privatization does improve 
efficiency, but the weight of evidence does not appear to support any general intrinsic 
efficiency of private ownership. Rather it points to the scale and nature of competition 
as the key factor. Efficiency also appears to be enhanced when owners are closely 
involved in management ( Stiglitz 1986). 
The task becomes even more complicated in the countries of Africa, Eastern, and 
Central Europe, where privatization is occurring at the same time as other basic 
structural reforms such as those of the legal system, of accounting practices, of banking 
systems, and of financial markets. Additionally, a distinction should be made between 
the short-term and long-term consequences of privatization using a non-partisan 
criterion. Otherwise we are often reduced to the counterfactual or the speculative in 
assessing its impact, more so from a partisan perspective. TKL for example was viewed 
as a strategic enterprise economically and politically and fits into this typology. 
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The studies of Latin American and Central European provide very different messages 
Werner and Nazmi (2000) point to the 'fragile' character of the privatization process 
and cast doubt on the regulatory capacity of the weakened state to produce allocative 
and productive efficiency. Rocha (1994) and Werner (2003) are critical of the results of 
privatization in Brazil, whilst Shirley (1994) on the other hand is somewhat more 
optimistic and suggests that there are lessons to be learned by developing and 
transitional democracies m Central and Eastern Europe. (Shirley,1994 and 
Ramanadham (1995). 
The complex nature of the political consequences of privatization is also high. Ayubi, 
(1992) in his study of the privatization program in the Middle East argues that such 
programmes may involve changes in the ruling coalitions but will not necessarily lead 
to political liberalization. Some of the paradoxes be they transitory, sectoral or country 
specific, are more apparent than real (Shirley, 2001). Others, however, are structural in 
character, and point to the problematic character of privatization, an argument made by 
Kiss, (1994) in a study of privatization in Eastern Europe, and in an analysis of the 
programmes carried out in Western Europe and Africa. 
Yet, in spite of its problem-ridden nature, and in spite of the challenges and resistance 
of certain groups i.e. development, social and political theorists, privatization is likely to 
remain on the policy agenda of most governments, whatever their political hue (Samuel, 
1999). In a period of challenging fiscal environment and internationalization, 
governments, squeezed by a powerful group will ensure that privatization remains a 
'policy fashion'. This research's thought and analytical process emanates from, and 
upholds, this perspective 
51 Shirley (1994); Megginson, eta!. (1996); Aharoni (1991); Ramanadham, (1989a) 
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2:5:1 Privatization in East and Southern Africa 
Until the entry of privatisation in late 1980s the Kenyan and Tanzanian economies were 
dominated by an elaborate system of state enterprises - the parastatal system. Parastals 
in East Africa are defined as; 
'Commercial enterprises owned by the government or with majority government 
participation and are run on commercial principles and whose accounts are not directly 
integrated into the government budget'. (Kenya National Assembly (1983, p.20) 
The number of parastatals in Tanzania started to increase rapidly after the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967 which committed Tanzania to socialism (Nyerere, 1973). By 1967, 
there were only 43 parastatals but by 1970 the number had risen to 85 and by 1974 it 
had risen to 139 and has continued to rise (Aseto and Okelo, 1997). The significance of 
the parastatal sector in the Tanzanian economy may be gleaned from the capital 
formation in the country by sector. In both Kenya, whose business and trade policies 
tend to be capitalistic, and in Tanzania where they tend to be socialistic, there are 
parastatals in every sector of the economy: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, 
transportation, communications, commercial, finance, and services. As has been 
indicated before, this tendency towards the development of state-owned enterprises is 
not limited to countries with socialist aspirations such as Tanzania. The trend is/was 
very strong in countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Egypt and Morocco, 
which all lean towards capitalism. Ake ( 1981) argues that that state capitalism arises 
primarily out of the desire of the national petit-bourgeoisie which inherited political 
power from the colonisers to create an economic base for its political power. While 
Reed (1992) argues that they provide services that the private sector cannot provide. 
Privatisation literature and programs in the context of CO MESA 52 region are relatively 
recent. Regional perspectives presume that increased privatisation should free up the 
markets, create competition and hopefully increase regional integration and produce 
business opportunities. The privatisation process can be said to encourage business 
opportunities and contribute to regional trade integration. As clearly indicated by the 
thesis survey in chapter five, COMESA has contributed to new businesses under its 
52 
see detailed discussion on COMESA Appendix2, Annex Illb 
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divestiture programs. Lessons on privatisation transactions are important in examining 
the process. Some countries are more difficult than others (Samuel, 1999; Shafik, 1997), 
but where markets are already competitive and policy is market-friendly, privatisation is 
easier. Where the private sector is small, capital markets thin and the interest of external 
investors is limited, the sale of enterprises even in competitive markets may be difficult 
(contrast Egypt, Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda and South Africa). Some sectors are 
harder than others, and timing is crucial as partial privatisation can have an impact on 
special circumstances. Political and social issues raised here may cause reluctance in 
privatisation, which often may lead to the creation of private monopolies. Indeed, the 
privatization approach should always seek to develop and strengthen the private sector 
(World Bank, (1998); Commonwealth, 2000; 2001). In the case of Kenya the research 
findings analysis outlines the process of transfer from SOEs/parastatals to privatized 
firms in detail. 
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2:5:1:1 Monopolistic Tendencies- Evolution ofParastatals in the East African Sub-Region 
As is generally recognised, the nationalist movement, which arose from the 
contradictions of the colonial economy, achieved political independence and not 
economic independence (Ake, 1989). The change in the locus of political power was of 
course bound to have consequences for the locus and the distribution of economic 
power. However, these changes (often subtle) took a long time to register, and it is only 
more recently that they are beginning to be clearly discernible. Market imperfections 
and monopolistic tendencies are economic features of the colonial social formation that 
have been very slow to change. 
Thus, the great monopolies of the colonial era used their advantages to their own good 
effect and survived, as is evident from the strength of their companies. Some of these 
are: 53 The East African Portland Cement Company; Kenya National Trading 
Corporation (KNTC), Block Hotels; Kenya Ports Authority; and Kenya Posts and 
Telecommunications. There is also United African Company; Kenya Railways; Kenya 
Commercial Bank (KCB); Kenya Reinsurance Company (KCR), Mumias Sugar 
Company, Chemelil Sugar Company; and the Agro-Chemical and Food Company Ltd. 
(ACFC). Under the umbrella of the Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation of Kenya are: Kenya National Properties; Kenya Industrial Estate Ltd; the 
KENATCO Transport Company; East African Fine Spinners Ltd; the Fluorspar 
Company of Kenya; Somerset Africa Ltd. and Kenya Mining Industries Ltd. The GOK 
still maintains a level of control in the majority of these enterprises, be it managerial or 
minority shareholding. More importantly, it is important to understand the origins of the 
monopolistic enterprises in East Africa and their relations to colonialism and 
multinationals. 
Some elements of infrastructure activities have been said to exhibit "natural monopoly" 
characteristics; this means where the market can support only a single firm. Examples 
include electricity transmission and distribution, telecommunications networks and gas 
and water pipelines. This raises the issue of organizing an infrastructure industry to gain 
the advantages of production by a single firm, without encouraging monopolistic 
conduct. However, not all elements of infrastructure exhibit natural monopoly 
53 
see annexes Va and VI 
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characteristics; (Mwangi, 2004). Market competition is both possible and highly 
desirable in many activities, such as electricity generation and long distance and cellular 
telephony, as indicated by Cox, et. al (2002, p.709).54 Foster (1992) argues that a reason 
for the survival of the great monopoly enterprises of the colonial era and for the 
persistence of monopoly tendencies in the postcolonial situation, is that the monopoly 
concerned represented more than anything else an effective presence of international 
capital in Africa, to which the postcolonial economy remained and remains a client. The 
explanation of their persistence is subsumed by the general and persistent domination of 
the African economy by international capitalism. 
Ake ( 1981 p.4 7) has submitted that the failure of particular monopolies to survive does 
not mean that the pressures for competitiveness, real or potential, are strong in Africa. 
Rather, the rise and fall of particular monopolies were reflected in the objective 
conditions of the metropolitan economy, particularly the oligopolistic rivalries between 
the multinationals, the state of development of productive forces and more generally in 
the competition between imperialisms and development. These realities, which may be 
summed up as representing the pathological maturity of a colonial and postcolonial 
capitalism into a monopoly stage, tend to allow for the displacement or replacement of 
particular monopoly enterprises without allowing for the displacement of monopoly by 
competition. A new dimension is the creation of a new type of monopoly resulting from 
state capitalism that is the involvement of the state in an entrepreneurial role. Tanzania 
and Kenya 55 present two of the most striking examples of this development. 
The governments in East Africa established these enterprises, first, in order to promote 
industrialisation, economic growth and the development of productive forces. The 
assumption is that the interests of the private investors, which dominate the colonial 
economy, could scarcely be expected to be entirely harmonious with the national needs 
of development, particularly the need for industrialisation and the diversification of the 
economy. In their development, plans of each African government's state enterprises 
were seen in every African country as a necessary part of the process of 
industrialisation, diversification, the development of productive forces and of national 
economic independence. The second reason for the growth of these state enterprises is 
54 Cox J.C. et. al (2002 pp. 709-736. 
55These two countries have similar colonial background geographical landscape, language, and culture 
but Kenya is predominantly capitalistic while Tanzania has been socialist. 
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that they were crucial in the struggle for the control of the economy as well as the 
struggle for economic independence. It was necessary to encourage the development of 
enterprises controlled by nationals that could compete with and, if possible, displace 
those controlled by foreign capital. 
The national bourgeoisies who came to office in the wake of the independence 
movement soon found that they were in office but not in power because they had very 
little control of the economy. They set up state enterprises with public funds and 
sometimes in partnership with private investors (Hyden, 1983). These enterprises 
were/are given privileges in regard to things such as import licences, credit and 
government guarantees of credit, tax concessions, government contracts, government 
patronage and preferred treatment in the granting of foreign exchange. In effect, they 
were given subsidies. Indeed some of them were given outright monopoly (i.e. Kenya 
Airways and KPTC) status in the very fundamental sense of having the exclusive rights 
to operate in a particular line of business or to supply particular commodities or 
services. 
These state enterprises were needed not merely to compete with metropolitan capital for 
control of the economy but also to undertake some forms of investment which were 
considered necessary for development, but which the metropolitan capital would not be 
disposed to undertake. A good proportion of these state enterprises were started as a 
means to promote exports and to realise import substitution. It is also partly for these 
reasons that they were given monopoly privileges. The monopoly privileges were 
expected to help them to survive and eventually become competitive and profitable. 
Some of the state enterprises came into being because of nationalisations of foreign-
owned private enterprises. Such nationalisations have been recurrent and popular in 
postcolonial Africa (Aseto and Okelo, 1997, p.58). It is important to note that they were 
not necessarily motivated by ideological commitments. They occurred with significant 
frequency in countries with socialist aspirations as well as those with capitalist 
aspirations, although more so in the former than the latter. To all appearances, these 
nationalisations reflected the desire for local control of the economy. 
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The monopoly tendencies and market imperfections are highly significant features of 
the postcolonial economy (Ake, 1981 ). They affect the character of accumulation, the 
prospects of liquidating underdevelopment, the character of political competition and 
the prospects of political stability. The implications for socio-political economy are 
enormous, one of which is a narrow resource base. For any of the firms to become 
natural monopolies there must be obstacles to entry that even similar sized firms find it 
hard to surmount The notion that successful privatisation should improve economic 
efficiency leads to the larger debate of economic regulatory offences, allocation 
problems, market failures and so on whose empirical evidence is not the subject of this 
thesis. 
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2:5:1:2 Rate of Industrialization and Privatisation in Africa: "Catch-22"? 
Closely related to monopolies is the process of industrialisation in the East African 
Community (EAC) and COMESA at large which is a step towards competitive 
tendencies. For privatisation programs to be successful, Africa has to industrialize at a 
much faster rate than it currently does. The core principle in industrialization is building 
these complex networks of forward and backward linkages, which come from 
industrialization that can enable African economies capable of self-sustaining growth 
and has a direct effect on the progress of privatization. Ake (1981: 1993) maintains that 
unless the rate of industrialisation is improved by rapid introduction of improved 
technology to enable African economies to break their cycle of "primary producers" 
comparative and competitive advantages, it would be difficult to improve their various 
sectors and remove constraints in the domestic market. Ake (1981) maintains that this 
can only be addressed through industrialisation, and he argues that this is the step 
necessary in order to privatise successfully. Only then, can competition, privatization 
and restructuring be viewed as a catalyst for overall development. The assumption being 
that during the privatisation process a business has to utilize the latest technology to be 
competitive. 
The relevance ofthe industrialization (Ake 1981:1989, GOK, 1997, Aseto and Okello, 
1997) argument to privatisation is important and with privatisation programs being 
financed by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and bilateral donor agencies 
it is difficult to foresee an acceleration of industrialisation. Moreover, apart from 
sustainability of the cost of privatization programs, there is considerable difficulty in the 
LDC governments to adopt entirely the concept of private enterprises provision of 
social services. In this regard, the basis for liberalisation spearheaded by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund termed 'neo-liberalisation' by Konings-
Giberto and Mommen (1996 p.224) cannot be entirely realistic, it is suitable for only 
western countries, and is bound not to hasten industrialization in developing countries. 
This will indeed happen since the IMF and WB believe that rolling back the state and 
liberalising the economy will automatically induce economic development and 
democracy. The evidence is scant and unsolid. Furthermore, the current misnomer by 
the Bretton Woods institutions, that there is an intrinsic connection between capitalism 
and democracy, that is the notion that democracy is thought to enhance the prospects of 
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economic development, while economic liberalisation is thought to enhance the 
prospects of democracy (Beckman 1993; Jefferies 1993, and Mkandawire 1994a), 
inevitably has turned out not to be entirely true. In many cases recent World Bank 
reports signal not only a shift to a quest for democratic governments but also 
increasingly to democratic and dysfunctional institutional structures whose capacities 
cannot sustain adjustment, liberalisation, restructuring and ultimately privatisation 
without full collaboration from private sector and civil society (Dnes, 1996; Rama, 
1999; and Hogan, 2001). 
Mugerwa-Kayizzi, (1996 p.278) argues that whatever the intention, purpose and 
modalities of a privatisation program, the 'new industries' need the intervention of 
government as an enabler that creates the conditions under which the new firm can 
thrive after privatisation. This calls for the removal of constraints on tariffs, a legal 
framework policy, an investment policy, infrastructure, and energy saving investments 
in order to improve competitiveness. Transaction costs have to be reduced and financial 
availability and credit affordability have to be guaranteed. In the case of COMESA, 
governments have to create this environment under the new free trade area of 
COMESA56 as a requirement. 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have to realize that while the 
pace of privatisation has been rapid in some countries, manufacturing output growth has 
remained very weak because change of ownership has not removed the structural 
weaknesses of former parastatals (Ake, 1993). For example, after the removal of credits 
and subsidies enjoyed by TLK, alternative financial sources are still inadequate due to 
small and undeveloped equity and stock markets, whilst access to financial institutional 
loans is still limited. This means that privatised companies are unable to rehabilitate 
equipment or introduce new technologies as promised in the letters of intent (of the 
World Bank, 1991 grant agreement, with GOKi7• Other limitations include slow legal 
regulatory structures, a lack of skilled labour, a lack of access to technology, poor 
physical infrastructure, policy reversals 58 and a lack of political will. 
56 BAWUSAID Telecommunications Report ( 1999) 
57 ibid 
58 For example, SNO tendering processes cancelled by the Minister, September, 2004 
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2:5:2 Political Dimensions of Privatisation 
Political dimensions contain several important theoretical and practical lessons. Yet, 
privatization raises many other political questions. At the logical level, for instance, it 
raises the sensitive issue of nationalism (Ake, 1981 ). The financial market place is 
increasingly apatride as it ignores national frontiers. Nevertheless, should small 
countries with inadequate financial markets allow their privatized industries to fall into 
foreign hands?59 
The question has been posed with increasing anxiety in several transitional democracies 
and in some developing countries (Hanke and Walters 1990, pp.97-108). Moreover, 
which industries are considered so 'strategic' that they have to remain in state hands? 
Answers to these questions revealed different national industrial cultures. So too do 
reactions relating to the regional development labour market and employment 
dimensions of state enterprises. Clearly, perceptions of the role of the public sector 
differ very sharply from one country to another and these embedded perceptions shape 
the nature of the privatization programs pursued. Stark (1990) makes this point when 
describing the privatization processes in Eastern and Central Europe. If industries are 
privatized, what degree of control continues to be exercised by the state, through such 
devices as limiting the percentage of shares allocated to foreigners, structuring 
ownership around national firms, state representation on the board, retention of a 
blocking minority of shares60 or even through a 'golden share' which confers veto rights 
in certain circumstances? Privatization demonstrates the power of both the market and 
the state (Wallsten, 2002). 
Furthermore, politically motivated privatizations may involve an important 
redistribution of power at the national level and it is certainly not politically neutral 
(Nyong'o et al, 2000). In the first place, actors in the privatization process are often 
'bound' by constitutional and legal norms; as Gui (1994) argues, courts are often 
mobilized to define the parameters of the programmes and have sometimes limited the 
scope or slowed down the pace of the privatization drive. Secondly, and this is one of 
59 The Kenya Parliamentary debates: The Weekly Hansard 1998; See also The Standard of April28 2004 
60 GOK divested from enterprises, still maintain minority shares in some Parastatals.15% shares in KCB 11% in Safari com 
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the most important lessons of privatization - the pursuit of radical privatization 
programs requires a great deal of political will and durability and a capacity to mobilize 
a pro-privatization constituency, clearly a public relations strategy. 
This may also involve the introduction of new actors or the strengthening of existing 
pro-privatization actors such as commercial banks and financial markets. It may also 
mean an attack on the coalition of interests, which protect the public sector and a 
reshaping of the sectoral policy network in the industry destined for privatization 
(Richardson, Maloney, and Rudig 1992). Third, and linked to the previous point, 
privatization involves winners and losers; a fact that is not lost to governments intent on 
rewarding supporters and penalizing opponents. This is demonstrated by Pint (1990) 
and Dunleavy (1986) in their rational choice analyses of the British privatization 
program, and by Boix, (1997), Feigenbaum, and Henig, (1989) whose comparative 
studies highlight the role of partisan choice in dictating the scale of privatization in 
several countries. This is also demonstrated by African and Asian governments, where 
when the government changes, all policy and management changes (i.e. Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Zambia, Egypt). Kenya's TLK, KQ and KCB management 
changes by the government are recent examples. 
Privatization also has significant institutional implications. Not only has it often 
involved the courts, it has also required institutional innovation through the reshaping of 
policy agencies that can push through privatization by creating agencies to implement 
privatization. The 'Treuhandanstal' in Germany is perhaps the best known (Meaney 
1995) and through the establishment of bodies to regulate privatized monopolies. The 
contribution of Guislain, (1995), provides a good account of the role of both traditional 
and new actors (such as legal and financial advisers) in various privatization programs. 
Meaney's (1995) argument is an excellent description of the role of foreign financial 
experts and of privatization ministries in four countries ofthe ex-communist bloc. What 
emerges from this analysis is that successful privatization requires not only political will 
but also robust financial and political institutions that ensure markets to operate 
consistently as findings of the field research show in chapters four and five. The study 
of the privatization of state-owned enterprises in Ghana by Danso, A. ( 1998) is but one 
of many which underline this point. 
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Finally, as a consequence of the above factors, privatization raises fundamental ethical 
questions about justice and citizenship - a point made forcibly by Buttle (1993) who 
questions the moral premises on which much privatization is based, especially when 
PEs that otherwise provide social services at a cost that cannot be competitive with the 
private sector (for example, the Tanzania train service provision of subsidized transport 
to all primary school children who receive free education), are forced to privatize. Also, 
at a macro-political level, in many countries the link between democratic transition and 
privatization, which was assumed to be axiomatic, is proving much more complex and 
problematic, as is argued by Bahgat (2000) in his brief study of privatization and 
democratization in the Arab world and by Mcfaul ( 1998) in his study on Russia. Is 
democracy strengthened if privatized property merely serves to reinforce already 
powerful banking or industrial interests, feudal ruling families, or ex-communist 
bureaucrats transformed into Mafia-like entrepreneurs, or a mere handful of very rich 
people - as is the case in Nigeria where opposition to privatization was brutally 
suppressed (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1998). 
In summary, privatization may be driven by technological, economic and financial 
pressures and may find its theoretical rationale in the private sector investment climate 
and in development and industrialization theory and regulation theory, but it is a 
profoundly political act in its motives, processes, approaches, implications and 
ramifications. To ignore this point is to fail to grasp why privatization programs have 
differed so much across the world and why the impact has been varied (Commander and 
Killick 1988). This research found that the underlying weight of privatization lies in the 
political dynamics in developing and shaping approaches and strategies to privatization 
in Kenya and in the COMESA region. 
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2:6 Restructuring and The Cost Benefit Analysis-A Performance Process? 
The other techniques or measures of privatization (i.e. liquidation, direct sale, trade sale 
etc.) that are popular and are recommended by the World Bank include restructuring 
prior to privatising with a detailed review (cost benefit analysis) of positive and 
negative external and internal factors. The restructuring process has introduced unions 
into the privatisation debate. During the restructuring process, most governments in 
Africa and the COMESA region in particular, have tended to worry about the 
"worthiness" in preparing the firm for privatisation by disposing hundreds of workers 
whom the government should not have employed anyway (Belser and Ram a, 2001 ). It is 
therefore important that governments undertake a cost benefit analysis, in order to 
evaluate the total social costs and benefits associated with each privatisation. Because 
most governments have not reviewed their social and economic benefits in detail there 
has been a general ambivalence as to whether privatisation as a labour market policy is 
supposed to be a pleasurable experience-the "carrot" of lucrative worker shareholdings 
and more liberal promotion structures-or a stem discipline for a "lax" public sector. 
Unions have suggested that in most cases the significance of worker shareholdings is 
overstated to the point of absurdity. Indeed, unions the world over have had to adopt 
new attitudes towards privatisation as Edmonds clearly states; 
" .... the trade union's initial view was that the policy was so self-evidently 
foolish the government would not get away with it. Next came strident 
campaigns of opposition and then a feeling of some alarm at our apparent lack of 
public support. (Edmonds, 1988) 
Attitude changes in both western and African countries have been inevitable, and have 
been catalysed by the rapid change in policy by governments in order to adopt 
restructuring. In East Africa, the governments have no initial strategy for workers and 
often come up with "carrots" for the workers after there have been protests. Edmonds 
(1988) argues that most governments in Africa initially conceive mechanisms of 
deregulation, liberalisation and increased competition as part of their privatisation 
program. However, they quietly make it an indispensable revenue raiser for a 
government whose commitments to reduced income tax rates, lower public borrowing 
and macro-economic policies leave substantial social obligations that come up as a 
result of their privatisation programs - i.e. mass unemployment. For example, there is 
the case of the UK fire fighters who were against modernization as a negotiating 
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principle, yet new technology and new ways of managing are key ingredients of 
privatization. This contradiction is not always reconciled. Edmonds (1988) emphasizes 
that the problem arises with the government's rapid change in policy. He argues that the 
government's preoccupation with the balancing of the books forces them to establish 
firmly the revenue raising mechanism over the policy mechanism for promoting 
competition by breaking-up monopolies and other large units. This rapid change in 
policy and rating the revenue side of privatization as the important aspect gives way to 
conflicts and contradictions and eventually creates private monopolies at the public 
interest's expense. This view is evident in Britain as Edmond (1988) reiterates; 
So, British Telecom and British Gas were not opened up to greater competition. 
Public monopolies become private monopolies and the treasury took the 
spoils ... " Edmonds. (1988, p7) 
This is indeed true of most privatisation programs, and while this research's mandate is 
not to investigate what happened later with BT, it particularly looks at Kenya's 
privatisation of TKL with a view to analysing whether it has or does not have the 
potential to turn out to be a 'private monopoly' 61 • As a sign of retreat to monopoly 
Kenya's President suddenly halted the privatization of TLK in December, 2000, 
stating that "we will not sell Telkom at a throw-away price,"62 after evidently realising 
that it would not necessarily be a "private monopoly" (i.e. subject to government 
control). Clearly, the motive here is that of revenue rather than restructuring for greater 
competition and efficiency. 
However, Kenya's official policy for the Privatization of Public Enterprises Program 
states that the main motives include increase in competition, creating efficiency, and 
thus new opportunities. Kenya's Policy Paper on Public Enterprise Reform and 
Privatization (PERP) outlines its primary objectives as: (1) to enhance the efficiency 
and performance of the private sector; (2) to reduce the financial burden of the sector on 
the government; and (3) to achieve these objectives through the introduction of reforms 
that will enforce financial discipline, mobilize managerial and financial autonomy and 
set up adequate accountability and appropriate incentives. While the PERP's overall 
aims are: 
62 Daily Nation Newspaper December 14, 2000 (Business News) 
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... "I) "Enhancing the role of private sector in the economy; 2) Reducing the demand of 
the public enterprises; 3) Reducing the role and rationalizing the operations of public 
enterprise sector; 4) Improving the regulatory environment; 5) Broadening the base of 
ownership; 6) enhancing capital market development" (GOK, 1996 pp.l-5) 
In the majority of cases, privatization in Africa has made the interests of the consumers 
of services, and those who provide these services, subservient to the often short-term 
interests of investors - on whom the government depends for a revenue raising exercise 
(Grimstone, 1989 and Richardson, 1990). Kenya must raise a total of Kshs. 26 billion in 
privatization proceeds in a period of three years to retire its crippling domestic debt 
(World Bank 1999). It had raised under Kshs.lO billion in revenue by 1999; in fact it 
had only raised Kshs. 6.4 billion proceeds by 1997 as indicated by government records 
presented in appendix 2 annex C. 
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2:7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter constitutes a literature review and forms a theoretical framework for this 
thesis study. To summarize, it provides a synthesis of the various theoretical discussions 
on privatization as outlined in sections under relevant subject headings of this chapter. 
Sections 2:1 :2 through 2:3:2 contain a discussion on the dynamics between 
privatization, liberalization, and market reforms, public and private ownership, and state 
intervention, and the impact of applying these theories to an actual program. 
Furthermore the discussion on the application of theories of privatization strategies and 
approaches to the process in practice are outlined in sections 2:4 to 2:5:2. Section 2:6 
discusses other techniques or measures of privatization recommended by the World 
Bank, such as restructuring prior to privatizing in terms of costs and benefits. 
The synthesis of the vanous theoretical (texts) discussions on privatization was to 
narrow the scope, relevance and organization of the literature on privatization which has 
increased within the ten year-period considered by this thesis research. The approach 
was to classify and evaluate the themes of the texts that are relevant to this thesis, with 
each section of the review dealing with different aspects, while recognising that more 
literature and perspectives on the same subject exist specifically for developed, 
transitional and developing economies. As a result, the review highlighted some of the 
critical issues in the implementation of privatization programs and policy. The various 
sources utilized in the sections are addressed in the data presentation and analysis in 
chapters four, five and six, and convey the extent and complexity of the literature in 
relation to the privatization programs, process and implementation. 
In terms of major agreements or /and disagreements in the privatization literature, the 
focus of this research was on discussing privatization issues that are argued in the 
theories and the questions raised on process, methodologies and methods applied that 
were/are appropriate and useful to Kenya's situation. This is extensively presented in 
section 2:1. A major agreement is that of the 'origin' of privatization and its definitions . 
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Indeed, section 2:1 contains specific theoretical elements of a critical review of the 
'origins' of privatization and privatization programs. There is agreement as to its origins 
when the World Bank engaged privatization in order to phase out the failed structural 
adjustment programs (SAPS) for macroeconomic reforms of the early 19980s (Ake 
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1985: 1993; Bangura, et. al 1989; Jamal, 1992; Sohn and Hayes, 1999; Islam and 
Monslave, 2002; Boubakri and Cosset, 1999). Privatization was first introduced in 
Germany as denationalization of SOEs after World War II, but did not gain recognition 
and momentum as a policy until the late 1970s and early 1980s when it was actively 
implemented in Britain under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's administration 
(Meggison and Netter, 2001). As for the definition of privatization, agreement in the 
literature is that definitions may be varied but are not different. Within section 2:1, the 
various definitions by Hemming and Unnithan, ( 1999); Bienen and Waterbury ( 1989, 
p.617); US Government, (1997); and the World Bank (1999) are discussed. The main 
conclusion is that definitions of privatization, as advanced by researchers and authors, 
present no disagreement. It is also agreed that the term 'privatization' has expanded 
over the years to include direct disposals of SOEs, restructuring of SOEs and changes in 
ownership forms and patterns as dictated by the local socio-economic, political, and 
globalised business environments. 
The other agreement is that privatization has taken root in LDCs. This moves the debate 
to how to proceed instead of why proceed (Samuel, 1999). In this regard, the literature 
conclusions show that as long as governments in LDC are required to use prescriptive 
approaches to implement privatization programs and manage the SOEs, little progress 
will be achieved in transforming enterprises from a monopolistic status and state control 
to competitive and free enterprise status, thus transforming economies to the desired 
levels. 
This literature further shows that it is now evident even amongst the World Bank, and 
other proponents of market reforms and structural adjustment programs in LDCs, as led 
by Killick, (1980: 1989), Taylor, (1993) Greenwald and Stigilitz, (1989), Kikeri and 
Nellis (2002); Kikeri et al (1999), Samuel, (1999), Wallsten, (1999), Vickers and 
Yarrow,(1985), Yarrow, (1999) and Guislain and Kerf, (1995), that no matter the 
prescription, each government and region should factor into their privatization 
approaches the social-economic and socio-political variables in order to attain positive 
transitions from SOEs to competitive enterprises. 
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More importantly, there is agreement that prescription doesn't work. The literature 
concludes that while the approaches may be prescribed by the World Bank each 
approach should be on a case by case basis (Welch and Fremond, 1998), since their 
implementation takes a unique form and are shaped by realities of each government's 
unique economic needs and the socio-economic (Stiglitz, 2003:2004) and political 
environments of each country or each region (Young, 2003; Yeats, 1999; Cook and 
Minoque, 1990). Indeed, the positioning of privatization into an economic and political 
category that implies a reduction of all forms of state control over equitable resource 
allocation however well argued by economists (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: Shirley, 
1991; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1994; Megginson and Netter, 2001) is not always smooth. 
Whereas it may enable the transformation of the role of the state in all economies, it 
may also have serious ramifications for the socio-political economy, as indicated by 
Reed, 1992: Hyden, (1983); Nyong'o et al. (2000); Ake, (1985); Wright and Perrotti, 
(2000); Hanke and Walters, (1990). 
The literature further reviews the continued debate on the social function, performance 
and benefits of public versus private enterprises (Birch and Davis International, 1989; 
Ramanadham, 1989a&b; Grimstone, 1989; and Heath, 1989). In this respect, the 
literature is not in agreement as to the levels at which the social functions can be 
provided effectively by the private sector at a profit. There is also no agreement as to 
whether the public enterprises can provide social functions without major subsidies and 
adjustments in the socio-economic structures and major political implications. The 
conclusion here is that it is believed that policy objectives such as job creation and 
income distribution63 fall into the government domain. However, as Rondinelli and 
Kasarda, ( 1991, p.11 0) point out "privatization is a means through which governments 
simply divest themselves of obligations for performing important but expansive or 
politically undesirable social functions. By privatizing, they can diffuse political 
pressures to deal with critical social needs." 
The debate still evolves around which functions should be provided by the private 
sector. This constitutes an important debate since it determines the choices of sectors 
and enterprises earmarked for privatization or those retained as strategic. A few 
economic authors concur that "public goods," including services that meet basic human 
63 
see chapter five 
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needs, are likely to remain the responsibility of the government (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 
1988; Cowan, 1990; Ramanadham, 1989a; Triche, 1990; Roth, 1987). Consequently, 
while little consensus by structural economists, developmental, neoclassical and private 
sector theorists has been arrived at on how to resolve these matters, the governments in 
LDCs and transitional economies have been forced to implement prescriptive 
privatization programs (Stiglitz, 2001; Singer and Roy, 1993, p.23; Ake, 1989). 
The challenge is set in this research in cases where inequalities and poverty makes it 
difficult for governments to levy user charges (used as subsidies for a public good like 
water, health and education) for political or economic reasons and the World Bank 
prescriptive conditionality would be against provision of subsidies. These services are 
not likely to be profitable to private companies (Wallsten, 2002; Rondinelli and 
Kasarda, 1991; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988). These dynamics determine the choices of 
sectors, approaches, transactions strategies and techniques as is the case with Kenya. 
Section 2:2 focuses on the role of SAPs i.e. liberalization and reforms of the early 1980s 
to the privatization process in Africa and the COMESA sub-region in particular. This 
discussion is based on the premise that the domestic markets earmarked for reforms had 
characteristics that were not necessarily based on free markets (Akanji, 1992; Rapley, 
1994; Harris, 2002; Harris and Kusi, 1992; Mugerwa-Kayizzi,1996). In this case, 
growing criticism by neoclassical theorists and citizens at large of the impact of SAPs 
and privatization policies on the balancing between eradication of poverty and 
introduction of free markets was found to negatively affect the approach to the 
privatization process (Davies and Sanders, 1993, p.81 ). It provided the nationalistic and 
protectionist mentality that breeds opposition to privatization (Ake, 1981 ). The literature 
thus concludes that this conflict of contributions to national economic development as 
opposed to correction of market failures or deficiencies (Greenwald and Stigilitz, 1989) 
have greatly affected the pace, quality and size ofprivatizations in LDCS64. Indeed, the 
spin-offs that enhance the development of the economy but are not profitable for 
individual firms to undertake such as research and development or human capital 
formation conducive to the development of the private sector, may include embracing 
difficult sub sectors whose development is necessary to the economy but which private 
firms eschew (Lesser, 1997, p.66 and Kemp, 1991). In Cote d'Ivoire, for instance, while 
64 
see various World Bank and OECD Reports on numbers of privatization by region and sectors 
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the Banque Ivoirienne de Developpement Industriel's unrecovered loans eventually 
drove the bank into bankruptcy, this was not before it had funded the creation and 
expansion of a large number of successful local private ventures. These ventures would 
probably not have been funded otherwise, because the foreign-dominated private 
banking sector avoided Ivoirien entrepreneurs in favour of safe investments in large 
multinational corporations (Rapley 1993, pp.135-36). Such a case is scarcely 
exceptional. Research on Taiwan (Crook, 1988), Brazil (Faucher, 1991), Ethiopia 
(Stiglitz, 2003, pp25-28) and Indonesia (Ellis, 1993) has also highlighted cases of public 
firms whose individual performances were questionable but whose contributions to 
national economic development was evident. This conflict still continues in the full 
privatizations as discussed in the case of TKL privatization and most social sectors in 
Africa. Further consequences of reforms and free market intervention are discussed at 
length, as presented in section 2:3. 
Sections 2:4 to 2:5:2 discuss the application of theories of privatization strategies and 
approaches to the process in practice. These theories include the experiences of different 
countries in their involvement in complex programs that combine privatization in 
several sectors (Edgren, 2001: 1987; Killick, 1990; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1998 and 
Kirkpatrick and Cook 1995). The theories explain why different approaches are 
preferred by different countries as is the case with TKL (Aggarwal and Harper, 2000; 
Bayliss, 2002; Newbery, 1999, p.134; Pushkar and Ranjan, 2003). In addition to trends 
and the impact of privatization in relation to approaches in COMESA, East Africa and 
Kenya, this review further discusses some case studies and the methods, forms, 
objectives and techniques applied in transitional and industrial economies and some of 
their positive and negative effects. In particular, Loizos, (1999); Singapore Port 
Authority, (2000) and World Bank, (2002) on Africa, Malaysia, Chile and Singapore 
Chile's experiences; and Shafik, (1993); Gomulka, (1993); Jermakowicz, (1993); 
Megginson, et al, (1996) and Frydman et al., (1999) on Eastern Europe, in particular 
Poland and Hungary. These experiences provide a large reference base of literature both 
for the analysis of the case study of TKL and for generating an approach to privatization 
in Kenya, as presented in chapters four and five. 
Indeed, one can conclude from this review and research findings that, although there is a 
wide ranging of theories and experiences on how to proceed with privatization, 
effectively an approach to a privatization program would have unique characteristics. 
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These depend on the capacity and capability to organise the program, select the sectors, 
and institute a legal and regulatory framework that help in the implementation of any 
privatization program. It is also clear that the political landscape plays a major role in 
shaping the approach that any country takes to privatization. And while this thesis' 
theoretical framework shows the complications involved, the research findings confirm 
that this landscape is dynamic and so is the privatization process. 
In conclusion, the conceptual or theoretical framework in this chapter gives this thesis 
research the impetus and guidance to the theoretical aspects of privatization and 
provides a context in which the field data, analysis and presentation are made. However, 
unlike an analysis that is based entirely on a theoretical framework with an existing 
database, this literature review was used as a point of reference and not the literature 
itself as a subject of discussion. Thus, it does not necessarily constitute the basis for the 
theory generated and major conclusions made. More significantly, this review does not 
one position for or against privatization. Nevertheless, it has served as guidance to the 
analysis and conclusions for this research in subsequent chapters. 
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3:0 RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction and Overview 
This chapter outlines the research methodology employed throughout the course of the 
research and by drawing upon the relevant literature explains why this approach was felt 
to be the most suitable way of addressing the research aims and purpose. Consequently, 
selecting the basic research methods to use depends on various considerations as "the 
overall goal in selecting basic business research method( s) is to generate new academic 
information and get the most useful information to key decision makers in the most 
cost-effective and realistic fashion" (McNamara, 1999, p.3). 
The research, which forms the basis for this thesis, is a single case study design within a 
larger privatization program. It was chosen because of the nature of the process under 
investigation. The organization involved in the research was selected because it was 
likely to provide an exemplar of practice within the case study approach, utilized to 
focus on an enterprise likely to provide special elements and knowledge of the process. 
This involved carrying out face to face interviews within public institutions and private 
companies over the research period. 
The methodology used depends on the nature of the research question, and the ability of 
that approach to address the pertinent questions more accurately than alternatives 
(Denzin, 1978). It is also determined by the extent to which there exists knowledge 
about the subject, which may guide a more specific search for answers to the question 
(Yin, 1984). In contemporary research, the most frequently favoured approaches are the 
survey, relying on quantitative data, and the case study generally relying on qualitative 
and quantitative data. Qualitative approaches using the case study are favoured in both 
'exploratory' and 'explanatory' studies (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt 1989), or in process 
analyses (Denzin, 1970). 
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Research Strategy and Approach 
The research methodology for this thesis is divided into two phases; the first phase is 
that of literature review to establish a theoretical framework; secondary or documentary 
data collection and analysis of Telkom Kenya, as detailed in chapters two and five. The 
second phase involved primary field data collection, research and analysis, using 
interviews and questionnaires. The case study method is fully discussed on page 90 and 
the results of interviews are presented in chapters 5 and 6. 
A substantial review was undertaken primarily in the areas of the theories of the 
privatization process and market reform elements, detailed in chapter two. These 
included all selected elements of the conceptual framework and a literature review 
outlining the theoretical elements of the privatization process; this included: reasons, 
objectives, goals, rationalization and methods; public private sector ownerships issues; 
the application of current approaches and strategies in practice; and the trends and 
impact of restructuring in privatization. This categorization was done in order to 
ascertain the current state of knowledge in both areas, and to construct a conceptual and 
theoretical basis 'model' which could be used to guide the research and identify relevant 
research issues. 
The research strategy involved policy and enterprise levels' case study of Telkom 
Kenya and Kenya's enterprises listed for divestiture. It was conducted over a scattered 
total of 4 months between March 2001 and January 2004. Several research techniques 
were used, including secondary data (or documentary) analysis, and detailed interviews 
and informal discussions with public sector and regional managers, operational 
individuals and private sector individuals, politicians involved in the process of 
privatization in Kenya and in the sub-region. All of which provided qualitative and 
statistical data that was transcribed, listed, added, compared and analysed using various 
computer based analytical instruments, discussed in section 3:6. 
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3:1 Research Methods 
3:1:1 A Qualitative Research Design 
An examination of the literature suggested that various approaches manifest themselves 
in the way public and private enterprises under privatization manage the process. The 
dearth of available research and the prescriptive nature of the existing literature, 
determined the exploratory nature of the research design. The conceptual model derived 
from the literature identified a number of research questions to be addressed, which 
suggested that a qualitative approach would be an appropriate way through which an 
understanding of an approach to privatization could be gained within the context of the 
Telkom Kenya enterprise and the telecoms sector. 
In determining an appropriate research approach the crucial question is the extent to 
which one method contributes to a greater understanding than any alternative method 
would have done within a given timeframe and level of academic thesis resource. 
Conventional business, econometric and organizational analysis would require a 
different (i.e. econometric analysis) approach for the study and conventionally it would 
be studied as an object using an existing panel data 'equation estimation' approach. 
However, the literature suggests that divestiture programs in developing economies 
present a way of strategically managing a transition to the process that is more to do 
with 'organizing' than 'organization' and thus requires an approach that is holistic. 
Because of the lack of country specific research-based knowledge on approaches in 
LDCs, and the apparent complexity of the process, it was evident that the research 
would be exploratory and inductive. 
Research of this nature can be found in studies like that of Mintzberg (1979), a key 
writer in the field of strategic management (Zikmund, 1984). Archer adds that it is 
becoming common to see calls for qualitative research in disciplines concerned with 
business and management (Archer, 1988). Indeed, the objective of qualitative research 
is to: 
"describe translate or otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, 
of certain, more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world." (Van 
Maanen 1979 p.520) 
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The insight of the privatization process that could be gained from qualitative study is, in 
an instance, analogous to that reported by Bryman (1989) in the study of corporate 
culture in InsCo by Smircich (1983), which involved following through the 
implementation of an initiative to deal with backlog of insurance claims; 
.. without the detailed knowledge of the varied interpretations of life in InsCo and the 
background context, the programme could easily have been interpreted by an 
outsider as a success ... (Bryman 1989 p137) 
It is evident therefore that it was only through the adoption of a qualitative research 
design that questions were raised as to the correctness of this interpretation. Similarly, 
the privatization model derived from the literature review clearly suggests a process that 
requires individual and government involvement across the organization. The 
complexity of the process, and the importance of the temporal nature of its progression, 
suggest that to gain an insight into the way events and service institutions are interlinked 
and how a strategic approach is managed and developed over time, requires the 
adoption of a qualitative approach. Pettigrew, who argues that in the field of strategic 
management and public policy, a contextualist approach should be adopted states; 
"understand the emergent situation and holistic features of an organisation or a 
process in its context, rather than divide the world into limited sets of dependent and 
independent variables isolated from their context." (Pettigrew 1985 p. 22) 
Indeed the centraVm~or question in a study whose focus is the use of qualitative 
methods does not require a rigorous testing of the hypothesis as in the case of a pure 
hypothesis. Central/major research questions are used here to generate theory in this 
'model case' rather than to test theory of approaches to a privatization process. 
The central/major question and four sub-questions are used in this research to address 
the overall elements in the approaches to the privatization process. They help "guide" 
the major indicators of the privatization process as discussed in the conceptual and 
theoretical framework in chapter 2 and in chapter five's extensive analysis of the 
telecommunications sector. 
One major strength of qualitative research is that of depth and detail. This depth may 
not be achieved in a standardized questionnaire; can generate new theories and 
recognize phenomena ignored by most or all previous researchers and literature. It also 
helps people see the worldview of those studied and their categories rather than 
imposing categories and attempts to avoid pre-judgements, while focusing on the goal 
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of capturing what is happening, presenting people from their own perspectives and 
vtews. 
Some of the weaknesses of qualitative research that might concern this analysis include 
the fact that fewer people studied adequately may result in less easily generalized results 
and as such it is usually difficult to aggregate data and make systematic comparisons. 
This was not necessarily the case in this study as the same group can be studied for a 
longer period. Further discussion on the benefits of qualitative research analysis can be 
found in section 3:3. 
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3:2 Process of Investigation 
3:2:1 Sample and Sampling 
A major institution in the GOK that manages the policy side of privatization was identified 
during the preliminary field secondary data collection. After discussions and preliminary 
enquiries with senior management in both the public and private sector an initial listing of 
50 public/private institutions and individuals was drawn in consultation with major players. 
There are/were no alternative listing for sampling as Good (1999, p.41) explains; 
An individual sample may not be representative, that is, an exact copy of the 
population, but the method by which you sample must be representative in the sense 
that it ensures that every possible sample is equally likely 
In order to enhance validity of the sample this listing was backed up by re-checking 
with the Telkom Kenya management using their listing of the institutions/individuals 
involved in the process directly with the private sector. The listing sample is shown in 
appendix 1 annex lila. In view of the 'closed nature' of the processes of investments in 
Kenya and developing countries, the underlying population from which a sample was 
drawn are representative. 
The sampling for respondents in this study was a non-probability form of sampling, the 
purpose of which is/was not to establish a random or representative sample, but to 
identify those people who have information about the process. It is a means of 
identifying relevant institutions, people, and documents and sub-processes. In drawing a 
distinction between the two forms of sampling Johnson suggests; 
"Probability sampling yields the researcher a representative picture of various 
features of the population; non probability samples yield a small number of 
informants who provide representative pictures of aspects of information or 
knowledge distributed within the population." (Johnson 1990 p23) 
This sample for the primary data survey drawn from a government listing of a possible 
fixed population of 50 institutions and individuals is a selected population in the area of 
the privatization program. Because of the 'closed nature' of the public process, the 
underlying public population from which a fixed sample is drawn has to be 
representative and observed in random order. This unique sample of one group of non-
homogeneous institutions and individuals is closely involved and plays a major role in 
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the process m Kenya, m COMESA and in the communications and transportation 
industries. 
After the initial consultation, the original possible sample listing of 50 was scaled to a 
population of 40 institutions and individuals by excluding those institutions that had less 
involvement in the privatization program and process. This estimate of the actual listing 
of the possible sample that are involved in privatisation programs (regional experience) 
was also based on the closed nature of the process in Kenya and in the CO MESA region 
(Nyong'o 2000). To further ensure representation, consultations the government head of 
privatization in the Treasury, with TLK and with the private sector were made. A 
sample population of 40 was selected based on their level of involvement, length of, and 
close involvement in dealing with/and managing the privatization and private sector 
development processes in the region, in Kenya and in their own companies. The levels 
and length of, involvement were important because they were likely to act as an 
exemplar of the practice. 
Further validation was made through phone calls and visits clarifying the levels of 
involvement in the implementation of the privatization program. Those sampled are 
listed in appendix 1 annex III (IIIa) 1• Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show the sample frame, 
number of institutions and distribution of the sample interviewees used in the study. 
After establishing the final sample preliminary interviews were held with semor 
management to outline the steps involved in the policy making process. This 
preliminary process provided background information relating to all the public, private 
and regional institutions and enterprises. 2 Since there was little or no institutional or 
company documentation relating to the privatization policy and process to be examined, 
accounts of previous experiences and transactions, i.e. KPTC, were gathered by way of 
discussions. 
1 Excluded population of the sample included (l.Kenya School of Monetary Studies, 2.Export Promotion Council, 3.Kenya 
Sugar Authority, 4.Government Printers, Ministry of Planning and 5.Home Affairs, 6.Parlimentary Accounts Committee, 
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Economic Desk, 8.UON Institute of Development Studies, 9.National Secretariat for 
Transport 10. Kenya Railways 
2 See appendix for a brief of selected institutions 
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The questionnaires were distributed to 40 possible respondents, by post, hand delivery, 
and email, along with customised letters (annex IV). The respondents had been sampled 
using a representative GOK list discussed above in detail.3 Follow-up telephone calls, 
emails, faxes and initial meetings were made to those sampled to make appointments 
and confirm the number of respondents from each institution. The responses via email 
acknowledging receipt was positive and led to a high response rate; out of the study 
sample of 40 earmarked for interviews in the field research plan, a total of 36 responded 
to the study, accounting for an 90% response rate. This research anticipated a target 
high of a 100% response rate and a low target of a 50% response rate. Fourteen 
interviewees were available for face to face and telephone interviews using both the list 
of semi-structured questions and the full questionnaire. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show the 
sampling frame and response rate. The reasons why the 90% response was 
unexpectedly successful was because of the difficult nature of the primary data 
collection experienced with this sample population of busy bureaucrats and chief 
executives. It was seen as unlikely that would respond to the interviews positively as 
they did .. Indeed, all the 28 major institutions involved in the privatisation process 
responded to the study (see table 3-2) unexpectedly, thus raising the response rate. More 
importantly the major drivers of the privatization program in Kenya and in the region, 
that is the ten parastatal chief executives, availed themselves for interviewing during the 
research period. 4 All these factors culminated into the 90% response rate. While the 
90% response rate would seem high, it is not unusual to a 'closed' or 'fixed' sample 
size as is the case in this research. A high response rate and high percentage of 
responses in specific questions as presented in the analysis in chapter five shows a high 
interest in the subject and has no negative effect on the results as might be the case in a 
purely quantitative analysis. 
Table 3-1 Sample Size and Response Rate 
Total Number of Respondents Number of Total Response Rate-
Sample Size responses to interviews % 
40 36 90% 
Source: Author's Compilation (2003) 
3 See the list of Institutions (annex Ilia and IIIb) and a further listing in annexes V and VI, 
4 These were: 1) The Investment Secretary Ministry of Finance, 2) The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Transport and 
Communication, 3) Investment Promotion Centre, 4) Minister of Planning and Development 5) The Chairman Parliamentary Investment 
Committee, 6) The Managing Director of Telkom Kenya, 7) General Manager Strategic Planning, Telkom Kenya 8) The Director 
General of Communication Commission of Kenya; 9) the Secretary General CO MESA, and I 0) the Secretary General TTCA. 
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3:2:2 The Sample -Actors 
The actors involved in the research came from all institutions listed and were drawn 
from all levels within institutions (see figure 3-1 and Appendix 1: annex Ilia for more 
details). They included senior management teams, middle managers and operational 
staff. Senior managers' roles involved having the wider picture of the privatization 
process and were expected to describe and explain significantly Kenya's 'unique 
approach' to the privatization process. All others involved had a significant role in their 
respective institutions and were expected to have significant knowledge of the 
privatization program and its implementation. 
The research method adopted was central to the selection of the interview sample: the 
Manager of the Department of Government Investments and Public Enterprises 
(DGIPE) or the Investment Secretariat; the General Managers strategic planning and 
technical operations of Telkom Kenya and the Managing Director of the Investment 
Promotion Centre championed the research and were the "gatekeepers" into the public 
sector privatization 'club' and an important link to private/public sector actors. The 
General Manager (Strategic Planning) of Telkom Kenya was particularly instrumental 
in facilitating access to resources and providing important updates and progress on 
privatization events on a regular basis. Access was provided readily in cases where 
contact had been made before the field interviews (see appendix! annex v for interview 
schedule). 
The majority of the participants had been in employment with the respective companies 
since their set-up in 1999 and during the period of the unbundling of Kenya Posts & 
Telecommunications (KPTC). They comprised three major levels, top management, 
middle management and operations/technical levels. A few of the senior management in 
both POSTA and TLK had been employed by KPTC before the implementation of the 
privatization program and the subsequent unbundling of KPTC that produced Telkom 
Kenya Company Ltd. (TKL). These 'gurus' came in handy to inform the process and 
substantiate data and continued to give a critical input throughout the study in Kenya 
and the analysis in United Kingdom. The major institutions surveyed are briefly 
discussed in appendix I: annex I. and the characteristics of the sample are described in 
the following sections. 
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Table 3-2 Sampling Frame and Interviews 
Sampling Frame 
Number of Total Number of Number of 
Institutions Sample (people) Interviews (people) 
,, 
A ;% 
28 40 36 
Source: Author's Compilation (2003) 
It is important to note that all respondents were sampled and interviewed based on their 
position in the institution or industry and not as individuals, even in cases where 
specific questions required a personal view or response, as in question 19 page 12 of 
appendix 1 annex 1. 
Documentation 
Documentation was sought throughout the course of the research. In some cases 
company brochures and newsletters provided valuable information from which 
historical company information could be obtained. They proved to be a useful indicator 
of involvement levels in the process and provided valuable statistical data on 
employees, performance and types of service provision. As far as possible top-level 
policy planning and annual reports documentation for each year detailing the translation 
of activities were collected and helped the verification and tracing of activities to inform 
the process and substantiate data. The notion that documentation is a useful tool for 
validation is further supported by Yin who states: 
"For case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources." (Yin 1994 p80) 
Indeed, this thesis research used documentation to corroborate primary or interview data 
evidence, throughout the analyses in chapters two, four and five. 
However, it should be noted that almost all GOK institutional documentation was listed 
as "confidential" and was only available for inspection on limited occasions and periods 
after clearance5• TLK and the consulting companies could not release first hand reports 
for inspection and analysis since they were all GOK documents. Obtaining 
documentation from bureaucratic systems within the government that value documents 
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as their maJor tool of operation was a difficult task. The challenge is that GOK 
considers most of their documents private and confidential even to a researcher during 
the period of the research. There is no legislation on "freedom of information" to enable 
obtaining important documents. It is left to the negotiation skills of the researcher and 
the "terms and conditions" of the official giving the document to resolve access to 
'classified' documentation and information. 
3:3 The Case Study Approach 
3:3:1 Applications of Case Study Research - a Scientific Approach 
The approach to case study is one that emulates the scientific method, posing clear 
questions and the development of a formal research design. Its use of theory and 
reviews of previous research to develop research questions or/and hypotheses and rival 
hypotheses, has applications to TLK's study. Case studies typically involve the 
collection of empirical data to answer these hypotheses/research questions and rival 
hypotheses, the assembling of a database independent of any narrative report; 
interpretations or conclusions that can be inspected by third parties; and the conduct of 
quantitative or qualitative analyses (or both), depending on the topic and research 
design. 
The use of a single case study approach in the field of business management and 
strategic management is not without precedent. As Mintzberg argues, "what, for 
example is wrong with samples of one?" In discussing the grounds for his own research, 
he argues that management research has "paid dearly for the obsession with rigor in the 
choice of methodology. Too many of the results have been significant only in the 
statistical sense of the word." (Mintzberg 1979, p.583). Michael Porter, another 
influential academic in this field, supports the need for this research approach: 
"Academic journals have traditionally not accepted or encouraged the deep 
examination of case studies, but the nature of strategy requires it. The greater use of 
case studies in both books and articles will he necessary for real progress at this 
stage in the field's development." (Porter 1991 p99) 
The lack of identified research led to the adoption of a single in-depth case study 
approach to gain a holistic view of the process. Consideration had to be given to the 
5 Note: all documents were under the governmental "zeal" as GOK documents 
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practical issues of the small number of identified enterprises and institutions and the 
problems of time, access and the resources available to carry out the research. 
In this context, case research seeks to obtain a holistic view of a specific phenomenon 
or series of events. This is a time consuming exercise and it is generally not possible to 
carry out more than one case or a very limited number of in depth studies in an 
academic research project. Glaser & Strauss recognize the value of a single case study 
in laying the foundation for future work: 
"Since accurate evidence is not so crucial for generating theory, the kind of 
evidence, as well as the number of cases, is also not so crucial. A single case can 
indicate a general conceptual category or property; a few more cases can confirm the 
indication. (Glaser & Strauss 1967 p30) 
The argument for supporting a single case study approach to this research is further 
reinforced by Burgleman who argues that: 
"Living with these concerns (about the external validity of fmdings) may be a 
necessary cost of providing new insight in as yet incompletely documented 
management processes in complex 'public' organizations. The purpose of such 
efforts is primarily to generate new insights that are useful/or building theory." 
(Burgleman 1985 p42) 
Yin further suggests three reasons for a single case study, one of which, the revelatory 
case, applies to this study: 
"This situation exists when an investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyse 
a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation. " (Yin 1994 p40). 
The approach adopted overcame the acknowledged problem in organizational research 
of taking account of the temporal processes in organizations/enterprises; especially the 
issue oftemporal validity: 
"In particular when research is based on detailed case study, there are often clear 
benefits associated with either an extended stay or a return to the organization in 
question. One of the strengths of qualitative research which is based on detailed case 
studies is that it is able to capture processes overtime ... "(Bryman 1989 p243) 
Case studies are often associated with 'qualitative' as opposed to 'quantitative' methods 
and data, which is associated with questionnaire-surveys and experiments. Clarification 
of two issues is necessary. First, while case studies more often than not use qualitative 
methods and gather qualitative data, they are by no means confined to this 
categorisation. Second, depending on the nature of the case study it can be difficult to 
perform statistical analyses of such data because the cases tend to be few in number or 
data may not be comparable across cases. 
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However, qualitative data does lend itself to statistical analysis and developments in 
qualitative research methods for example, Glaser and Strauss, 1987; Yin, 1984; Miles 
and Huberman, 1984; Strauss and Corbin, 1990 demonstrate that it is possible to 
analyse systematically qualitative data using a variety of regimes. Glaser and Strauss 
have argued in defence of case study and qualitative methods: 
There is no fundamental clash between the purposes and capacities of 
qualitative and quantitative methods or data. What clash there is concerns the 
primacy of emphasis on verification or generation of theory - to which heated 
discussions on qualitative versus quantitative data have been linked historically 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967, p.l7). 
It has been reported that case studies offer the researcher an ability to collect rich data of 
high validity while presenting and analysing data within their wider context (i.e. the 
holistic view). Mitchell (1983) has argued that the critics of case study reliability do not 
consider that the case study inferential mechanism relies upon 'the cogency of or the 
quality of being logically valid, believable, rigorous and relevant in theoretical 
reasoning' than merely seeking the typicality or representativeness of the case. 
Case studies are not without critics. Bryman reports that case studies have been labeled 
as idiosyncratic as evidence derives from one or two untypical organizations (Bryman 
1989). Implicit in most research as discussed earlier is the notion that generalization is a 
desirable outcome. Gummesson however, argues for cases; he reports that in case study 
research generalization has two dimensions, that which arises from qualitative studies 
based upon a large number of observations in order to determine the 'how' question, 
how much, how often and how many, and in-depth and exhaustive case studies which 
can be used to explain the alternative meaning of generalization (Gummesson 1991 
pp78-79). 
Generalization from case studies has to be approached differently and should be 
evaluated in terms of the adequacy of the theoretical inferences that are generated (Yin 
1995, Mitchell 1983). Bryman concludes "the aim is not 'necessarily' to infer the 
findings 'directly' from a sample to a population, but to engender patterns and linkages 
oftheoretical importance." (Bryman 1989 p.l73). 
Case studies therefore play a unique role in providing and understanding the workings 
of organizations' and institutions' processes, that are not well documented and which 
are not amenable to investigation through qualitative methods of investigation. Indeed, 
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Bryman reports the exploratory case study approach utilized to achieve insights into a 
previously uncharted area leads to subsequent generation of theory (Bryman 1989). 
Note throughout that the purpose of this thesis study was not to propose and test 
hypothesis, but to explore and clarify a largely unknown situation guided by a 
conceptual framework established through previous research as laid out in chapter 2. 
This research further focuses on investigating the linkage between approaches of 
privatization of public enterprises (PEs) and their outcomes in the region providing a 
unique case for a developing country. A case study (unique case) can therefore be 
defined as one that is: 
expected to catch the complexity of a single case. We study a case when in itself is 
of very special interest. We look for the detail of interaction with its contexts. Case 
study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to 
understand its activity within important circumstances. Each case is of interest in its 
uniqueness and commonality. We seek to understand them (Stake, 1995: xi: 1) 
For example, the approaches that define the objectives, methods and techniques of 
privatization may be in general common to industrial, emerging and developing 
economies (environments). What differs are the various approaches and strategies 
applicable to specific environments unique to those sub-regions or countries. Case 
studies are useful for unfolding research findings because they are easily cross-
compared and generalized with other telecoms privatisations i.e. Uganda, Britain and 
South Africa, with a time series sample over the period of 1993-2003 to isolate any 
themes or patterns. For example, various case studies about process, approach, strategy 
and program failures might be compared to commonalities in these 'privatization' 
experiences and how they went through the program6. These commonalities might 
highlight where in the program the process needs to be strengthened. Empirical research 
i.e. data-collected, is based on Kenya's 'experience'. Punch (2000) used the general 
term 'observation' alongside the term 'experience', thus defining 'empirical' to mean 
based on direct experience or observation of the world. He further explained the 
question of empirical data: 
"To say that a question is an empirical question is to say that we will answer it - or 
try to answer it - by obtaining direct, observable information from the world, rather 
than, for example, by theorizing, or by reasoning, or by arguing from first principles. 
The key concept is 'observable information about (some aspect of) the world'. The 
term used in research for this 'observable information about the world', or 'direct 
experience of the world', is data. 3 The essential idea in empirical research is to use 
observable data as the way of answering questions, and of developing and testing 
ideas." 
6 See analysis by Shirley, and Wallsten (2002; 2001) on Ghana; Shirley et.al (2002; 2003; 2004) on Uganda And Azam; 
Dia, and N'Gussan, (2002) On Senegal 
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An exploratory case study method is useful in challenging existing approaches and 
strategies and the structure of privatization by presenting an example which existing 
theory cannot explain completely. The case of telecommunications is unfolding (i.e. 
happening at the time of study and that implies that the theory may arise or be explained 
by researching the case. The exploratory case method was used in both phases of this 
research (secondary and primary phases). This is necessary to show the approaches to 
the privatisation process and their impact as exemplified by the case of TLK's 
privatization in a developing country environment where there are less resources and 
differing priorities/objectives from those of fmanciers of privatisation (i.e. donor 
agencies, and sometimes those of the public and the government). 
The case study approach (which emphasises theory generation rather than theory 
testing) therefore became appealing in exploring the grivatization transactions and 
subsequent search for a model approach/strategy. In its examination of public policy 
implications versus private ownership under different approaches and market structures, 
this research design enables the study to draw useful conclusions on the quest for an 
approach to privatization for a developing economy. 
Further, through the case study used herein, when profiling privatization activities of the 
State owned enterprises and related private sector and regional institutions, it is possible 
to replicate or generalize the prevailing privatization approaches and strategies to the 
CO MESA sub-region as discussed in the transferability subsection of this chapter. The 
general empirical approach to this study is sub-sectoral, and as Boomgard et al. (1992) 
would argue, a sector strategy approach to privatization enables a focus on observation 
of the implementation evolution by examining the characteristics of approaches to a 
privatization i.e. forms adopted, processes and strategies using a case study as discussed 
in chapter two. 
Strengthens and Weakness 
Furthennore, as noted in the overview of this chapter, the main validity weakness 
attributed to the case study approach is its alleged lack of representation (in application 
to population) and the difficulty in identifying the specific biases of each case, which 
affects the external validity ofthe research study. Yin (1984) addresses this often cited 
limitation of the case study approach and provides a solution by arguing that: 
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"Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not 
to populations and universes. In this sense the case study, like the experiment, does 
not (page 148) represent a 'sample' and the investigator's goal is to expand and 
generalise (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalisation)." (P .21 ). 
This thesis supports this view. The case of Telkom Kenya is easily replicated in the 
COMESA region due to its similar policy characteristics shared by other similar 
member states, and the implementation of a similar agenda prescribed by the World 
Bank. Further, Eisenhardt (1999) asserts that it is neither expedient nor necessary to 
sample the population scientifically, when indeed it is a unique unfolding case like that 
of Telkom Kenya; 
"The sampling of cases from the chosen population is unusual when building theory 
from few studies. Such research relies on theoretical sampling (i.e. cases are chosen 
for theoretical, not statistical, reasons ... )" (P537) 
The choice and sometimes the number of the case(s) in qualitative research is 
significant because a study that investigates more than one case may allow the research 
to gain a broad view of the issues but preclude a more detailed examination of these 
same issues in contrast to a single case study. Clearly, in multiple cases, questions of 
reliability and frequency may be more important to the research objectives than in this 
study. The single case of TLK allowed for an in-depth analysis of a typical case with 
"closed" or "limited" representativeness. Although the case may be chosen randomly, 
random selection is neither necessary, nor even preferable. Eisenhardt (1989) has also 
argued that it is to the advantage of the research to select cases which replicate previous 
cases or extend emergent theory, the "incremental approach to case selection", or tend to 
fulfil theoretical categories and provide examples of polar types. In this respect, 
representativeness is not a necessary condition. Indeed, because of the small number of 
privatized cases in the population of interest, this strategy is applied. 
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3:4 Field Research Methods 
The research instruments were designed based on these discussions, on the theoretical 
framework outlined in chapter 2 and on the analysis of the telecommunications sector in 
chapter 4. The questionnaire was divided into three sections to target the public sector 
policy makers, the private sector stakeholders and the regional economic and trade 
policy makers ·(i.e. COMESA, EAC and IGAD). At this stage, three major levels of 
how/what to divest from and how to apply the global theoretical principles (chapter 2) 
became more important. In addition, how to develop a longer-term approach, unique 
and appropriate to the Kenyan economy, that can absorb the impact of reform activities 
(i.e. institutional building and establishing framework) seemed much less clearer. The 
stage was then set for an empirical investigation. 
~easures~easure01ent 
Field research is distinguished from other styles of research by the fact that one enters 
into the natural settings of respondents. In studying Kenya's approach to privatization, 
primary multiple data collection techniques were employed. Brewer and Hunter (1989) 
argue that fieldwork methods, i.e. participant observation, informant interviewing, 
surveys, groups and analyses of clients and cases, are often combined. Field work is 
therefore inherently multi-method and as stated by Brewer and Hunter (1989, p.45) 
derives it strength from its flexibility in data collection and its unique strategy of 
observing natural elements first hand. 
The major thesis question was not intended to be measured or tested but to provide 
guidance to data collection and analysis. The research questions guided the research into 
collecting data on approaches to a privatization process with specific reference to 
Telkom Kenya's transaction. Recent approaches to identify more robust measures of the 
practices and impact of privatization have proved to be problematic (Truss, 2001). The 
questions of the field questionnaire described in the data collection section used an 
average of a five-point Likert-scale that required respondents to rank or/ and rate from 
the highest to lowest. Interviewees responded to 'how' to determine 
approaches/strategies taken and were asked to explain why certain decisions and actions 
were taken, agree on a 'yes' or 'no' basis and indicate the extent to which they strongly 
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agreed or disagreed with specific statements. As Guzzo et. al (1994), and Meyer and 
Allen (1997) noted, perceptions of 'reality' are likely to influence respondents' 
performance thus making it necessary to collect individual perceptions of Kenya's 
approach to the privatisation process, using a qualitative analysis of a case study 
discussed herein. 
In privatization and investment deals that involve sale of enterprises and joint 
ventureships confidentiality of transactions is required to avoid an 'insider information' 
situation. In view of this, most of the respondents did not want to be identified. As 
Punch (1986 p.44) argues conventional practice and ethical codes demand that various 
safeguards should protect the privacy and identity of research subjects. Bulmer (1982) 
in Punch7 argues that "identities, locations of individuals and places are concealed in 
published results, data collected is held in anonymity form and data are kept securely 
confidential (Punch, 1986, p.44). 
In addressing the confidentiality and possible conflicts of interest in this thesis study, a 
personalised letter explaining the purpose of the study and follow-up phone call was 
made. In addition at the start of the interview terms of confidentiality were restated. The 
interviewee was verbally assured that the information and issues discussed would not be 
used for any other purposes than that of an academic study for a PhD thesis. 
Respondents were further assured that the researcher and no other person would handle 
access to their responses. Where their comments, quotes and their names were to be 
used, their verbal or written permission would be sought, during and after the 
interviews. The format and expected length of the interview was explained on the phone 
and at the start of the interview. In all cases, permission was sought to take notes. This 
was acceptable in all the cases except five where the respondents were uncomfortable 
with note taking and preferred anonymity in representing their information. 
7 These two individuals are industry players who have been in the industry for over 15 years. One of them was a former 
CEO of KPT&C and is now in the private sector (telecoms). The other individual has both an investment and academic 
background. 
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3:5 Data Collection 
The field primary data collection combines two major data methods: questionnaires that 
included structured and semi-structured questions and a list of guiding open ended semi-
structured questions (numbers 1 0-15). This small number conveyed the focus of the 
interview, allowing for conversational flexibility (annex I & II). The questionnaires 
used had three sections namely: the public sector; the private sector; and regional 
sections, with an average of 20 closed and open questions and were administered using 
face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews and an e-mail conferencing system where 
necessary. Face to face interviews were used to get more in-depth information from 
specific respondents directly involved in the process. More specifically data on the 
operations ofTLK as a parastatal under the GOK's privatization program were collected 
and focused on its core business; that of a fixed line telephony service provider, with 
particular reference to the customers, growth and performance targets, competitors and 
so on (figure 5-8). These data were as a result of a combination of the above methods, 
including documentation (applications, histories, records, etc.) and observation, as 
stated in the research methodology. 
The research questions were designed to elicit both qualitative and quantitative 
information. The nature of the research also required that data were gathered in both 
methods to ensure validity and variable inclusiveness. Due to lack of resources and 
distance involved, necessary information was collected 'on 'site' to avoid major data 
'gaps' during the analysis process. A questionnaire (tool) was either administered by the 
investigator or completed by respondents and picked up by the researcher. Typically, 
interviewing (see section 3:2:4) was used to collect information and took place in the 
work place or preferred venue of the interviewee. An interview schedule of a list of 
semi-structured questions was administered in enterprises and to individuals. Additional 
evidence was sensibly required to further "ground the theory" with qualitative data 
leading to textual information structured under agenda headings of approaches, 
objectives, methods, and techniques of privatisation programs detailed in chapter 5 and 
discussed in chapter 2. The main field data collection activity was undertaken in late 
October 2003 to January 2004, and the data were gathered, sorted, recorded (i.e. 
notebooks) and analyzed as described in the data analysis and interpretation section. 
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3:5:1 Methodology Used in Conducting Field Interviews 
Questionnaire Design and Implementation. 
The overall purpose of the questionnaire (tool) was to broadly target the major research 
question outlined in chapter one and get information that would sketch the institutional 
pattern of approaches and to uncover a region's divesture program. It further served 
three purposes; first it enabled the study to collect information from respondents who 
for personal or distant reasons were unable to participate in interactive interviews. 
Second, the semi-structure questions were used as guiding interview questions for 
public, regional institutions' managers and private sector representatives. 
Questionnaires enabled the study to use face-to-face, phone, email and mail 
interviewing methods for the three distinct (but related) groups of respondents in a 
unique but similar manner, thus maintaining the quality and quantity (reliability) of the 
data to be collected, within limited time and resources. Third, the questionnaire was 
helpful in sampling out those respondents that needed follow-up for clarification or in-
depth purposes. It was a time saving tool for the respondents that were unable to do 
interviews and the semi-structured guiding questions (annex II) helped in focusing the 
interviews. 
Specifically, information and data gathered by semi-structured questionnaires was based 
on indicators focusing on; i) broader privatization policy-approach areas. That of rating, 
ranking and comparing divestiture objectives using interview responses in percentages, 
targets of expected revenue, sales and total real revenue received by regional 
governments; ii) wealth creation and share distribution (who buys the enterprise); iii) 
the specific institutional roles, including the increase in percentage of business 
opportunities/jobs created, management competencies, public sector capacity to manage 
a privatization program; iv) the specific enterprise targeted for privatization the 
telecommunications case, to restructuring, through an increase number of lines per 
employee, technology levels, speed of technology adaptability, size of market, rate of 
market penetration and debt levels and eventually achieve a sale and; v) qualitative and 
statistical sector data on costs, sale timeframes, number of customers and employees, 
investment levels, preferred methods of disposal, and competition. A large part of the 
data addressed qualitative information on different expectations of GOK's management 
and the private sector on the management of the process of actual transfer of assets. 
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3:5:2 Interviews 
Types of Interview Techniques 
The interviews allowed the researcher to examine more deeply the reasons why certain 
steps or systems within the process were, or were not being utilized. In following the 
study of Telkom Kenya throughout the privatization process the unstructured interviews 
are used as a means through which: 
"Perceptions, motives and different levels of influence of the various participants in 
the process under investigation .... and the data will describe patterns in the broadest 
sense rather than in terms of causal relationships." (Hornsby and Simon 1994 p.l68) 
Each respondent was interviewed separately to avoid influences or cases of restriction, 
where respondents were restricted in their answers due to the presence of others or were 
in an environment that caused discomfort. Good, (1999, p.40) states that the ... 
"restrictions would arise if one did a survey of political preferences by going from 
house to house interviewing the occupants while they sat around the dinner table. 
Their answers would not be the same as those expressed in the privacy of the polling 
booth. People care about what others think and when asked for an opinion about an 
emotionally charged topic in public, may or may not tell the truth. In fact, they are 
unlikely to tell the truth if they think third parties are listening in. If a wife hears a 
husband say "Democrat," she may just reply "Democrat" herself to avoid argument. 
To obtain a true representative sample, our observations must be independent of one 
another" 
Indeed, in view of the sensitive and 'closed' nature of a public enterprise disposal- a 
high level of confidentiality of 'insider' information had to be maintained during this 
thesis's study observations, and interviews with respondents were arranged and done in 
acceptable, 'safe' and comfortable environments. As Punch (1986 p.44) has correctly 
argued, emotional practice and ethical codes demand that various safeguards should 
protect the privacy and identity of research subjects. The in-depth interview technique 
was used in order to probe the ideas of the interviewees about the phenomenon of 
interest, while maintaining all protocols including confidentiality. This was utilised 
extensively because some of the CEOs interviewed had a 'monopoly' regarding specific 
information, thus requiring an in-depth session, which this technique provided. 
Interviews also helped in the gathering of in-depth information on actual situations and 
on the figures behind respondents' experiences of their role in the privatisation process. 
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In cases where the respondents preferred to go through the questionnaire but did not 
physically complete it, telephone interviews, were undertaken. In some cases, several 
phone calls were made or another meeting was arranged to complete the questionnaire. 
About 1 0% ( 4 interviewees) of the respondent interviews were unstructured or informal 
and conversational - at the request of the respondents, and no predetermined questions 
were asked, in order to remain as open and adaptable as possible to the interviewee's 
nature and priorities. This line of interviewing was particularly useful for exploring 
broad areas in cases where CEOs were unwilling to discuss structure. However, the 
disadvantage was that since each interview tended to be unique it was more difficult to 
analyze unstructured interview data, especially when synthesizing across respondents. 
In this regard, it was a method used in limited cases where the respondent requested this 
format, or had limited time, or was uncomfortable with guided interviews. 
All other interviews followed a general interview guide, based on either the 
questionnaire or a summary of the semi-structured list of questions. This summary 
guide was intended to ensure that the same general areas of information were collected 
from each interviewee. This provided more focus than the conversational approach, but 
still allowed a degree of freedom and adaptability in getting information from the 
interviewee. 
The questionnaire interviews varied, but overall it took a maximum of 2 hours to 
complete during the interview. It took the respondent approximately an hour and 30 
minutes to complete one section without an interviewer and one hour to complete each 
of the three section without the interviewer. The telephone interviews lasted 30 
minutes8• In some instances, the closed questions still elicited discussion in the face-to-
face interviews. This format was useful for getting standard answers that helped in 
providing factual figures, numbers (statistical ) information on specific events; such 
information turned out to be very useful in the data analysis. 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, an 'expert group panel' discussion was 
used. This group went into an in-depth discussion on the privatisation process in Kenya 
and in particular, discussed the Privatisation Bill. The Ministry of Planning and 
8 While you can time interviews these are estimates cognisant of individuality of speech and experience 
118 
Chapter Three: Research Approach and Methodology, Field Research and Data Methods 
Development (MPD) convened the expert work-group panel in collaboration with the 
African Academy of Sciences (AAS). It was chaired by the Minister of Planning and 
Development and included: the Permanent Secretary (PS) in the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications; the directors of divestiture, Kenya Power; the Investment 
Secretariat; Treasury economists; trade specialists, private sector individuals; and 
academicians. The group's main mandate was to critically review and analyse the 
privatization program's major sectors (utilities, sugar industry, banking, transport and 
communication). 
The advantages of using semi-structured interviews for this thesis study include: its low-
cost; its rapid form of gathering information from individuals, institutions or small 
groups; its flexibility; and its use as an advance guide. The interviews also provided 
benefits in the assessments of the capacity and character of institutions, to verifications 
of macro-economic data about the state of local socio-economic conditions; and in 
efforts to understand the basic mind set of intended policy makers, investors and 
beneficiaries. Their focus on issues of factual knowledge, opinions and perceptions of 
program approaches, objectives, ownership and reasons for ownership as well as 
selection criteria was an advantage. They also provided practical suggestions and 
recommendations on specific issues and subjects, such as the introduction of new 
technology, levels of investments and choice of objectives and speed of privatization. 
The semi-structured questions used were reviewed by two representatives from the 
privatization program. 
The semi-structured interviews were also very useful in providing detailed information 
on policy issues and the comparative perspectives of diverse populations (i.e., male, 
female, young, old, buyer, seller, producer, public, private). They provided an option for 
the interviewer to repeat or add interviews in the event that unforeseen biases or 
perspectives became apparent. Feedback from interview participants was found to be a 
valuable means of verifying information during and after the field interviews. In some 
instances, this feedback was sought directly and continued to the analysis stage. 
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3:6 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
"There is no particular moment when data analysis begins. Analysis is a matter of 
giving meaning to first impressions as well as final compilations. Analysis 
essentially means taking something apart. We take our impressions, our 
observations, apart. Analysis and interpretation are the making sense of all this. How 
is this part related to that part? Analysis goes on and on ... "(Stake, 1995, p.71) 
As described in sections 3: 1: 1 and 3:3, one of the difficulties in utilizing a qualitative 
research design is the quantity of data generated and handling the data in a consistent 
manner. The process of analysis often begins before the data collection with the 
development of the conceptual model as presented in chapter 2, and the secondary 
analysis of the telecommunications industry in chapter 4. These two chapters provide 
for a tentative framework through which the sampling and/or the relevant data 
collection could be undertaken. The exploratory nature of the research determined the 
way in which the analysis developed as an iterative inductive process, the aim of 
which was to develop an understanding of the approaches and strategies within the 
context of the privatization process and using a particular organization (TKL). 
Levels of Analysis and Study Units 
This study used a holistic case approach, described by Yin (1989) as advantageous 
when "no logical subunits can be identified and when the relevant theory underlying the 
case study is itself of a holistic nature". The study reported here meets both conditions. 
In addition, the research questions in chapter one suggest that the approaches to the 
whole program were in question, making it difficult to isolate units of analysis. 
However, various levels (as stated herein) of response are used to explore, examine and 
analyse data collected on a broad spectrum of institutions, enterprises and individuals 
involved in the privatization processes that are employing approaches to the parastatal 
reform (GOK 1996) program. Hence, while following the holistic level of analysis, the 
inputs to this analysis were solicited from various empirical responses and secondary 
sources. This had the added advantage of circumventing one of the problems of holistic 
approaches; that of allowing the "investigator to avoid examining any specific 
phenomenon in operational detail" (Yin, 1989, p.49). 
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Throughout the continuous process of analysis, data was being organized at several 
different levels and this is reflected in the way in which the study results are presented 
later in the thesis. The secondary/primary data collection and analysis generated robust 
information that allowed the development of an understanding of the way the 
institutions under study operated, and the context within which they did this, including 
the relationships. The final results are presented in Chapter 5 with conclusions in 
chapter 6, linking theory to field data and the documentary analysis of in-house 
publications which entailed a process of clarification and summarizing, noting the 
significant issues for the study of TLK as an organization and the analysis of relevant 
data from interviews, questionnaires and transcripts for interviews. 
This analysis consists of three concurrent flows of activity: data sorting/reduction, data 
display and conclusion drawing (Miles & Huberman 1994). Because the research 
question sought to establish the approaches to the privatization programs, the first level 
of analysis was/is an overview of approaches and privatization processes relevant to 
specific enterprises that have been privatised, data which is itself summarized. The 
second level was that at which an understanding and knowledge of the data developed 
so that themes and gaps were identified and clarified, and the third was that at which the 
data was synthesized and major themes were explicated to produce conclusions. This 
level of analysis included establishing from the chief executives guidelines for 
proceeding to privatise, their strategic intentions and actions (i.e. the selection process 
of firms for privatisation, objectives, techniques, selection of approach, treatment of 
restructuring and downsizing, and so on). This separation practically proved challenging 
at an operational level but was necessary for purposes of analysis. Given the exploratory 
nature of the research, an inductive iterative analytical approach guided by a tentative 
conceptual framework proved to be a fitting approach to adopt in order to make sense of 
the rich body of data that resulted from the field research. 
The next stage of analysis focused upon a need to develop an understanding of the 
restructuring and actual sale of TLK; the results of this analysis are presented in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. As has already been noted, the process of analysis began before the 
field research with the development of the conceptual model and the research design. 
The focus upon the progress of objectives (discussed in section 1:3 chapter one) 
provided a way of ordering the iterative collection and analysis of the relevant data by 
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subdividing and reducing the data. The analysis was further assisted by the interviewing 
and transcribing process, described in sections 3:4 to 3:5. 
The advantage of notebook transcription, which occurred as soon as possible after the 
interview, allowed the development of a perspective that combined immediacy with a 
reflective overview of what went on in the contact. This was captured using annotations 
throughout the transcription that were a reflection upon the main concepts, themes, 
issues and questions which arose as a result of the contact interviews. Because 
recordings of interviews were transcribed almost immediately, the impact upon the 
perspectives of those involved was recognized and follow up interviews were arranged 
later. 
During the process of data collection and analysis what were sought was evidence of the 
way in which Kenya approached the privatization process and the issues associated with 
its operation at policy and enterprise levels. What was of interest was the uncovering of 
the way the process worked from the perspective ofthe enterprise/organizational actors; 
that is, what they did and how they did it and how they thought it ought to be. Each 
organizational actor might have referred to one or more of the four or more stages 
involved in any single privatization transaction and process as outlined in the 
introduction. While there was no formal structure to the interview process, during the 
interview informants were asked to provide examples of how they would treat stages of 
the privatization process and transactions operating at their level of involvement. 
The dynamic research approach facilitated a constant process of verification, as 
throughout the research common themes and/or anomalies became apparent, and 
sometimes differing perspectives emerged. What is presented in this thesis is a 
representative view of an approach to a process, which reflects the experience of 
Kenya's public and private sector actors involved. This is evidenced by the use of 
quotations derived from the open questions and answers in questionnaires; the evidence 
also shows that there was no significant difference interview respondents in 
understanding the way in which the process operated. 
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Data from the questionnaires and field notes collected from October 2003 to January 
2004 were extracted, sorted, analyzed and organised using the SPSS, Excel and Word 
database management applications9. The data in a qualitative form was organized into 
highlights of the focus of the study; the approaches to privatization in Kenya and in the 
COMESA region. Data in this case was extracted question by question around the 
research questions' themes (as indicated in chapter five) and written out to show how 
they revealed the structure of the divesture program. As each question in the 
questionnaire was analysed with collaborating evidence from the notes and memory, 
patterns began to emerge. This analysis forms the development ofTelkom Kenya's case 
study narrative that integrates and summarizes key information around the focus of the 
case study. The results of these analyses are discussed in section two of the thesis in 
chapters five and six. 
The iterative nature of the process necessitated continuous analysis at this stage to 
enable the identification of the relevant individuals who had more information, so as to 
contact and interview them throughout the flow of the research. This meant that there 
was a constant movement back and forth between the process of thinking about the 
existing data and the collection of new data. In addition, this uncovered bias and 
surfaced areas for clarification. One example ofthis is reported in Chapter 5, which was 
the potential impact upon the research process of the organizational restructure affecting 
the middle managers, technical and clerical staff (for downsizing), and the resulting 
recycling of technical staff and CEOs. 
At the same time, there was recognition of the potential positive and negative impact of 
restructuring POST A and Telkom Kenya for privatization (i.e. labour and financial 
impacts as discussed in chapters four and five). The analysis required a constant 
"feeling of the way to a set of relationships that accounted for important pieces of what 
was seen and heard" (Miles and Huberman 1994 p.62). The constant process of analysis 
and rereading of transcripts allowed a deeper analysis as the research progressed, and 
knowledge developed about local dynamics allowing a shift from descriptive analysis to 
a more inferential, exploratory and explanatory analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
9 See Sample of the Interview schedule in Appendix I: Annex V .Electronic (FSD, 2004) and hard copy data are available 
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Analysis also sought to develop an understanding of the process as a sequence of events 
from the perspective of the actors involved as they occurred during this period. 
The process was assisted by continuous writing up, which was itself part of the analytic 
process, and resulted in the production of interim study results. As part of this writing 
process a number of figures, tables and matrices were constructed which were both a 
development of the analytical process and its outcome. They assisted in the reduction 
and sense making of the relevant data, and provided a means to present themes and 
relationships in a 'user friendly' way. The final versions of some of the tables, figures 
and matrices are presented as part of the study results, mainly in chapters 4 and 5. 
Throughout the process of writing and analysis themes began to emerge and tentative 
conclusions were drawn which were continuously challenged as the research process 
progressed, until the final conclusions from this study which are presented in chapters 4, 
5, and 6 of this work were arrived at. 
3:7 Validity 
After the aforementioned discussion on methodology, data collection, analysis and 
interpretation, a brief overview of the elements of validity, reliability, transferability and 
conformity in the study are discussed. 
Validity of cases is a major criterion for qualitative research and is a vital aspect of 
quality control in any research study. Internal validity was not a problem here since it 
was an exploratory study (Yin 1989) and since Kenya's divesture program (as discussed 
in chapter one) is a 'closed' activity with few 'insiders'. The validity ofthe information 
is based on the 'specialized' sample; the interconnection of the validity of case study 
research could be threatened by any number of factors, mainly those related to the 
design of the study and the actual process of data collection and analysis. This research 
did not encounter serious validity problems, because the respondents were all interested 
parties and were willing to counter check the validity of the information. Validity, 
reliability, triangulation and transferability as discussed in sections 3:7 -3:7:4. 
The validity of case study research could be threatened by any number of factors, 
mainly those related to the design of the study and the actual process of data collection. 
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Case studies have been criticised on grounds of laxity in validity arising from factors 
such as the absence of precise research instruments and factors related to case selection. 
In this approach, validity is threatened right through from design to analysis as the 
process of case research itself can be viewed as a continuous design activity (Yin, 
1989:41 ). While internal validity was not of concern due to the exploratory nature of the 
study, external validity was critical. Also critical was the general reliability of the data 
collected and the credibility criteria involved establishing that the results of qualitative 
research are credible or believable from the perspective of the participant in the 
research. Since from this perspective, the purpose of qualitative research is to describe 
or understand the phenomena of interest from the participant's eyes, the participants are 
the only ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of the results. 
Qualitative researchers argue for different standards for judging the quality of research. 
Criteria for judging the soundness of qualitative research as an alternative to more 
traditional quantitatively-oriented criteria were: internal validity; credibility; external 
validity; transferability; reliability; dependability; objectivity; conformability and focus 
groups. Although this study will not involve all of them, some are highlighted. 
CEOs validated information continuously during data collection and analysis. The 
expert focus group was also used to validate information collected in some instances. 
Besides this, follow-up phone calls and rechecking information especially during the 
data analysis stage, helped enhance the validity, credibility, reliability and objectivity of 
the interviews and information collected during field research. The expert group 
meeting, for example, served as a forum to address a particular concern of the 
Privatization Bill and its institutional capacity, which was how a regulatory framework 
can be developed in order to build stakeholder (public/private partnerships) consensus, 
providing an opportunity to crosscheck information with a large number of people in a 
short period. 
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3:7:1 Conformability 
Qualitative research tends to assume that each researcher brings a unique perspective to 
the study. Conformability refers to the degree to which the results could be confirmed or 
corroborated by others. There are a number of strategies for enhancing conformability. 
The researcher can document the procedures for checking and rechecking the data 
throughout the study. Another approach is to take a "devil's advocate" role with respect 
to the results, and this process can be documented. The researcher can actively search 
for, and describe, negative instances that contradict prior observations and after a study, 
one can conduct a data audit that examines the data collection and analysis procedures 
and makes judgments about the potential for bias or distortion. In analysing the 
information collected, in chapters four and five, this thesis takes both views as and when 
it is necessary. 
3:7:2 Transferability 
This refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can be generalized 
or transferred to other contexts or settings. From a qualitative perspective, 
transferability is primarily the responsibility of the one doing the generalizing. The 
qualitative researcher can enhance transferability by doing a thorough job of describing 
the research context and the assumptions that were central to the research. The person 
who wishes to "transfer" the results to a different context is then responsible for making 
the judgment of how sensible the transfer is. In our case study for this thesis as indicated 
in chapters six results are easily transferred to the context of CO MESA, because of the 
similarities in their social, political and economic environments. In fact this research is 
planned for a pilot replication amongst the ten countries of COMESA free trade area. 
Besides, the COMESA free trade area membership is pursuing similar investment and 
trade policies that include enterprise restructuring and privatization hence; there are a 
curry-over findings. 
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3:7:3 Triangulation and multiple Data Sources 
Triangulation is a strategy which qualitative researchers often use to ensure both 
internal and external validity by eliminating some of the biases which arise from, and 
are because of, the research process. It involves the use of several data sources 
(respondents and/or secondary data sources) during fieldwork, or the use of several data 
collection strategies. In her example, Eisenhardt (1989) uses the triangulation of data 
collection strategies, arguing that when qualitative and quantitative data are used 
together, the qualitative data is useful in understanding the rationale underlying 
relationships revealed in the quantitative data. Yin (1989) and Denzin (1978), on the 
other hand, advise the use of triangulation by various data sources rather than various 
methods or approaches. Denzin (1978 p.295) adds, that by triangulating data sources, 
analysts can efficiently employ the same methods to maximum theoretical advantage". 
This study used triangulation between various sources of information as well as between 
methods (face to face, telephone interviews and questionnaires). Several data sources 
(respondents) were used in this study, which made it possible to collaborate information 
or to confirm some findings. On a second level, observation was used as a form of 
collaborating information about processes provided by respondents. In addition, it was 
possible to use some secondary materials regarding the history of the process and of the 
enterprise to confirm some perceptions, figures and projections. 
3:7:4 Reliability 
Another quality control measure is the reliability of a piece of research: the extent to 
which the operations of a study can be repeated with the same results (Yin, 1989:41 ). 
One of the criticisms levelled at qualitative methods, particularly the case study method, 
is the high level of 'subjectivity' emanating from the lack of 'objective' measures, among 
others. One way of dealing with this objection is to standardise research procedures so 
that the data collection can be replicated. Data source and method triangulation are 
some approaches used by researchers such as Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) and 
Denzin (1978) to address this problem. Other researchers have addressed it by studying 
specific constructs and variables across cases (Yin and Heald, 1975). 
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This survey used 'standardised' data collection methods (as discussed above) for the 
Telkom Kenya case study by using an interview guide (questionnaire, and a listing 
semi-structures questions) which addressed similar issues across the privatization 
process and in TKL's case. These were not treated as pre-defined but as potentially 
evolving during data collection so as to include variables not included (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984) in the questionnaire. Indeed a second way is to study specific pre-
defined constructs and variables as described by Yin and Heald, (1975) and as applied 
by Schusselbauer (1999); and Carlin, and Aghion (1996). This study did not take that 
approach. Consequently, the study explored the research question along three lines, the 
nature and extent of restructuring and privatising Telkom Kenya; the perceived and 
actual factors influencing the choice of approaches and strategies; and the nature of 
interactive relations between and within stakeholders and enterprises that emerge. This 
way, it was possible to 'standardise' the research process and follow only particular 
variables over all the cases of interest, although care was taken not to confine the 
respondents to particular responses. 
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3:8: Limitations, Constraints and Problems in Field and Thesis Study 
Every field study does pose its own challenges, and this study is not exempted. 
However, the challenges discussed herein did not present any significant negative 
effects on the results of this thesis study. There are however some study problems that 
need to be discussed here to aid other studies to be undertaken, while noting the 
sentiments of Connell, et. al (200 1) that research suggests that there is no one best way 
to research social phenomena; "clearly, each methodological approach has its own 
strengths and weaknesses, nuances and peculiarities, and all can be altered, refined and 
merged with other methods to meet the specific demands of the research question and 
the local context within which the research object exists" 
Generally, as is discussed in the chapters, the study was faced with inadequate time and 
resources. There was little or no material and supervisory support from the academic 
institutions of the researcher's affiliation, and fieldwork was a lone range affair with any 
difficulties encountered in the field and during analysis in Kenya and in the UK being 
dealt with personally. There were no research assistants and when instances of health 
problems or death in the family did occur, the study was halted or delayed. 
More significantly, there was no possibility to undertake specific courses or to update 
specific methods and analytical skills for the research. For example, it would have been 
easier, quicker and appropriate for this study to have taken a purely statistical method of 
data collection and analysis. A straightforward regression analysis - more familiar to the 
academic supervisor, and perhaps may have been less complicated for the study and 
time saving for the thesis process. In addition, the University of Durham and the 
Business School in particular did not provide the needed institutional and financial 
support for an international student undertaking field study in a developing country. The 
family situation was negatively affected with a bad financial position and this interfered 
with the study's progress. The financial constraints eventually did have a negative effect 
on the person and the research. 
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Field Research Problems 
More specifically, obtaining documentation or reconstructing documentation in cases 
where records were poorly kept or did not exist was a difficult task, as discussed in the 
documentation section. 
As a single researcher conducting field interviews occasionally the verification of 
interview data during and after the interview process was not possible between 
interviews and writing-up due to back to back interview schedules. In some cases where 
the respondent did not feel comfortable with note taking during the interview, 
verification was difficult, unless done with another respondent. In some cases, it was 
difficult to verify the written notes, e.g., to clarify any statements or statistical 
information, or complete any notes that were unclear immediately after the interview 
due to limited time. 
In a few cases, interviews were interrupted and had to be rescheduled for a later time or 
date. This affected the momentum of the interviews and the research schedule but not 
the quality. In some instances, it was difficult to find an alternative date. As stated 
above, in some instances note taking was not allowed and this made the immediate 
transcription and verification of the interview notes extremely difficult and time 
consuming. It meant using memory to remember the important points of the responses. 
In addition, the researcher had no assistants and no resources to help in the verification 
of the recorded information schedules and cross checking of information. Although this 
slowed down the data collection and analysis, it did not significantly affect the validity 
and quality of the data collected and the data collection process. It only meant that the 
process took more time and that the investigator had to collect as much information as 
was physically possible and make more follow-up calls. 
Since most of the respondents were chief executives, it was difficult to choose a setting 
with little distraction. Where possible this was often done with the help of the 
respondent in the majority of the interviews, however avoiding answering of telephone 
calls during interview sessions was not possible. In some instances the interview was 
disrupted and had to be rescheduled; this which happened on several occasions, thus 
generating a new research hypothesis of "answering calls during interviews as an 
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indication of a specific culture of management amongst Kenyan CEOs." This thesis 
submits that this 1s one of those hypothesis generation settings alluded to in the 
methodology and 1s an interesting research area for those in public and strategic 
management. 
In some instances where the interviewee indicated that the information on the 
approaches to privatization in TLK was confidential, plans were made in advance to 
respect their position. For example, for respondents who did not feel comfortable to be 
interviewed in their office environment, arrangements were made for a more acceptable 
venue, time and method of proceeding. As indicated earlier, where possible interviews 
were rescheduled and this was done in five cases. In some cases, the interview dates and 
venue were changed several times which disturbed the investigator's schedule. In two 
cases, the interview was cancelled after a four hour wait without prior notice. On three 
occasions, the respondents turned out not to have any useful knowledge of the process 
(after 1.5 hours of interview) although they were in a public or private sector position 
involving the process of privatisation. This explains the "closed" nature of the 
privatisation process/program in Kenya. 
In conclusion, the constraints and compromises involved in the field study could be 
summarized as follows; specifically, the sensitivity of the issues, resources and time 
involved meant that the researcher chose to compromise the research strategy by 
limiting data gathering techniques to semi-structured interviews and document analysis 
where respondents expressed discomfort with filling in the questionnaire or discussing 
the questionnaire with the researcher. This compromise however did not jeopardise the 
research process. 
The constraints and compromises experienced in any research reinforce the notion that 
compromise of some sort is common to all research strategies. Inevitably, researchers 
are faced with not only the demands of the research question but also other local 
limitations and contextual conditions which sometimes force a re-appraisal of the 
method, without compromising the research process or findings. The experience of this 
researcher suggests that, although clearly influential, the choice of research 
methodology is rarely completely conditional upon the research question's assumptions. 
The researcher's choice of methodology is inevitably shaped by limitations and research 
considerations out in the field that go beyond research question issues and which 
ultimately may result in compromise. 
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3:9 Summary 
The review of the literature suggested that the nature of the approaches to privatization 
in LDCs was such that it required a qualitative research approach. The lack of research 
based knowledge on the unfolding process and the apparent complexity of the process 
required an exploratory and inductive approach. A single in-depth case study design 
was decided upon as it would provide valuable insights into Kenya's privatization 
process over time within an enterprise context. 
The selection of Telkom Kenya Company Ltd as the focus of the investigation was 
based upon its potential in providing an exemplar of practice because of the likely 
transfer of learning which would have resulted from its unbundling, formation, 
operation and its sale to a strategic partner status. This would act a tangible example to 
the Investment Industry of an approach to privatization. As an exemplar of practice, this 
study was likely to provide a richer and more informed understanding of the process, 
and as such was of particular interest. 
Using documentation and a series of 40 questionnaire responses, based on structured 
and semi structured interviews including 14 face to face interviews over the research 
period, data were collected to support the aims of the research as outlined in chapter 
one. Analysis was carried out using the theoretical conceptual framework proposed in 
chapters two and secondary data in chapter four, the results of this analysis are 
presented in chapters 5 and 6 and the thesis's reflexive account of the impact of this 
research approach upon the research itself, and the limitations of the research are 
discussed herein. 
Thus, the aim of this study was to look for patterns, ideas and hypothesis rather than the 
testing or confirmation of existing hypothesis (Hussey and Hussey, 1997: p10) .The 
techniques that were employed included a case study of TLK that provided qualitative 
and quantitative data. The case study technique was favoured because there was little or 
no existing data. Secondly it was a flexible technique offering few constraints on the 
kind of data to be collected and the nature of activities addressed by this thesis. Thirdly, 
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the case study analysis technique provided an open approach to the research in an 
environment where information on privatization was confined to a limited sample 
population mainly in the public sector. Indeed, Hussey and Hussey, (1997, p10) 
emphasize that "techniques used in exploratory research include case studies, 
observations and historical analysis which can provide both quantitative and qualitative 
data. Such techniques are very flexible since there are few constraints on the nature of 
activities employed or on the type of data collected." 
Due to the academic limitations of time and resources this study did not venture into in-
depth descriptions and explanatory research - i.e. analyzing causal relationships and 
related issues. The thesis was investigating the transaction process as it pertains to 
privatizing, not as it relates to enterprise performance. In some instances research 
moved progressively from exploratory and analytical to descriptive and predictive 
research, as indicated in figure 3-1 
Figure 3-1 Logic of Research Process 
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insight discovering 
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This research utilised triangulated methods customized according to the research 
questions and objectives described in chapter one. Ultimately, as Patton (1990) pointed 
out, the validity and reliability of qualitative data depends largely on the methodological 
skill, sensitivity and integrity of the researcher. As this research found, the generation of 
useful and credible qualitative findings occurs through observation and interviewing. 
This requires significant discipline, knowledge, training, practice, creativity and hard 
work to analyse and present the rich data often collected using triangulation. In some 
instances when qualitative data was compared with the quantitative data, some 
quantitative results may be unexplained; however, since a large amount of qualitative 
and quantitative data was produced, overall the quantitative findings assisted in 
supporting the qualitative findings. 
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4:0 CHAPTER FOUR 
4:0 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS OF 
TELECOMS: The Case of Telkom Kenya Company Ltd (TKL). 
4:1 Introduction and Background 
This chapter seeks to provide an insight into the telecommunications sector based upon 
analysis of secondary and primary information i.e. company documentation and 
information gained through the research process. This information provides a context of 
the detailed findings of the empirical field survey study which follows in chapter five. 1 
The discussion is based mainly on secondary data analysis with some field (interviews 
and questionnaire) data analysis indicated by a referenced short form of "FSD, (2004)"2• 
A brief historical overview of the unbundling process of KPTC, the birth of Safaricom, 
TKL and other subsidiaries and their ownership structures is also set out in this chapter. 
This context provides a backdrop against which the approaches of GOK's privatization 
process preparatory stages can be examined. The process moves from engaging and 
adopting the World Bank reform agenda; to the institutionalization of the practice of 
privatization through engaging with relevant stakeholders; to setting up an approach that 
provides a basis for understanding an exploratory account. 
This chapter highlights areas of this research which are further informed and analysed by 
the results of primary data (i.e. questionnaire and interview data) and analysis as 
presented in chapter five and conclusions made in chapter six. This chapter also 
highlights the progress to-date of the developments in the privatization of the 
telecommunications sector in Kenya and of Telkom Kenya in particular (GOKIMOT &C, 
1 GOK/TKL 1998-2003) Various internal confidential unpublished documents and reports cited herein as necessary 
2 Indicates field interview and questionnaire data referenced as Field Survey Data, ( 2004) in the list of references. 
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1999). In the process it explores the implications of that choice through a critically 
detailed examination ofTelkom Kenya (fKL) divestiture, restructuring and privatization. 
It also examines the recent developments in the worldwide spread of liberalization, 
reforms and privatization of telecommunications and the surge of competition into the 
telecommunications sector. Indeed Petrazzini, (1996a&b) and Wallsten, (2001), p.l-2 
have argued that the telecom markets around the world in the 1990s became 
increasingly competitive although traditionally telecom is viewed as a natural monopoly 
and could be provided at the lowest cost only by one firm due to levels of technology .3 
However, these research findings show that this view has changed due to the rapid 
change in technology that has encouraged rapid growth, reduction in entry in barriers 
and investor interest in the sector. Telecoms services seem to be falling rapidly out of 
the category of natural monopolies as lower costs in the provision and entry to telecom 
and utility services are attained. This view is also supported by the ITU (2000) report on 
International Telecommunications Regulators (ITRs), Bolt and Humphrey (2005) 
discourse on public good issues also support this view. 
However, there has been notable slow progress with respect to the reform of the core 
and more strategic public enterprises (PEs) that includes telecommunications in LDCs 
and in the COMESA region in particular, although the successful completion in 1996 of 
the Kenya Airways privatization and liberalization of the telecoms sectors in Kenya, 
Uganda and Zambia has shown upward trends (COMESA, 2003). Strategically on the 
public front few efficiency improvements have accrued in the railways, ports, water, 
power, energy and telecommunications sectors (World Bank, 2000), despite the 
extensive technical work performed within the sector reforms framework. These 
companies play a significant role in the economy and the lack of progress in their reform 
and privatization accounts for the overall impact ofthe program on the economy. 
Indeed, the overall impact of the telecommunications privatizations is rather modest, at 
least in relation to its potential; this is because the more ambitious privatization 
programs adopted by most governments in 1997/98 are still largely at the level of 
3 See Noll, (2000) for a comprehensive examination of telecommunications reforms in developing economies 
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intentions. However, significant but delayed progress has occurred in the privatization 
oftelecommunications as evidence from Latin America (Wallsten 1999, p.5), shows. In 
particular, Wallsten's empirical analysis of competition and regulation in Africa 
indicates that the existing "empirical work to date consists largely of case studies and 
non- econometric tests of the effects of competition, privatization, or regulatory 
changes" (Wallsten, 1999, p.1). This gap exists because reforms in telecommunications 
have occurred only recently. He also argues (as chapter five findings confirm) that these 
studies find positive effects of reforms on the development of telecoms sector. Indeed, 
other case studies support this view including that ofWellenius, (1992) which concludes 
that: 
"Initial results from privatizing state telecommunications enterprises are generally very 
encouraging. Governments have successfully sold to consortia led by experienced 
foreign operating companies capable of providing expert managers, specialised 
management tools, and continued access to latest technologies. Good financial 
performance, reflecting major tariff adjustments and lower costs, is allowing privatized 
companies to initially finance accelerated investments largely from internally 
generated funds. Also, international markets have been increasingly willing to provide 
large amounts of capital for privatized companies in countries with sound 
macroeconomic and regulatory frameworks (e.g., Chile, Mexico, Argentina) 
(Wellenius, (1992, p.8) 
Most developing economies nationalized their telecom providers in the 1960s with 
resulting consequences of limited and poor service. Saunders, et al (1983) note that by 
1981 Africa and Latin America averaged only 0.8 and 5.5 telephones per hundred 
people, respectively, compared to 83.7 in the United States. 
There was a general worldwide trend towards divestiture started largely by Britain's 
Thatcher government in 1979 (alluded to in chapter two), which coined the term 
"privatization" (Megginson, 2000). In developing countries, by the end of 1999, the 
International Telecommunications Union reported that more than half of Asian and 
Latin American countries and one-third of African countries had privatized their 
telecommunications providers. Wallsten (2002), and Shirley et al (2000) discuss 
evidence revealing that privatization of telecommunications can lead to increased and 
efficient service provision. Megginson et al (1994) compare pre- and post- privatization 
financial and operating performance of 61 companies (in 32 industries, including 
telecommunications) from 18 countries and find positive sales, investments and 
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employment following privatization. The findings of questionnaire data analysis in 
chapter five also found that there were increased employment and job opportunities 
nationally and regionally. The existing literature on telecom reforms in particular 
contains primarily two types of analyses: case studies and empirical work that compare 
average performance indicators across firms or countries. An ITU (2000) report indicate 
that no Arab states have privatized their telecommunications providers before and after 
reforms took effect. Not surprisingly, given the region's relatively early start in reforms, 
most of this evidence is from Latin America. In general, these studies find that with 
positive effects (e.g., Wellenius, 1992; Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 1992) the spread of 
telecommunications reforms around the world is increasing. 
These telecommunication privatization trends point to the possibility of vastly improved 
telecom service for literally millions of people (Wallsten, 2001, pl6). However, the 
empirical literature as noted by Wallsten (2001), Megginson et. al (1994) and Shirley et. 
al ( 1992; 1999) almost completely ignored the details of the privatization process (as 
laid out in chapters two and five of this thesis). These details can make an enormous 
difference. In particular, governments tend to give the newly privatized firm a monopoly 
concession on telecom service (i.e. TKL's exclusivity monopoly). While some contend 
that an exclusivity period is necessary to encourage investment, Wallsten (200 I, p.l6) 
argues that the only reasonable explanation is to increase the government's revenues 
from the sale, as was indeed the case with TKL when the GOK used TKL's monopoly 
to delay its privatization whilst responding to pressure to maximize the sale price under 
the guise of restructuring. 
However, turning a public monopoly into a private monopoly may not necessarily 
generate the improvements reformers envision. Guaranteeing the newly-privatized firm 
a monopoly can increase the government's windfall from the sale but may seriously 
reduce investment in the telecom network and potentially the country's net welfare 
(GOK, 1996). As illustrated by the case of Telkom Kenya in this chapter and in chapter 
five. 
137 
Chapter Four: Developments in the Telecommunications Sector: Restructuring, Valuation and Market Structure ofTKL 
4:1 TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POSTAL SECTOR POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
The postal and telecommunications sector policy launched by the Government of Kenya 
(GOK) in 1997 and strengthened by the 1998 act stipulates the role of the sector as that 
of instituting measures for revitalisation and transforming the postal services into a 
market oriented economy. Kenya's telecommunication Policy Statement attempts to map 
out objectives, strategies and features that are necessary to facilitate the orderly 
expansion and modernisation of the sector in the period 1999 to 2015 through divesture 
of the communications sector (GOKIMOT &C, 1999). The aim is to ensure that, the 
sector develops an adequate capacity to meet demands for basic services and rapidly 
emerging requirements for new services. The GOK is aware that the sector will continue 
to experience rapid changes (i.e. reforms, deregulation/market liberalization) with 
implications for both the service providers and users. 
The Policy Statement is reviewed periodically to ensure that the sectoral objectives and 
strategies being pursued are relevant, efficacious and supportive of national 
development. The GOK in translating the policy statement into an act (GOK, 1998) 
intended to attract investors and appropriate opportunities for investment that would 
catalyse the building of a modem, efficient and reliable communications network to face 
the challenges of the twenty first century. More importantly it defines the framework 
within which postal and telecommunication services are provided. 
The GOK's aim is to establish Kenya in the medium to long term as the centre of 
industrial and financial activities in the Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
Free Trade Area (COMESA-FT A) region. To this end, telecommunications and air 
transport sub-sectors are key in the achievement of first generation reforms aimed at 
revitalizing market functions through liberalization and opening up markets including 
the withdrawal of the state from ownership, market intervention, market entry, market 
exit and pricing (Kikeri et. al 1994; Megginson and Netter, 2001). Indeed the overall 
GOK objective for the sector is to optimise its contribution to the development of the 
Kenyan economy as a whole by ensuring the availability of efficient, reliable and 
affordable communication services nationally (GOKIMOTC, 1998; GOK, 1996, pp 1-
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4:2 Liberalization & Restructuring of the Communications Industry 
Overview and Trends 
While reviewing the trends in the communications industry in the World and indeed in 
the COMESA sub-region, it is evident that, in the 1980s, the nationalization trend began 
to reverse itself with the introduction of SAPs; although the specifics differ nationally 
and regionally largely three common factors drove liberalization reforms around the 
world. Apart from the international financial lending agencies' pressure to African 
governments, the exceptionally poor performance of state-owned telecom firms 
generated pressure for reforms. Long waiting periods for telephone connections 
(averaging 1-5 years in the COMESA region) and the unreliability of those connections 
generated reforms by popular demand, while inefficient operations often requiring large 
subsidies encouraged governments to divest firms that were draining national treasuries. 
Wellenius (1992) notes that in the 1960s the World Bank funded primarily infrastructure 
investments and organization and management reforms in the 1970s, but by the 1980s 
the focus switched to sector reforms including privatization. Using panel data on 167 
countries from 1980 through 1998, Li, Qiang, and Xu (2000) found empirical evidence 
of telecom reforms brought about both in response to poor sector performance and 
foreign aid including the presence of World Bank telecommunications loans. 
Trends in developing countries show that divestiture and disposal of large-scale 
infrastructure, such as telecommunications, power and transport accounts for the largest 
share of privatization revenue, and telecoms transactions were largely responsible for 
1997-1998's revenue peak. However, in 1999, the primary sector privatizations for 
example, petroleum, mining, agriculture and forestry--overtook infrastructure 
privatization, as indicated in figure ( 4-1) 
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Figure 4-1: Privatization Revenues in Developing Countries by Sector 1990-1999 ($billion)4 
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Source: Global Development Finance, the World Bank (2000) 
Meanwhile, the actual liberalization and restructuring of telecommunication state 
enterprises started back in 1993 but was only effected in 1996 after the successful 
privatization of Kenya Airways (KQ) as described by Atieno, (2002, p.19-34). This 
research found that the telecommurucations sector in Kenya had been identified as a 
priority in view of the required investments in fixed and mobile telephone networks 
(GOK, 1996). 
Kenya' s parastatal liberalization, reform and privatization program is managed by the 
Investment Secretariat based at the Ministry of Finance Treasury and operates as the 
Department of Government Investments and Public Enterprises (DGlPE (see figure 5-
1). ln general, reforms of parastatals since 1992 have resulted in the reduction of direct 
and indirect government subsidies to parastatals. For example, loans serviced on behalf 
of Kenya' s six largest parastatals and their recurrent and development expenditure 
declined from Kshs. 2.25 billion (US $ 29.61) in fiscal year 1992/994 to less than Kshs. 
300 million (US $ 3.95 million) in fiscal years 1999/2001 (World Bank, 2002). This 
decline should be viewed against Kenya's privatization related revenue estimated at $ 
70 million and that of CO MESA totalling to US$ 5.2 billion raised by 2000 in the four 
major member countries of Egypt, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia ,as indicated in table 4-1 
4 Note that this data include proceeds from domestic and foreign investors as well as direct and portfolio investments. 
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Table 4-1: Total Privatization Transaction Proceeds in COMESA 
COMESA's Privatization Transaction Proceeds in 1993-2002 
Country Year Amount In US $ 
Egypt 1995-2000 3,868,612,213.00 
Kenya 1993-2002 136,840,000.00 
Uganda 1995-2000 174,494,375.00 
Zambia 1995-2000 826,200,000.00 
Total Proceeds 5,239,906,588.00 
.. Data Source: World Bank Pnvatizat10n Lmk, Listings, (2003) 
However, this research's initial field survey found that GOK maintained that Kenya's 
revenue rose to over US $ 306.3 million by 2003, with an estimated $100 million 
proceeds accrued to the exchequer in support of the government's budget from 169 
enterprises fully or partially privatized, up from $ 86.5 million between 1992 and 1997 
(GOK, 1996; KNA, 1997; and annex C). Out of a total of 267 non-strategic and 33 
strategic enterprises which were listed for disposal since 1992, the privatization 
transactions gave Kshs. 8.12 billion (US $ 106.84 million) to the exchequer out of the 
total proceeds of Kshs.1 0.4 billion (US $ 136.84 million) raised by 2002 (see table 4-2) 
(World Bank/Privatization Link 2004). Over 50 percent of share trade sales have been 
transacted through initial public offers (IPOs ), as in the case of Kenya Airways. Mumias 
Sugar Company was transacted by management contract; and Kenya Commercial Bank, 
ICDCI investment Company Ltd, and KPT &C through strategic investor sales and an 
IPO after unbundling. (GOK/DGIPE, 2002; GOK, 1996; Kenya National Assembly -
KNA, 1997). 
Table 4-2 Kenya's Total Reform and Privatization Transaction Proceeds 1992-2003 
Year Amount in Kshs. Amount In US $ 
1992-2001 I 0.4 billion 136.84 million 
2002-2003 12.9 billion 169.46 million 
Total Proceeds 23.3 billion 306.30 million 
Data Source: GOK reportsflnterview data (2003) 
Interestingly, in the 2003/04 National budget, the government factored in the US $64 
million revenue expected from the license fee sale to a Second National Operator 
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(SNO), yet publicly the GOK claimed the transaction had not been completed and the 
licence fee had not been paid. The balance of the $64 Million was used to service the 
government's debt and support restructuring efforts and investments into the 
privatization process. Notably though, none of the COMESA governments nor the 
World Bank had explicit records available (except through interviews) showing levels 
of reinvestments put into the privatization restructuring process (FSD, 2004). 
Specifically, liberalization and reforms in the telecommunications sector in Kenya were 
started actively in 1999 in line with targets set in the 1998 act. Liberalization of the 
sector was meant to attract private sector capital and increase efficiency by allowing 
competition in certain crucial areas. The first phase involved reforms and restructuring 
the policy environment, and the supply, installation and maintenance of terminal 
equipment, external cabling and wiring. Where as, some of the targets in phase II 
involved licensing of over 40 companies as service providers for e-mail and data 
transmission internet services. Phase III focused on paging, mobile phone services, trunk 
radio networks, public data systems, and Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) 
installation and maintenance (GOK, 1998; CCK, 2001)). 
In addition, TKL installed a new toll switchboard in Nairobi in 2002 to ease the 
connection of new telephone operators which consists of 5,460 channels designed to 
enhance both international and local telephone calls. During the exclusivity period 
extended to June 2004 Telkom Kenya was under obligation by law to provide these 
channels to any telecom company licensed by the Communications Commission of 
Kenya (GOK, 2001: 1998; CCK, 2003). This facility was part of the company strategy to 
offer connectivity infrastructure to the second largest mobile telephone operator, 
Kencell Communications and the third mobile operator (TMBO) ECONET. These 
channels were intended to make telephone calls cheaper and enable faster connections. 
Other telecommunication infrastructure expansion projects were being carried out in 
Mombasa, Eldoret, Nakuru, Kisumu and Nyeri (see chapter five). Phase IV was the 
identification and licensing of a new fixed line network operator to compete with TKL 
which had a five-year exclusivity period for the Nairobi market. Efforts to liberalise 
VSA T were slow and controversial with complaints from the private sector regarding 
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TKL' s lack of technical and human capacity to effectively liberalize VSA T services. 
However, by December 2002 Radio stations were streaming and some banks had been 
issued with licences to operate VSA T services. Additionally, the local Operators 
Association of Kenya (TOPAK- service providers) was licensed to operate a local 
internet exchange point known as an Internet Service Provider (ISP) in 2001, which was 
intended to ease the internet traffic flow (TLK, 2003; GOK/TKL, 2000 and CCK, 2002). 
4:2:1 Status of the Telecommunications Sector in Kenya: An Historical Evolution 
This research found that historically the submarine cables linking Zanzibar, Mombasa 
and Dar -es- Salaam laid by the Eastern & South African Telegraph Company in 1888, 
were Kenya's earliest telecommunications connections to the outside world (KPT &C 
1984; KPTC, 1999). Within the country, the construction of a telegraph network began 
with a 200-mile coastal line linking the port city of Mombasa with Lamu. Further 
linkages to other parts of the country began in 1896 in conjunction with the building of 
the railway system forming a dual "backbone" for Kenya's telecommunications 
infrastructure. The telegraph line reached Nairobi in 1898 and Kampala and Entebbe in 
Uganda in 1900. Telephone service soon followed and in 1908 the public telephone 
network began service in Nairobi and Mombasa and eighteen telephone subscribers 
were connected. The connections remained low during the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, in the 1980s there was a notable gradual development of Kenya's network. It 
attained a slight increase of 73,932 direct exchange lines of public telephone lines by 
1980 an annual growth of 1.4% and 1,030 lines (KP&TC, 1984). Along with this was 
the slow transition from telexing and faxing to internet and text services offered by 
KPTC (GOK, 2002). 
During this research the telecommunications sector was managed by the Ministry of 
Information, Transport and Communications (MOITC) operating under the Kenya 
Communications Act of 1998 which replaced the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation Act 411. The 1998 act, (i.e. GOK, 1998) enabled the establishment of the 
National Communications Secretariat (NCS) within the parent ministry that serves as 
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the policy advisory arm of government on matters pertaining to the telecommunications 
sector. The Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) serves as the regulator for 
the sector, the Appeals Tribunal (with powers of the High Court) serves as the 
independent arbitrator and Telkom Kenya Limited and other licensed network operators 
serve as public telecoms operators (GOK, 1998). 
The Government of Kenya's (GOK) main objective of restructuring KPTC (and its 
subsequent choice of gradual liberalization of Telkom Kenya as an option), was to 
ensure high quality service, cost effective expansion, introduce new technology, and 
financial self-sustenance which effectively would help minimize unfavourable 
distributional impacts on taxpayers, consumers and employees as indicated by GOK's 
privatization objectives (1996); FSD (2004); and Ramanadham, (1995). In addition, 
this process would enable the enterprise to operate with improved efficiency and 
improve on the future divesture price. To achieve this, KPTC was split into three legal 
entities namely Telkom Kenya Company Limited (TKL), Postal Corporation (POSTA) 
and the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) as the regulator discussed here 
and in chapter five in detail. The TKL Company took over the KPTC 
telecommunications business and started functioning in 1999 after the enactment of the 
Kenya Communication Act of 1998.6 The Postal Corporation of Kenya (POSTA) 
established by the Postal Corporation Act (GOK, 1998) is the public postal licensee 
with the specific role to ensure universal access of postal services. POST A holds 
exclusive provision of stamps and private letterboxes but competes in all other market 
segments while the state controls the extensive postal service network. 
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4:2:2 Restructuring of Kenya Posts & Telecommunication Corporation {KPTC)7 
Against this historical backdrop and with the act in place and in order to address the 
poor performance of growth in lines, the GOK embarked on liberalization and reforms 
of the telecommunication sector in the early 1990s in four phases described earlier. This 
meant that Telkom Kenya become the sole provider of basic telecommunications 
services. After the unbundling of Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation 
(KPTC) its valuation and separation of assets/liabilities, the privatization process was 
set in place (GOKITKL, 1999; GOKIMOT &C, 1999). KPTC's specific outcomes of its 
unbundling and strategic nature required that the GOK request an extension to the 
World Bank (privatization/liberalization project based on an agreed timetable for 
privatization. This was to be completed with the sale ofTelkom Kenya with preparatory 
legal and investment banking support provided by the World Bank. It was expected that 
the Stage I period of 12-24 months transaction period stipulated in the Interim Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 1999, would include the completion of the 
privatisation of Telkom Kenya through the sale of a 49% shareholding to a strategic 
partner and commercialization of postal services (GOK, 2000). Stage two of 18-36 
months schedule transaction (figure 5-2) was to be completed by FY 2002/04 with the 
introduction of a second national fixed telephony operator (SNO). The project also 
provided support to the Government allowing further reforms and liberalization in the 
sector (CCK, 2002). 
Telkom Kenya Limited (TKL) is a public telecommunications operator established in 
1999 under the companies act with the GOK as the only shareholder (TKL/ Safaricom, 
2000). The government initially offered 49% of TKL's equity shares to a strategic 
investor through the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE). This ratio (subject to change 
without notice) was later revised as discussed in chapter five. TKL took over all the 
telecommunication functions of the parent organisation KPTC and held licences in all 
telecom services including in its access to service requirements where it is obliged to 
provide interconnection to duly licensed operators. Theoretically the CCK Act set out a 
7 KPTC's restructuring is discussed at length by GOK, (1998) and KNA, (2001) on public accounts 
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modem regulatory regime suitable for a multi-operator environment necessary to 
support the revitalisation of the telecommunication and postal sectors. The Act also 
provides for the rights and obligations of licensees and service consumers. It also sets 
out principles on interconnection, public service obligations and fair competition which 
ensure the protection of consumers and investor interests. CCK's major functions 
include licence issuance, price regulation, establishment of interconnection principles, 
type approval of equipment and management of the radio and the communication 
frequency spectrum. These functions, which are periodically revised and expanded, are 
discussed thought-out section 4:2 and in the major findings in chapter five (GOK/CCK, 
2001). 
Following the liberalization of the non-strategic portion of the telecommunications 
network in 1999 the opening up of the value added service market that included internet 
and calling cards in 2001, the number of private telecommunications service providers 
increased considerably. There were over 300 registered companies dealing with 
vending, installation and maintenance and customer premises' internal & external 
wiring. There were about 60 registered Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other value 
added service providers between 2001 and 2002. Many privately operated telephone call 
offices and Internet cyber cafes have sprung up throughout the country's urban centres 
during this period (CCK, 2002). 
The findings of this thesis show that overall, despite years of efforts towards expansion 
and modernisation of the country's postal and telecommunication services, substantial 
demand for basic services remained unsatisfied and the disparity in the distribution of 
communication facilities between the rural and urban areas continued to widen (see 
table 4-3). This re-emphasises the fundamental structural reforms that must be initiated. 
Kenya has to respond by implementing Stage II of the World Bank Project whose 
objective was to strengthen the liberalization and reform agenda that led to the sale of 
the second cellular telephony licence to Vodafone as a second mobile operator (SMO) 
and the introduction of a third mobile operator (TMO) effected after October 31, 2003, 
to further speed-up liberalization of the sector through increased competition. 
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This process would improve penetration in the rural areas from the present 0. 16 lines to 
I line per I 00 people and improve service penetration in the urban areas from the present 
4 lines to 20 lines per 1 00 people by the year 2015 . These targets translated to the 
installation of 300,000 lines in rural areas and 2.4 million lines in urban areas 
respectively, at an estimated average cost of US$ 800 to $1 ,250 per line, the total 
investment over the 20-year period amounting to US$ 5.4 billion. This means on 
average the annual requirement was estimated to be about US$ 270 million (TKL 2003). 
This high level of investments requires new initiatives to attract capital into the sector 
from the private sector by the introduction of new investments in technology, targeting 
cellular and fixed lines through restructuring of KPTC and TKL and the gradual 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector. 
Table: 4-3: Service Penetration Projections 
Current Planned -2015 
Rural Areas 
Lines 0.16 1 
Population ·Per 100 people Per 100 people 
Urban Areas 
Lines 4 20 
Population Per 100 people Per 100 people 
Sources: Author's compilation from field Data, (2004) 
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4:2:3 Telecommunications Network Development 
Kenya's development of telecommunication servtces smce 1981 saw telephone 
exchange capacity increase to an average growth rate of 15% annually rising from 
112,861 lines in 1981 to about 480,000 lines in 2000 and to 600, 00 lines by 2003. In 
addition, the rural component of total telephone exchange capacity increased from 
16.6% in 1981 to 24.3% in 1990 before declining to 15% in 1997. A relatively 
outstanding achievement during this period was the expansion of the public telephone 
service, with public booths increasing from 588 in 1981 to 10,000 in 2000 as the growth 
of the operational fixed lines increased to 350, 000 by 2002 as shown in table 4:4. In 
addition table 4:5 shows the growth of cellular or mobile subscribers since 1997 
(GOK!fKL, 2003-1998; GOK, 2002). 
Table 4-4: Growth in Number of Mainlines in Operation (1993 to 2000) 
Main Telephones in Operation, 1993 - 2003 
)'ear 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 
!Lines 214,759 228,522 256,434 ~66,780 ~71,816 ~88,251 296,400 310,000 350,000: 
Sources: TKL Reports: Market structure, (2001) 
Table 5-6 and figures 5-7-5-9 of chapter five further show the growth in 
cellular and fixed telephony and table 5-13 shows the network expansion plans 
forTKL. 
Table 4-5 Growth in Cellular Subscribers (from 1997-2001)9 
Cellular Subscribers 
M010 -Provider 1997 1998 1999 2000 June 2001 
Safaricom Ltd 3,000 6,000 20,000 54,000 160,000 
Kencell Com. Ltd - - - 60,000 190,000 
Total Subscribers 3,000 6,000 15,000 114,000 350,000 
Sources: Author's compilation from field Data, (2004) 
245,000 
The GOK made encouraging progress in its efforts to modernise the network, increasing 
automation levels from 84.3% in 1981 to 98% in 2000. The greatest impact of this 
8 This figure is given by engineers and technicians of TKL as the actual connected and operating by end of 2003. 
9 Figures in Table 4-5 are rounded to the nearest thousand and chapter five shows figures for 2002-2004. 
10 MO- Mobile operator. 
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automation was felt in the rural areas with levels improving from 15.3% to 40% in 2003 
(ILK, 2003). Kenya's telephone service density (teledensity) stands at about 0.16 fixed lines 
per 100 people in the rural areas and about 4 lines per 100 people in the urban areas (table 4-
3). The telephone penetration factor which is the percentage of households/offices with a 
telephone was 4.2% of the households having a telephone line by 1999. This factor, 
however, varies widely from 0.1% in the very remote districts to 27.7% in the city of Nairobi 
(TKL, 1999; GOK, 2002). However, most of the telephones in the urban areas are within 
offices rather than households. 
The GOK's aims at increasing customer choice and investment through the introduction 
of competition - the envisaged competition in the telecoms sector - is within a defined 
market structure fostering new licences, to attract entry of new players in a previously 
monopolised sector (FSD, 2004). Some of the specific elements or conditions of the 
telecoms programme include provision of Universal service- within the international 
telecommunications law; the GOK has committed to continue the provision of basic 
postal services to all unserved or underserved areas at affordable rates (GOK, 1998). 
However, such rural service is often deemed uneconomical by the private sector because 
of high overhead costs caused by poor infrastructure, distance and low number of users. 
The government can undertake some selected services in order to create balance (FSD, 
2004). Consequently, it is an investment requirement that any firm licensed to provide 
services in the liberalised market segment should have at least between 51-60% of its 
equity owned by Kenyans. However, the field interviews show that for all the listed 
companies, the equity participation often conforms to the capital markets regulator's 
rules and procedures. This policy is reviewed when necessary in line with the country's 
investment needs. 11 TKL 's initial privatisation of 26% sale of its equity to a strategic 
investor (STI) was planed in 2000 with 23% to its local and international investors on 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) and 51% to be shared between employees, local 
investors and the government. 
11 Field Survey Data, (2004). 
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4:3 Objectives of Restructuring before Privatisation 
The restructuring of Kenya Posts and Telecommunication (KPTC) started in 1996, with 
a study commissioned by the Ministry of Finance of the Government of Kenya (GOK). 
The study's overall objective was defining options for the financial restructuring of the 
three separate commercial entities created out of KPTC. POSTA was to remain a 
government operation and Telkom Kenya was to be privatised (GOK!fKL, 1999). 
Transaction advisors were engaged to consider the best option for GOK and to 
implement TKL's privatization; and a regulatory advisor was also appointed to advise 
on the best regulatory framework for the sector and measures to realise this framework. 
The advisory team prepared TKL for operation, audited KPTC's accounts; considered 
the treatment of certain non-core functions within KPTC under the valuation of TKL; 
and considered options for the financial restructuring of KPTC. During this process of 
restructuring a number of core business areas of KPTC 12 were reviewed by 
commissioned consultants. A study into pension liabilities; a review of assets by Tyson's 
Ltd; and a review of balances with government departments and parastatal 
organisations, were done (GOK!fLK, 1999: FSD, 2004) 
This research found that the major portion of the restructuring of KPTC was financial 
restructuring. The subsequent valuation of TKL had four major objectives: 
maximisation of sales proceeds from the transaction, minimisation of cash injection 
from GOK prior to sale (clearly there was balance with the latter); consideration of 
public perception of value for money and safeguarding the ability of the Company to 
operate optimally in the short to medium term. During the financial restructuring 
process, the "joint funds" (i.e. inter-business account for KPTC/POSTA and TKL) was 
the basis of the criteria used to separate KPTC into the Telecom and Postal divisions, 
using 25% of the total current assets (GOK!fKL, 1999). 
12 By a Steering Committee comprising, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Communications, Investment Secretary 
DGIPE GM KPTC, Ps Division World Bank Nairobi & PMG' 
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Loss of Market Share- on Valuation 
With the introduction of new products and services and continued restructuring of postal 
and telecommunications institutions, it was clear on valuation that there would be a loss 
of market share by TKL and PCK due to increased competition, unless they fast trucked 
the restructuring of operations and management of their core businesses (GOKITKL, 
1999*:2000*). Indeed, the TKL's base case valuation of an estimated 3% of services 
reflect the realisation that each service would lose a market share at a rate of 3% per 
year although the model employed reflected no loss of market share for local traffic 
while the loss on international market share was 4% annually (Stiglitz, 1999; Wallsten, 
2001a:2002). The figures presented were correctly based on a 3% per year loss of 
market share across local, national and international traffic. The valuation and financial 
restructuring ofTelkom Kenya as an entity earmarked for privatisation was important to 
the achievement of GOK's objectives with respect to the communications sector in 
Kenya (FSD, 2004). 
According to the GOK, the valuation exercise was undertaken to give GOK and TKL an 
initial view on what investors might consider a reasonable price for acquiring a stake in 
TKL. It should be noted however, that the true valuation of a company could only be 
defined by what investors actually pay. The valuation process was intended as an advice 
to GOK of the potential range that future investors might be expected to pay and to 
allow the consideration of different options. In this case the GOK had to re-
confirm/validate the valuation of TKL once decisions on the privatisation process were 
confirmed in late 1999 (GOKITLK, 2000*)13 • The discount rate was considered to be 
between 20% and 24% a value that reflected the assessment of prevailing local 
conditions including political and economic developments and could have been reduced 
to 18%, a value that can be predicted by taking an optimistic view of future economic 
developments- in particular interest rates and exchange rates (GOK/TKL, 1999*, p.40). 
13 
*indicates a confidential report that included a financial valuation of assets especially labour issues 
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Figure 4-2: Indicative enterprise valuation of Telkom 
Indicative Erterprise Valuatlon of TLK 
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Sources: Authors compilation from TKL various reports, (2000) 
Analysis (section 4:5) shows that in addition to the discount factor, tariffs and capex are 
both critical factors in determining the value of Telkom Kenya under the gradual 
liberalization scenario (figure 4-2). A small variation in either of these factors will 
influence significantly the value of the company (Stiglitz, 1999). 
The reason for this is that loss of market share does not become significant until later 
years by which time high discounts have to be applied to reduce the amount to the 
present value (in other words given revenues in later years contribute less to total 
present value). A similar argument applies for the low impact of productivity. This is 
because there is a phased reduction over time to achieve the target productivity level and 
an associated cost of staff redundancies that act to offset any immediate cost savings. 
Notice however, that TKL had major problems with staff downsizing and yet this is an 
aspect not reflected in their revenues as indicated in figure 5-l 0 and table 5-14 in 
chapter five. 
Nevertheless there were some significant changes made from the original position of 
KPTC to achieve the modelled scenario of three sister companies namely; POST A, TKL 
and Safaricom. In particular, there was a substantial change in productivity level, 
penetration and capex per net productivity. For example improvements from 16 lines 
per employee in 2000 to 90 lines per employee in 2010 for the fast scenario and to I 00 
lines per employee in 2015 as indicated in table 4:3. This analysis identified the key 
parameters affecting the value of TKL. Telkom Kenya could orient its strategy 
accordingly by balancing its commercial objectives and its financial position. An 
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optimum strategy can then be found, for instance, Telkom Kenya knows that by 
discounting significantly its tariffs, it is likely to maintain its market share more readily 
and slow down the progress of competition as discussed in sections 5-6 to 5-7 in chapter 
five. However, a significant impact on the cash flow of the company must be expected, 
(as is evident in their June 2001 annual results), which was occasioned by its subsidiary 
Safari com reducing tariffs to retain market share after Kencell' s entry into the market. 14 
Before describing TKL's market structure in detail in sections 4:4 to 4:5 it is important 
to briefly examine the key assumptions that drive the telecommunications valuation 
model. First general assumptions relating to the Kenyan economy and demographics are 
important before considering assumptions specific to the telecommunications sector. 
4:3:1 Demographic Assumptions 
According to Kenya's economic survey (GOK, 2003), Kenya is divided up into eight 
geographical regions or provinces and its population, land area, population density, 
household size, household density and urban population for each of these regions are 
shown in the figure 4-3. Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) further indicates that of 
rural and urban populations 84.5% of population can be found in rural areas. The World 
Bank/GOK, (1996) 15 report however estimates the rural population at 70% in 1994. The 
Economic survey of 2003 indicated that the rural population still stands at 81.4% with a 
decline in urban migration starting from 1999. The differences in these figures is due to 
the different definitions of rural and urban. To aid the work in terms of international 
comparability of statistics, the figures used were assumed from the WBIUN for urban 
population figures. Percentage urban/rural populations in each Kenyan province have 
been adjusted by the GOK accordingly (GOK, 2003). 
14 See sections 5:1:2-5:1:2:3 and 5:6-5:7:4:1 
15 The World Bank Kenya Poverty/Welfare Report of 1996. 
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Figure 4-3 
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Sources: Author's Compilation from TKL data in various reports, (2001) 
In terms of telecommunications service provision and improvement in market share 
Kenya could be split into three demographic regions based on household density 
statistics: Nairobi (very high household density); Central & Nyanza provinces (medium 
household density) and the remainder of the country (low household density). In regions 
of low household density, the cost for TKL installing an additional telephone line is 
much higher than supplying a new line in Nairobi where houses are located more closely 
together. It would therefore be economically more attractive for TKL to install a new 
line in the city or urban areas than in villages that are more rural or provinces if revenue 
per line was equal. It is important to note that on average household size varies 
dramatically across regions (KP&TC, 1984). 
Furthermore, in Nairobi a telephone line in one house on average allows access to the 
telephone by 3. 7 people. In North Eastern province with 6.1 people per household each 
new line effectively gives access to 64% more people than the equivalent line in 
Nairobi . All variables being equal, less telephone lines are required in provinces with a 
higher number of people per household than those with a lower household size. 
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4:3:1:1 Population Growth Rate 
Kenya's population growth rate has been increasing by 3% per annum in the 1990s and 
went down to 2.9% in 1999 and settled at 2.17 in 2000 (Kenya's Economic survey of 
2003 (GOK, 2004). Such high growth has meant that KPTC has had to install lines at 
the rate of approximately 7,000 per annum just to stay still in terms of teledensity, 
Population growth is expected to slow in Kenya, however and views on the speed of 
slow-down vary depending on the source. Two population growth rate scenarios were 
selected (by the GOK) for the purposes of examining the impact on TKL of variations in 
the expected number of customers for a given teledensity in Kenya. The first of these 
was sourced from the Kenya Bureau of Central Statistics, the second from the World 
Banlc The World Bank/United Nations estimates urbanisation increasing at the rate of 
2.52% per annum rising to 46% of the population by the year 2010 (World Bank, ABB., 
and UNCEA, 2000). This demographic shift acts to improve the disparity between rural 
and urban teledensities over time. 
Figure 4-4: Population Growth Assumptions 
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Data Sources: GOK-CBS16 and tbe World Bank, (2003) 
16 Central Bureau of Statistics 
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4:3:2 Market Structure and Liberalization 
In service industries the demographic and populations assumptions are important in 
shaping the market structure. In this regard, population and demography enhance the 
challenges and demands faced by policy makers in Kenya in their attempt to fulfil 
economic needs of the market through; infusion of finance and capacity to expand the 
network, enhance service quality and features and upgrade operational efficiency and 
productivity (Wellenius, 1992; Kikeri et al, 1992). While Kenya has had a rapidly 
expanding economy over the years, it is also reported to have one of the world's highest 
annual population growth rates its population is expected to reach 40 million by 2005 
even at its lowest growth rate of 2%. Kenya will also need to invigorate agriculture and 
enhance the lives of those in its rural areas to stem the tide of migration into the towns 
(GOK, 2003). 
The Kenya economic survey of 2002 (GOK, 2003) estimated that five million new jobs 
needed to be created in the urban areas. This is to help Kenya avoid massive 
unemployment and social unrest that Schusselbauer ( 1999) has argued is often likely to 
follow the restructuring and privatization of the communications industry in emerging 
and developing economies. The GOK responded to these challenges with a market-
oriented economic policy, which emphasizes openness to the world economy and 
export-led growth. This policy necessitates a more universal and reliable telecoms 
network than would be needed had Kenya attempted a predominantly inward-looking, 
centrally directed economic strategy similar to those attempted by other African 
countries (e.g. Tanzania in the early and latel990s). 
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4:3:2:1 Telecommunications Services 
The approved market structure (appendix 2: annex XI)17 consists of the following major 
segments: customer premises equipment; internal and external wiring; resale services 
(value added services); internet backbone; VSAT services; mobile cellular services; 
mobile satellite services; local telephone access services; national long distance 
telephone service; international long distance telephone services (CCK, 2002). 
Telkom Kenya holds licences for and operates all the services previously offered by its 
predecessor KPTC as shown in table (5-5 p.239) These include: Local telephone 
Services, National long distance telephone Service, International gateway service, 
Global mobile personal communication by satellite (GMPCS), Mobile radio services, 
VSA T Services, Internet node and Backbone services, Value added services (VAS), 
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE); vending and Internal & External Wiring services 
(CCK, 2002). TKL however faces stiff competition in almost all of these market 
segments from new market entrants following the current market liberalization trends. 
Mobile Cellular Operators: - The cellular phone market was expected to operate in a 
duopoly environment until the licensing of the third mobile operator (TMO), ECONET 
and a Second National Operator (SNO) (CCK, 2002). 18 Before the entry of SNO in 
2004, the three major players in Kenya's telephony market included TKL as a fixed line 
operator; Safaricom Company Limited, (whose 60% shares are held by TKL and 40% 
by Vodafone UK); and Kencell Communications (Ltd) which was licensed as the 
second mobile cellular operator on the 28th January 1999 (CCK, 2001). Kencell 
Communications limited is a Franco-Kenyan consortium made up of Vivendi 
International, Vodafone (40%) and Sameer Investments Group (60%), with Celtel as the 
new entrant who purchased Vivendi shares in an interesting sale spearheaded by Sameer 
Investments Group, who own 40 per cent of the shares in Kencell. This acquisition of 
17 Appendix 2 
18 Beardsley, S. Patsalos-F. (1995); Faulhaber, G. and Hogendom C. (2000) 
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the 60 per cent equity in KenCell Communications was made at a cost of Sh18.3 billion. 
Celtel was in competition for the sale with another African giant, MTN. Vivendi, the 
initial chief shareholder in KenCell, had agreed to sell its majority stake to MTN. 
However, the South African group was beaten to the finish line by Vivendi's partner in 
Kenya, the Sameer Investments Group, which owns 40% of KenCell (Financial 
Standard, June, 2004). After this acquisition, Celtel become a majority shareholder in 
KenCell and changed its business name from Kencell to Celtel. This change enabled the 
branding and increase of Celtel's market share in the COMESA sub-region by merging 
the Celtel networks in Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Zambia, to become the 
single largest COMESA Mobile network operator (Financial Standard, June, 2004;. 
FSD, 2004). 
The awarding of the second and third licences was carried out through a competitive 
tendering process. The total market share had combined connected lines of 
approximately 350,000 mobile cellular subscribers by 2001. However, Safaricom was 
accused by its competitor Kencell for over-subscribing above the capacity of the line 
infrastructure, resulting in higher demand than Safaricom could supply causing poor 
service provision due to congestion. These congestion and network access problems 
persisted into 2004, enabling an easier roll out for ECONET as TMO with dissatisfied 
Safaricom customers shifting to the new provider (FSD, 2004). 
Regional Telecommunications Operators & other players: - The Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK) issued seven regional licences to private entities to 
operate both local and regional long-distance carrier systems within the licensed regions. 
The licences are for the provision of local exchange basic voice services, inter-exchange 
basic voice services, and regional long-distance basic voice carrier services in each of 
the seven provinces outside Nairobi City. The licences were granted to experienced 
operators of fixed and mobile telecommunications systems (CCK, 2002: 2001). Eight 
Regional Telecommunications Operator (RTO) Licenses were issued by CCK, under the 
liberalization program of the telecom sector in Kenya. The provision of Regional 
Telecommunications Operators was to stimulate competition in the market and 
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encourage expansion in the sector. 19 Table 4-6 shows the eight telecoms regions 
established by CCK, following the liberalization of the non-strategic portion of the 
telecoms network in 1991 and opening of the value added service, market which 
increased the number of private telecommunications service providers considerably 
(CCK, 2002; FSD, 2004). 
Table 4-6: Eight Regional (Telecoms) Operations 
Region Population (1998 est.) 
Western Telecoms Region 3.0 Million 
Nyanza Telecoms Region 5.1 Million 
Coast Telecoms Region 2.4 Million 
North Eastern Province 0 .44 Million 
Eastern Telecoms Region 5.0 Million 
Central Telecoms Region 3.9 Million 
North Rift Telecoms Region 3.5 Million 
South Rift Telecoms Region 3.6 Million 
Data Sources: TKL Report, (2002) 
By 2004 there were over 300 registered companies dealing with customer premises 
equipments (CPE) vending, installation and maintenance and customer premises 
internal and external wiring and about 60 registered Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
and other value added service providers. In addition, privately operated telephone call 
kiosks and internet cyber cafes had sprung up throughout the country's urban centres by 
June 2004 (CCK, 2003). 
19 The response to RTO's depends on FDI and local investment financing, especially for COMESA investors. 
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4:3:2:2 Customer Premises Equipment & Wiring; internet-backbone and VSAT: 
In view of the fact that TKL monopolized the internet-backbone and VSA T terminals 
for over fives years since the start of reforms program in telecoms i n 1998, the 
deregulation and liberalization process of the internet-backbone and VSA T services 
discussed below was important in the privatization process of TKL. It become clear to 
the GOK that in order to attract investors and create efficiency in the communications 
and telephony market VSAT terminals had to be fully accessible to the market. In this 
regard, liberalization of the entire communications and telephony market was made part 
of the restructuring and privatization strategy for TKL (CCK, 2003). It was viewed as 
the only way for TKL and the Ministry of Transport and Communications to introduce 
competition into the market as part of their restructuring program. The liberalization of 
VSA T services or Internet-Backbone service in particular, was much more important 
because competition allowed the introduction of new products and services, new 
technology in data and voice related services. This positioned TKL favourably in its 
quest for a strategic investor. 
Indeed, by December 2004 the provision of telecommunications terminal equipment and 
customer premises wiring was relatively fully liberalised, (notwithstanding persistent 
problems of poor or non-existent telecommunications infrastructure, transport and high 
utility costs). Along with these, resale services or Value added service, which include 
internet services, electronic mail messaging, voice mail, videoconference services and 
data are subject to class licences issued by CCK (CCK, 2003). This market segment is 
sufficiently open to competition to public telephone operators such as telecentres to act 
as service re-sellers with their major role being to increase accessibility of services. 
The CCK encouraged competition in the provision of these services and increased 
licenses to operators or service re-sellers in 2002 in order to encourage a creative service 
delivery system Public telephones were exempted from being subject to price regulation 
until after the licensing of the SNO. However, CCK continued to monitor rates to ensure 
that the consumer is always protected from unregulated price hikes (CCK, 2002). To 
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ensure rapid expansion of the important service of internet- backbone and Very Small 
Aperture Terminal (VSA T) the establishment of an internet backbone is necessary. 
These services were licensed through Telkom as the sole provider (before June 2004) to 
enable providers to establish internet nodes/points of presence within the backbone 
infrastructure to connect customers directly from their businesses (FSD, 2004; CCK, 
2003). 
The GOK opted to gradually liberalize the supply and installation of VSA T terminals. 
By 2001 VSA T services were restricted to national and intra-corporate data traffic 
within national boundaries and with the carrying of public voice services on VSA T not 
authorised in an interim period (2001-2003). Consequently, only Telkom Kenya and 
operators of long distance and international services were licensed and authorised to 
operate a VSA T hub. The result was that this service did not open up as quickly as 
expected. Despite liberalization of the sector TKL continued to control the VSA T and 
access to the internet directly through 2003. For example, big hotels, universities, 
hospitals and other large businesses still use a Telkom phone dial-up system by 
"leasing" access lines to access the internet. This results in expensive internet access use 
due to high TKL telephone bills---high costs and prices, resulting in a slow 
liberalization process, yielding less than the desired competition promised in the GOK's 
1998 sector policy statement. In fact, introduction of complete competition failed to 
take off due to this control by the expected end of monopoly date of June 2004 (FSD, 
2004). 
The other fact that affected the speed of market structure liberalization was the pricing 
of operator licenses for postal and telecom operators, TV operators, radio operators and 
various types of telecommunications network operators and service providers which was 
and still is largely based on 0.5%-1% annual gross turnover or a fixed amount, which 
ever is higher. This complicated the pricing system and continued to make it expensive 
as is the case in a monopolistic market. Section 4:4 discusses VSA T licensing and 
regulating in the COMESA. 
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4:4: Telecommunications Services in the COMESA Sub-region 
In recent years, the industry has known dramatic changes, as COMESA countries 
compete to open their markets, attract investment and improve the regulatory 
environment to develop telecommunications services. As part of this effort, 
Governments and regulatory authorities are increasingly permitting companies to 
operate private networks for their internal needs. Liberalization, restructuring and 
privatization of the Transport and communication sectors are taking place in leading 
COMESA (Egypt, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia) countries in one form or another (FSD, 
2004; COMESA, 2003). Nevertheless, the small portion of the market occupied by 
private networks in relation to public fixed and mobile services, as well as the lack of 
collected information on their management as a policy objective, has made them an 
understudied feature of telecoms deregulation. 
National governments throughout the African continent first began introducing real 
competition in telecommunications services in 1999. Initially, with the exception of a 
few discrete alternatives, the only services available, if any, were those provided by the 
national operator's public-switched terrestrial network ("PSTN"). Consequently, the new 
policies naturally tended to focus on privatisation, competition and deregulation as they 
affected the national operators. The subsequent gradual availability of mobile phone 
services and to a lesser extent, internet-based services, starting in the second half of the 
1990's, both expected but surprising the speed which they expanded, monopolised 
attention in the field oftelecoms deregulation in Africa. 
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Licensing and Regulations 
While the Kenyan telecoms market was struggling to open up, private VSA T networks 
were already a growing feature of telecommunications services in Africa and in the 
COMESA sub-region since the mid 1990s (COMESA, 2003). Telecommunications, 
long since an important business factor, over a decade (1994-2004) become an integral 
part of the security, speed and quality of communications and transport essential to any 
modern business undertaking across borders in the COMESA region. That integrity was 
also dictated by the fact that telecoms services became a significant part of corporate 
expenditures often reaching a significant percentage of operating costs. Not surprisingly 
then, companies focused on reducing costs in this area and improving the quality of their 
intra-corporate networks. Private VSA T systems have an important role to play in this 
regard on the continent providing reliable high-speed, high-quality data and voice 
transmission and cost-effectiveness for large users of telecommunications who have 
made VSA T a preferred solution in the CO MESA region (CCK, 2002). 
In the COMESA telecommunications harmonization program, VSAT networks are a 
benefit to consumers and to the development of an improved national telecoms 
infrastructure. They are also easy to regulate, for the following reasons: Consumers of 
private VSA T networks are invariably corporations with the clout to negotiate 
favourable service terms and are therefore not in need of consumer protection measures 
such as those that regulators might apply to public networks (CCK, 2001). In private 
network services, there are no real issues of unfair competition between private network 
operators, as no service provider is sufficiently dominant and there is vigorous 
competition from the many operators in the market (Ros, 1999; Wallsten, 2001a).The 
regulator's attention to unfair competition, if any, in this field, must be directed at 
preventing the national operator from abusing monopoly (Mwangi, 2003), such as by 
restricting access to space segments. If anything, some regulatory authorities have 
created conditions of unfair competition by restricting the market to a small number of 
VSA T operators and denying end-users the possibility of obtaining their own licences. 
These private networks do not represent any competitive threat for public fixed or 
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networks therefore need present to regulators is to ensure that the process for their 
approval be as open and lightly-regulated as possible. This implies that regional 
regulators like CCK, Communication Commission of Uganda (CCU), Communication 
Commission of Egypt (CCE) and Communication Commission of Zambia (CCZ), must 
be strengthened and made completely independent of government in order to encourage 
competition (Wellenius, 1992; Ambrose, et. al 1990). However, such an open approach 
has only sparingly made gains against the more widespread perception held by many 
individual regulators entrusted with deregulation, that private VSA T networks must be 
treated with as much scrutiny as fully-fledged universal service public telecoms 
services. 
Indeed, applications for authorisation to install and operate a private VSA T network, 
serving one company, often take as much time to be processed as it takes to grant a 
licence to an entire cellular network (CCK, 2001). This narrow-minded and heavy-
handed regulatory view has been exercised in plain defiance of clear and governing 
legislative goals and is contrary to promises from governments that there would be no 
formal barriers in a "full" liberalization scenario for private VSAT networks. These 
were vital to telecommunications end-users who faced no restriction in access to such 
services. 
The literature confirms the problems with VSA T networks argumg that the 
unavailability, unreliability and high cost of telecommunications services in many local 
areas today (Shirley, 2001) means that a company's decision to invest in any African 
country must take into account the ease with which it might be able to freely decide 
what private telecommunications service best suits its commercial needs. Only a few 
years ago this was next to impossible due to monopolistic tendencies and regulatory 
barriers (Wellenius, 1992; Gala) and Nauriyal, 1999). All telecommunications services 
were the monopoly of a national operator (Wallsten, 1999) and the VSA T was an 
exclusive service until the end ofTelkom's monopoly period set for June 30th, 2004. 
This provision of exclusive "monopolistic service" has increasingly been a popular 
feature of telecoms liberalization and privatization in Africa and Europe (Wallsten, 
2000). For example, BT had a fixed line and voice monopoly for several years (ending 
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2005) long after its restructuring and privatization and Egypt Telecom a COMESA 
member still holds this monopoly. 
Denial of voice transmission -this was a common restriction practised by Telkom 
Kenya, South Africa Telkom (SAT), British Telecom (BT) and Egypt Telecom (ET). 
Under the full liberalization model business end-users were allowed transmission and 
receiving data, voice and video signals, both domestically and internationally to 
connecting their company facilities across the continent without artificial restriction 
imposed by regulation. However, this research found that where deregulation of private 
networks occurred it was dogged by a number of enduring restrictions, as illustrated by 
demand for voice transmission. 
Despite the chronic and demonstrated failure of national operators to live up to their 
own conditions of licence and provide service to corporations, their unwarranted 
monopoly over voice transmission continues to be perceived in many quarters as a 
birthright vital to the national interest. However, some countries including Uganda and 
Senegal allowed end-user licences with no voice restriction for several years. There is 
no evidence that voice liberalization has harmed the national operator - indeed, it 
happened during a period in which the national operator was expanding, rolling out a 
cellular network in the face of competition and successfully attracting investment to 
privatise (Azam, et. al, 2002, pp.25-35). 
It was evident that the retention of a formal monopoly in the case of Telkom Kenya 
would limit private networks to domestic use, making a mockery of any purported 
liberalization policy of private VSAT networks, as one of the main benefits and use of 
private VSA T networks is to link facilities across extensive geographical distances 
typically in different countries. Barring international use is therefore equivalent to 
disallowing private networks entirely. Moreover, the banking institutions, whose 
networks of branches within a country make them a natural user of domestic networks, 
always require an international connection to process electronic transfer transmissions. 
Allowing domestic networks only is thus an expedient allowing an administration to lay 
a claim to liberalization without actually modifying the basic regulatory framework. 
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without actually taking any effective deregulatory measures. However this position has 
changed with the expiry of the monopoly and the privatization of TKL (CCK, 2003; 
GOK/CCK, 2001). 
Initially in April 1999, the Government of Kenya issued its Telecommunications and 
Postal Sector Policy Statement on VSAT services, which gave Telkom Kenya the 
mo~opoly of the same carrying of public voice services on VSA T. Consequently, only 
Telkom Kenya and operators of long distance and international services, when licensed, 
were authorised to operate VSAT hub (sic). Indeed, the only liberalization measure 
contained in the Kenyan policy was allowing the sale and installation of VSA T 
equipment by suppliers other than Telkom Kenya (which previously had a monopoly the 
same). Actual operation was reserved to Telkom Kenya until June 2005; this meant in 
practice no opening up of the market as it seems more possible to enter into an 
agreement with Telkom Kenya for the operation of a private VSA T network, than to 
establish one independently while the quality of service and reasonable pricing thus 
remain elusive (CCK, 2001). 
Throughout the 1990s, many national operators in Africa attempted to upgrade their 
networks and the range of services they could provide by installing large-scale, 
expensive VSA T hubs and leasing a large quantity of bandwidth. An internal KPTC 
report ( 1998) estimates that Telkom Kenya spent some US$2 million on installing a 
VSA T hub from 1992 to 1997 of which over 93% of the transponder capacity was 
unutilised. TKL seems not to have evolved from this position as indicated by figure 5-9 
and tables 5:12-13 on network expansion and utilization (CCK, 2001 :2003). 
Despite the failings of such projects, or rather in part due to those failings, subsequent 
liberalization policies have often attempted to force users to route their private network 
transmission through national hubs regardless of technical or financial disadvantages. It 
was not commercially or technically reasonable for end-users to route through a national 
hub, because of reduction in the quality of transmission service and lack of the up-to-
date bandwidth management equipment to allow the end-user to select the best mode of 
166 
Chapter Four: Developments in the Telecommunications Sector: Restructuring, Valuation and Market Structure ofTKL 
access to the satellite. There are other technological reasons like the national hub and 
the "hop" transmission20 factor, national competence of engineers and end user reliance 
on one service provider, a technical discussion that although interesting was outside the 
scope of this research thesis. 
While the number of countries requiring routing through a national hub is steadily 
dwindling, there are others, for example, South Africa, who require transmissions to 
transit through SA Telkom hub. Most other jurisdictions that allow private VSAT 
networks have now dropped the requirement of transiting signals through the national 
hub. 
Allowing End-User Licences, But Not Operator Licences: Most countries that now 
allow private networks have regulations allowing for both end-user and operator 
licences, thus allowing for the full range of services possible with VSA T networks 
(CCK, 200 I: 2002). Zambia opened its market in this respect as early as 1994 followed 
by Cote d'Ivoire in 1995 and more recently Mozambique in 1999. However, a small 
number of countries have more timidly approached the issue, some allowing operator 
but not end-user licences others end-user but not operator licences. This restriction was 
aimed at allowing users to install their own private network, but not to allow operators 
to set up their own hub and provide private network services (for example Kenya and 
Egypt) (( CCK, 2003; COMESA, 2003). 
The regulatory objective here is clearly to allow some liberalization, while limiting the 
progression of services and controlling each new network installed. Yet it has not been 
clear why some jurisdictions essentially chose to allow private VSA T networks, yet at 
the same time interfere in the market by freezing operators out. Such a policy results in 
needless regulatory delay and cost to end-users each of which must go through the 
application process which can last from several months to a year, the licensing of a 
TMO and SNO in Kenya is a good example. It also increases the cost of service itself, 
20 
"hop" transmission is the One step, from one router to the next, of the path of a datagram on internet or wave in 
radio or voice in telephony .The whole journey from source to destination may take for example 5 or 10 hops 
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since each end-user must acquire the entire range of equipment needed for a self-
standing private network, rather than use private services off a hub run by an operator 
(ITU, 2002). 
Allowing Operator Licences, But Not End-User Licences 21 - This situation only exists in 
a minority of situations in Africa, such as Botswana, Morocco and Uganda (World 
Bank, 2001). This approach is predicated on the notion that consumers require 
protection against the unavailability of service that can result if operators fail 
commercially. This is quite a reasonable safeguard in the case of services intended for 
the public - such as fixed or mobile services where operators are required to invest very 
substantial amounts incurring service provision obligations that span up to a decade. 
While the failure of such operators may theoretically result in areas being unserved or 
under-served, the main driver behind the restriction of operators in this area of service is 
the public operators themselves, who would otherwise not risk the large investment 
required. In the case of private VSA T operators this only results in creating an oligopoly 
between the few service providers licensed to provide service, with resulting poor 
quality and high prices to consumers, who are thereby deprived of using the service 
provider of their choice. This research found that Kenya for example moved from a 
monopolistic Telkom Kenya to introducing a second national operator (SNO) creating 
perfect conditions for an oligopolistic situation; these are not desirable conditions for 
attaining high levels of competition (FSD, 2004). 
Denying connection to the public network; - Some jurisdictions theoretically allow 
connection to the public network for additional licence fees, although in practice this 
concession is very difficult to obtain. As private networks are primarily intended for 
intra-corporate communications this has not been a major concern for end-users. The 
restrictions mentioned above were official policy but there were unofficial/unwritten 
restrictions almost as a matter of routine that imposed additional burdens on users and 
21 See CCK, Regulations (2001) and GOK/CCK, (2001) 
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operators of VSA T services. These included lack of transparency, inefficiency in 
processing applications, failure to adopt regulations specifying the manner in which 
general legislative principles are to be applied (thus leaving decision-making to the 
arbitrary decisions of individual regulators) and disregard for the rule of law (Nation 
Newspapers, July 23, 2004i2 by policy, and legal reversals by politicians. The cost of 
VSA T licences has come down to commercially reasonable levels throughout a majority 
of those countries in which they were available. However, there remains a clutch of 
countries whose national operators claimed astronomical costs for VSAT authorisations 
(CCK, 2002), effectively stifling use of VSA Ts. Nevertheless, it should be said that a 
majority of African jurisdictions implemented some form of liberalization, the most 
common being the authorisation of private VSAT networks restricted to data 
transmission excluding voice (COMESA , 2003). 
Mobile Cellular and Satellite Services: Over the last decade ( 1993-2003) the growth of 
mobile telecommunications market was rapid the technological changes caused a drastic 
reduction in cost and a rising differentiation in the supply of services. The Kenyan 
mobile telecommunications market was forecast to grow from over 1 million users in 
1999 to an estimated 3million in the year 2004. This research survey interview data 
found that the entry of the three MOs in the Kenyan market had positive effects on final 
consumer prices but other effects of a new entrant carrier in terms of profits and market 
share among the competitors were carefully evaluated (FSD, 2004). As Cricelli, et.al 
(2002) have argued this model may be useful to highlight regulatory considerations and 
understand relevant features related to the structure of the mobile telephony industry. 
This field research found that mobile cellular services and trunked radio services were 
awarded by TKL through a competitive selection process subject to the availability of 
appropriate frequencies (FSD, 2004). The Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) including the 
Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) service was considered 
a new evolution in telecommunications in 2003 provided by means of a satellite to the 
end users. The mobile satellite services include voice telephony, data and paging 
22 The minister of communications in Kenya stopped a procurement for an SNO against the regulator's advice 
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services. In their annual sector statement the GOK and CCK emphasized that the three 
main MSS service elements considered in its operations were: 
First is the satellite system operator whose main duty is to provide world wide 
connectivity through its satellite; the second is the Mobile Satellite Service gateway 
operator who provides connectivity between the satellite network and the terrestrial 
public switched network. Thirdly is the mobile satellite service provider who markets 
the service and connects the end user. These satellite systems have already been agreed 
under the auspices of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) that 
spearheaded the formulation and worldwide acceptance of the Global Mobile Personal 
Communication by Satellite Memorandum of Understanding (GMPCS- MOU). Separate 
licences are required for the provision of mobile satellite service gateway in the country. 
Provision of mobile satellite user terminals will be done under a class licence. 
(GOK/CCK, 2001 p.5) 
MSS considered local access network exchanges and granted licences in specific 
geographic areas/regions for the purpose of providing telephone services and other 
related services that may be defined in the licence. These operators are expected to 
interconnect with the TKL network. Terms the for interconnection agreement are 
mutually agreed but are based on principles developed by CCK. Local access operators 
become like TKL subject to universal service obligations and some form of price 
regulation (CCK, 2003: 2001). However, TKL continued to be a monopoly on National 
Long Distance Telephone Service (NLDTS) and operated the national long distance 
telephone services even after the end of the exclusive monopoly over a period of five 
years. The GOK and TKL deliberately delayed the entry of the SNO, citing lack of 
TKL' s preparedness. 
Initially, CCK and GOK planned to introduce competition in this market segment in 
phases in accordance with the law and was to take account of the need to avoid 
unnecessary infrastructure duplication (GOK/CCK, 2001). Licensed operators of local 
access networks and mobile cellular services were encouraged to maximise the utility of 
the TKL trunk network. International gateway and telephone services were operated 
mainly by TKL with Kencell (the SMO Third cellular operator) showing interest after 
the privatisation of TKL was delayed in 2002 and when there were doubts that the 
market could withhold three major players (CCK, 2002). Besides, the monopoly period 
for TKL offering the NLDTS was still active and the industry players contend that this 
helped delay the roll-out strategy for the operators. In addition, the cost of old and 
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inefficient technology infrastructure risked rendering telephone services as undesirable 
business. Ultimately, the operators had to spend resources to upgrade the infrastructure 
to increase the possibility of a good return on their investments (see tables 5-12-13).23 
4:4:1 Telecommunications Infrastructure- (Carrier Systems} 
This research found that Public Telecommunications infrastructure or carrier systems 
were provided by Telkom Kenya until June 2004. Other operators showed interest to 
provide services such as local access service, long distance telephone service and 
international long distance services (GOK/CCK, 2001). There were other sector specific 
telecommunications facilities and services provided by TKL, POST A, Kenya Railways 
(KR) and Kenya Pipeline (KP) in support of their critical operations, these are still 
operated by these institutions, under licence from CCK (CCK, 2003). It is worth noting 
that KR and KP were earmarked for privatisation although they were previously 
considered strategic (annex Va).While POSTA is in a transformation stage with a lot of 
its services under restructuring and privatization along with TKL. POST A's postal 
services (as a support carrier to Telecoms) are still a monopoly business. 
23 Telecommunications Operators Association Of Kenya -(TOPAK), African Telecommunications Union- (ATU) and 
Private Sector Players in Telecoms 
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4:5 Market Structure and Privatisation of Telkom Kenya 
4:5:0 Sector Overviews 
What are the implications of reviewing the market structure? Liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector in Kenya like any other liberalization programme is designed 
to expand the depth and breadth of telecommunications services and introduce market 
forces where appropriate to improve quality and reduce cost. The introduction of 
customer oriented services for example, is what drives customer loyalty in the 
telecommunications industry (GOKIMOT &C, 1999). Studies show customer 
satisfaction as being important in the telecommunications industry. Indeed, Khatibi, et. 
al (2002) argue that there is a significant relationship between customer satisfaction and 
quality of service. They also suggest that the reliability dimension of any service 
provider consists of three elements, namely a fault-reporting centre, response time and 
restoration time that have a strong correlation with customer satisfaction. These are 
elements of weakness for most SOEs. The empirical analysis of TKL as an SOE 
confirms this argument, as indicated by figure 5-13 showing TKL's poor fault response 
rate. 
In addition, this collaborates Shirley, et. al (2002) on Telecommunications Reforms in 
Uganda, which showed that there was poor quality of service before reforms and 
improvement after reforms. The GOK's objectives as stated in its telecoms policy 
statement (of 1998 and 1999), seek to ensure the availability of reliable and affordable 
communications services throughout the country by encouraging expansion of 
telecommunications services and facilitating development of advanced services; 
improving quality and quantity of service by encouraging sector investments; and 
initiating price competition and encouraging indigenous Kenyan participation in the 
sector. The desirable sector characteristics that government hoped to achieve were 
protecting the value of investments; achieving proper balance between competition and 
regulation; promoting universal service/universal access programs and encouraging 
entrepreneurial spirit, in creating new business opportunities across COMESA borders 
as indicated in GOKIMOT &C, ( 1999), and the findings in chapter five. 
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Telkom Kenya Ltd (TKL) operates the national telephone network in Kenya that was 
formerly in the hands of KPTC. TKL has four subsidiaries namely; Safaricom-which 
operates a cellular phone network (in partnership with Vodafone Airtouch, which has 
40 percent shares), Gilgil Telecommunication industries-manufacturers of 
telecommunication and postal products (telephone handsets, P ABX systems etc), 
Kenya Postal Directories Ltd that publishes the yearly telephone directory, and Kenya 
College of Telecommunications Technology (KCCT) which offers training to the 
communications sector. TKL also offers a satellite-based communication service 
(VSAT hub), KENSAT and operates Jambonet, which links local Internet service 
providers to the rest of the world. Other facilities include a digital leased line service, 
KENstream and an analogue packet switching service, KENPAC as indicated by tables 
4-7 and 5-13. (CCK, 2001; TKL, 1999). 
Table 4-7: 24Market and Competition Structure of the Expected Framework 
SERVICE LICENSE COMPETITION STRUCTURE 
REQUJRED 
CORE SERVICES 
(BASIC 
TELEPHONY) 
Local Yes TKL issued a nation-wide license with a five-year exclusivity period for Nairobi and 
Mombasa. Additional local service licences are issued to qual ified operators on a 
geographic basis 
Interurban Yes TKL was issued a nation-wide license with a five-}'ear exclusivity period-2004 
International Yes TKL was issued a nation-wide license with a five-year exclusivity period-2004 
GSM Mobile Yes Duopoly with TKL and a second operator holding nation-wide licences 
Non-core Services Yes 
Other mobile Yes Regulator reserves the right to issue additional, mobile licences using older analog 
technologies or new digital technologies based on spectrum availability and service 
demand 
Paging Yes Within the limits of spectrum availability there should be no limit on the number of 
paging licences 
VSAT Yes VSAT market should be fully competitive. Only private network services are 
permitted 
VAS Class License Fully competitive firms register to operate under the conditions of class license. 
Public Telephones Class License Fully competitive firms register to operate under the conditions of class license. 
Customer premise Certificate &/or Fully competitive- no license to operate is required. All equipment sold must obtain 
Equipment type approval of 
equipment 
certification or type approval 
Sources: CCK, Market Regulation Report, (2001) 
24 Table 4-7a is annex XI : Source CCK, Licensing Regulations, ( 2001) 
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The set-out competition (structure) framework outlines seven core basic services 
(telephony) that require licensing and another four (i.e. public telephones and customer 
preuse equipment) that requires class licences or certificate of approval. However, the 
VSAT framework has been a contentious issue as outlined in detail in sections 4:3:2:2. 
through to 4:4 while TKL operated the VSAT technology without restrictions until 2004 
when the VSA T services were fully liberalised and ISPs got access to VSA T (CCK, 
2001 ). However, the state-owned corporation also enjoyed a statutory monopoly that 
allowed it to exclusively operate an internet backbone making it the biggest wholesaler 
of bandwidth to ISPs in the COMESA region (CCK, 2001). However, during TKL's 
exclusivity period, entrepreneurs and business managers of local internet service 
providers raised concerns with GOK to allow VSA T usage. The decision to maintain 
TKL's exclusivity period for internet backbone helped keep the cost of internet 
connectivity high in Kenya. Although the regulator (CCK) maintained that VSA T 
service in Kenya was fully liberalized except for international voice, by controlling the 
voice license (i.e. TKL), ISPs can only receive data via the technology but cannot send 
out. This decision was largely interpreted as motivated by the need to control the content 
that Kenyans can send out of the country-a relic of the oppressive days when the 
government was keen on muzzling political dissent in the country in the 1990s.25 
Besides, this slowed down infrastructure (investment) reforms in the sector which is a 
major variable in the growth of telecoms (Wallsten, 1999). 
This thesis field research revealed that Jambonet (as an internet backbone monopoly) 
continued to impair the development of the information communication technology 
(ICT) sector as the GOK moved the exclusivity period to June 2004 (see table 5-5 in 
chapter five) thus failing to license another backbone service provider to allow for 
competition. In addition, Jambonet's bandwidth capacity became inadequate in 
servicing the needs of all the telecommunications providers effectively, forcing 
companies to install servers in the US to avert risk when Jambonet failed rendering 
Jambonet's services poor, expensive and unreliable. This made for a strong case by the 
25 The Financial Standard of July 23'd and 30th 2004 
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private sector for early elimination of exclusivity and monopolistic awards to TKL 
(FSD, 2004). 
Indeed as interview results indicate, and as argued by Wallsten, (1999, p.2), for mobile 
operators operating public phones ideally the market structure of TKL should have been 
set by the introduction of competition through reforms rather than maintaining 
monopolistic services.26 It has been argued that competition shapes the market structure 
by lower prices, increased efficiency and rapid expansion of services, more universal 
access and more diversity through appropriate reforms. Such reforms have several key 
ingredients: First, there can be no granting of monopoly powers, it should be recognized 
that in some segments of the industry, especially in the "last mile," the final 
interconnection to the user, and it may be some time before competition arises on its 
own (Shirley and Tusubira, 2002). Second, given that there were likely to be important 
segments in which there was little if any competition, it was important to have a 
regulatory structure that protects consumers (CCK, 200 I; TKL, 2003). By ensuring that 
firms with monopoly power do not exercise that power to raise prices excessively and 
ensure that monopoly power in one segment (in the "last mile") was not leveraged to 
achieve power over other segments. Because abusive practices are hard to monitor 
regulation may entail structural separation (e.g. between the provider of "last mile" 
services and other services). In addition, TKL management argues that an important and 
essential goal of regulation should be to ensure access and interconnections. 
Third, international service providers and investors are an essential source of services 
and financing for the telecommunications sector in developing countries; however, 
competition for international services for the domestic market is just as essential (ITU: 
2000: 1999). The rationale behind any market structure during post- privatisation is that 
the regulatory participation and the level of licensing should vary based on the 
importance of the service and the need for consumer protection. The ideal market 
structure should also have the capacity and autonomy to manage the dynamics of the 
market so as to encourage a substantial increase in the levels of investment in 
26 See tables 4-7 on competition structure and on TKL monopolies 5-5. 
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telecommunications infrastructure in many COMESA countries. These countries and 
Kenya in particular, look to the private sector to provide that investment and should 
seek to create an environment which attracts that investment (GOK!TKL, 2003). 
An indispensable precondition for sustained large-scale investment is the institutional 
capacity of national (i.e. CO MESA) countries to strengthen their regulatory framework 
and restrain arbitrary administrative discretion, enabling a commitment in a credible 
manner to a stable regulatory process. Without government commitment to regulatory 
stability, frequent changes and semblance of lack of independence in the regulatory 
regime could have the same effect as (partial) expropriation of sunken investments and 
raise questions of the independence and capability of CCK as a regulator. 
(USAID/BAH, 1999; Galal et al.1994). Private telecoms operators that are vulnerable to 
administrative intervention could be expected to invest less than the optimal amount and 
especially to make disproportionately low investments in activities characterized by 
large sunk costs (for example, in house R&D are costs that cannot be eliminated in the 
short or intermediate term). In this regard, it is important that the core and non-core 
services shown in table 4-8 conform to the criteria (Nauriyal and Galal, 1995; Young, 
2003) 
Table 4-8: Core and Non-core Services 
CORE SERVICES NON-CORE SERVICES 
l.Core services are presumed to be critical 1. Non-core services are not viewed as 
public services with participation in the essential with the risk of unsuccessful 
sector reserved for highly qualified service operators to the public and the economy 
providers operating in a controlled no greater than in any private business 
environment venture 
2. Core services are also presumed to 2. Licenses in non-core services should be 
require significant investment in network easily obtained in order to encourage 
assets thus implying increased risk for the innovation and competition 
sector if operations are unsuccessful. In the 3. Licenses will serve primarily as a 
Kenyan environment, with limited means of maintaining minimum standards 
resources, developing many unsuccessful and of monitoring overall sector 
networks is risky performance 
3. Core services require licences that 4. In most cases, prices for non-core 
contain quality of service standards and services should be based on competition 
mechanisms for price regulation rather than regulation 
Source: CCK, (2001) 
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4:5:1 Sector Segmentation 
With a liberalised environment and entry into the market of new third mobile and 
second national operators, various improvements in the sector were expected. Advanced 
technology was to be naturally introduced into the market and an increase in ISPs was to 
be realised. This advanced technology was intended to reform the old market and 
introduce a business portfolio reflecting new services, new products and product 
differentiation as investigated by Wallsten, (1999, p.3) and indicated in figure 5-12. In 
the old sector, market segmentation structure included only three major "players": 
Ministry oflnformation, Transport and Telecommunication, TKL and POSTA. The new 
sector includes geographical local service operators, public telephone operators, VSA T 
operators and wireless operators (table 4-7). It also included the Ministry of Transport 
and Telecommunications as part of the telecommunications regulator, the TKL as a 
dominant (monopolistic) carrier with operating licences in specific areas, Safaricom (a 
TKL subsidiary) as a first cellular national operator, Kencell as a second cellular 
national operator, GSM operators, paging operators, internet providers, and POST A as a 
postal service regulated by the postal rate commission and the postal service (table 5-
12)?7 
This research further revealed that as a dominant carrier in the sector, TKL had certain 
unique privileges and responsibilities that enabled it to operate as a duopoly. In this 
regard, as a single major GSM operator TKL was granted licences that facilitated 
network build-out issues, which enabled it to account for a large majority of sales in the 
market. A duopoly should result in price competition thus minimising the need for price 
regulation. However the GSM operators in the market were dependent on TKL for 
interconnection and for inter-switch trunking and this opened the regulator and TKL to 
be subjective in their decisions, since TKL participates in the industry as "first and third 
national operators" respectively (through Safaricom), it raises questions on possible 
conflict of interest. This calls for the recognition of the needs (CCK, 2002) of GSM 
operators and licence conditions to contain certain build-out and universal service 
27 Three cellular operators and two SNOs by June 2004 
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requirements (CCK, 2002: 2004) in order to create a 'true' duopolistic market where 
price competition is real. 
The local telecoms service operators are issued with the same licences as TKL, the latter 
differing only in the "dominant carrier obligations". Five-year concessions were granted 
to operators in specific geographic areas for the purpose of providing local service (core 
service) as well as other non-core services subject to license conditions. In addition, 
local operators can be awarded licences on an exclusive basis with the exception of 
Telkom Kenya, which has a nation-wide license. Local operators are subject to some 
form of price regulation but allowed to price their services differently than the Telkom 
Kenya tariff (see CCK Tariff schedule). However, interconnection holds the key to the 
local operator although its accomplishments in the sector segmentation (after the 
abortive sale to the Mount Kenya Consortium) were clearly stated but the positive 
effects of the pre-privatization (Megginson et. al (1994i8 competition were already 
noted by the entries of the Third Mobile Operator (TMO) and Second National 
Operator (SNO) in 2003. The second national operator (SNO) was expected to be 
awarded the license one year prior to the end of Telkom Kenya's exclusivity period. 
According to the GOK the introduction of SNO was expected to encouraged price 
reductions, sector efficiencies, expansion of services and improved customer services. 
SNOs are subject to similar license conditions as Telkom Kenya including 
interconnection and universal service (infrastructure assets -access) obligations (FSD, 
2004). 
According to CCK management, the non-core service (table 4-8) public telephone 
operators have certain obligations designed to protect the consumer, however, public 
telephone operators require wholesale prices for accessing Telkom Kenya and GSM 
lines. At the same time licences required were designed to promote market entry and to 
encourage creative service delivery systems (telecentres, card phones etc.). Public 
telephones were not subject to price regulation however, the CCK monitors rates and is 
28 Their studies of 61 companies (in 32 industries) from 18 countries, find that during and after privatization, 
firms increase sales, profitability, capital spending, operating efficiency & increase skilled workforce 
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anticipated that after privatisation a series of new companies would enter the 
telecommunication market providing services on a competitive basis. The commission, 
(at this stage of market entry) limited its role to a monitoring role, rather than a 
regulatory role with respect to core services. During this stage of multiple entry most 
licences are issued as "class licences" on an administrative basis. With the entry of new 
companies fair and reasonable network access was required. Moreover, additional 
mobile operators in new spectrum bands are classified either as core or non-core 
services depending on government policy (CCK, 2004: 2003) and activities. 
4:5:2 Efficient and effective Market Structure operation: Issues of Focus 
In conclusion the interview analysis and Telkom's strategic plan that in order to 
encourage and structure efficiency and effectiveness in the sector, universal service, 
interconnection, price regulation and telephone numbering plan (i.e. from analog to 
digital) have to be the centre of focus (TLK, 2003; FSD, 2004). This means that there 
have to be viable mechanisms for supporting universal service. For example, service 
obligations should be established that avoid hidden subsidies. Core service provided 
should have certain universal service obligations in their licences. Since not all-
universal service might be profitable, it is prudent that a "universal service fund" is 
established to provide operators with funds for meeting universal service obligations. 
Examples of universal service funding mechanisms from South Africa, the United 
States and the United Kingdom exist and Uganda in particular set up a fund using a 2% 
overall surcharge on profits that was charged from the service providers (COMESA, 
2004; COMESAIITU, 2003) 
Alternatively, license conditions could require the connection of certain universal 
service lines based on a specific formula without designating a funding source. It is 
important however, to emphasise that universal service obligations must be consistent 
with operator resources and market position, recognising that they are dynamic 
(GOK!fKL, 2003). 
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4:5:2:1 Interconnection and Market Structure 
Interconnection plays a critical role in influencing technology development market 
development, and the success of new operators. The dominant carrier's tariff structure 
should be fair without discounts or subsidies that influence market share; as indicated in 
TKL's confidential reports (GOKITLK, 2000*) the regulatory environment could 
constitute barriers to entry due to economies of scale, which in tum affect the new 
entrant's pricing strategy and cost structure. The cost structure is determined to a large 
extent by the interconnection agreements, influenced by profits and returns of new 
entrants, through the development of a competitive environment. The market share 
determines the quality of service of both the dominant carrier and a new entrant. 
Elements of the interconnection agreement define the relationship among network 
operators, thus enabling consumers to benefit from broad sector participation. 
Table 4-9: Elements of interconnection and the relationship among network operators 
TOPIC DESCRIPTION 
I. Scope of the agreement 1. Which services , which partners does the agreement include , 
which additional steps and services have to be considered 
2. Definition of 2. Distribution of responsibilities for maintenance, provision, 
interconnection services quality, management, routing principles, transmissions etc 
3. POI 3. Location and number of POI, time schedule, definition of 
standards, physical realisation, control over connection 
4. Network planning 4. Guarantee of capacity, traffic forecast mechanism, adjustment 
of POI to modernisation, penalties, etc 
5. Charges -Circulation and 5. Circulation method, structure and value of charges, payment 
payment dates, recording principles 
6. Customer access and billing 6. Who bills the customer, where and how does the customer get 
access to the network of the competitor?, equal access conditions, 
customer authentication and handling billing information 
7. Operative questions and Which information should have to be exchanged, responsibilities 
Conflict Management in day-to day work, avoid conflict escalation 
8. Actualisation 8. Time frame for calculation procedure, which topics are subject 
to actualisation etc 
9. Legal Formalities 9. End of agreement, security for personnel and confidentiality of 
intellectual capital 
Sources: CCK L1censmg Regulation Gu1dehnes (2001) 
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The interconnection factors are key to both liberalization and successful privatisation of 
the telecommunication sector. Interconnection policy must be well thought-out, in order 
for it to promote competition and enable consumers to have a real choice of service 
providers (TKL/Safaricom, 2000). The provision of fair competition may often require 
the frequent intervention by the regulatory authority in order to secure equitable 
agreements between operators. However, interconnection arrangements should be based 
on cost and should recognise legitimate technical considerations. 
4:5:2:2 Price Regulation 
Telecoms and electricity utilities are capital-intensive sectors and require heavy 
investments. However, privatisation of telecoms or utilities does not rest on the financial 
case. In order to privatise a network utility, the buyer has to be convinced that prices 
can be set at cost recovery levels and that profits are adequate to finance the investment 
(Newbery, 1999). There has to be real effort to rebalance tariffs based on the cost 
service areas under regulation and based on market factors in competitive segments. The 
problem is the elimination of price regulation in order to ensure that regulators maintain 
"real" competition; TKL operated under a price cap regime during its period of 
exclusivity and the local network operators may operate under a price cap scheme if 
competition from Telkom Kenya is weak in specific geographic areas. With the 
licensing of three companies (i.e. Safaricom, Kencell and ECONET) GSM is still 
currently under regulation although initially it was stated that regulation would only be 
necessary if a second GSM operator was delayed and if two strong companies did not 
emerge. At the moment non-core services are unregulated and prices are determined by 
the market forces (CCK 2004:2001). 
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4:6 Telkom Kenya Valuation Process 
Before deciding on TKL' s sale price a valuation of the TKL as a going concern had to 
be done. The interviews for this study revealed that the managers of TKL, the GOK had 
estimated the value of TKL at $800 million (GOK/TKL, 2000*:1999*). Several 
valuation techniques are used by investors to ascertain the 'cost' of a company 
earmarked for sale as discussed by Welch and Fremond, (1998, pp.21-40), who report 
several methods that can be appropriate to dispose of a company depending on the entity 
within the valuation study. There various steps to be followed to a successful sale and 
these are discussed in chapter five. However, one Key step is the discounted cash flow 
(DCFi9 approach that (in this case) aimed to model the complete operations process of 
TKL in order to determine the price. According to industry analysts interviewed during 
the field data collection for this thesis, this is a very flexible tool and allows the impact 
on value between different options for TKL to be considered (GOK/TKL, 2000; FSD, 
2004). In a strict business model this is an important step to determine the price of an 
enterprise; however, it is not the major subject of this thesis and is reviewed here as tool 
used in all the valuation processes in the developing countries as influenced by the 
World Bank (2002). A number of different regulatory options were considered. 
Different stakeholders in TKL perceive value differently. The enterprise value of TKL 
looked at the value of the company as a whole by considering cash flows resulting from 
the daily operations of the company. It did not consider the value to a particular 
stakeholder. In particular, the total effect on GOK will only be partly addressed by 
considering the enterprise value and the broader potential benefits to GOK resulting 
from financial restructuring. The initial enterprise is only important in as much as it sets 
a sale price as indicated in figure (5-2) which forms the basis of negotiations for 
transaction. 
The field survey data (2004) on KPTC's audit report of June 1997 (table 4-10) shows 
KPTC in its pre-restructured format was highly geared because they raised most of their 
29 See glossary for DCF definition 
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funds from fixed interest loans, (Pendleton et. al, 1995, p.82)30 since they were not yet 
members of the Nairobi Stock Exchange- NSE 20 index .On examining the restructured 
balance sheet's possible options, the valuation report (TKL, 2000) recommended 
various scenarios regarding the treatment of the inter-business account and pensions as 
discussed in sections 4:8 through 4:9 and summarized in table 4-15. After the study was 
completed, TKL was still not in a position to settle the pension liability (TKL, Pension 
Report, 2000)31 • In the interim, they agreed to handover the Teleposta towers (one of 
TKL's prestigious and biggest fixed asset investments) proceeds to the pension fund. 
TKL's was still in discussion with the TKL/PCK Trade Union (as of June 2004) to find 
ways in which part of the debt can be turned into equity shares, when they are floated on 
the Nairobi stock exchange. The only available adjusted balance sheet ofTelkom Kenya 
reflects this position and is summarised in table 4-10. The details of the options of 
dealing with the pension debt are discussed in section 5:6:1 of chapter five (TKL, 2003). 
Table 4-10: Restated Balance sheet for TKL as at June 1996 
KSbs. Million Telkom Kenya Financial Restructure Adjusted Restructured Telkom 
Kenya 
Fixed assets 39,045 39,044 
Investments 900 900 
Current assets 
Stock 4,0 17 -1,0 1 
Debtors 9,67/3 (4,267) 5,406 
IIJeposits 127 
!Cash at bank and in hand 224 224 
~ntercompany account 4,560 (4,560) 
18,601 374 
Current liabilities 
Creditors 28,204 (23,643) 4.556 
Overdraft 177 28,381 4,733 
Net current asset I Oiabilities) (9,780) 5,041 
Long, term liabilities 
LOans 18, 685 15,67-33) 3, 0 121 
Pension liability 5,148 5,148 
23,833 8,160 
INet assets 6,332 36,826 
!Financed by 
Grants 95 (95) 
!Revaluation reserves 10,114 (10,114) 
peneral reserve (3,877) 33, 8 7 7 
!Equity capital 36,826 16.826 
~ ~ 
Source: KPTC Audit Report June 1997 
30 A company is highly geared when it raises more funds using fixed interest loans and less from shareholders 
31 This Study was discussed in the interviews but was not made available as it was considered confidential. 
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Before detailing the analysis of the valuation elements in the financial restructuring of 
KPTC -TKL it is important to revisit the action recommendations made by internal and 
external advisors to the GOK after the re-alignment of the balance sheet in table 4-10. 
The recommended approach to proceed was that GOK should maximise the headline 
sales proceeds and be required to forgive or take on some debt under KPTC as it did 
with KQ. This was because during the privatization process, KPTC!fKL was still 100% 
owned by the GOK with a high level of gearing and net assets of about Kshs 8 billion, 
making it very difficult to dispose of it especially through an STI or an IPO (GOK!fKL, 
1999*). 
The GOK financial advisors (i.e. World Bank and IMF) and transaction advisors 
recommended a financial restructuring with a long-term benefit of an reduction in value 
of GOK ownership to 70%, was that GOK forgives the 30 billion of debt by converting 
it to equity. This would benefit TKL in real terms because TKL would have no debt 
servicing as was the case with Kenya Airways privatization. According to the 1996 audit 
report, 32 in its pre-restructured format, TKL' s gearing33 was 1. 79: 1 or 179%. An 
analysis34 of the profit and loss account indicated that interest cover (being operated on 
profit/interest and penalty charges) was 1.9: 1. This could not attract potential investors 
and they needed to be confident that TKL would be able to fund future operations 
including any network development requirements (table 4-15, figures 5-9 and 5:13 and 
table 5: 11 ). The buyer needed to be convinced that profits are adequate to finance the 
investment. If not they may conclude that the company was not be able to sustain such 
high gearing and interest cover in the medium to long term. If a potential investor 
reaches such a conclusion, they would seek to ensure that more proceeds go to the 
company to achieve a lower gearing. This position is reflected in the price proposals 
discussed in sections 4:8:1 on financial restructuring and 4:9:0 on TKL's sale 
negotiations (GOK/TKL, 2000, p.45). 
32 This was the last audit report that was available - done before the privatization process. The subsequent Audits 
undertaken by the Auditor General were unavailable for this research. 
33 See definition of Gearing of a company in the glossary section 
34GOK!TKL, (2000*, pp40-56) valuation report 
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However, it should be noted that the acceptable level of gearing would depend crucially 
on issues yet to be decided by government. These include tariff policy, the timing for the 
introduction of competition and network development objectives, putting together an 
independent and effective regulatory body, balancing the political variables in order to 
correct the old image (i.e. partisan, inefficient management, service and technology) 
that dents the value, and seeking membership in the NSE. Such issues define the need 
for cash and the ability to fund this from future revenues; resolution of these issues are 
fundamental to the final financial restructuring (GOK!fLK, 2003; FSD, 2004). 
Indeed, TKL's valuation35 further indicated that some of the decisions taken by management on 
factors and options of the business strategy contributed to KPTC/TKL's high gearing. This 
amounted to some KShs 4.5 million, representing what the postal division owed TKL on the 
basis of the criteria used to separate KPTC into the telecoms and postal divisions. The account 
represents the funding over time of the postal business by the telecoms business whose balances 
were not transferred to TKL. This write-off did not have an impact on the value to government 
and internal reports showed that pension liability faced by TKL highlighted a need to fund a 
pension scheme at inception by some KShs 5.1 billion ('15% of the total assessment of liability) 
with the remainder funded through increased contributions in the future (TLK, 2003). 
There were still other considerations to be examined in which the pension liability could be 
funded. The principal balances are indicated in figure 4-5 in detail. Internal TLK documents 
show an increase in a corporate tax liability of Ksh1.6 billion ($20.7 million) on the books of 
Telkom relating to the defunct Kenya Posts and Telecommunications (KPTC) as at June 2003. 
Indeed, an internal confidential document showed the total pensions liability amounting to 
Ksh4.2 billion ($54 million) resulting in a shortfall of Ksh3.8 billion ($49 million). The GOK 
and TLK engaged the PKF consultants in late 2003 to review the treatment of the liabilities 
before June 2004. This report was expected in August 2005. 
35 
as indicated in their internal confidential reports of 1999 and 2000 
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This research further found that the third liability (the first and second are tax and pension 
liabil ities) for TLK is a$ 33 million ' loan ' the government lent Telkom in 2000 to facilitate the 
acquisition of the Safaricom licence, must be paid within two weeks of its privatisation, 
according to an agreement signed between TLK and the GOK (FSD, 2004; TKL/Safaricom, 
2000). 
Figure 4-5: KPTC's Principal Balances 
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4:6:1 Considerations for Financial Restructure and Privatisation of TKL 
According to the GOKffLK (2000*: 1999*) valuation reports, the restructured balance 
sheet had to make the recommendations regarding the treatment of the inter-business 
account and pensions as summarised in table 4-15 .36 This was important because the 
process for the privatisation of Telkom Kenya required the formation of Telkom Kenya 
as a stand-alone company with shares that would then be sold. In order to form this 
company, the GOK and its advisors needed to decide whether certain assets and 
liabilities of KPTC should be vested in the company before privatisation or assumed by 
government. This determines the balance between debt and equity and the financial 
structure used to finance the new company of TKL and also determines the price for a 
Strategic Investor (STI). 
36 KPTC, ( 1999) 
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The approach taken was to identify the relevant balances to be considered, assess the 
pros and cons of the various options for the treatment of these balances and review 
suggested approaches for the treatment of the balances. In making the decision on 
whether a particular balance should be vested in the new company (Telkom Kenya), it 
should be recognised that there was no right answer in achieving the best option for all 
concerned. The decision depended upon the perception of the decision maker and other 
major stakeholders (for example the Trade Unions) involved in the decision making 
process. All stakeholders viewed similar situations in a different light depending on 
their interests. For example, the implications differed depending on whether the future 
of TKL was considered or the realization of value price of TKL due to privatisation. 
Other things being equal, if TKL was left with higher debt after restructuring, more of 
the proceeds of any future sale of equity could be injected into the company and less of 
the proceeds would be received by GOK; this meant that the GOK were unwilling to 
address the issue. Further more, as already stated the investors' perception as to the 
acceptable treatment of proceeds would also be determined by the obligations imposed 
on it by government. For example, a high level of investment required by the imposition 
of rapid development targets will require more proceeds to be vested with the company. 
On the other hand, limited tariff intervention by government may encourage an investor 
to be more willing to accept less favourable arrangements on financial restructuring 
(GOKffLK, 2003; FSD, 2004) 
For GOK to achieve the principal objectives for the telecommunications and postal 
sector as laid out in the policy statement, it made decisions based on making TKL a 
regional force in telecommunications by, ensuring private investment in infrastructure 
improvement and expansion of the sector;37 maximising headline sales proceeds in the 
transaction and retaining a majority of the sales proceeds; and minimising the 
requirement for any initial cash injection by reducing the risks related with the impact of 
unqualified elements of current liabilities in the interest of the public. 
37 The objectives are stated in the Sector Policy Statements of 1996/1998 revised in 1999 
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4:6:1:2 The Investor and the Investors in a Trade Sale 
TKL and GOK chose this approach to privatize Telkom Kenya; the trade sale is often 
used for assets that do not have a good record of accomplishment. KPTC had been a 
natural monopoly for over forty years with a negative financial performance record (see 
table 4: I 0). The investor in a trade sale is likely to arrive at the price he would pay by 
deducting from a value based on cash flows before financing activity and has his 
perception of existing or future liabilities irrespective of what TKL's marketing states. 
Clearly, therefore, higher debt in the company would result in a lower sale price and/or a 
proportion of the proceeds being injected into the company. Further-more, business 
experience and the literature, for example Gayle and Goodrich (1990), suggest that the 
value gained from a trade sale is likely to be enhanced by the presence of a number of 
interested parties in the bidding process (see section 4:9:0 on TKL's transaction). 
Certain aspects of any transaction that are perceived by an investor as risky are likely to 
reduce the number of interested parties and therefore could impact on the sales proceeds 
eventually derived. In the TKL's trade sale specifically the bidding (privatisation) 
process was ongoing over the planned eighteen months (figure 5-2) starting June 2001 
to December, 2002 during which time there was considerable confusion as to the 
government's objectives, organization and approach as to who or which 
institution/ministry was responsible for moving forward the process.38 Secondly, the 
final price is often likely to be affected by different policy decisions that would result in 
different prices for acquisition. Thirdly, the lack of a clear relationship between the 
telecommunications and privatisation processes appeared to undermine the GOK's 
rationale for the privatisation of TKL, as well as its intentions with regard to other 
privately-owned telecommunication companies (FSD, 2004). 
Along with the foregoing, the industry analysts and Welch and Fremond (1998) contend 
that any investors in a trade sale consider the means by which the risks in their 
discounted cash flow assumptions can be limited. For example, the trade investor 
38 Due to lack of a law that institutionalizes the instruments and offices of privatization, (Appendix 2 annex Ilia) 
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considers the economic background, the clarity and definition of the regulatory regime 
(especially with regard to tariff control and timing for the introduction of competition) 
and the level of operational control that can be exercised, especially with regard to the 
investor's ability to improve operational and purchasing efficiency. Perceptions of the 
investor in a trade sale are regarded as in a "debt free sale" state only when sales 
proceeds valued as discounted cash flow are less than the debt. The bidder's impact on 
sales proceeds, require a well defined regulatory regime and a level of operational 
influence or control. Whereas the investor in an IPO would be emotive and obtains 
information from the press on comments and sale particulars, reviews perception of past 
performance and has strong perception of future and general performance of the 
company and ofthe NSE (Young, 2003). Additional mechanisms to improve accounting 
and the investment return objective (e.g. management changes) would be of importance 
in a trade sale (Welch and Fremond, 1998; FSD, 2004). 
4:6:1:3 The investors in an IPO 
A public offering commonly referred to as an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of stocks is 
used by investors as a vehicle for raising a substantial amount of cash to implement a 
company's growth plans, through the stock and securities exchange. Although a 
sophisticated institutional investor in an IPO could view a valuation in a similar manner 
as an investor in a trade sale, the majority of private investors have a less considered 
view of whether the company is a viable investment (Welch and Fremond 1998). They 
are likely to focus more on several aspects which include: the likely level of dividends 
to be paid by the company; the level of debt in the company; their perception of past 
performance and their perception of future performance - based principally on press 
reports and hearsay and perceptions about the quality of the management team, along 
with the general performance of the Kenyan Stock Exchange and the critical 
presentation of the company in the press and in the prospectus that often accompanies 
the IPO. 
the institutions involved in the process are subject to arbitrary changes by the president of the day 
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4:6:1:4 The Company 
The company while in accord with a majority of the perceptions of the government tries 
to secure the future of its staff, operations and to an extent, profitability. Its objectives 
may include: (l) making Telkom Kenya a regional (i.e. COMESA) force in 
telecommunications by; (2) ensuring investment in infrastructure improvement and 
expansion. (3) maximizing headline sales proceeds in the transaction while retaining a 
lion's share of proceeds; (4) safeguarding job security and retirement benefits; (5) 
maintaining operational and financial autonomy; (6) minimizing any assumption of 
future liabilities and; (7) ensuring that any transaction is presented to the public and staff 
in a controlled manner (Welch and Fremond, 1998; Lee 2002, p.536) 
4:6:2 The Criteria Used to Assess the Financial Restructuring of Telkom Kenya 
While all the aforementioned matters need to be considered and are vital for a 
privatization transaction, to arrive at a revised capital structure, the objectives of all 
parties cannot be achieved. Studies undertaken therefore have concentrated on reaching 
congruence between the objectives of the Government and the Company (Welch, and 
Fremond, 1998). The principal objectives used to review any financial restructuring can 
be concluded as follows: 
First, that KPTC assets and liabilities are important during the restructuring process and 
the formation of TKL necessitated recommendations at a broad level, on what would be 
an appropriate treatment of the assets and liabilities due to the financial restructuring. In 
particular, the importance of GOK balances, that of debtors due from GOK and 
creditors due to GOK; loans', pension liabilities, and old service debtors (many which 
are bad debts). The liability of uncollectible old service debtors are estimated at Kshs. 
30million.39 The figures are indicative40 and the valuation is based on assumptions and 
predictions that could not be given with certainty. Second, the true value of a company 
39 This is a conservative figure and as evidence in findings shows this debt has increased to of Kshs. 5billion 
40 As indicated in the 1997 balance sheet 
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can only be determined by the actual price paid by investors for the company as a result 
of a trade sale or stock market flotation (Stiglitz, 1999). If the valuations given in a 
report become publicly known it may adversely influence the sale prospects. For 
example, the discount rate on which the valuation is based influences value significantly 
and thus the true cost of capital in future cannot be determined. 
During valuation, information provided by the former KPTC (1975) showed key 
assumptions driving the DCF model were documented; although sources of information 
were listed,41 verification was not done independently.42 Three different valuation 
approaches were used during the process: analysis of comparable transactions, market 
value and analysis of discounted cash flow (DCF). However, the discussion of a DCF 
model and its pros and cons is not within the mandate of this thesis research. 
Indeed, good marketing and healthy competition during the sales process can mean that 
a trade sale pushes the value up and may yield a better return. The higher values 
achieved in some strategic sales for example in Uganda, Cote' d'Ivoire and Senegal as 
described by Shirley, et. al., (2002) demonstrate this effect. Additionally, the market 
value at flotation significantly depends on the company's management at the time. A 
strong management team, possibly involving outside expertise yields premium 
valuations. This was a big shortcoming on TKL's side, as the top management was 
perceived to be partisan with TKL experiencing a high labour turnover since the active 
discussions started in 1997. This led investors to perceive the management team as 
weak, unreliable, lacking in technical capacity and unpredictable (GOK!fLK, ( 1999; 
FSD, 2004). 
The comparative transactions approach was based on an analysis of recent strategic sale 
transactions involving other telecommunications companies. The value paid was 
compared to a number of key parameters relating to the company. Parameters typically 
41 List of sources include: data provided by KPTC, Ministry of Finance, GOK, economic and demographic s statistics from the 
Central, Bureau of Statistics; Interviews with KPTC senior and middle management (appendix I annex V) and World Bank Data 
42 Data used for the TKL valuation process could not be independently verified in this case any of the data provided except to the 
extent of assessing its reasonableness in the light of industry experience was acceptable 
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used include the number of access lines the company had; its turnover; earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT); and earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
earnings (EBITDA). It can be said that the valuations for TKL implied by other 
transactions cover a wide range. Some of these are explained by the fact that investors in 
these transactions had access to unpublished, confidential information about the current 
or future performance of the company; however, a general pattern can be discerned. 
Transactions that are more recent have had fewer bidders (Ireland. South Africa, the 
latter of whom is still searching for a strategic investor) and less good marketing and 
have been less highly valued. This demonstrates the importance of good marketing in 
the sale process (FSD, 2004). 
4:6:2:1 Demand and Network Rollout 
The future demand for telephone lines in Kenya was one of the key variables that 
affected the value ofTelkom Kenya Clearly if usage, line rental and installation charges 
are reduced, telephone services would be more affordable and more people would 
demand a telephone line. The DCF valuation model links the demand for telephone 
lines with tariffs so that the impact of lower tariffs as a result of price regulation enables 
efficient service provision; more access to services; and also consideration to 
introduction of price competition. 
Three scenarios were identified (during TKL's valuation) and these allow for an 
estimate of the impact of varying levels of demand on value. These are shown in tables 
4-11 and 4-12 and correspond to the likely level of demand for telephone lines arising 
by the year 2010 (see table 5-15 and 5-16 in chapter five), given the three different tariff 
scenarios described in the preceding section which are based on the economic and 
demographic projections for Kenya. In general terms, as a country's economy grows its 
expenditure on telecommunications services increases, due to telecoms 
complementarity's to other communication related sectors. As line connection, rental 
and call charges decrease, owning a telephone line becomes cheaper and therefore the 
'demand' for lines increases accordingly. The relationship between an increase in lines 
demanded and reducing tariffs is the price elasticity of demand for telephone lines 
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noting that the number of lines as at June 2004 was way below the target in the "High" 
scenario as shown in table 4-11 (GOKITKL, 2000*; TKL, 2003) 
Table 4-11 Tele-density Projections 
Scenario Tete- Number of new lines Multiple of Notes 
density required by network size 99 
2010 by 2010 
LOW 2.1% 560,00 2.4V Demand arising as a result 
HIGH tariff scenario 
BASE 2.4% 700,00 2.9v Demand arising as a result 
HIGH -BASE tariff scenario 
HIGH 2.8% 810,00 3.4x Demand arising as a result 
of LOW tariff 
Sources: TKL, (1999) annual Reports 
The target tete-densities and number of lines in table 4-11 are calculated based on 
macroeconomic models. These models predict the demand for telephone lines based on 
the affordability of the service in comparison to the wealth of a country's population. 
The price and income elasticity of demand for telephone lines are estimated 
econometrically by examining the tariffs, GDP and demand for telephone lines in a large 
number of countries throughout the world. The data that drives this model is often 
collected over a number of years (Shirley, 2002; Wallsten, 200 I, p5. ). The model 
predicts that as tariffs are reduced, the demand for telephone lines increases. This 
reflects the increased affordability of service that lowers tariffs (resulting from either 
price regulation as part of sector policy or through price competition). 
The regulatory policy analysis was done against a back-drop of a projected teledensity 
by region in Kenya as shown in table 4-I2 and figure 5-7 respectively. Notably these 
business elements attract investors to telecoms because they catalyze the growth in 
teledensity. For example in the COMESA region the top ten COMESA countries by 
Fixed Teledensity (telephones per I 00 inhabitants) included Mauritius 28.52 %, 
Seychelles 26.92% Egypt* I2.45%, Swaziland 4.43%, Sudan 2.7%, Zimbabwe 2.56%, 
Comoros I.66%, Djibouti 1.42%, Kenya* I.04 and Eritrea 0.92%.Uganda and Zambia 
are below 0.60% and this can be attributed to higher Cellular tete-density 
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Table 4-12: Projected Tete-density By Region 
Area Nairobi Central Coast Eastern North Nyanza Rift ~estern Weighted 
Eastern Valley 
House 3.7 5.3 5.3 5.8 6.1 5.0 5.3 5.8 
Hold Size 
GOP/Cap 852 218 299 176 332 245 284 185 
Projected 9.5 1.8 2.4 1.3 2.3 2.1 2.3 1.4 2.4 
tele-Density 
2010 Base 
Data Sources: TKL, (1999:2000) Reports 
Indeed, in the COMESA region historically KPTC was exempt from government duties 
if such duties now become payable then capex per line43 would increase accordingly and 
overall value would be reduced. Such duties may however encourage the production of 
materials for telecommunication systems in Kenya, rather than being sourced 
predominantly from abroad. In practice, overall efficiency targets are reached by a 
combination of both techniques of increasing the number of telephone lines in the 
network and reducing employee numbers by downsizing as discussed in detail in the 
major findings in chapter five. In order to investigate the impact of efficiency 
improvements, modelling three efficiency scenarios for a given level of demand or 
network roll-out (BASE case tete-density 2010 as above) was used. These are shown in 
the table 4-11 and correspond to LOW attaining efficiency levels in 2010 of an average 
African country (in 1995). (GOK/TKL, 2000*; CCK, 2003) 
To achieve the staffing level scenarios described in efficiency targets (table 4-13 and 5-
15) some staff numbers could be reduced through natural attrition (leavers, people 
retiring, sickness etc.). KPTC estimated that between 2 and 3% of staff leave each year 
through natural wastage (retirement. death in service etc.). Others may leave through 
voluntary schemes i.e. early retirement and voluntary redundancy compensation 
payments. For example, required redundancy levels are based on a growing network 
based on the BASE case teledensity scenario. Real salaries are estimated to grow at 3% 
43 Capex per line or capital expense. - is the amount of money spend to upgrade or acquire a line (and other related 
physical assets such as buildings and machinery this tends to be a very large expense for telecoms companies in 
manufacturing facilities and much less of an expense in the services sector. 
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per annum from their 1996levels. Voluntary redundancy payments are assumed at KShs 
I 00.000 (1996 currency) adjusted for inflation in successive years. Table 4-13 indicates 
an approximate number of staff that KPTC needed to make redundant in the early years 
to achieve the desired level of productivity. However, these levels were not achieved as 
discussed in section 5:7:4:1 of chapter five. 
Table 4-13: Impact of Efficiency Targets on Redundancies 
Scenario Lines per employee Approx. Number of Approx. Total cost of 
arget (2002) redundancies P.a Over redundancies Pa Over 6 
6 years 1997-2002) 1997-2002) 
"Current" 16 0 -
"Average Africa" 45 1,290 Ksbs. 774 
(LOW) Million 
"Top quartile Africa" 75 1,920 Ksbs. 1,152 
(BASE) million 
"Best Africa" (HIGH) million 90 2,090 Ksbs. 1,254 
Sources: TKL Reports (2003)44 
There was a political aspect to the number of redundancies that were to be effected. It is 
worth mentioning that even ifTelkom Kenya targets a 'best in Africa' efficiency level by 
say the year 2002, based on 1995 African efficiency levels, this would not necessarily 
mean that TKL would be the most efficient operator in Africa. Other African countries 
had to increase their efficiency over the same period (Egypt and Uganda are examples). 
To model the impact of competition under scenarios 2 and 345 it was assumed that in 
each core business area (local, national, International and mobile) a fixed percentage of 
total revenues for the relevant service was lost to competition in each year including and 
following the year of introduction of competition (e.g. if competition was introduced in 
local loop infrastructure in 1999 and the assumed loss of market share per annum was 
3%, then KPTC market share in 1999 was 97% of total, 2000 was 94% of total, 2001, 
was 91% of total and so on). The impact on the value of KPTC of the loss of market 
share and timing of competition is presented in TKL's market structure and transaction 
in sections 4.5 to 4:5:2:1 and 4:9 to 4:10 of the analysis, respectively. 
44 Staffing levels based on total of I 8,660 telecoms staff 
45 KPTC/TKL reports (1996-1999) 
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4:7 Regulatory Policy 
The above analysis of the financial restructuring and the dynamics of different interests 
that need to be taken care of during the privatisation and liberalization processes calls 
for a regulatory framework. Two distinct regulatory scenarios for KPTC were envisaged 
by the transaction and GOK/TKL's valuation team (see 4:1). These two scenarios 
correspond to either a relatively quick (FAST case or else a more relaxed pace for sector 
liberalization (SLOW case). 
In the Slow case, competition in cellular telephony was expected one year after 
privatisation of Telkom Kenya by awarding a second licence in March 1999, with 
competition expected to start at the beginning of 1999/2000 financial year. While 
competition in the provision of local loop infrastructure was expected to be on board 
three years after privatisation of Telkom Kenya schedule date of June, 2004.46 
Competition in national long-distance infrastructure and services was expected five 
years after privatisation and competition in international PSTN, six years after 
privatisation. However, this slow pace meant that there would be no substantial growth 
in the industry. This Confirmed the arguments in the literature which indicated that early 
or faster liberalization and competition in the telecommunications industry is paramount 
for the growth ofthe sector (See Wellenius 1992; Wallsten, 1999; 2001; Shirley, 1998: 
2002 and Beardsley and P-Fox, 1995). 
Telkom Kenya preferred the FAST case scenario, where competition in cellular 
telephony was expected one year after a licence awarded to GSN joint venture was 
negotiated and awarded in July 1999 to Safaricom Limited. Competition was also 
introduced in all service areas of local national and international sectors. For the 
purposes of valuation analysis, two regulatory scenarios namely: Retain the "status quo" 
(without competition); and two "no competition" but stringent price control were 
considered These two scenarios were to enable the regulator to force tariffs to reduce to 
46 TKL /CCK Reports, (1999) 
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levels similar to the FAST regulatory scenario described above. These two were added 
during the valuation process. The regulatory scenarios are summarised in table 4-14 
Table 4-14 Regulatory scenarios47 
Regulatory scenario Description Notes 
1. Status quo No competition as today Existing tariff levels are likely to be retained 
2. Slow (intro. of) Mobile competition in Slow tariff decline and rebalancing is likely to 
competition 1999 occur; competition introduced in other service 
areas from 2001 to 2005 
3. Fast (intro. of) Rapid tariff decline Competition introduced in other service areas in 
competition Mobile rebalancing is likely to 2001 
competition in 1998 occur 
4. No competition, Monopoly for TKL in Price control simulates effect of competition on 
with stringent price basic voice services and tariffs to benefit consumers 
control stringent price control 
Source: GOKffLK, (2000*) Valuation Scenarios for KPTCffKL 
47 See also Market structure, appendix 2: annex XI 
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4:8 Overall Objectives used for Financial Restructuring ofTKL 
In considering the options for restructure, the objectives and perceptions of the three 
principal interested parties in the transaction are considered and often differ: in this case 
the investors, the GOK and the company are paramount (TKL, reports, 1998; 1999; 
2000). Since the interests and perceptions of all the interested parties cannot be met, 
overall objectives under which it is assessed are assumed to yield options for financial 
restructuring as described in the TKL valuation criteria. 
It was concluded that: a) the inter-business account needs to be written off prior to 
setting up Telkom Kenya as a going concern; b) responsibility for all GOK related 
debtors and creditors should be assumed by GOK; c) there was a direct relationship 
between the sales proceeds and the amount of debt in the company to be privatised as 
described herein chapter five. Therefore, GOK was advised to assume liability for GOK 
guaranteed loans, for GOK on-lent loans while responsibility for the commercial loans 
was to be vested in TKL. In addition, the treatment of the unfunded pension liability and 
responsibility for old service debtors should be vested in TKL. This recommended 
approach was intended to maximise the headline sales proceeds which required that the 
GOK forgave the debt and made a cash injection of Kshs. 30 billion into TKL based on 
the GOK benefit in the medium to long term as illustrated by table 4-15 
Table 4-15 GOK Benefits Medium to long-Term 
Present State Financial Restructure Transaction Lon2 term 
100% Ownership of a Recommendation to Sales proceeds Increase in value of 
company with a high forgive KShs 30 Billion of from sale or 70% owned by GOK 
level of gearing and net debt (debt/equity flotation of (say) 
assets of about Kshs. 8 conversion is one approach 30% of the equity 
billion ofTKL 
Difficult to sell 100% ownership of a Increase in value Increased corporation 
company with net assets of of the 70% owned tax from a profitable 
nearly Kshs. 40 billion by GOK in line company 
with Valuation 
Increased Dividend 
from Company 
Sources: GOKffLK, Reports (2000*) 
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According to the initial review, although_the GOK needed to make an investment (TKL, 
reports, 1998-2000) in the short term, it was likely to reap the benefits of the financial 
restructure in the medium to long term. As the GOK valuation team in 1999 and the 
due diligence treasury team 2002 advised, this would enable GOK to move forward with 
the privatisation of TKL cognisant of the following: that the financial items that a 
strategic investor could dispute had largely been removed from the accounts leaving 
GOK in a stronger negotiating position and increasing confidence in the re-structuring 
already undertaken. The balance sheet as indicated in table 4-10 and figures 5-9 and 5-
1 0 is strong enough for TKL to continue to operate and invest in the short term prior to 
the completion of a strategic sale or IPO. Besides, the balance sheet was strong enough 
for TKL to be able to fund a dividend flow which could have benefited valuation on an 
IPO (GOKITLK, 1999*) 
As stated above, final decisions on the appropriate level of gearing post sale, whether by 
IPO or by strategic sale, can only be made in the light of final decisions on licence 
tariffs. Such issues as roll-out and tariffs and the competitive environment and decisions 
taken on whether loans should be assumed by Government do not impact value realised 
from the process but increase the head-line sales proceeds achievable. The 
implementation of the above recommendations was thus to enable the transactions to 
start with a "clean sheet". 
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4:8:1 Financial Restructuring: Loans and other Liabilities48: Options 
When considering the treatment of loans a number of issues that are common to all 
types of loans and those that are specific to the type of loan, should be addressed 
(GOK!fKL 2003:2000*:1999*). Internal Valuation and Due Diligence reports, 
generally, these are considered as: 
Effects of press comment: - the amount of liability transferred could result in adverse 
comment in the press49 • If significant liability were assumed by GOK, the perception 
perpetuated in press comment would be that the GOK were writing off too much debt 
prior to sale. Conversely, if the debt were to be vested in Telkom Kenya. the press 
perception would be that the sales proceeds received were too low and profitability 
unlikely. In practice, if the liability were assumed by the GOK, an argument could be 
portrayed in the press to balance the sales proceeds with the amount of liability 
assumed. The other perception could be that, there was a risk of future 'control' by 
GOK 
Free cash flow in practice: - TKL would have to generate cash through operating an 
activity, which is used principally to fund loans repayments in the early periods. 
The future scenario: - It was apparent that the amount of debt in TKL would decrease 
the amount available for operations, therefore reducing inward investment in the 
operations of the company or for distribution as dividends. If investor perception and 
impact on sales proceeds is as outlined above: - an investor in a trade sale is likely 
simply to reduce his equity valuation of TKL by the amount of debt left in Telkom 
Kenya. In addition, the sales proceeds will therefore be reduced proportionately to the 
size ofthe stake sold (GOK!fKL, 2000*) 
Therefore, where the debt is vested should make little difference to an investor in a trade 
sale. However, it was also noted that sales proceeds in a trade sale transaction could be 
affected by the number of bidders attracted to the sale. Leaving the debt in Telkom 
48 based on the GOK/TLK's (1999*: 2000* )valuation reports and TKL's Due diligence internal report of 2003 
49 See sample ofTKL press articles: Appendix 2: annex XVI 
200 
Chapter Four: Developments in the Telecommunications Sector: Restructuring, Valuation and Market Structure ofTKL 
Kenya without compensating benefits could make the company look unattractive to a 
potential investor thus reducing the number of bidders and consequently reducing the 
sales proceeds by more than the value of the debt. In extreme cases, either trade 
investors may insist that proceeds be injected into TKL rather than given to GOK, or 
that other compensating measures are taken. A private investor in an IPO is likely to 
react more strongly to a highly geared company than in a trade sale. A highly geared 
company is one where the company raises more funds by using fixed interest-loans and 
few funds from shareholders. In a situation where the company raises more funds by 
using shares and uses very few fixed interest-loans, it is said to have a low capital 
gearing (Pendleton et al. 1995, P.82) and a company presented for an IPO with a high 
gearing is often likely to suffer from low interest from investors. 
Ability to raise new finance: -All the options open to TKL management require the 
ability to raise new financing and a company that is already highly geared would find 
it more difficult and more costly to raise new funds either as short term working 
capital or for expansion plans indicated in table 5-13. However, the prospective 
strength of Telkom Kenya's operating cash flows would be attractive to providers of 
alternative forms of financing (e.g. high yield debt (equity) and project finance) in 
early years. One of the advantages of a trade sale is often to use the strategic partner's 
ability to raise finance (in this case perhaps cheaper overseas finance) to fund the 
operations of the company. However, guaranteed loans from GOK may still be 
required. Leaving the TKL highly geared was likely to impede its ability to raise 
funds and therefore nullify the effects of this advantage (GOK!fKL, 2000*; TKL, 
1999). 
QOK guaranteed loans: - these loans were transactions where KPTC was the 
p~incipal but where the repayment of the loan was guaranteed by the GOK. 
Considerable redemption arrears and interest remain outstanding and the company 
had suffered significant management charges on late payment of amounts. There were 
principally two options considered either: the loan is vested in the Company, Telkom 
Kenya1 that was to be privatised or the loan was to be assumed by GOK before 
privatisation. The two options are considered and discussed herein in sections 4:8:2-3 
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Government on-lent loans: -The industry analysts maintained that these are back-to-
hack loans where, Government was/is the principal to the external lender and acted as 
the sub-lender to KPTC and therefore all the suggested options apply to the treatment 
of on-lent loans. However, in practice other issues should be considered: The 
mismatch between service and the loan by KPTC and GOK: - KPTC was 
substantially in arrears on the repayment to GOK of these loans. However, this does 
not necessarily mean that the GOK incurred the same redemption arrears, interest or 
management charges through late payment of the loans which were truly back-to-hack 
and the profile of repayment by the GOK matched the profile of repayment by KPTC 
to the GOK. Any assumption of the liability for the debt would require the repayment 
of that debt by GOK and therefore require the injection of new cash by GOK or an 
allocation of sale proceeds which the GOK was unwilling to undertake (GOK/TKL, 
2000*; FSD, 2004) 
If the GOK had maintained their repayments to the head lender, while KPTC had not, 
the balances outstanding would not represent the need to repay the loans but would 
actually represent loans that had already been paid by GOK. Under these 
circumstances, the assumption by Government of the liability and an allocation from 
sales proceeds would result in the immediate pay-back to GOK of old monies already 
remitted to the lender by GOK. This would increase the strength of the argument for 
the GOK to assume the liability for the debt. The link between the relationship of 
GOK and head lender and the relationship of GOK and KPTC is not clear since 
KPTC operates as POST A and is delinked from KPTC and TKL. 
The size of the amounts outstanding: GOK on-lent loans represent some KShs 23.9 
billion (65%) of the total loans amounting to some KShs 36.3 billion. In the 
discussions in section 4:8:1 above, the assumption of the liability by GOK was 
mitigated by the transfer of sales proceeds, and the size of the amount outstanding as 
on-lent loan. This would mean that in the best case, a substantial part of the proceeds 
would need to be allocated to GOK, or in the worst case the liability would not be 
covered by sales proceeds and lead to need for cash injection from GOK (TKL, 2003: 
(GOKITKL, 2000*) 202 
Chapter Four: Developments in the Telecommunications Sector: Restructuring, Valuation and Market Structure ofTKL 
An important conclusion made by analysts and this study was that the objectives 
stated and options available above would best be met by the GOK assuming the 
liability for- all on-lent loans with the exception of loans at preferential rates, which 
should be vested in Telkom Kenya prior to sale and negotiations with the investor in 
order to derive the value reflected in sales proceeds for the preferential rates. This is 
because certain on-lent loans could be perceived by an investor in a trade sale to be at 
advantageous rates (FSD, 2004) 
Commercial loans: - Commercial loans are those entered into by KPTC as the 
principal on open market terms and conditions. KPTC had serviced these loans and 
given the size of these loans, the cash flow needed to service them was not unduly 
damaging to TKL's ability to invest. In this case, there was no reason for GOK to 
assume this liability. In practice, the reassignment of this loan could lead to the 
crystallisation of the liability and require the loan to be paid on demand due to public 
perception (GOKffKL, 1998: 2000*).50 
Regulatory and Market Institutions: - From the analysis in this chapter it is clear that 
the GOK needed to make some serous institutional and policy strengthening in order 
to improve on the market infrastructure for telecommunications. Telecommunications 
investments have become global and therefore there is demand from investors and 
industry players for global legal and regulatory frameworks that drive expansion, 
growth and access in the telecommunications sector. 
50 see various financial restructuring ofKPTC internal Reports. 
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4:8:2 Option I - Invest the Liability in Telkom Kenya 
Note that any strategic investor would require GOK to continue to guarantee existing 
loans already guaranteed by GOK. New loans arranged following the privatisation may 
be guaranteed pro-rata by the shareholders if a guarantee is required. Alternatively, it 
may be possible for TKL to borrow in its own right without the benefit of shareholder 
guarantees if its balance sheet and projected future cash-flows were considered 
sufficiently strong along with looking specifically at the pros and cons of vesting the 
liability in Telkom Kenya prior to privatisation as is considered in option 2. 
4:8:3 Option 2: Government Assumes Liability 
Option 2 summarizes the pros and cons of the liability for guaranteed loans being 
assumed by the GOK prior to privatisation as detailed in table 4-16 
Table 4-16: The Pros and Cons of Guaranteed Loan Liability by GOK 
Pros Cons 
1. Value of company was likely not to be reduced by 1. In practice, the reassignment of this loan 
the amount of liability assumed by government could lead to the crystallisation of the liability 
2. GOK's reputation would not be affected by any and require the loan to be paid on demand (as 
default by Telkom Kenya was the case with MKC in December 2002) 
3. IfGOK assumed the liability for the loan, it would lead 2. Public perception of the value for money could be 
to an increase in the available funding for the company compromised as the amount of liability assumed by 
which would enhance its ability to operate in the medium GOK increased- since TKL would need the GOK as 
and short term a guarantee in the future 
Sources: GOK/ TKL, (1999*: 2000*) 
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4:9 PROGRESS IN THE PRIVATISATIONS OF THE TELECOMS SECTOR 
4:9:0 Privatising Telkom Kenya Transaction; Policies, Process and Negotiations 
The analysis and description of TLK's step by step restructuring and privatization 
process as outlined in this thesis is based on government documentation and various 
interviews with public sector officials involved in the process and TLK Management. 
The actual process took off in June 2000 when the GOK Cabinet approved the strategy 
for the second phase of the privatisation program (TLK, 2003a). 
The main thrust of the second phase was the privatisation of the infrastructure I utility 
sectors which were originally considered strategic. The Cabinet also approved the tabling 
of a Sessional Paper on the strategy, to achieve the earmarked privatisation. However, 
the GOK decided in January 2001 to draft a privatisation law for Parliament to consider 
on a priority basis; a draft bill was published in November 2003 (annex IX) and was 
presented before Parliament in December 2003 for debate and enactment in 2004. The 
GOK committed to its fast facilitation for approval by Parliament and implementation by 
the policy organs; this draft law is critically discussed in chapter five (GOK, 2003). 
The privatisation of TKL was officially launched in April 2000 after the Cabinet 
approved TKL's sale to a strategic investor.51 for an initial ratio of 49% GOK 
shareholding in Telkom Kenya, to be sold only if foreign investors made a bid that the 
government deemed as reasonable. Following the official launch, bids were invited from 
interested investors in a process that culminated with receipt of final bids on 4th 
December 2000. In this respect, Schroeder Salomon Smith Barney (SSSB) were 
appointed (in 2000) as lead transaction advisors to manage the TKL privatization process 
while Linklaters of UK with Hamilton, Harrisons and Mathews (HHM) and Oraro and 
Company were retained as legal advisors. The consultants carried out financial and legal 
51 Section 5:1:1:1 describes a Privatization transaction in detail 
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due diligence and other transaction advisory services including valuation of the TKL 
shares. They fixed the asset valuation of the 49% of TKL shares at US$224 million and 
the adjusted equity value of the same percentage of shares at a value between 
US$337million and US$ 386 million. They valued Telkom Kenya at US$1.633 per line, 
which compares to the international norms. Six companies were short-listed for the 
bidding process. However, as a result of the global depressed state of the 
telecommunications sector since the end of 1999 and the poor investment environment 
in Kenya only three bids were received by the bid submission date (of December 4th 
2000). South Africa-based Mount Kenya Consortium (MKC) was the highest bidder 
offering US$240 million for the 49% stake that included a $15 million in the form of 
preferred shares. This bid was followed by Orascom of Egypts' of US$160 million and 
Telkom Malaysia's bid of US$134 million. Later in the follow up discussions, MKC 
agreed to raise a further US$65 million in loan finances that improved their bid to 
US$225 million plus $80 million in form of preference shares and loans. The transaction 
team with the assistance of Solomon, Schroeder and Smith Barney (SSSB) as advisors 
evaluated the bids and observed that all the three submitted technical bids qualified as 
per the criteria issued (FSD, 2004; (GOK/DGIPE, 2002; TKL, 2003a). 
This research found that the transaction/privatization committee (made up of Treasury, 
Communications and transport, Telkom Kenya and Ministry of Trade as shown in figure 
5-1) evaluated the financial bids and submitted a report to GOK which recommended the 
Mount Kenya Communications (MKC)'s52 initial bid price offer totalling to US$240 
million. Government of Kenya found the MKC financial bid to be low compared to 
GOK valuation earlier undertaken along with SSSB, which estimated TKL's value to be 
approximately $300-800 (as per scenarios options to be implemented by the GOK). 
Consequently, the Government proposed to Mt Kenya Communication a price of US$ 
350 million and an exclusive negotiation period of 2 weeks which MKC rejected and 
presented a counter offer by increasing its bid to US$305 million (i.e. US $225 plus US 
52 
consortium of ECONET (lead negotiating company for the consortium) South Africans, the Netherlands and Kenya 
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$80) with a two month exclusivity period. The GOK rejected this counter offer 
(GOK/DGIPE, 2002). 
During the period when MKC rejected the GOK's offer to increase its price to US $350 
million with a 2 week exclusivity period, the GOK invited Orascom Telecom (OT) of 
Egypt53 to re-evaluate their bid in line with the proposed price of US$350million and the 
exclusive negotiation period of two weeks. Orascom Telecom accepted the proposed 
price and the exclusive negotiation period of two weeks before the signing of definitive 
agreements. Discussions with Orascom Telecom did not commence immediately 
because SSSB the lead transaction advisor demanded extension of their contract, which 
had expired on 30th June 2000 and an immediate payment of all their outstanding 
payments. The outstanding payments were made and the contracts extended to July 
200 1. It was only after these arrangements were completed that the transaction advisors 
were willing to begin serious discussions with Orascom Telecom (FSD, 2004). 
Meanwhile, Safaricom showed signs of financial losses that were worrisome to the 
potential investors. As a result Orascom pulled out of the race after reviewing the June 
2001 accounts statement for Safaricom that showed signs of financial trouble and MKC 
asked for a review of the agreed parameters. 
The initial timetable developed by the financial advisors envisaged a visit for initial 
discussions with the relevant party for exclusive negotiations, which were scheduled for 
early July 2001. However, Orascom Telecom (OT) did not honour the appointment and 
instead proposed a meeting in London in mid June 2001. Given the importance of the 
transaction and the need to progress in a timely manner, a sub committee for transaction 
met representatives ofOrascom Telecom in London. 
53 Orascom Telecom Holding S.A.E (OTH) was established in 1998, and has grown to become the largest and most 
diversified GSM network operator in the Middle East, Africa, and Pakistan with nine licences covering the region 
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Orascom Telecom proposed the following payment structure: US$ 80 million cash 
payable to the GOK upon closing ofthe transaction; US$190 million capital contribution 
by OT to TKL in the form of installed lines to meet the expansion; and four additional 
cash instalments of US$ 20 million payable by OTto the GOK on December 3rd of years 
2002-2005. An analysis of the Orascom Telecom proposal indicated that Orascom's 
financial proposal did not meet the minimum cash proceeds of US$ 350 million as 
sought by the GOK. It did not split the proceeds in a required ratio of 23:26 between the 
Government and Telkom in respect of the 23% sold shares by GOK (US$ 164,285,000) 
and 26% subscription of new TKL shares (USD 185,714,000). Second, it did not 
anticipate any separate payment for the settlement of the Safaricom License fee debt 
(US$ 33 million) annually, which was contemplated as part of the transaction. It also 
reduced significantly the value of the price paid, (a Net Present Value at a discount rate 
of 15% of only US$ 295.5 million), way below the nominal price of US$ 350 million. In 
addition, to commit US$ 190 million into the network, as part of "purchase price" did 
not add value since future capital expenditure and expansion of number of lines was 
already part of what each bidder committed to provide. The proposal also appeared too 
complicated to manage. Further to this OT informed the transaction team that they were 
unable to commit human resources. In addition, Orascom Telecom (OT) did not make 
any reference to Korea Telecom or WorldTel,54 two previously named partners who were 
supposed to bring necessary experience to manage the fixed line business and to help 
raise the necessary capital. They also did not mention the capital investment of US$ 533 
million that they were required to commit during the period of 2000- 2005.This led to 
the discontinuation of the negotiations with Orascom Telecom (OT).( TKL, 2003; 
GOK/DGIPE, 2002; FSD, 2004) 
54 World Tel- is a reputable company with holding companies in Bermuda and Mauritius and a strong management team of 
professionals in the fields of private equity investments, project finance, network operations, technology, licensing 
regulation, equipment evaluation, law & accounting. 
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Meanwhile, in early July 200 I MKC again expressed interest to reinstate their proposal 
for 30 days with effect from that date and to increase the price previously discussed by 
up to a further US$.20 million to a maximum US$325 million; the amount was to be 
paid on the anniversary of the completion date. MKC further stated in their business plan 
that they would double the number of telephone lines in the network in 24 months. They 
also promised to invest Kshs. 8 billion (US$1 00 million) in the company over the initial 
12-month period supported by KPN Royal a privatized Dutch telecoms company55. The 
government then entered into a contractual agreement with MKC that stated as follows: 
• A foreign managing director to be recruited by MKC 
• The government to appoint the members ofthe board. 
• The strategic equity partner was 1D control the Company's management. 
• The rights and obligations of both the GOK and the strategic investor as stated on 
the shareholders agreement were to be produced and followed. 
• The GOK was to take over the pension fund liability 
• The GOK was to downsize the workforce or allow the strategic investor to do so 
within its own schedule 
However, MKC's proposal was subject to confirmation of exclusivity and announcement 
of preferred purchase status, satisfactory outcome of further due diligence inquiries of 
MKC's subsidiaries abroad by the GOK privatization committee, final documentation 
and agreement on process and timetable. Preliminary discussions took place between the 
Government and MKC in Nairobi in late July 2001. As a result, the parties entered into 
an exclusivity agreement for a period of three months commencing August 1, to 31st 
October 2002 both dates inclusive. The purpose of the exclusivity period of three months 
was to allow for further due diligence, discussions on regulatory issues, finalisation of 
management accounts for the period ending 301h June 2001 and finalisation of 
negotiations on the transaction documents. Subject to successful negotiations, the legal 
documents to complete the transaction were to be signed before the end of the 
exclusivity period (GOK/DGIPE, 2002). 
55 This was MKC's operating partner 
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During the exclusivity period, (October 2001-December 2002) the GOK's constituted 
Privatization Committee (PC) undertook an in-depth due diligence of the consortium 
'subsidiaries' and decided to discontinue the negotiations with MKC after it was 
established that from the time the consortium submitted its bid it had weakened 
considerably by loosing Eskom Enterprises of South Africa, the consortium member 
who experienced liquidity and technical problems in the South Africa Power market this 
loss rendered MKC's bid technically unqualified. Besides, KPN Royal Dutch Telkom of 
Netherlands had abandoned an option to acquire shares in MKC, remaining only as a 
manager of TKL under a management contract while Transtel, the telecommunications 
subsidiary of Transnet of South Africa had pulled out (Investment Secretariat Report, 
(2003). After the due diligence and expiry of the exclusivity period there was no further 
negotiations between MKC and GOK and negotiations broke down. Although the GOK 
remained silent as to the reasons of the breakdown in negotiations, the industry analysts 
argued that there was simply too much political manoeuvring of various stakeholders in 
the TKL privatization deal that accounted for the delayed transaction scheduled for 
December 2002 and that the dynamics involved indicated the problems and delays in a 
transaction process. The politicians argued that these delays gave government more time 
for restructuring the entity and instituting a legal and regulatory framework. This study 
found that the government meanwhile had to restate its commitment to the sale of TKL 
to the investors, World Bank, donor agencies and to the public. (GOK/DGIPE, 2002). 
However MKC moved to court seeking legal action for the time and resources wasted 
when negotiations failed just before the last step of concluding and closing action, shown 
in figure 5-2, that contributed to lowering further the price of TKL in an STI option. 
These dynamics are discussed and updated in Chapter five. 
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4:10: Conclusion 
In conclusion, the developments in the telecommunications sector leading to the 
privatization of TKL and PCK were speared headed by the setting of GOK's objectives 
and goals for its privatization program. In doing so the GOK targeted the 
telecommunications industry as one of its strategic sectors. GOK's liberalization and 
restructuring program that began with the unbundling of KPTC moved subsequently to 
restructuring of the three major enterprises (TKL, Safaricom and PCKIPOSTA) and 
helped shape the growth and changes in the telecommunications sector. This process 
encouraged the review and design of a telecommunications policy framework that led to 
the institutionalization of the legal and regulatory framework (i.e. CCK and the 
Privatization Bill). 
The restructuring and policy changes introduced competition into the sector encouraging 
growth and access to telecommunications services, with the entry of cellular and 
National operators. It is also during this process that the GOK developed an approach to 
a privatization process that included outlining in detail the strategy for disposal of a 
strategic enterprise in a strategic sector. This approach included putting together a team 
that would engage with the investors on a daily basis and engage a transaction by 
preparing an enterprise for sale through seeking political approval, price valuation, 
inviting bidders, due diligence, bidding, and closing of the bid, just to mention a few 
steps (see figure 5-2). 
Indeed, research analysis in this chapter shows that determining the value of an 
enterprise for privatization is a significant step in the process. Equally important is 
analysing the market structure in which the transaction would operate and making 
changes that add value to the enterprise and to the business and policy environments. 
Some of theses changes include specific operational aspects of the market and enterprise 
in preparation for a sale. 
This chapter specifically discusses the operational and market options available to TKL 
on its road to privatization. Most of these options or choices are affected by the 
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value, management and liabilities in TKL and the possibilities for future improvements. 
In summary then, TKL and GOK needed to take cognisance of the fact that there was/is 
direct relationship between the amount of liability assumed by the GOK and the sales 
proceeds from the transaction, as was the case with KQ's privatization where the 
investors viewed GOK's assumption of liability as a positive step. Even where amounts 
outstanding from KPTC had already been remitted to the head-lender by the GOK, there 
was strong argument for the GOK to assume liability, presenting it as a swap not a write-
off, otherwise negative press comment could likely have affected the sale to an STI or 
through an IPO. Significantly, for the company to be attractive to an investor in a trade 
sale or IPO, GOK needed to assume liability for a significant proportion of the debt and 
more importantly, address the ability of Telkom Kenya to raise funds in the future by 
reducing its high gearing through vesting in Telkom Kenya certain loans which were/are 
at preferential rates. 
In addition, GOK is likely to be able to retain a higher proportion of the proceed and it 
can therefore be concluded from the discussion in section 4:6 that Telkom Kenya's 
financial objectives56 would be best met by GOK assuming liability for all government 
guaranteed loans in KPTC. In practice, this would be achieved by the cancellation of the 
government guarantee and re-negotiation of the terms and conditions of the loan with 
Telkom Kenya at a revised price subject to an assessment of the benefit to TKL of the 
terms of the loan as per the time of negotiations. 
This chapter also indicated that although the GOK has made some important steps 
towards institutionalization and creation of market structures that support the growth and 
expansion of the telecommunications industry, it still has a long way to go in instituting 
irreversible legal and regulatory institutions through the political system as exemplified 
by the reversal of the ECONET contract by the Minister of Communications in 2004 and 
the delays that were initially experienced in the enactment ofthe Privatization law. 
56 The conclusion are based on the TKL's original valuation report, considered an internal document 
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5:0 CHAPTER FIVE 
5:1 Major Field Findings and Data analysis 
5:1:0 General Findings: The Institutional and Regulatory Framework 
This chapter is discussion ofthe research findings of interview and questionnaire data evidence 
of Kenya's approach, in the light ofthe recent developments (i.e1993-2003) in the application 
of the privatization process, in the context of the discipline of public enterprise reform and 
business administration. The field research findings generate theory and practice that 
establishes the nature of existing patterns in less developed countries (LDCs) through the 
approach ofTelkom Kenya privatization. 
While the data analysis and the theoretical privatization model elements raised in Chapter Two 
may guide the discussion, the major conclusions made are based on the findings in Chapter 
Four and this chapter. The data also show how far the knowledge of the privatization of 
Telkom Kenya Company Ltd (TKL) can inform and develop models of privatization presented 
by the World Bank, GOK's 1996 framework and the various theory analysts.3 
Indeed, the choice of TKL was based on its potential in informing the approach as an example 
of practice and the likely transfer of learning which resulted from its unbundling, formation, 
and operation. Of particular importance, is its "sale to a strategic partner" status as a first tier 
supplier to the investment sector of an approach to privatization. This chapter further 
highlights evidence showing that as an example of practice, this thesis provides new data, new 
information, and a richer and more informed understanding of the approach and the process of 
privatizing. 
3 That include: Mansoor, (1988); Cook and Kirkpatrick, (1988); Cook and Monique, (2002) Cook and Uchida, (2001) 
Loxley, ( 1990); Kikeri and Shirley, ( 1999) ; Letwin, (1988); Haggarty, et al (2002); Megginson et a! (1996); Little and 
Meredith, (1994) amongst others 
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The evidence of the results of the primary data survey analysis presented herein are 
based on field interviews and questionnaire data collected to support the aims and 
objectives of the research as outlined in chapter one and includes secondary data (in 
chapter four). The analysis was carried out using the theoretical conceptual framework 
delineated at length in chapters two, chapter four and more importantly the field survey 
data findings in this chapter. 
To accomplish this a main questionnaire and semi-structured questions or interview 
guides (Annexes I and II) consisting of open-ended questions were designed to gather 
responses that correspond to the central question and sub-research questions outlined in 
chapter one, focusing on Kenya's approach to privatization in the light of TKL's 
privatization. 
The analysis herein listed, explained, enumerated, rated, scaled, and ranked the major 
objectives, methods, and processes of privatization programs and contextual insights 
with potential for comparative insights as put forward by Dyer and Wilkins, ( 1991 
p.614). In their brief rejoinder to Eisenhardt, they argued that "stories" are what makes 
good social science, not better constructs. In ranking, rating and measuring on a scale, 
this survey data analysis identified and blended the exploratory description (chapter 
four) with case analysis and conclusions in chapter five and six respectively. This 
analysis further reveals patterns of GOK's approach to privatization and strategies that 
are unique to the case of Kenya and that of the COMESA region. Using triangulated 
data, this research analysis was compiled and presented in the form of figures, tables, 
diagrams, and statistics. The thesis results generated information that challenges the 
existing theory reviewed in the literature and as outlined in section 3:3 of chapter three. 
The field survey data evidence analysis is discussed as field findings and presented 
from the specific to the general results, responding to the central research question to 
collect data and focus on 'an approach' to privatization. Indeed, the field evidence in 
this chapter, corroborate the documentary and literature discussions in chapters two and 
four. 
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5:1:1 Kenya's Approach to the Privatization Process 
Selection Criteria 
The criteria and strategy for selecting public enterprises to be privatized is dependent 
on decisions by the GOK Treasury, often based on producing a list describing whether 
a public enterprise is strategic and commercially viable versus non-strategic non-
performing enterprises. This research's interview data shows that the Ministry of 
Finance used the financial performance criteria to enlist the enterprises. The study 
further found that after the initial division of public enterprises by the Ministry of 
Finance into strategic enterprises (appendix I: annex v) to be retained and restructured 
and non-strategic that were to be privatized, the GOK further listed those that were non-
central to the economy and constituted a burden to the exchequer and were under 
liquidation. The research reveals that the basis of this categorization and indeed of the 
whole privatization framework is a subject of discussion amongst the private sector, 
civil society, and Parliament (FSD, 2004). 
There are no particular criteria and strategies for grouping enterprises into strategic and 
non-strategic; the process is dependent on the government divestiture department listing 
what they consider as "national jewels or family silver" and the government (and the 
COMESA) does not define what a national jewel (Colin, 1990) is. In most instances 
however, the GOK is pressured into adopting the World Bank's "advice" criteria that 
involves targeting those enterprises that receive direct or indirect government subsidy 
to be listed for liquidation, whether they are national jewels or not. This criterion is one 
of the World Bank conditions for funding privatization and related programs. 
Along with the World Bank conditionality, the 'strategic firms', especially those in 
telecoms are under pressure from COMESA region's telecommunication harmonization 
program to liberalize and reform, not withstanding the realities of globalization, and 
international and regional competitiveness. Indeed, evidence is discussed herein4 of 
4 see section 5:1 :3 and tables 5-10, 5-13 and 5-15 and figures 5-8 and 5-9 
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increasing numbers of subscribers and activities in the expansion of coverage to rural 
Kenya; reductions in tariffs for mobile calls; shifting local calls from fixed line 
telephony (TKL) to mobile telephony (Kencell, Celtel, Safaricom and Econet); and 
increasing revenues. These developments are accelerating reforms in the sector along 
with increased revenue and coverage for the mobile sector. The third criterion has been 
simply listing of those enterprises with liquidity problems and using the 'list' as the 
only prudent action for their disposal. However, 86% of the respondents were not aware 
of the criteria for selection. 
Effectively, this unclear criterion has affected the overall restructuring and privatization 
outcome of Kenya's program in the last five years (1999-2003). It has been in a state of 
"stop and go paralysis", as one ofthe CEO's described it when he stated that the GOK 
"has no tangible strategy, no commitment, and no political will to effectively privatize." 
(appendix 1 annexes V). Largely, the research found that the outcome has been 
dependent on the donor conditionality and personal interests within the government of 
the day. Evidence of non-commitment to a clear selection strategy and approach to 
privatization was indicated during the interviews and in Parliament on the debate on the 
privatization Bill (Annex IX).This lack of urgency, barely seventeen months after the 
'new' NARC administration was voted into power on the promise of instituting a legal 
framework and finalising the sale of TKL, was a worrying rally point for Kenyans, 
donor agencies5 and in particular to the World Bank. 
The study findings show that along with lack of a clear selection criterion, 58%6 of the 
respondents concluded that the outcome of Kenya's privatization program is slow and 
unplanned. It has completed few privatization transactions, accumulated low proceeds 
as shown in table 4-1 and 4-2 and its approach to the process is lengthy and unclear. 
With the exception of Kenya Airways, service industry (banking, hotels /tourism) and 
selected sugar companies, the rest of the privatizations cannot be accounted for and 
their approach is not well documented. This thesis's field survey revealed that if Kenya 
and the region had a strong operational privatization law, clear criteria and clear 
approach to the process, TKL's transaction would have been finalised in December of 
5 East African Standard Newspapers, August, and September 23, (2004) 
6 (n=21) 
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2002 as scheduled. This would have been of great advantage to TKL, giving it a head 
start in the expansion and securing of a substantial market share in the region. On 
whether the government had a strategy that enables a systematic operation of 
privatization, 90% of the respondents strongly agreed that government does not have 
such a strategy. The introduction of a privatization Bill and the planned creation of a 
privatization Commission were seen as an effort to bring order and clarity to the 
process. At the same time, the respondents viewed the delay of the enactment of the bill 
as a politically motivated delaying tactic pursued by corrupt individuals within the 
KANU and NARC administrations, taking advantage of the apparent lack of a clear 
approach and criteria (East African, 2002; KNA, 2001 :2002; FSD, 2004; Opiyo, 
2004).7 
This thesis finding therefore concludes that the framework of privatization was not well 
thought out and was ill conceived. Indeed, Nyong'o, (2000)8 argues that a legal 
framework for the facilitation and the development of a strategic approach needed to be 
put in place as a first priority to enable the enactment and implementation of the 
privatization law. This would protect stripping of public assets by CEOs, politicians 
and unscrupulous businesspersons. For instance, an external audit by the Auditor 
General contained in the PIC tenth report, (KNA, 2001) on the privatization of African 
and Tours chain of hotels, sugar companies, insurance corporations and the milling 
corporation revealed irregularities and under-valuation of the privatized firms. 
Although the Parliamentary Investment and Accounts Committees (PIC/PAC) 
KNA,l996-2003)9 recommended a "stop and review" stage and for fresh bids to be 
invited in the case of the sugar and hotel industries, citing the lack of an 
institutionalized privatization approach that was organized, clear and transparent, the 
administration took no action. 
Apart from clear parliamentary interventions, regarding lack of a clear approach, this 
thesis data also showed public concerns regarding the laxity and unprepared manner in 
which public assets were 'sold' at less than market prices to well-connected politicians 
and government officials, in the name of privatization or rolling back the role of 
7 Bill was presented to Parliament in 2001 and was not passed for enactment until November 2003 
8 see also KNA, (1997:1999; 2001 pp. 19-35 Hansard parliamentary Reports 
9 KNA, PIC and PAC reports 
217 
Chapter Five: Study Findings and Data Analysis: General Research Findings on the Privatization Process, Institutional and Legal Framework 
government in the economy. 10 Much more dramatic was the case ofworkers being laid-
off as public enterprises started to downsize to give way to privatization. This gives 
impetus to the contributions of the World Bank, ( 1981 ), Young (2002), Estache, ( 1997), 
Cook and Kirkpatrick, (1995:1998) and Nyong'o (2000), who argue that privatization 
should be undertaken in a context where the rules of the game are clear and central 
institutions are constructed and reformed. This encourages reduction of subsidies, 
encourages competition in the buying of public assets, increases deregulation, and gives 
momentum to government divestiture. They further argue that where there is no 
accountability PE's are used as a tool for enriching the power elite and where the law 
provides for accountability and protects the proceeds realized, privatization would 
contribute positively to the Treasury and help in attracting investments into a depressed 
economy. 
More importantly, the field interviews found that investors often are more willing to 
invest in impersonal markets where property rights are protected, contracts are less 
costly to enforce and government policies are relatively credible. Contract enforcement 
can only be implemented when laws are in place to register and enforce rights and 
obligations, when constitutional, legislative and electoral rules make it hard to change 
laws arbitrarily and when legal and bureaucratic systems function effectively, 
efficiently and honestly. Experience in Kenya, the COMESA and in transitional 
economies show that it is difficult to carry out a successful privatization initiative 
where institutions are weak and uncoordinated, laws easily ignored and laid down 
procedures undermined without any penalties from established authority. The World 
Bank (2002) argues that in many cases the authorities undermine the laid down 
procedures as confirmed by the various instances11 of transaction interference by the 
GOK in the telecommunications and insurance industries. 
10 The East African Standard, May, 2000 
11 see discussion on Kenya Re- and the halting of the SNO tendering (processes) procedures 
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5:1:1:1 The Privatization Process: Steps in A Transaction- An Overview 
In attempt to understand the dynamics of a privatization process within an operational 
business transaction, it is necessary to gain an overall understanding of the general 
framework in which the privatization transactions take place. This thesis delineates the 
six steps involved in a single transaction and figures 5-1, 5-2 and table 5-1 complement 
the steps and help contextualize the privatization process. 
Step1 -Identification of Entities to be Privatized 
This is an important step often carried out by the agency in charge of the parastatal 
reform program, which is the Department of Government Investments and Public 
Enterprises (DGIPE) within the investment secretariat of the Ministry of Finance. As 
discussed earlier this field research survey found that while the criteria for selection of 
enterprises for privatization were found to be subjective and unclear, the major 
identification criteria generally are based on the strategic nature of a country's national 
social-political and economy interests. Kenya's privatization program operates under 
the investment secretariat, and is an example of similar divisions or committees across 
COMESA and developing countries as figure 5:1 of the Kenyan privatization 
organization structure shows. The role of the DGIPE internal committee12 is to review 
amongst other issues the viability of the enterprise and its central role to the economy. 
In collaboration with the agency, the committee or division then runs a ''test" to 
determine the enterprise's specific importance to government. This initial evaluation 
determines whether the enterprise should be earmarked for privatization or be retained 
as a state enterprise and be commercialized. This is also the organisational stage where 
the government selects/appoints a competent individual or team in charge of the 
process. If the enterprise is found not to be important to the government then the 
agency proceeds to step two. 
12 The committee is the first step in the privatization process in Kenya. Its position is indicated in the GOK's 
approach figures 5-1 and 5-3 
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Step 2- Consideration and Acquisition/Hiring of Financial Advisors 
The second step in the process is the hiring of fmancial service advisors or a consortium 
of advisors that include legal, regulatory and technology experts who take over the 
initial privatization process. They may be used in a feasibility study during the 
identification of enterprises and the examination of various policy issues that often 
arise. In Kenya, this should be the Investment Secretary; however, that is not the case, 
(for undisclosed reasons) and instead the Minister of Finance determines the choice of 
the Financial advisor (s) (FA). Ideally, this should be a competitive process. It should 
be noted that in most cases the IMF and the World Bank weigh in heavily on the final 
decision with the approval of a Privatization Board or Committee (see figure 5-1) in 
cases where they provide the funding and the "advisory services." The feasibility study 
investigates policy issues relating to privatization and proposes solutions. Some of the 
issues include instituting a regulatory framework i.e. a communication regulator, a legal 
agency and a privatization Commission. These are important in creating effective 
competition and addressing challenging labour and financial matters during the 
privatization process. 
Further issues under investigation by the F As during the feasibility study include 
debt/liabilities; employee downsizing; buyouts; ownership; and management of any 
shareholding issues. The F As advise the privatization Committee/Commission on how 
best to proceed. During this process, the current and future commercial viability of the 
enterprises is determined. If they are found to be unviable then the privatization 
manager, committee, or Commission13 embarks on the process to wind-up the 
enterprises and if they are viable, the F As undertake an in-depth analysis of the above 
policy issues that lead to steps 3 and 4. 
STEP 3: Strengthening and Instituting a Regulatory Framework 
A strong independent regulator and regulatory framework are the hallmarks of a 
successful privatization program. 14 This is especially so in enterprises where high 
growth and fast technological changes are experienced, determining the market 
13 As presented in figure 5-1 
14 Foster, 1992, p4); Czada, (1990); Meany (1995) in Wright and Perroti (eds) 
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structure and extending liberalization and its effects on the industry. In most cases, this 
step has to be undertaken along with valuation of the enterprise. This step is important 
if the country privatizing anticipates attracting foreign investors as well as providing 
new local investors with equal opportunities. A regulator is important in checking that 
the competition is fair and that the legal process of bidding and acquisition of entities is 
done in an internationally accepted legal framework. The regulator is also important in 
instituting and applying rules determining tariffs, penalties, prices, standards, and 
compliance. After the regulator is in place step 4 flows. 
Step 4: Valuation of Enterprise and Possible Methods and Sale Timing 
The valuation step also consists of the Government's Privatization Plan; this is a very 
important step because it gives indication of a market price for the enterprise. More 
importantly, it matters whether the entity is a strategic or a non-strategic enterprise. In 
Kenya's case, the Privatization Committee (PC) comprises of the Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Finance and the Investment Secretary for Treasury, the Permanent 
Secretary from the parent Ministry of the enterprise to be privatised, a member of the 
Attorney General's Chambers in charge of the State Corporations Act and the director 
general of CCK- the regulator (see figure 5-1). This committee decides what kind of 
process will be followed and mandates a "sub-committee" to take on enterprise 
valuation in the transaction process. More often, F As base valuation on market 
principles and this is considered important for two other reasons: First, it helps quell 
disquiet amongst the citizens that would suggest that the government is not receiving a 
fair price for a public enterprise. Second, it increases the chances of attracting investors 
who might not be in a position to have sufficient knowledge of the value of the 
particular enterprise in a given market. Valuation is based on discounted-cash flow 
projections of future earnings and comparisons of similar enterprises' market prices 
(especially through trade or negotiated sales). During the valuation process, the 
options15 of those policy issues that include value of enterprise, debts, employee levels, 
technical and human capacity, and shareholding for national and foreign investors 
identified in steps 1 and 2 are analysed in detail and target resolutions are identified. 
This leads to step five, due diligence. 
15 see analysis on TKL's initial valuation in chapter four section 4:6 and 4:8 
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Step 5: Seller's Due-Diligence16 
This important stage determines the appropriateness and seriousness of the buyer or 
strategic investor(s). It examines the legal financial and technological encumbrances in 
evaluating the assets and accounts of the company. To accomplish this it is necessary 
for the PC and F As to seek the input and cooperation of the management of the 
enterprises and the public. It is at this stage that the value of entity is determined and a 
decision taken as to whether its approval for sale should be sought or not. This step may 
also include recommendation of the necessary restructuring aspects that need to be 
undertaken before privatization. 
Step 6: Pre-bid and Bid Process-Sale-Approval Process 
This process includes sales options/methods, approval of the bidding and post-bidding 
process. The Privatization Committee recommends to Cabinet and the President (see 
figure 5-l) the acceptance or refusal of the bidder and bid price. This also includes the 
sale options and methods, which could be; trade sale, auctions, trade sale negotiated, 
IPO share flotation, STI sale, or mixed sale options that are presented to the 
Privatization Committee and cabinet for approval. If the Cabinet approves, the regulator 
(i.e.) and the Minister of Finance issue letters of acceptance to the bidder, paving the 
way for the final sale negotiations between the winner of the bid, the regulator and the 
Privatization Committee. During this process, new financial advisors or sales agents 
may be hired or the step two advisers reconfirmed as sales agents to help in the 
finalization of the process. 
Step 7: Post-bid Matters 
This stage is closely related to step six and includes forwarding of acceptance or refusal 
recommendations of the bid to the agency in charge of approving the bid. The lengthy 
process of instituting a regulatory framework delays privatization in developing 
countries and further exacerbates delays in sector reform policies and enterprise 
16 Due Diligence Review include: Review of accounting policies, procedures, quality & sustainability of earnings, 
cash flow the condition and value of assets, along with review of real and potential liabilities, accounting systems 
and controls, tax implications of deal structures and Capacity of the entire company 
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restructuring. In addition, resolution of transactional and inter-ministerial and party 
politics issues (raised in chapter two and sections 5:1:2,5: 1:3:3,5:4 and 5:5 of this 
chapter) often result in major delays in the bidding process. Furthermore, the 
complexities and difficulties arising from differences between various interest groups in 
the due di ligence and negotiation processes and the lack of technical and operational 
capacity to effectively manage this stage compound the delays.17 Figure 5- 1 gives an 
overview of the organizational structure of the privatization management team and 
figure 5-2 gives a detailed chronological schedule of a transaction sale with an 
estimated period of 18 months. Table 5-l gives a glimpse of some of the transactions 
that are underway or planned that have to utilize the steps described herein. 
Figure 5-1 Kenya's Privatization Transaction Structure 
Kenya's Privatization Transaction Structure 
President 
Chair of Cabinet 
Final Approva l 
~---------~ 
Ministry of Finance Ministry of Finance 
Department of Government Deputy Chair to Cabinet and 
Investments & Public Enterprises . ~ Commi ttee Member of 
(DG IPE) & Investment Secretariat Cabinet Committee on 
& TU Privatization (CCOP) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Financial and management 
Advisors 
I ···-------.- ---' I 
Sector Committee Members 
Enterprise, Parastatal, AGCs and 
the 
Privatization Committee: 
Ministries of Finance, & 
Communication, CCK, TKL 
I ~-~· - · ---·----·-·-·- I ll Privatization Commission (PC) I (When in operation)-.. ~ Financial (Advisors & management 1 t Advis~rs -- tj 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
+ 
I Parliamentary 1 ---_, Investment Committee 
.... -. -. j_ ______ - - --······-- ····-··-· 
I 
I 
.. 
Regulator 
___ __________ ____ __ ~ r Publ~r~;:~eness ~- ___ -> 
tL.-~----~-~·-· 
~ -'---------·-
Source: Author's compilation from field data (2004) 
17 World Bank (1998); Ake, (1981) 
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Figure: 5-2: Schedule Approach-Timetable For a Strategic Sale 
Scfuufufe )fpproacfi-'Timeta6fe for a Strategic Safe 
Board approval and contract negotiations 
Valuation - Regulatory 
Framework 
Preparation of info memo and 
data room 
Pre-qualification of bidders 
Due diligence by pre-qualified 
bidders 
Pre-bid conference and bidding 
PC approval 
Sale agreement and closing 
Source: Author' s compilation from Field Data (2004) 
Months 
Table - 5-l: List of Up-coming Privatization Transactions (as per Research period) 
·-Company- Approx. Date ~-- ___ Tree of Sale Envisag~~----··-·---1 
Banking and Finance Sector 
Kenya Commercial Bank - 2004 26% of 35% government shares strategic sale. 65% 
National Bank Of Kenya- 2005 already sold 
---------·--·----
Oil and Gas 
Under Review 
49% Public Offer 
Kenya Oil Refinery (KOF)- 2004 51% strategic sale 
National Refine Ltd - 2003/04 51% strategic~----·---------·-.. ----
Power Sector Under review 
Kenya Power &Lighting Company (KPLC)- 2004/5 51-74% shares 
Kenya Electricity Generating Company (Ken Gen)2006 51% shares 
Nairobi City Wate~ Dep~~_l!_t_-__ 2_00'--4 _________ 
1 
Management <~g_l).~~!_gi_~en to ajoif!!_venture ----·--.. -
Transport Industry Concession, & Asset sale (Real estate) 
Kenya Rai lways Corporation (K.RC)- 2005 Concession of the Container Terminal and Conversion of 
Kenya Ports Authority (KP A) - 2004 KP A into a landlord port and Asset Sale 
Source: Author's compilation from Field Data (2004) 
18 note: that each step may be undertaken by different actors 
19 EOI- Expressions Of interest 
20 RFP- Request For Proposals 
224 
Chapter Five: Study Findings and Data Analysis: General Research Findings on the Privatization Process, Institutional and Legal Framework 
5:1:1:2 Telkom Kenya's Strategic Option: The Privatization Roadmap 
This research revealed that the privatization process described in section 5: 1 : 1 is 
informed by various internal positions on how the process should proceed. One of the 
strategic positions was for TKL to drew-up a final strategic option in the form of a 
cabinet memorandum or roadmap. This strategic roadmap outlined proposed scenarios 
for proceeding with the restructuring and privatization of TKL through an IPO and 
strategic equity collaboration (TKL, 2003a: 2004 ).It also outlined details of the "final" 
strategic option for approval by cabinet after June 2004/05. 
The Privatization roadmap (PR) became necessary after the stalled negotiations 
between the GOK and the Mount Kenya Consortium (MKC) in December of 2002. 
According to TKL's management the roadmap proposed a strategy on how to resolve 
the debt issues (pension and tax deficits), especially the pension fund which needed to 
be raised to the 70% level in order to meet the acceptable requirement levels of the 
Retirement Benefit Authority (RBA). The roadmap also advised cabinet to take quick, 
serious and innovative efforts for financial restructuring that are key to the success of 
TKL's privatization. More critically, the perception of the sector by the potential 
investors needed to be reversed with TKL' s strategic sale proposal depending on the 
implementation of the efforts contained in the roadmap. 
The draft cabinet memorandum or roadmap also outlined the "new" ratio for sale of 
TKL with a 26% strategic equity partner and 25% through an IPO on the Nairobi stock 
exchange in reverse of the original ratio of 49% of government shares intended to be 
sold to the strategic partner in 2002. The roadmap's compelling reason for an IPO 
option was the slow down in growth in the telecoms industry worldwide at the time 
with; big telecommunications operators selling off their assets or merging, as alluded to 
earlier by the BellSouth case (Scanlon, 2001). For example, in early 2004, Cingular 
acquired AT&T Wireless, creating the largest wireless carrier in the United States. 
Vodafone USA sold-off its assets in USA, in South Africa and were contemplating 
selling in Kenya, where the partnership is between Vivendi and Sameer group of 
companies, (see The Financial Standard, June 17, 2004 and The Sunday Standard, May 
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23, 2004).21 Therefore, the window of opportunity for a Strategic Investor (STI) expired 
rendering this option unattractive. Moreover, the GOK hoped to rely on the history of 
Safaricom's subscriber oversubscription originally set at 400,000 maximum capacity 
This thesis's field survey interview responses and TKL/Safaricom, (2000) showed that 
the other consideration for the IPO was the high cost of money on the equity market, 
which would be resolved by a public offering. However, the politics of who pays the 
cost of the already acquired equity loan from Citibank and Barclays to Safaricom 
guaranteed by Vodafone U .K had been a point of disagreement between GOK and 
Safaricom for over two and half years from 2002-mid 2004. The private sector and 
Vodafone argued that in the spirit of government divestiture from the industry the GOK 
should relinquish its 11% shareholding in Safaricom as its contribution to the loan 
repayment. This debate continues after this research along with it is the political and 
economic landscape for investor confidence levels that have been in a "wait and see 
attitude." (FSD, 2004; TKL, 2003) 
Furthermore, the roadmap outlined original government divesture objectives stipulating 
the introduction of efficiency and infusion of capacity measures to remove TKL's 
monopoly status by June 2004, with the intention of introducing an SNO along side 
TKL. This was to create a duopoly status that would introduce competitiveness in order 
to raise efficiency levels, reduce prices, improve the quality of services and encourage 
diversification into a wide range of products and services (TKL, 2003a). 
However, the strategy does not stipulate a timetable and strategy for negotiating with 
the unions on the issue of pension liability and as Haske] and Szymanski ( 1990b, p.208) 
argue, privatization has an enormous effect on the negotiating positions and the role of 
unions. They further argue that privatization gives the "right to manage" and the 
managers in this case as agents maximize an objective function dictated by the 
shareholders represented by trade unions as in the case of TKL. The challenge for 
TKL's management is the realization that a privatized TKL will cross quite rapidly 
from its current 'control type relations' by government to that of a shareholder partner 
as it transcends to private ownership after its sale. This poses some difficulties for the 
21 This sale of shares went through but was largely viewed as a hostile takeover, when Sameer blocked a South 
African investor acquisition of Vodafone shares. Sameer used its pre-emptive rights to mobilize funds and 
bought shares, only to sell them to Celtel a few hours later. 
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TKL management-government relationship because the necessary institutional change 
'buffer' has not been rapid because of changes in the re-election objectives of the 
NARC administration. Again, Haske! and Szymanski (l990b, p.214) argue that 
inherently in all economies the short-term effects of privatization are often 
unfavourable to the government objectives of realising profits because of slow 
improvements in poor outputs, declining employment, and price rises. Whatever the 
theory on this, the GOK seemed forced into taking on the option22 suggested in section 
4:8:3 of chapter four where the government assumes responsibility in dealing with the 
pension liability and labour issues raised by the KPTC!fKL trade union and the 
strategic investor, before the implementation of the roadmap. 
22 i.e. scenario one- where the government assumes liability 
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5:1:2 Market and Institutions in the Privatization Process: Findings Overview 
At the policy level, the study found that the number of objectives, in relations to 
markets and institutions, flowing from the government privatization policy varied over 
the research period and changed overtime depending on the sector being privatized. The 
TKL' s roadmap was a classic example of shifting objectives. Indeed, the interview data 
analysis revealed that some objectives i.e. revenue was considered less important than 
the overall benefit of the program by the private sector and yet, it was considered very 
important by the government at the planning stage and gradually by the transaction 
stage the government's focus and objective changed (FSD, 2004; TKL, 2003a).23 This 
shifting nature of the approach indicated that the objectives of the process remained 
firmly within the domain of public sector senior management and politicians lending 
itself to the tendency for governments to be bureaucratic, centralized, and hierarchical. 
In addition, the objectives and motives of the program were largely determined by the 
degree to which senior public sector management specified and dictated the course of 
action to an approach, highlighting the closed nature of the divestiture program. 
Samuel., (1999), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny ( 1996), Stiglitz., (2003) and Wallsten, 
(2001 :2000a) discuss the emphasis given to political goals over efficiency goals and the 
differences which exist between the LDCs and the developed countries regarding the 
purpose and importance of setting up institutional and legal frameworks before 
privatization. The field interview discussions showed that although the GOK 
acknowledged the importance of institutional frameworks rhetorically, it was not 
matched with action in the market. 
In addressing the central research question and questions three and four, the research 
found that regional objectives of telecommunications privatization differed from the 
national objectives at country level. The regional objectives were ranked as; sector 
reforms; liberalization; regional integration; and unbundling or splitting up of SOEs in 
order to allow for restructuring, competition, investments, efficiency, and profitability. 
These objectives were important to the region as far as they could encourage regional 
integration through investments and trade. 
23 Interviews focused on the main questionnaire appendix l annex l questions 7, 8, II and 15 and appendix 2 annex l 
questions 2, 4, 5,6, and 21 
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This important finding suggests that with manageable enterprises managers are able to 
undertake growth-oriented strategies that may include infusing more funds into the 
enterprise, allowing the introduction of new technology, new management, and product 
diversification. The growth strategies in-tum provides the enterprise space, capacity, 
and capability to engage in regional and global competition. Wright and Perroti ( 1999) 
further argue that growth oriented types of transactions are given impetus by factors of 
technological change, political considerations and budgetary pressures, along with the 
expectation that governments have to free markets and build institutions 
simultaneously. In line with this discussion the interview findings corroborates this 
evidence and revealed that the regional responses ranked sector liberalization, 
unbundling, restructuring and new management as extremely important objectives in 
any approach taken to privatize telecommunications, while ranking introduction of new 
technology, equity and regional integration as very important objectives (FSD, 2004). 
The research further found that regional responses maintained that liberalizing and 
reforming the telecommunications sector is vital since it permeates the closely related 
sectors of communications, transportation (i.e. road, rail, water, and air), banking, and 
insurance (FSD, 2004). The respondents also indicated that telecommunications and 
banking are the two sectors that have been relatively easy for the government to 
restructure and privatize with minimal difficulty corroborating the literature. Although 
politically telecoms presented significant social, economic and political challenges. 
They reported that airlines and agriculture were the most difficult sectors to privatize 
occasioned by the 'national jewels' syndrome that has dogged the privatization 
programs in Africa (FSD, 2004; Megginson, 1998) since the structural adjustment 
programs of the late 1980s. This finding is particularly important because it responds to 
the central research question of this thesis in relation to selecting sectors to privatize as 
discussed in the selection criteria. In relation to the selection objectives, it is notable 
that the government of Kenya lists (see appendix1 annex Va) POSTA and Telkom 
Kenya as strategic enterprises and yet goes ahead to initiate their privatization based on 
its viability and potential to create wealth. This is also true of other CO MESA countries 
that are in the process of privatising telecommunications, notably Uganda, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Egypt. 
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On the issue of institutionalization and organization of the privatization structures, the 
research found that the government did not have a systematic documentation process, 
which could be followed and identified. The various offices and officers indicated in 
figure 5-l did their work seemingly independently and there was no one office or 
officer with a complete mandate of the program. The only documentation available to 
the public as evidence of the existence of a privatization program and process was the 
1996 Divesture framework document. In effect, this thesis was the first known attempt 
to document the approach Kenya takes to implement its divesture program. However, 
the research revealed that the GOK under the Privatization law is moving towards the 
institutionalization of the process by instituting a Privatization Commission that will 
have a mandate to operationalize and document the implementation of Kenya's 
approach to privatization under the law. A related issue is the degree to which a balance 
can be reached between working towards implementing the World Bank privatization 
agenda and building an overall strategic direction while maintaining local 
responsiveness as argued by Stiglitz (2003). The research further suggested that 
prioritization of the GOK's privatization objectives and the objectives of SOEs listed 
for privatization were important not only at the top of the governmental organization, 
but also at every other level of the approach and transaction. A lack of this clarity was 
evident in discussions with government officials (FSD, 2004; Appendix 1 annex V) 
Related to the findings on lack of a documented approach and legal framework, the 
research found that, while senior government officials established and decided on the 
direction of the organizations earmarked for privatization they had no clear programme 
of achieving an approach at policy and managerial levels. The establishment of a 
relatively strong semi-independent communications, banking, capital market and sugar 
industry regulators with the existence of sporadic non identifiable transportation and 
insurance regulators, suggested a greater degree of involvement by the GOK at a later 
stage ofthe process than would have been anticipated. However, as discussed earlier in 
chapter one this closed process was perceived by the GOK as a seedbed for new ideas 
and managers were able to develop the means through which the 'restructure before 
privatization' targets were to be achieved. The major part of this achievement was the 
challenge of building strong independent market, legal frameworks in their respective 
sectors as a basis for proceeding with privatization. 
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5:1:2:1 Characteristics of The Market 
Size of Market: Facilities and Network Elements 
To understand how the legal institutional frameworks interrelate with privatization 
objectives, this section continues the preceding discussion on market characteristic, by 
discussing the TKL's market, facilities and network elements. Telkom Kenya Ltd 
operates the national telephone network in Kenya that was formerly in the hands of 
KPTC. Telkom Kenya has four subsidiaries namely; Safaricom that operates a cellular 
phone network (in partnership with Vodafone Airtouch, with 40 percent shares), Gil gil 
Telecommunication industries-manufacturers of telecoms and postal products 
(telephone handsets, PABX systems etc), Kenya Postal Directories Ltd that publishes 
the yearly telephone directory, and Kenya College of Telecommunications Technology 
(KCCT) which offers training to the communications sector. 
In an attempt to prepare fro competition after June 2004, Telkom Kenya merged several 
exchange centres as part of the ongoing internal restructuring and modernization to 
promote efficiency, aiming at retaining only six exchanges countrywide with the 
introduction of new technology service capacity and capability as shown by tables 5-13 
and 5-14. (CCK, 2001; TKL, 1999 and GOKIMOT&C, 1999). 
The research showed that two mobile phone licences were issued in 2000 and 2001 to 
Safaricom and Kencell Communications Ltd. Safaricom is a joint venture between 
Telkom Kenya (60 %) and Vodafone Airtouch (40 %), while Kencell is a partnership 
between Sameer Investments of Kenya and Vivendi of France, the latter of which 
started operations in August 2002. The two companies had a total of over two million 
subscribers between them by December 2003, with the resulting competition expected 
to broaden the subscriber base and reduce charges for mobile phone services. Their 
coverage has also improved substantially and their networks now cover most of the 
major towns and some rural areas in Kenya (CCK, 2003:2004). 
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The study found that the fixed telephone network had a capacity of 600,000 lines, out 
of which 328,116 lines are installed and 250,000 are functional. The government plans 
to improve service penetration from the present 4 lines for every 100 people to 20 lines 
in urban areas by the year 2015. The penetration in the rural areas is to increase from 
0.16 lines for every 100 people to one line during the same period. This translates to 
around 300,000 new lines in rural areas and 2.4 million new connections in urban areas, 
respectively. At an average cost of US$2,000 per line, the total investment required is 
US$5 .4 billion or US$270 million annually during the period 1995-2015 (compare this 
with TKL's plans in figures 5-9 & 5-12 and table 5-14). The government has been 
moving in earnest to achieve this goal but the process has been slowed down by limited 
funds, and lack of an operational legal framework for its privatization process and 
programs outlined in figure 5-3. One of the key GOK objectives for its privatization 
process was to attract private capital to realise the above tele-density targets, but TKL 
in its operating financial and business position between 2001-2004 (discussed in detail 
in chapter four and updated in this chapter in sections 5:7 and 5:8) could only attract 
IMF and World bank funds for restructuring and privatization. 
This research found that TKL had relinquished its exclusivity of regional fixed 
telephony in anticipation that mobile phone providers would; first, rollout further 
network to the fixed lines with a goal of connecting all households at affordable rates, 
and second, install card phones and other essential services. Indeed Kencell installed 
network receivers in 44 towns across the country by December 2003 (see table 5-5, 
CCK, 2003). To avoid a situation where the large mobile phone customer base stretches 
the operator's network, and results in unreliable and low quality service (as frequently 
happened to Safaricom), a third mobile Operator (TMO) (ECONET) was licensed by 
CCK but did not commence operations by October 2003. It was expected to have 
rolled-out its network by November 2003 to ease pressure on Safaricom and Kencell. 
The current operator's emphasis as stipulated by the Kenya Government through the 
Communications Regulatory (CCK) is to make sure that the targets for universal 
coverage were adhered to by a rapid expansion of the operator's network to rural areas, 
in order to increase universal coverage through Regional Telecommunications Operator 
(RTOs) licences issued by CCK. The RTOs were a strategy to cover the unprofitable 
market areas unattractive to competing national mobile operators. 
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Three companies were issued with Regional Telecommunication Operator (RTO) 
Licences in June 2000 to compete with Telkom Kenya in provision of fixed line 
services in other regions excluding Nairobi (Telkom had a five-year exclusivity period 
in Nairobi, expiring in 2004), as shown in table 5-5. The companies were to operate as 
follows: Safitel (North Rift and Eastern regions), Bell Western (North Eastern) and 
Widestream Communications Ltd (Western, Central, Coast, South Rift and Nyanza). 
The companies were expected to be operational in 2001 but encountered serious start-
up problems. Industry experts argue that the rollout of mobile phone networks covering 
most of the country made the viability of Regional Telecom Operators (RTOs) 
questionable, as the expansion, speed and span of mobile telephony had not been 
anticipated. These RTOs were also expected to install public pay phones under the 
universal service obligation rule. 
Cellular Phones 
Currently the cellular phones market is expected to operate in a duopoly environment. 
The two telecommunications companies providing cellular services are Safaricom 
Company and Kencell Communications with a third mobile operator entry in early 
2004. There has been a tremendous growth in the use of cellular phones since 1997, 
increasing the number of subscribers to cellular phones by millions, a record speed in a 
six-month period in a year as shown by table 5-2. This is in contrast with the growth 
comparisons of cellular and fixed line growth during the actual privatization process 
shown in table 5-6 on page 267. 
Table 5-2 Growth in Cellular Subscribers 
Provider 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002/03 
Safari com 3,000 6,000 26,000 64,000 170,000 1.8million 
Kencell . . . 60,000 190,000 600,000 
Total 3,000 6,000 26,000 124,000 2.4 million 
Subscribers 
Sources: Author's Compilation from field Data, (2004) 
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5:1:2:2 Market Structure and Trend 
As detailed in section 4:9:0 this thesis research revealed that in the process of 
restructuring as a fixed line operator, a strategic partner to take up the 49 percent shares 
in Telkom was identified but the process was shelved towards the end of 2002 after 
fallout with the leading bidder (FSD, 2004)?4 The strategic partner who was expected 
on board by the end of 2003 in order to attract additional shares in the market through a 
public flotation on the Nairobi Stock Exchange created false expectations for the local 
and international investors in the telecoms market. Viewing the stalled process with 
scepticism, the employees of Telkom Kenya planned to take up shares through an 
employee buy out share ownership plan (EBO) in an attempt to resolve the pension 
liability problem. The industry analysts argued that if an EBO had succeeded it would 
have diluted the government shareholding substantially giving the strategic partner a 
free hand to steer the company into a profitable position. The GOK and the 
management were unwilling to enter into this arrangement. To buy time and counter the 
pro-privatization critics during this period, TKL planned a major expansion project for 
upgrading its capacity and facilities as indicated in tables 5-13 and 5-14. The plan was 
to increase exchange capacity by 430,000 lines before December of 2002 (later 
extended to June 2004). In order to respond to competition and attract more 
investments it was anticipated that TKL under a strategic partner would join the mobile 
phone sector as the new operators expanded the coverage of their networks to smaller 
urban and rural areas under a poor infrastructure (TKL, 2003; GOG/DGIPE, 2002). 
Local Calls 
A local call is defined as a call that originates from an exchange and terminates within 
60 kilometres radius from a designated reference charge point for that exchange. The 
same reference charge point can be shared by several exchanges and one unit is 
equivalent to 3 minutes. As a monopoly offers no discount or economy rate for local 
calls that is a disadvantage to TLK's efforts to contain the cellular phone competition, 
24 Mount Kenya Consortium (MKC) (led by Econet Wireless) 
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as the two mobile phone companies have rationalized their national and international 
charges/tariffs25 making their services more attractive? 
Table 5-3 Charges per Unit 
Charge per unit (US$) 
Customer Lines 0.07 
Public Payphones 0.06 
Sources: TKL Reports, (2003) 
As tables, 5-3 and 5-4 indicate during the privatization period national, local and long 
distance calls continued to attract higher charges compared to the rest of COMESA 
region (TKL, 2003). These tariffs were also higher than those of mobiles when you sum 
up the other variables of access and convenience. Yet, 80% of Kenya's population are 
based in the rural areas and utilize landlines or fixed telephone. This posed a challenge 
for Telkom Kenya, which needed to be more competitive in the rural areas by 
reviewing their tariff structure downwards for their fixed line, and improving access 
and convenience of their product and services. The research found that these detailed 
factors on market operations shape Kenya's approach to privatization and determine the 
levels of investments into the sector (TKL, 1999; CO MESA, 2003). 
Table 5-4 Long Distance Calls 
Charge per unit (US$) 
Trunk I (60-230km) 0.22 
Trunk II (over 230km) 0.27 
~runk III (East Africa Region) 0.48 
Sources: TKL Reports, (2003) 
Payphones 
This thesis research found that the public payphones play a major role in the support of 
objectives of economic efficiency by providing broader access to public telephones. 
During the research period there were a total 9,604 payphones countrywide compared 
to Kenya's population of over 30 million (as per the 1995 population census, GOK, 
1998). This disproportion was found to be common in developing countries of the 
COMES A region where over 80 % of the people do not have access to a telephone line 
at home or/and at work or cannot afford the high cost of the mobile sets and air time. In 
25 i.e. it costs the same amount to text nationally and internationally 
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addition, payphones are valuable as part of a communication policy of the Kenyan 
government since they serve the majority poor households in low-income urban centres 
and the rural communities who vote in politicians to political office. They are important 
also to small businesses that cannot afford the connection costs of a telephone line. 
The study interview responses (FSD, 2004) showed that one major disadvantage in 
using payphones was the lack of adequate numbers of payphones resulting in long 
queues occasioned by malfunctioning of half of the phones and the time it takes to 
complete a call, which is much longer than that of mobiles telephones. Besides, issues 
of security and vandalism make them more unattractive to use and uncompetitive to 
mobile phones. It is hoped that this situation would change with the entry of an SNO 
and an end to TKL's fixed line monopoly. Additionally, the mobile phone companies 
also joined in the provision of telephone booths in order to help improve efficiency and 
usage of fixed telephone lines and step up the competitive pressure as indicated by 
figure 5-9 (p.293), showing the progress made in growth of telecom indicators (CCK, 
2004). 
5:1:2:3 Telkom Kenya Monopolies 
The monopolistic nature of the telecommunications sector was not a focus area of this 
thesis research, however, the monopolistic tendencies related to restructuring and 
privatization of the telecoms sector in particular help explain Kenya's approach. In 
addition, the theoretical framework in chapter two sections 2:2 and 2:3 and 2:5:1:1 raise 
issues related to performance and reforms in monopolies as argued by Gayle and 
Goodrich (1995); Foster, (1992 p.4); Mwangi, (2003); Newbery, (2000) and Foster and 
Olsab (1991) amongst others. Similarly, this study found that although GOK had 
declared total liberalization of the communications market, TKL continued to operate 
under the monopolistic market structure approved by the Investment Secretariat, the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications and implemented by the CCK (CCK 
Reports 2002). The Investment Secretariat representing the government on the matter 
argued that TLK's monopolistic behaviour was because of its delayed strategic investor 
sale, which was "due to circumstances beyond the government's control." This 
situation bore all the hallmarks of a monopoly as TKL operated six complete 
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monopolies shown in (table 5-5) with the full backing of the government. This meant 
that over the period of over five years (1999- 2003) these services and areas could not 
be further liberalized and TKL had a monopoly to compete unfairly. As Mwangi 
(2004), Shirley, Tusubira, Gebeab and Haggarty (2002) and Wallsten (2002) have 
argued, governments in LDCs continue to use monopolistic behaviour in smaller 
activities within the enterprises in order to gain time over impending competition. 
Wallsten (2002) specifically argues in defence of exclusivity periods as a time buying 
measure to further break up the monopoly during restructuring. 
Indeed, this state of affairs was similar for example, to British Telecom (BT), which by 
2004 retained monopoly on voice telephony and landline installations. This meant that 
any other telecoms companies, (i.e. car-phone telecoms subsidiary), cannot offer lower 
prices on telephone calls terminating on BT landlines unless these are diverted into a 
specific product as in the case of Car Phone communications, TALK service. This 
position is expected to change when BT looses monopoly on provision of voice 
telephony via land lines in 2005. TKL still maintained its voice telephony monopoly in 
2003, which was 90% of its business portfolio (figure 5-11) but was missing the data 
transmission and mobile business sectors. In contrast, BT for example utilized its data 
monopoly to venture into the broadband market and has rapidly grown its internet and 
TV (i.e. Sky) connections business. By June 2004, TKL had lost its monopoly on 
VSAT, GMPSC and Internet Node and Backbone services and was experiencing 
operational and technical difficulties, with new competition from GSM and Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs). The position of the divestiture literature and academic 
arguments on creation of monopolies at firm level activities, and the larger 
infrastructure within privatized enterprises in LDCs although divided has gained 
momentum26 
It was evident from the interviews that Telkom Kenya and the Kenyan government 
continue to make serious "bad business" judgments (The Standard Daily, November 
2003); as access to its services was severely limited, for example an old underground 
cable system. For example, forty years after independence (1964-2004) only 330,000 
fixed lines were installed in Kenya most of which were in Nairobi and Mombasa with 
26 see Shirley Et al (2002) , and Wallsten, (2002) 
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limited functional capacity as indicated by the preceding discussion on markets. In spite 
of the fact that Telkom incurred huge monetary penalties charged by CCK for lack of 
compliance with license conditions (discussed in section 5:1 :3 :2), it failed to 
significantly increase the rate of access for the duration of the five-year monopoly. The 
services offered by TKL were found to be of low quality, and quantity and costly by 
competitive local and international standards as figure 5-5 and Table 5-10, figure 5-7, 
and table 5-12 indicated respectively. Jambonet (the Internet Gateway Service) for 
example operated in a state of disrepair 90% of the time in spite of all TKL's stated 
efforts to improve this service. 
Table 5-5: Telkom Kenya Monopolies 
Monopolies Geographical Expiry 
Location 
Local Telephony Nairobi June 2004 
National Long Distance Republic June 2004 
International gateway &services Republic June 2004 
Global Mobile Personate Communications via Satellite Republic June 2004 
(GMPSC) 
International Commercial VSA T Networks and Services Republic June 2004 
Internet Node and Backbone Republic June 2004 
Sources: CCK and Leadersbtp Centre, (2004) 
This thesis research also found that TKL did not utilized this monopolistic advantage 
over other companies to create a niche for itself, indeed, over 75% (n=27) of 
respondents argued that TKL had no convincing explanation to offer for its poor 
performance as a monopoly in fast growing industry. TKL's service had been non-
competitive with poor non-operational lines, poor connection rate, a slow and confusing 
billing system, poor record of unresponsive repair and disconnection time and a slow 
fault response service (figure 5-13). Some of the customers indicated that in some 
cases the non-response to a fault repair service extended to several years of waiting. 
In addition to an abused monopoly, the termination and transit agreements that TKL 
holds with other international carriers under ITU regulations, provided TKL with a rich 
set of revenues for precisely that purpose - to expand access to domestic users - both in 
terms of pricing of telecommunication facilities and for rural access. On the contrary, 
Telkom and its predecessor (the KPTC) appear to have abused monopoly power by 
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restricting access to the public.27 For instance, there are less than 700 international 
circuits available for making telephone calls into and out of Kenya; that means that 
only fewer than 700 fixed line calls can be made into or out of Kenya at any one time. 
This casts doubt on TKL's ability to compete globally and calls for the questioning of 
where and to whom the benefits of this monopoly power accrued, and one need not 
look far because most of these have gone into bad investments, referred to as "white 
elephants." This field survey found as an example of these 'white elephants' the VSA T 
station in Kericho which was not used for over three years (i.e. between 2000-2003) 
and was subsequently underutilized under the period of this thesis writing (2001-2004). 
In addition, TKL undertook a large expansion program of the exchanges in Nairobi 
without due regard to its human and technical capacity for connections and last mile 
capability, along with the introduction of wireless exchange in Eastlands in 2003 
without backup power installations and maintaining a large workforce. With this kind 
of background, an SNO was a welcome addition to the market (FSD, 2004, see also 
table 5-13 ). 
However, it was not clear whether the SNO would have supplied the market with 
sufficient relief because TKL still owned the telephone lines by the end of 2004. The 
question is whether the SNO would ensure an adequate degree of competition, and 
indeed, it could be argued to the contrary from first principles, 28 as outlined by 45% of 
the respondents. They argued that it appeared that the solution offered by the new 
NARC administration did not provide a market assurance of a satisfactory outcome 
with regard to increased access or competition, (although the policy makers in this 
study expressed their satisfaction on greater access and competition). Most importantly, 
the law and indeed the market share implied that CCK should have licensed at least 
three players in any market segment of telecommunications in order to rid the market of 
any obvious abuse of monopolistic status and tendencies. Theorists often reflect this 
lack of provision for sufficient competition by the regulator as characteristic behaviour 
of infrastructure and utility sectors (see Wallsten, 2001a; Newbery and Pollitt, 1997 and 
Newbery, 1999) 
27 The reason TKLIKPTC were given monopoly of specific services was for the GOK to ensure that there was 
access to services by a larger public. Opening up to competition was seen as restricting access through tariffs 
28 These contained in the reforms and liberalization discussion in chapter and access and interconnection in chapter 4 
i.e. removal of monopolistic activities, greater and easy access to interconnection services etc. 
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5:1:3 Providing an Institutionae9 Framework Context 
The preceding discussion on TKL's behaviour in the market and institutions leads this 
analysis of field findings to the context in which these institutions and enterprises 
operate as outlined in the Privatization Bill (GOK, 2003) and the CCK regulations 
GOK/CCK, 2001). Vuylsteke, (1988) and Estache, (1997) have argued that providing a 
context within which privatization action takes place i.e. an institutional and legal 
regulatory framework for privatization, prevents hap-hazard implementation of 
programs which has been a trademark of divestiture of SOEs in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Stiglitz adds to this argument when he contends that a legal regulatory framework is 
important because investors use it to set the value of the firm. Indeed field interview 
evidence30 showed that foreign investors viewed lack of a regulatory framework as a 
high-risk environment. However, providing vision cannot be adequate on its own and 
the question asked in any privatization process is to what extent national governments 
should be trusted to develop the institutional frameworks and capacities that go beyond 
providing static exhortative statements for action suitable for local environments 
(Stiglitz 2003, pp25-28; 1999). This thesis research and indeed the literature found that 
very often the political will needed to catalyze the establishment of a strong 
institutional infrastructure has been absent; indeed, Young, (2003) echoes this 
sentiment when he reports the importance of building strong institutions; 
There are many choices in how to undertake a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) 
reform programme- do it quickly, do it slowly; involve many enterprises, or just a 
few; use these methods, or those. But international experience shows that however 
a country chooses to designs its programme, it is important to construct a very 
robust institutional framework to implement it (p.l) 
29 Infrastructure and capacity of a country to engage a privatization program often with an outside developed 
agenda by the international financial and development agencies 
30 Appendix I annex V and FSD, 2004 
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This research's field interviews (appendix I annex V) further indicated that there was a 
lack of respect and trust as to the effectiveness of the existing institutional framework 
for implementing privatization along with lack of capacity of the governments to build 
institutions. As Hill and Abdala's experiences echoed these sentiments in Argentina: 
... while privatization proceeded rapidly in 1990, little attention was paid to the 
regulatory framework. Though a regulatory framework was drawn up the same 
year, little was done at first to implement it. Many of these rules were rewritten 
and the management changed within a year. This uncertainty seemed to hurt the 
privatization process, causing investors to demand very large risk premiums 
(quoted from Wallsten, 2002, p.7) 
The field interviews notes further show that there were no clear strategies and 
allocation of roles and responsibilities between and amongst government departments 
and PEs managers, exposing confusion in the separation of the various decisions to be 
made about the enterprises. For example in response to question 16 section 2 a senior 
investment manager retorted; "Yes I strongly agree. Because as an investment agency 
we have the difficult job of directing the investors to the various officers dealing with 
privatization, and the management is confusing to say the least". The study also found 
that the approval process of the overall approach and approval of specific details in 
single transactions are not separated but are dealt with in a group. The research 
suggested that the approach activities thought to have been undertaken to underpin 
incremental improvement in the privatization process, were in fact reactive, and tended 
to be operationally focused in the sense that they were reactions to identifying crisis 
areas rather than a well thought out daily operation of the process. Those activities, 
which were undertaken because of applying regulatory policy, tended to bring about 
proactive outcomes for example, the initial valuation and tendering process derived 
from policy, were focused upon external as well as internal issues. The research further 
found that for many working on policy related activities sometimes the outcome was 
circumvented by a government ministerial directive issued over the electronic mass 
media on contractual reversals as in the case of the Econet Wireless contract as a TMO, 
thus putting the whole process in jeopardy (The Standard Business News, March 18, 
2004). 
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5: 1:3:1 The Communications Regulatory Structure and Sector Legislation 
The analytical review in chapter two and the findings of the secondary and primary data 
in chapters five and six show the importance of legislation in privatization programs 
and telecoms divestiture in particular. They also show the difficulties experienced in the 
institutionalization of regulatory frameworks in any privatizations around the world. It 
is particularly difficult in the COMESA countries where the regulatory institutions are 
either non-existent or are in their embryonic stages. According to the COMESA 
secretariat Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia have made 
substantial efforts towards the creation of regulatory frameworks in the 
communications sector (COMESA, 2003);31 they implemented the COMESA transport, 
and telecommunications reform program. 
In Kenya, the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) is the regulatory body 
responsible for developing and coordinating the policies, strategies, and operation of 
telecommunications services (GOK, 1998). It is also responsible for coordinating the 
COMESA Regional Regulatory Framework and its target is to bring the telephone line 
density to 20 lines I 100 people in urban areas and 1 line per 1 00 in rural areas by the 
year 2015. These targets refer to the installation of over 375,000 lines in the respective 
national rural areas and 2 million lines in the urban areas at an estimated cost of 
between 800 and 1,250 US dollars per line with the total investment estimated to cost 
between US $ 2 billion and US $ 3 billion. This is a large investment requirement, 
which calls for new initiatives to attract capital into the sector. It was in this context that 
a systematic liberalisation of the sector has been undertaken with a view to attracting 
capital from the private sector. 
31 COMES A, (2003) 
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5:1:3:2: Major Telecom Licences (Issued By CCK)31 and the Kenya Communications Act 
This thesis research found that the Kenya Communications Act (KCA) No. 2 of 1998 
sets out policy and stipulates the rules and regulations for operating the licensing 
market by CCK. The KCA further reinforces the understanding of the implementation 
of the regulatory framework as presented in the structure of the Communication Act 
(see appendix 2 annex Xb).33 The KCA in particular the section on telecommunications 
services, is an important legal instrument that provides the basis for liberalising the 
communications sector and privatizing TKL. In particular, the major licences provided 
by CCK are fixed line Services to Telkom Kenya Ltd (TKL) licensed on 1st July 1999. 
According to the CCK's annual report (2003), the mobile telephony services provided 
three operators licensed for countrywide coverage using GSM Technology : Safaricom 
Limited licence issued on I st July I999; Kenya Communications Limited (Kencell) 
licence issued on 28th January 2000; and Econet Wireless as a TMO licence issued in 
May, 2003. The main features of fixed and mobile service licences include: licence 
duration of 25 years for major licences, 15 years for GSM licence duration extendable 
by IO years; and annual rollout obligations (CCK, 200I). The CCK licences consist of 
provision of universal service, specifically a national numbering plan and number 
portability, interconnection obligations, non-discriminatory provision of services, 
prohibition of anti-competitive practices and quality of service requirements. Other 
mandatory requirements for complying with licensing requirements include the 
provision of free emergency services to specialized life saving service institutions and 
individuals i.e. beepers for doctors, signals for the police, airlines, aviation, and rail 
transport. The other requirements are mandatory CCK inspections of installations and 
operations, rate regulation; provision of relevant information to CCK and submission of 
returns and payment of requisite fees to CCK, (2003 :200 I). 
32 Appendix2 -Annex Xa: shows a schedule of varied licenses 
33 This framework is similar to the CO MESA legal framework for communications 
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Figure 5-3: Privatization Approach: The Operational/ Regulatory Framework 
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Figures 5-1 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4 show the approach a privatization transaction takes in 
Kenya and in the CO MESA region, and one of the major findings of the study was the 
tracing of Kenya's approach to privatization as presented in summary in figure 5-3 and 
discussed in detail herein. However, although the initial literature and secondary data 
analysis indicated that the approach is not as clear or did not exist, this thesis' analysis 
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of the field data generates a tangible approach to the privatization process as indicated 
in figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3. The findings further show that there is no clear operational 
'manual' and no records to show GOK the operational approach to the process before 
this thesis study. In the process of generating elements of the sketched approach, these 
study findings captured the views of the industry players on the progression of the 
approach. The various views on the actual process outlined three scenarios presented in 
figure 5-4. This mapping of the progression or approved format of privatization of 
telecoms was not entirely conclusive. However, in these findings there were three 
emerging scenarios of approaches to the privatization in Kenya. These three scenarios 
adhere to the on going discourse on the form, structure, order and timing of the 
theoretical elements of restructuring, liberalization and regulation raised in sections 2:1 
and 2:6 of chapter two and summarized in figure 5-4. 
Figure 5-4 Progression of Approaches to Privatization 
SCENARIO I 
Policy -Liberalization, 
Reforms Restructurin 
SCENARIO II 
nbundle/ 
SCENARIO III Ideal preferred scenario34 
Legal framework 
Privatization Law 
Liberalization 
Restructure 
Sources: Author's compilation from field interview Data, (2004) 
Regulation 
The study found that in the COMESA region, most countries started with structural 
adjustment programs then liberalisation/reforms of major sectors (i.e. banking, 
manufacturing, transport and telecommunications).35 After liberalisation came 
restructuring and or privatization that was followed by policy, measures or guidelines 
34 Preferred scenario for Telkom Kenya's privatization (TKL, Management, field interview, (2003) 
35 Due to pressure from the IMF and World Bank 
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used to create a legal-regulatory framework. The findings do not show a particular 
pattern but it was evident that most of the PEs managers interviewed favoured scenario 
I which was popular because of the freedom it allowed SOE management and 
government to gain time under the mode of perpetual restructuring. This scenario 
sacrifices other important steps in the transaction process for example the strengthening 
of regulatory instruments, which as the research interviews shows is an important step 
but is easily relinquished to the last page. The interview evidence show that in cases 
where the SOE was in the restructuring stage (i.e. TKL) it was clear that the priority of 
the government and the TLK management was not strengthening the regulatory 
instruments or resolving the pension liability problem. The priority was on who would 
buy TKL and how it would be sold (FSD, 2004) 
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5:1:3:3 Major Issues and Critical Overview of the Privatization Bi112003 
After a detailed description of the legal and regulatory structures that include the 
Communications Act and the privatization Bill (PB) in the preceding sections, this 
section takes a critical view of the Bill in the context of the privatization process. The 
analysis is based on the findings from interviews and the focus group workshop 
discussions (AAS/GOK, 2003). The Bill provides for a piece of legal framework that 
was absent in the process. It gives good transition from the fragmented sector policies 
to a privatization law that was to be enacted in the early part of 2004.36The Bill's 
enactment was to incorporate flexibility of implementation dynamics to reflect the 
turbulent privatization environment as indicated in these thesis findings. The structure 
of the Privatization Bill (act) is critically examined pointing out challenges to its 
implementation and as highlighted in the preceding section 5: I :3:3: I. 
5:1:3:3:1 Structure of The Privatization Bill: 37 The Legal Framework 
The 'privatization Bill, 2003' is "A Bill For an Act of Parliament to provide for 
the privatization of public assets and operations, including state corporations, by 
requiring the formulation and implementation of a privatization programme by a 
Privatization Commission to be established by this act and for related purposes" 
(GOK: Kenya Gazette Supplement NO. 88 (Bills No.26) p.1 005). 
These thesis findings indicate that over the last decade (I993-2003), the privatization 
process in Kenya has relied on fragmented policy statements and acts of parliament as a 
basis for legal framework (GOK, I998 and GOK/CCK, 200I).38 In order to change this 
position, the Privatization Bill (PB) provides for a law, as a basis for a structure and 
framework for Kenya's restructuring and privatization process. This is a much-needed 
instrument that will guide the privatization program in Kenya, although contextual 
issues are not adequately covered, since it is clear that privatization in COMESA goes 
beyond legal and political issues. As a legal instrument, it is a giant step for the 
privatization and globalisation process in the COMESA/Kenyan investment 
environments. However, since the Bill comes in between an already ongoing and 
36 The Bill was taken before parliament for enactment in December of2003 
37 See AAS/GOK, (2003) -Privatization Expert Group Workshop Proceedings 
38 As discussed in sections 5:1:3:1 and 5:1:3:3:1 on structures 
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elaborate privatization program, there are major operational issues that needed a critical 
review before its application to the privatization program is considered. 
In the early nineties, the privatization and liberalization movement reached Kenya and 
the COMESA region through the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund, (IMF) and international donor 
agencies. These agencies were anxious to create markets for their respective 
multinational and transnational corporations (MNC's and TNC's) in a bid to cover up 
the negative effects of SAPs (discussed in chapter two sections 2:2, 2:2:1 and 2:3:2 pp 
45, 50 and 54).39 Since World Bank economists were eager to 'spread' textbook 
market doctrines, all state owned enterprises (SOEs) were targeted premised on market 
failure assumptions and on the belief and justification that the SOE underperformance 
was squarely based on state political control. In contrast, Mwale, (2000), Mugerwa-
Kayizzi, (1996), Ramamurti and Vernon (1991) and Ake, (1981) make extensive 
commentary against these assumptions and programs. They advance arguments that 
suggest that privatization and liberalization in Africa was based on weak conceptual 
frameworks inherited from the West with application of some knowledge of the Latin 
American experience. These analysts further argue that privatization and liberalization 
were quickly adopted as the 'new' model that would correct the social political and 
economic imperfections of the LDC's occasioned by the failed SAPs that were 
implemented by the same institutions and in some cases the same economists. Indeed 
this thesis findings also show that the unique social economic-political conditions and 
non-existent institutional and economic frameworks in the COMESA region and Kenya 
in particular received very little attention. Key lessons from this oversight are evident in 
the privatization approaches in Africa as shown by this thesis field findings (FSD, 
2004). 
In reality, towards the process of regulation and enforcement, the government published 
The Privatization Bill (PB) of 2003; after a lengthy debate by parliament in November 
2003, the Bill was to be brought into law in February 2004. However, it was evident 
that there was need to discuss the PB with other stakeholders and regulatory experts to 
39 
see Daouas, (2001); Mugerwa-Kayizzi, (1996); Ramanadham (ed), (1993); Stiglitz (2002:2003); Cook and 
Kirkpatrick (1988); 
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avoid any ambiguities or contradictions raised before its enactment. Theoretically, the 
PB appears well drafted as part of an institutional legal document and as law, but the 
difficulty arises in its application and enforcement as indicated by the expert group 
discussions (AAS/GOK, 2003, p. 25). The major question is whether the Bill as an act of law 
would shape positively Kenya's approach to the privatization process substituting the 
various fragmented committees. This thesis findings show that these committees have 
been inefficient, lack human and technical capacity resulting in bad governance, 
bureaucratic tendencies and poor implementation COMESA, 2003; FSD, 2004). 
Key Concepts 
The Bill40 starts by defining some key concepts but does not define what a public good 
is. It also does not address the importance of government divesture from business and 
direct control of public enterprises held in trust by the government. Moreover, the same 
Members of Parliament (who have to enact the bill) perceive these enterprises as 
strategic and of national importance and therefore should be retained under GOK 
management. However, the Bill does not define the core and non-core projects and does 
not outline the criterion for the categorization. Moreover, the parliamentarians 
influence the contents of the Bill since they have the largest input. In this regard, it is 
important that the Bill give provisions for preferential schemes for Kenyans in the 
privatization process and has a clear mandate to check on cases of possible collusion in 
the approach to the process. This is in view of the often-lengthy discussions on the 
privatization process being a project between those in power and foreign investors 
whereas, the public ''who own" the enterprises seem to be left out ofthe discussion and 
process. The other important issue in the Bill is compromising national security with 
the sale of 'strategic enterprises' (i.e. airlines, agriculture, transport, and 
telecommunications) to foreigners, which is not clearly stated by the Bill. On these 
issues, the study found that 95% of the private sector respondents rated GOK's 
performance on the institutionalization and management of the process as extremely 
poor and lacking clarity.41 
40 GOK, (2003). 
41 Evidence is derived from question number 15 section two page 5 ofthe field questionnaires 
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In Whose Interest? 
The research reveals that PB in its current form does not protect the interests of the 
Kenyan public given that the process of ownership transformation is of critical concern 
in any public sector sale. This could be explained by the lack of structure and strategy 
of the privatization process; on the other hand, it may be simply that the process is not 
open to the public or to the interested parties within the private and public sectors. A 
further concern on the PB is that it is double edged and presupposes that the Minister of 
Finance will act in good faith and in the interest of the public; this may not be the case 
in reality where the political economy is highly partisan.42 In this regard, it is 
paramount that the Minister's role should be clearly spelt out and his/her mandate 
clearly stipulated. The industry analysts recommended that the Ministers' role should 
be amended to be facilitative and not posses arbitrary powers designed to overrule the 
Privatization Commission (PC); for example, the Minister should be mandated to 
advise the government in availing credit facilities and financial resources to local 
investors to effectively participate in the privatization process. In addition, the PC 
should be empowered to reserve a given percentage of shares to local investors as a 
strategic measure of encouraging management, employees and the public to support 
and participate in the privatization process, this in tum would create a sense of 
ownership that has over the years endeared the public to SOEs. 
It is worth noting that the process of privatization cannot be reversed without a proper 
law. As such, it would not be prudent to ignore the previous cases of abuse of the 
process in which public assets were stripped (KNA, 1997:2000:2001). Nonetheless, the 
Economic Crimes Act and the new constitution that were to be enacted in 2003 would 
adequately handle any wrongs committed under the guise of privatization as a back-up 
measure to the privatization law.43 Ninety per cent of respondents argued that it is 
important for the Commission to be independent and for this reason it should be 
empowered to refer cases to the Kenya Anti-corruption Authority, or directly to the 
courts. 
42 As was the case in the immediate former KANU administration and as is the case in the NARC administration in 
office from 2002-2007Government 
43 The Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Bill was enacted under a regional COMESA program and is contained 
in Appendix 2: Annex XII 
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The Bill is also expected to resolve some real problems in telecoms sector that revolve 
around public versus private monopolies. Indeed, as indicated in chapter two, the 
desirable situation for any public enterprise to operate would be to reform the market 
and restructure the enterprise substantially before privatization, as favoured by the 
TKL/GOK managements. The reforms in the sector were carried out on a piecemeal 
basis neglecting proper regulation and the process of institutional building. Yet the Bill 
seems to depend erroneously on the same institutions that have not performed in the 
past and does not address the importance and role of the Commission in institutional 
building, or creating a good environment in which the institution of the PC would 
operate efficiently. This has been compounded with the fact that both the KANU44 and 
NARC45 administrators considered Telkom Kenya a strategic enterprise and could not 
avail it for privatization in good time. This helped prolong TKL's monopoly or" 
exclusivity" on the provision of select telecom services indicated in table 5-5. This 
monopoly was provided by virtue of government order for exclusivity that exceeded the 
five years (i.e. June 2004), noting that CCK, as a regulator abhors monopolies. Notably, 
although TKL was charged for extending the monopolistic activity beyond June 2004 
there was no evidence of payments from the government records. 
The research findings further conclude that the Bill should allow for the Commission 
and the telecoms regulator (CCK) to collaborate, creating an effective regulatory 
mechanism that would deal with issues of monopolies and inefficiencies discussed in 
the TKL monopolies section. Multinational companies represent 80 per cent of the 
shares quoted on the local stock market but even with this nature of ownership, the Bill 
only gives the Commission broad reference on what to do to curb monopolies and 
"exclusivity periods" without giving specific guidelines. The Commission has to 
interpret properly its own powers, creating accountability problems. Although the 
National Economic Social Council was created to provide support to the interpretation 
of the law, the interview evidence suggested that it should also provide technical advice 
to the Commission. The other important concern to the public is the handling of the 
proceeds from the sale I disposed assets. The Bill should mandate the Commission to be 
44 Conservatives or Republicans 
45 Democrats 
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involved in stipulating in detail the total proceeds and the criteria for allocations instead 
of dependence on the consolidated fund, whose structure, accountability and 
performance is unclear. 
The Program 
The research also found that the Bill provides for a privatization program, but does not 
stipulate the requirements for the inclusion of various sectors in the privatization 
process. For example, in the event that privatization of the transport infrastructure (i.e. 
Kenya railways) has to be undertaken there is no provision as to who ensures inclusion 
of a strategic programme for development. Part II section 2 (e) of the Bill states that the 
focus should be based on market forces, the question posed by respondents was 
whether the PB 's response, whose priority was to balance the social and economic 
gains, would be wholly based on market forces. Besides, investment gains need to be 
made by clearly spelling out target sectors in order to open up the region. In this regard, 
the Bill aught to provide the Commission with capacity to respond to these economic 
challenges. For example, the government needs to invest in both the physical and 
institutional infrastructure for the roads, railway, airports and communication structures 
needed for privatization of the utility and agriculture sectors. Furthermore, in cases of 
review the Bill does not stipulate who would be responsible for the review of the law. 
For example, section 5 (IV)'s statement on the review is vague: should it be "may 
review" or "will review". How about in cases of overlap, who does the review? In the 
case of roads/rail and air/transport this issue becomes vital because the Commission 
does not have the right and capacity to review the assets and it is open to interference 
from the various sector-stakeholders especially from parent ministries. The act is silent 
on the potential interactions with other statutes that may raise possible conflicts, for 
example the State Corporations Act,46and does not provide modalities for the treatment 
of such conflicts. Indeed as a respondent in the field interviews put it, ''the biggest 
stumbling block to any private and public sector enterprise operations is the big 
monster called the State Corporations Act of 1987"( FSD, 2004). 
46 See appendix 2: annex VII 
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This thesis research findings show that Section (22) of the PB does not discuss the 
treatment of a monopoly. Instead it states that a monopoly should not be annexed but 
rather the monopoly power because regulators are not created for the purposes of un-
regulating. Recognizing that it is not possible to have unregulated monopoly given 
competition unless sectoral regulators are in place. Section (23), states that the 
Commission is mandated to give a notice of transfer but who formulates the 
privatization policy between the Minister, the Commission and the sectors? The Bill 
only talks of programmes but not the actual transaction process and there is need for 
clarity and update as shown in figure 5-1 and 5-3, since the Bill as an act is the legal 
framework and forms the basis of regulatory institutions. Wellenius, et al (1992) 
pointed out that there is a tendency for countries to rush telecoms privatization at the 
expense of building a regulatory capacity at a much slower pace for various reasons. 
This research found that in COMESA, this was occasioned partly by the potential for 
growth and raising capital in the sector and in particular, the World Bank's initiated 
privatization programs that were rushed as a replacement for failed SAPS as discussed 
in chapter two. 
The Technical Competencies 
On technical competency, this field research survey found that the Bill's proposals to 
have the Commission conduct privatization reviews raises issues of the technical 
competencies of the Commission, and its exact mandate in valuation of assets and 
businesses and in the due diligence process before and during divesture of an entity. All 
indications show that the Commission would be constituted as stated in the public acts. 
This leads to section 33 (g) which provides for the critical question of representation on 
the board-why involve interested parties when you cannot satisfy the rest of the 
stakeholders? As discussed in chapter four, privatization elicits stakeholder interest and 
their selective involvement as outlined in the Bill can only create conflicts and delays in 
the process (Nyong'o, 2000). 
Representation on the Commission should not be based on customary representation as 
is the case in Government Commissions. For example, ninety per cent of the 
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respondents indicated that there should be less government representation in the 
Commission, it was argued that out of twelve members, Government representation 
should not exceed three officials. More importantly, representatives from the public 
sector should be competent and add value to the Commission. The criterion for hiring 
the representatives is not clear and is based on selection which the privatization law 
(PL) should change. In addition, stakeholders47 representing potential investors are ill 
advised to be part of the Commission; as conflict of interest may arise. 
The respondents also suggested that it should be made mandatory for the permanent 
secretaries of finance and attorney general to attend the Commission's meetings 
without delegating the responsibility to their junior counterparts who often do not have 
the authority to make immediate decisions. In addition, the criteria for the composition 
of stakeholders aught to be restated. For example why Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers (KAM), Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE) and not Kenya Business 
& Professional Women's Clubs (KPBC), Council for Economic Empowerment For 
Women of Africa (CEEWA-K), or, Kenya Institute for Policy Research and Analysis 
(KIPRA), or The Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA)? In other words, by 
requiring participation of some minority groups without clear criteria and a 
predetermined programme, the act cannot be adequate and is difficult to implement. It 
also exposes the Commission to criticism, and sceptical overtures and acts as a 
hindrance to the creation of a tangible privatization approach. The interview evidence 
indicates that the role of the state needs to be clear in particular where, for example, 
operations could be better handled by the private sector in order to provide for the 
protection against influence from partisan politicians. 
47 i.e. Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE) and Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) 
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5:1:3:3:2 Capacity and Effectiveness? 
Field interviews ( i.e. FSD, 2004) and documented evidence (see KNA-2002, The 
Weekly Hansard, 2002; Finance week, 2002; KNA, 2002; KNA, 2003 and The 
Standard Newspapers, 2004) further indicated that there has been notable effort of 
exclusion and mischief in the way privatization has been carried out in Kenya as 
exemplified in asset valuation, fudging and outright theft of public property. The 
evidence is supported by the number of cases in court contesting the acquisitions of 
hotels and sugar companies acquired at lower than market value48 . While Article 28 
provides for valuation of the assets and gives the Commission open-ended options for 
valuation methods it is not adequate and may still be open to abuse and capture by 
different interests. 
The Commission should be mandated to acquire the capacity to continuously obtain 
and analyze information on the value of the enterprises to be privatized. The Bill, 
setting aside this function to independent valuations (selected by GOK) exposes the 
Commission to capture, by parent ministries and parastatals. Independent valuations 
can only be used to endorse what the Commission already knows. In return, the 
Commissioners should be liable to prosecution if they abuse this privilege or leak 
'insider trading' information. The same principles that guide investment institutions and 
stock exchanges globally should guide the asset valuation by the Commission. This 
means that the government would also have to depart from their usual way of forming 
Commissions (i.e. by selection) and instead constitute them professionally at inception 
in order to give them credibility and full investigative powers. In addition, for the 
Commission to be an effective legal instrument of the privatization process, it needs to 
have the capacity, the capability and the stature to operate independent of government, 
acting as "one stop shop" for the privatization process. 
Industry expert evidence from the discussion group49 suggested that the Commission 
should be a technical Commission rather than political and administrative, and should 
48 See (PIC/PAC) reports on State Corporations (1999:2001) 
49 Researcher was in the group as an expert participant 
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be empowered to create a research wing for conducting urgent due diligence and 
business inquiries. This information would help inform the process of privatization 
(without compromising "insider information"), advice investors, the public and the 
government so as to make informed decisions on approaches to privatizations. Besides, 
since the Commission was expected to be central to the implementation of the 
privatization law, it should have the capability to verify the value of assets on a 
continuous basis and price discovery. This is important because the major problem 
experienced in the listing and valuation of enterprises is a lack of the legal framework 
to enable independent valuers and financial analysts to access information and 
documents for valuations (FSD, 2004). 
Along with lack of capacity, the SOE enterprises are hampered by poor sequencing and 
coordination of liberalization activities as a whole, requiring a clear distinction between 
privatization law and policy. This is reinforced by the fact that the Privatization Act is 
the instrument that the state would use in sequencing an approach to privatizing and 
should be supported by sound economic and business policy. The Commission should 
state clearly the privatization period and the context of obligation to social service 
provision by the state. The field findings for this thesis indicated that there is need for 
clarification of the role of the state in the new law, especially procedures and actions to 
be undertaken by the PC during and in post privatization periods. For example, 
outlining clear strategic buffers for any complications that may arise in connection with 
renegotiation of difficult transactions and failed privatizations in the post privatization 
stages (i.e. Sugar industry). More importantly, the findings suggest that the law should 
be strengthened in order to mandate the Commission to put in place a privatization plan 
that would deal with unexpected outcomes, for example, sudden change of 
administration and policy and public opposition to specific sector privatization. 50 
50 The case of a recent move by the British Government to "renationalize" certain business services ofthe 
network rail is an example of post privatization complications. 
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5:1:3:3:3 The Bill flawed on Globalization and Trade Issues 
The research found that the Bill is silent and negates Kenya's international obligations 
on trade and globalization. For example, the bill does not address issues related to 
globalization which under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS') target the service sector of which 
telecommunications is a major part (providing, email, voice mail etc).The service 
industry relies heavily on efficient and effective telecommunications. The services to be 
privatized under GATS needs to be made clear in the Bill because of the socio-
economic sensitive service sectors such as health, security and education which when 
privatized would have adverse impact on the poor. According to country, WTO reports 
(WTO, 2002:2000) on GATS it is estimated that over 50% of African domestic services 
are untapped and the GATS's agreement requires that they be liberalized; however, 
Article 3 (1) of the proposed privatization law does not address how the process would 
be undertaken. 
The Bill transfers sole authority to the Commission on recommendations of methods of 
privatization, yet in global trade development terms the Bill does not address 
accessibility, affordability and coverage for the low income and less privileged. As 
discussed in section 5:1:2:2 on markets, Regional Telephone Operators (RTOs) 
experience problems delivering services to low income population areas (e.g. North 
Eastern, which is dependent on government subsidies); it was feared that the RTO 
operators might use the licence to divert traffic to other international destinations, 
especially being close to Somalia where there is no government. In this respect, the 
Commission needs to design and develop a differentiated tier system in setting of prices 
and consumer protection and state how it would relate to GATT and the consumer 
organisation of Kenya. This is paramount because the Commission can only implement 
what is contained in the enacted law, anything else however important would be outside 
the Commission's mandate. 
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5:2 Policy and Operational Strategy: Critical Issues 
Highlights of Specific Findings: Some Lessons from the Past 
The thesis findings discussed in this section specifically highlight some lessons from 
finalised privatizations of Kenya Airways, Mumias Sugar, hotels and Kenya 
Commercial Bank (KCB) transactions that inform Kenya's general approach. In this 
regard, the respondents were required to discuss some specific differences and 
similarities in the transactions, especially those of Kenya Airways, TKL and KCB by 
ranking rating and scaling the various levels of major objectives, plans, methods and 
transactions of the privatization process. This analysis identifies patterns of an approach 
to the process and further addresses the central research question and questions two, 
three and four. 
In order to contextualize GOK's approach and strategy to its privatization process, it is 
important to note that applying the World Bank's approach has set minimum 
benchmarks of the "best practices"51 for privatization that influence the shape of 
Kenya's process. In this respect, the study found that in the case ofTKL the proportion 
of shares were as follows; TKL floated shares were new shares at a ratio of 26% TKL: 
23% government and strategic partner respectively. The shares from a Strategic 
Investor (ST) were expected to bring in capital and new technology. Whereas, shares in 
KCB and KQ were existing shares owned by the GOK and the strategic partner (KLM) 
was expected to acquire management rights, while the GOK was to offload its 35% 
shareholding in KCB, making the ratios financially different to the new shares in TKL 
(FSD, 2004). 
The study further revealed that in its first stage, TKL was a newly created private 
company from KPTC whereas Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) and Kenya Airways 
(KQ) were already operating as public companies before privatization. More 
importantly, KCB's 65% shares did not involve a strategic partner whereas KQ's 26% 
strategic partnership with KLM is similar to the position of TKL. KCB and KQ 
51 See Samuel., (1999) on Ten Commandments and White, and Weissman, (2002) of the Multinational Monitor, 
on private sector development strategies (PSDS) as a World Bank privatization tool 
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benefited from government intervention (i.e. GOK took over KQ's debt amounting to 
Kshs. 1.07 billion (US$ 7.7 million) and the government injected Kshs. 2 billion (US$ 
26 million) into KCB in 1999 to help restructure its (political) bad debt. These findings 
raise two issues. First in privatizing TKL the GOK would have to refer to the lessons 
learned from the privatization of KQ, KCB and Mumias Sugar Company, namely, the 
difficulties experienced in justifying to the public, parliament and the World Bank the 
absorption of the bad debt, often occasioned by bad management by the state (FSD, 
2004; TKL, 2003; GOKIDDGIPE, 2002). Second, as argued in the literature review 
(i.e. World Bank, 2002; Yarrow, 1999; Kirkpatrick, 2001), if governments privatise for 
revenue purposes, then inheriting bad debt contradicts this objective. This experience 
necessitated a cautionary approach by the GOK in TKL's pension debt matter as it was 
still under negotiation by June 2004. Further more, investors are more interested in the 
financial state of the company before its privatization. The company's financial status is 
also important in determining policy, price and methods for its divestiture. 
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5:2:2 Financial and Strategic Decisions- Reform Consequences 
The study found that in an effort to improve its operational and financial status and 
public image, the GOK appointed to KCB a CEO from Barclays Bank. However, the 
situation had not improved by December 2003 and in May 2004 a new CEO was hired 
from Citibank into Kenya Commercial Bank. The new CEO improved the position and 
KCB was to undertake privatization, through a stock option on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange (NSE). (Financial Standard Weekly July 5, 2004). However, the bank 
continued to steadily loose customer confidence and faced political difficulties over the 
huge salary earned by a government acquired CEO. However, its performance seemed 
to defy the slow recovery of the Kenyan economy with KCB reporting an 89 per cent 
growth in profits during the first quarter of 2004. Profits rose to Sh284 million ($ 2.03 
million) during the first quarter of 2004, compared to Sh150 million ($1.071 million) 
during the same period in the 2003 financial year. A huge fraction of the earnings came 
from revenue growth and from an increase in operating income, which resulted from 
continuing strict management of expenses and a reduction in bad and doubtful debt 
expenses that forced government intervention in 1999. Owing to its huge losses and bad 
debt experience in the past, KCB become a much weakened player lacking enough 
capital to aggressively chase new business opportunities (through privatization) in the 
unsecured personal lending and home loans market. 
However, a year of increased profitability improved the situation enabling KCB to 
grow its ratio of total capital to weighted assets of 12.88 per cent, compared to the 
similar period in 2003 of 10.99 per cent. The 2004 operational figure is ahead of the 
Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) minimum of 12%. To address this situation, KCB 
strategically planned to raise Shs.2 billion from its shareholders through a rights issue 
and the management was expected to explain its grand plans to the shareholders 
specially why the firm's capital base needed to be increased. The GOK argued that the 
new capital was expected to reduce the government holding from 35 per cent to 15% 
allowing for investor interest. By January 2004 nine commercial banks and two 
building societies that include National Bank, K-Rep, Investment, and Mortgages, Co-
operative Bank, Barclays Bank, Commercial Bank of Africa, Standard Chartered, 
Equity, and Family Finance, had agreed to facilitate the proposed rights issue. 
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These financiers are also expected to take part as agents and at the same time provide 
credit to shareholders to take up this rights issue. The bank appointed Suntra Stocks and 
Dyer & Blair, Standard Stocks and Kestrel Capital as the co-sponsoring brokers with 
Ernst & Young as the auditors and financial advisors (figure 5-2). Ogilvy & Mather 
Advertising PR provided the advertising and publicity direction. Oraro & Company 
advocates were to act as the transaction lawyers. 52 The unique 'approach' of involving 
other players improved KCB's image and attracted unlikely investors thus shedding-off 
the bad image of a "politically-correct bank with political debt".53 
Besides, the participation of partner players in the industry raises prospects for the 
success of the offer as they would facilitate sale of shares nationwide and finance them 
to take-up additional rights. In addition, with the Kenyan stock market facing a shortage 
of new securities in 2003/04, KCB's rights issue was expected to be "a hot sale" 
especially in the light of its improved prospects for its earnings. Notably, it was listed 
as a strategic enterprise, viewed as a 'national jewel' since it is the first and largest 
indigenous commercial bank with the largest rural network in Africa. 
Whereas KCB has rapidly moved from restructuring to privatization, the research found 
that GOK and Telkom Kenya management experienced difficulties making this 
transition. They seem to favour restructuring and commercialisation over direct sale of 
TKL, noting that commercialisation can be applied as an aspect of restructuring specific 
products/areas of an enterprise in order to increase efficiency (Kikeri, et al. 1992). The 
difference between restructuring before privatizing and after privatization (e.g. the case 
of Kenya Airways), is that the restructuring is a 'survival strategy' in the case of TKL 
whereas, it a long-term growth strategy in the case of Kenya Airways (KQ). 
However, the government and TKL management prefer this option as a short-term 
measure to give them time for reorganising their strategy. Interestingly, the divestiture 
team prefers commercialization as an intermediate method for TKL restructuring, 
which would mean that TKL remains a government enterprise relating directly to the 
options/scenarios discussed in chapter four. In this regard, it is apparent that GOK and 
52 see figure 5-2 activities l and 2 
53 This is a terminology used for firms that are embedded in businesses and politics with the government of the 
day, giving unsecured loans to politicians, their business partners and relatives in order to gain favour from 
contracts and businesses from the government in power. 
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TKL in favouring restructuring are in need of a delaying tactic in order to "settle" the 
liabilities stipulated in the valuation scenarios addressed in the markets section 
(5: 1 :2:2). The study findings show that profits made under restructuring are not enough 
to payoff the liabilities within the TKL's privatization schedule. Secondly, GOK 
become increasingly reluctant to absorb TKL's debt54 since the perception has been that 
TKL is a very profitable going concern (see Okwatch, 2004). Meanwhile, the GOK 
risks the fall in sale price of TKL under a strategic investor option and disinterested 
share investors for TKL shares on the Nairobi stock market (TKL, 2003a; GOK!fKL, 
2003). 
The difficulty with the two options55 is in their sustainability as argued by Kikeri, 
( 1999), and Haltiwanger and Singh, (1999) in terms of financing, resource availability, 
management and new technology. Public management has problems of sustainability 
alongside poor corporate governance. Management of Telkom Kenya and the Ministry 
of Transport in particular were not keen on the strategic investor option due to the 
demands of control by the CEO and the downsizing of half ofTKL's workforce that the 
strategic investor was expected to enforce. The restructuring option was preferred by 
the top management since it gives them time to stay in office longer aware that a 
strategic investor would prefer to engage new management (FSD, 2004). 
The government was not comfortable with a repeat performance ofVodafone's demand 
that they retain their chief executive in Safaricom, occasioned by a condition of the 
equity loan from Citibank, which demanded that the Vodafone's CEO be retained for 
longer than the original three years. Besides, the restructuring option gives TKL and 
GOK management time to find a strategic solution to the options for downsizing the 
workforce as demanded by the World Bank. Realistically, 90% of the private sector 
respondents favour short-term restructuring to make the company more attractive to 
investors and then privatize. The private sector respondents saw this as a good time for 
TKL to change its image in order to attract "perception" investors by infusing new 
management, additional finance, new technology and best business practices. 
54 See recommended scenario/options in chapter five 
55 Commercialization and restructuring 
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The thesis field study also showed that there were three major disadvantages in the 
privatization of Telkom Kenya namely: (1) settlement of the pension liability and 
GOK's involvement and unwillingness to take on the debt. (2) The "government 
control image" which discourages investors signalled by the government's refusal to 
allow market forces to determine the top management and its interference in the 
licensing and bidding processes. (3) Old technology and infrastructure, that requires 
large investments to turn around TKL under privatization making it unattractive to 
investors. In the case of TKL's sister company, Safaricom and POSTA, the findings 
reveal that complete government divestiture needs to take place for restructuring as the 
best option to take place before full privatization (TKL, 2003; CCK, 2003). This would 
provide these enterprises with an opportunity to improve efficiency, expand their 
services and products and increase revenue levels at Kshs.2.7 billion (in 2003/04) from 
Kshs.l.8 billion in 2000/2002 (FSD, 2004) 
Operational Issues 
In response to the question of how the privatization of TKL should be done, these 
research findings indicated that 90% of the managerial respondents interviewed56 raised 
concerns at the lack of a clear linkage between the policy statements the roadmap and 
the bill in outlining clear strategies for liberalising, restructuring and privatising the 
communications sector. There was a sense in which the government and the public 
expected that market forces would help sort the TKL corporation out and force it to 
privatize without the economic, political and social concerns that a government 
propelled privatization brings. The widening gap between the process and the actual 
operations raises concerns; for example, although the bill was taken to parliament for 
enactment in 2003, the parliamentary process in itself is a public sector process that 
takes a lot of time and resources. Meanwhile, there is no clear law and no "one stop 
shop" for the process of transactions in progress as advertised by the Investment 
Promotion centre's Website. 
While waiting for the enactment of the law, CCK as the regulator along with TKL and 
the Ministry of Transport went ahead and sought an SNO through a tender process; 
56 See appendix I annex V and Field Survey Data (i.e. FSD, 2004) 
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however, this model or option has not proved to be successful in Africa. According to 
industry, analysts interviewed investing in Africa under an SNO in the past revealed 
bad experience citing the example of Telkom South Africa's privatization and its 
subsequent quest for an SNO that yielded no results. This raised calls for the option of 
engaging two or three international licences to replace an SNO. At the same time, CCK 
revealed that it received a good response to the tendering process for an SN0,57 with a 
specific interest for Econet Wireless. Forefront to the SNO debate is the GOK 's focus 
on the STI option; the TKL' s roadmap proposal to cabinet58 was to sell 26% to an STI 
and attract an SNO. This strategy was complicated by the trends in 2002-2004 all over 
the world, where big investors (i.e. AT&T, Bell South, and Vodafone) sold-off their 
assets. For example, BellSouth's assets that it needed to sell-off in 2004, due to the 
decline in telecoms investments world wide, were its strong customer base, a reliable 
revenue stream, a relatively stable stock price, good leadership and clear vision ( 
Scanlon, 2001 ). 
Telecom companies all over the world are weighing options that improve shareholder 
value, particularly getting into areas like gaining stream in the long-distance market. 
As the BellSouth CEO Mr. Kaut put it "Drip, drip, drip- the long-distance revenues are 
getting eaten away by competitors, If you can't beat them, join them." (Scanlon, 2001 ). 
In other words, mergers are the norm not acquiring 'new' enterprises, rendering STI 
opportunity unattractive. In addition, the Safaricom commercial paper was 
oversubscribed (bonds not shares) making the cost of money (capital) quite high for 
TKL and scaring away potential STis who did not favour raising expensive funds 
within a short period (one to six months). Commenting on the licensing of an SNO, 
65% (n==23) of the respondents from the private sector felt that it would be delayed by 
government to give advantage to TKL. Although CCK was positive, the industry's 
trends sets odds against the seriousness of a viable SNO entering the Kenyan market in 
the privatization period, as argued by Sclar (2000) and as experienced by the South 
Africa government noting that there was still no SNO in South Africa by the end of 
2003. 
57 Financial East African Standard, Newspapers, July 23, 2004) 
58 See the Privatization Roadmap or cabinet memorandum discussion 
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"The absence of legislation and inadequate supervision leads to abuses and fraudulent 
behaviour by management; if such situations persist, the public may assume a negative 
attitude towards privatization, and then it would be very difficult, in an atmosphere of 
general lack of trust, to carry out a successful privatization programme." Ninety six 
percent59 of the respondents agreed strongly with this statement and pointed to the lack 
of approach and legal framework. TKL is a case in point in the sense that TKL as a 
"strategic" enterprise had its transaction managed by a 'special' committee from the 
Ministry of Finance as outlined in figure 5-l whereas the other parastatals were under 
the Parastatal Reform Committee (PRC). The PRC's role was to supervise the non-
strategic enterprises and act as an oversight. 
Since the operating policy is to privatize all public enterprises irrespective of their 
original status, 80% of the respondents strongly agreed that the absence of legislation 
and inadequate supervision has led to abuse of 'insider trading information.' An 
example is the failed negotiations of TKL and MKC in October 2002 and the halted 
privatization of Kenya Reinsurance Company which failed to take off because of 
special interests from government employees who fronted their proxies the rendering 
the process illegitimate ( KNA, 2003 p.25). This leads to negative attitudes towards 
privatization making it very difficult for the government to carry out a successful 
privatization. This situation has been exacerbated by nepotism that is prevalent in the 
parastatals earmarked for privatization. In addition, the Investment Secretariat had two 
units, The Technical Unit (TU) and the DGIPE,60 while the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications has two offices, Office of the President and the Ministry of Trade's 
Investment Promotion Centre (IPC), all adding to the confusion. The delay in 
constituting a clear approach was indicated by the mismanagement in the enterprises; 
this makes the government not value legislation but instead to view it as an 
impediment. 
On new approaches and strategies: "Strategies and approaches adopted for the 
privatization programs have been sporadic, non-committal and slow. Focusing mainly 
on the listing of potential divesture enterprises, rather than development of a solid 
59 
n=35 
60 Department of Government Investments and Public Enterprises (DGIPE) and The Executive Secretariat Technical 
Unit(ESTU) 
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strategy for restructuring enterprises for the full benefit of the economy." Ninety five 
per cent of respondents strongly agreed with the lack of a solid privatization and 
divestiture strategy, citing the absence of an institutionalised regulatory framework to 
guide the process of divesting from state owned enterprises. The case ofTelkom Kenya 
was cited as a classic example, as it has taken over five years since the unbundling, 
restructuring, and the transaction process to reach its completion stages (figure 5-2). 
Meanwhile, there was no particular and single institution accountable to the process 
that was fragmented and not well coordinated and the respondents translated this to 
mean lack of clear approach and strategy. These respondents (75%) mainly from the 
private sector further stated that there were some serious accountability and governance 
problems61 in PEs and no proper guidelines from a government that was still seen to 
apply the state corporation act (SCA), perceived as an instrument of "control and 
regulation of state corporations." As one respondent stated" as long as the government 
continues to force the CEOs to apply the SCA in the enterprises for privatization, there 
will be no progress, this act is a monster that is eating up these enterprises and slowing 
down their capacity to grow."62 Besides, those charged with implementing and 
designing Kenya's approach and operations lacked capacity to implement the 
privatization process effectively (annex IV). 
However, despite the operational difficulties and poor regulatory structures, 
liberalisation efforts towards restructuring and privatization have definitely increased 
competition and opened up the telecommunications sector in Kenya and in the 
COMESA region (COMESA, 2003: CCK, 2001 :2003). Notably mobile telephony 
CEOs confirmed this by emphasizing their market share in 2003 as follows; Kencell 
had approximately 45% of the mobile market share, while Safaricom had an estimated 
65% market share of with an estimated 2 million subscribers, while the combined 
mobile subscribers stood at 2.6 million (Telkom reports, 2004). The industry analysts 
predict that the market has a potential to grow to four million subscribers. After the 
failed first attempt of the TKL sale in December 2002, TKL management, CCK and 
GOK have embarked on a "new" approach for TKL's privatization, however, the 
challenges ahead of this new approach are huge. As Table 5-6 indicates, Telkom 
61 A concern that was subsequently voiced by the World Bank see Standard Report October 15 2004 
62 A CEO respondent at the Expert Group discussions from the Sugar Industry required to operate under the 
SCA 
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Kenya's fixed telephony growth has been slow compared to the mobile telephony. The 
figures indicate that since 1999 to December 2003 TKL realized an overall growth of 
II percent of its core business and only 6.2 percent growth in lines (of the total 540,000 
lines) representing less than 33, 000 lines in five years and an annual growth of only 
2.2%. In comparison, the Safaricom's mobile growth has been way up the scale with a 
total of 1.3 million lines in 2003 up from 20, 000 in 1999 a five year period, equalling a 
growth of 256,000 lines, per year compared to TKL's 6,720 per year. This record 
speaks for itself and outlines how much work was to be done in TKL to improve 
growth in their core business (figure 5-12). By the end of 2004, Safaricom's subscriber 
base hit 1.8 million and was expected to reach 2 million by early 2005 (FSD, 2004). 
Table: (5-6) Cellular and Fixed line Subscribers during the reforms and 
Privatization period 
Safaricom KencelVCeltel Telkom Kenya 
Cell Cell Fixed Fixed Cell Total Annual Growth of 
Under Mobile Subscribers 
KPTC 
·~~~ I '&~~ ill h' y . :; ~~ y [I + '+ !Y iLl l!ll' 
1998 
1999- July 00 26,000 Nil 20,000 26,000 
2000 64,000 Nil 220,000 64,000 
2001 170,000 190,000 301,000 360,000 
2002 600,000 400,000 20,000 332,000 900,000 
2003/2004 1.3 million 600,000 330,000 1.9 million 
2004 1.8 million 940,000 350,000 2.74 million 
2004/2005"" 2.5 million 1.3 million 400,000 3.8 million +1.8 TMO in 2005 
Totallin2 to 4.6 million64 
Source: Author's compilation from field data (2004) 
63 Forecast numbers 
64 Expected total subscribers in the FY 2005 
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5:4 Major Field Findings and Data Analysis 
5:4:1 Challenges of the Restructuring Process: Performance versus 
Retrenchment: A Human Resource Debate 
This section continues the discussions of the outlined responses of disposal methods, 
objectives, employee and enterprise performance vis-a-vis reforms, restructuring, 
liberalization and privatization. The analyses outlines major challenges in the 
restructuring process revealed by findings of the questionnaire and interview data. 
Chapter two raised the dynamic debate on matters relating to employment, staff and 
management rationalization in any business transaction and the introduction of new 
employees and how this process is often very delicate and presents enormous 
challenges during the restructuring phase. It is not surprising that downsizing was rated 
as the most unpopular approach to privatization with 95% 65 respondents in the public 
sector rating it as very unpopular. 
The application of the management employee buyouts and employee buyouts 
(MBO/EBO) 66 method of sale, where ownership transfers to management and 
employees was favoured by the public and was ranked the most popular by 89% 67 of 
the respondents. Yet the GOK did not mention this method as a way to proceed in 
transaction sales. The GOK applied this method in a one-off attempt in the disposal of 
Kenya Re-insurance and the cooperative sector after pressure from employees with 
little success. This clearly indicates that the government and the public are not in accord 
as regards methods, objectives and techniques of the privatization process (FSD, 2004). 
One explanation from the research was that the government was unwilling to guarantee 
loans to the employees and management to invest. Further evidence from the study 
shows that this method works best in a financial environment with low interest rates 
and quick and available financial advice, a status Kenya has been struggling to attain. 
This method also has been popularly applied in Egypt and Uganda68 , successfully in 
manufacturing, construction, and agriculture respectively. 
65 n= 34 
66 see glossary for definitions 
67 n=32 
68 See World Bank- Privatization Link (1999) 
268 
Chapter Five: Study Findings and Data Analysis: General Research Findings on the Privatization Process, Institutional and Legal Framework 
The entire downsizing program for the three unbundled entities (i.e. TKL, CCK and 
POSTA) experienced a high labour turnover within the last five years (1999-2003). In 
particular, there were changes in top management with no strategic focus for growth, 
profitability and performance. The new management insisted that they would focus on 
objectives for infusing good governance, new investments, new energy, new ideas and 
creating a forward-looking strategy. This strategy would stir TKL's profitability and 
expansion and Safaricom's network expansion and diversity (tables 5-11-15), along 
with restructuring of the Postal Corporation of Kenya (PCK) and diversification as 
indicated in tables 5-12 and 5-13 on financial and business performance and field 
interview data (FSD, 2004). 
However, interview data analysis of question 11 of section 2 (see appendix 2 annex I) 
reveals that "new management" hired during the restructuring phase were government 
employees or former KPT &C employees recycled back. TKL's six managers out of 
twelve were previous employees of KPT &C or were 'trading' with Telkom Kenya 
whilst in the private sector. The sitting TKL CEO during the research period was an 
excellent example of this finding. He was a previous KPTC senior engineer in 
management who resigned and become a supplier to TKL, was then a board member 
and was reappointed by the NARC administration on a partisan basis as TKL's CEO 
(FSD, 2004). The impression within and without these corporations indicates that the 
recycling of these "new managers" cannot improve the corporation's restructuring 
program envisaged in the timetable of June 2004. 
Besides, top managers who were forced to resign and those middle managers that were 
replaced by "outsiders" are disillusioned and have moved to the courts for redress.69 
Interestingly, the major accusations for their removal from office are vague; for 
example, "conflict of interest"; "owning and operating similar business to TKL"; and 
"reached retirement age." These were and still are the same concerns investors have 
with those employees who replaced them including the CEOs. This situation does not 
provide for a good environment for restructuring and privatization, and shows the 
69 three of these former managers were interviewed 
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70 ibid 
complexity of human resource issues, it particularly does not help an IPO strategic 
option for disposal. 
The findings also show the importance of restructuring human resources 70 as a key 
ingredient in turning around parastals for privatization. Despite this fact, there was no 
evidence to show efforts by GOK to seriously address this matter. The privatization law 
is supposed to spell out the guidelines: but the three communications parastals (i.e. 
TKL, POSTA and CCK) have no (attractive) incentives program for voluntary 
retirement and all the three companies owe the workers a growing pension debt 
estimated at Kshs.l2 billion ( US$155miliion). These challenges are enormous and 
their likely effect on the success of the sale of TKL through an IPO was evident in the 
delay of IPO plans. Investors are often very sensitive to management changes without 
specific targets, skill capacity and record of accomplishment for success. In this regard, 
89% (n=32) of the sample respondents indicated that they had no confidence in the new 
management of Telkom Kenya and in POST A and had serious doubts about their 
capacity to tum around the corporations in record time for the end ofTKL's exclusivity 
period. 
In addition, the new middle managers (sourced from the private sector selectively) 
might have had the competence but lacked the experience needed to think creatively on 
strategic plans at a desirable speed to counter competition in the telecoms sector.71 
Again, the approach of sourcing top management in the restructuring and privatization 
phases by GOK was ill advised and unpopular with investors and contributed in 
discrediting the managers' judgements and technical competencies. It also changed the 
dynamics of operations at TKL and POST A as the chain of command and line of 
accountability had to include the government rather than the customers and prospective 
shareholders as in the case of a privatized enterprise. 
The interview evidence further showed that 1 00% of the respondents agreed that the 
CEOs to these corporations should be hired competitively from the telecoms private 
71 In most cases these top and middle managers take over a year to learn the dynamics of the industry, gather momentum and create 
the networks necessary to compete in a first changing environment 
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sector and not be selected by the President72 and the parent ministries. Inevitably, the 
public sector need to learn that any management put in place in a parastatal preparing 
for divesture and sale through "public" divestiture instruments, must have the 
confidence of investors in order to help raise the value of the enterprise. The 
government recognises this fact but ignores it. This confirms the arguments advanced 
by the literature on politics and public management discussed in chapter two.73 
5:4:2 Downsizing (Retrenchment), New Employees and Performance issues 
Restructuring 
This research further indicates that the most challenging aspects of any approach to 
privatization is getting the balance right between attaining increased efficiency and 
production while maintaining a lean workforce. 74 In the literature review in chapter two 
these challenges are discussed at length in sections on impact of the social-political 
consequences of liberalization, markets reforms (SAPs), and enterprise restructuring 
(i.e. 2:2, 2:3:2 2:5 and 2:6), while in chapter four section 4:7 discusses specifically the 
financial challenges of TKL related to labour and retrenchment issues. The analysis in 
the preceding section on restructuring and management are intertwined with 
downsizing and labour, since SOEs often use downsizing to create efficiency. 
Furthermore, in addressing the central research question and supplementary questions 3 
and 4, the specific research findings herein show interesting results, that include for 
example, restructuring by downsizing which found to be most unpopular method of 
privatization PEs by 89% (n=32) respondents, while the GOK and the TKL 
management favour restructuring as a major method of privatizing. 
With regard to downsizing and acquisition of new employees, the field data analysis 
further underscored their effects on production, competitiveness and profitability. 
Ninety five percent (n=34) of the respondents were concerned about their effects 
although the government down played their impact. Indeed, the GOK does not 
72 World Bank Letters to GOK, (2000;2001;2003) 
73 
see Pint, and Dunleavy, (1990); Boix, (1997); Feigenbaum, and Heing, (1989) 
74 
see discussion in chapter two sections on political dimensions and consequences of reforms Buttle (1993), Edmond 
(1998, p7), Nyong'o, (2000) 
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specifically mention downsizing as one of the objectives of its divestiture program, 
instead the GOK lists as its third objective "reducing the role and rationalizing the 
operations of public enterprise sector." More specifically a major impediment to the 
downsizing problem was the doubtful treatment of the pension debt for TKL 
employees. In addition, the government's constant change of the top management in 
entities for privatization, intensified the industry doubts of GOK's commitment to 
divestiture from TKL, with an average span of a CEO being two and half years in an 
organization. The problem becomes the investor perception of the competency of the 
GOK to appoint CEOs and that of the CEOs themselves, hired on partisan grounds. 
The interview data of this research confirmed that most of these CEOs do not have 
market knowledge of their respective enterprises, or distinctive or special skills that 
would add value to these organisations.75 As one manager in Posts & Telecoms put it 
"my Boss knows nothing about the strategy for our company yet he is the Boss" and a 
General Manager said, "I have worked for posts and telecommunications for 18 years 
and reached the level of General Manager. My boss was a teacher promoted by the 
NARC government to deputy secretary of Teacher Service Commission and now CEO 
of POST A. Yet he knows nothing about Posts business." This way of hiring CEOs by 
GOK negates the goals and objectives for restructuring through introduction of new 
private sector oriented management in PEs as outlined in the GOK's divesture 
objectives as required by the World Bank and common good business practice (FSD, 
2004). 
Alongside, the chief executives are middle managers, hired through a competitive 
process whose details were not available for 'public view.' Discussions with internal 
managers showed that the process was not entirely transparent and the performance 
record of the new managers showed that they relied heavily on the "old managers" with 
the expertise and had been relegated to junior positions, in eligible to receive new 
salaries given to the "new middle managers." This resulted in low morale amongst the 
old managers and low performance and output. Besides, due to frequent changes of 
CEOs and middle managers, there was no continuity in leadership and strategy; the new 
75 Except the CCK director general who is a lawyer, a qualification necessary in a regulatory and contracts business 
environment 
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managers took sometime to figure out the market structure and operations, this 
selection was compounded by the government's inability and technical capacity to 
provide direction to the CEOs (FSD, 2004). 
It is a widely held opinion in the World Bank literature and business practice that 
effectively downsizing and acquiring new employees should culminate in increased 
performance (Shirley, 2002; Schusselbauer 1999), and therefore increased efficiency 
and production for Telkom Kenya (TKL). In this respect, the 2003 turnover for TKL 
was reported to be between Kshs.l8-24 billion (figure 5-10 and table 5-14). However, 
TKL had major liabilities, the pension liability, VAT /taxes liability and the contingent 
unpaid contract claims liability; the fixed assets (buildings), which by 2003 were still 
owned by the pension fund, guaranteed these liabilities. These liabilities slowed down 
the downsizing program substantially and reduced the ability for effecting substantive 
changes in the employee levels. Although TKL's management is confident it can 
rationalise its expansion and employee programs their lack of a clear strategy to address 
the liability issues was evidence to the contrary. In addition, although TKL underwent a 
due diligence process during the search for a strategic partner (STP) before the end of 
2002, by the end of 2003 it's financial, and business position had not substantially 
improved to attract big investors as anticipated by GOK and TKLs top management. It 
was notable however, that 60% of the private and public sector respondents strongly 
agreed that TKL had potential to be a profitable company and capture its lost market, 
occasioned by TKL's poor financial performance and lack of a clear strategy to return 
to profitability. In this regard, 35% of the respondents who had full knowledge of the 
communications labour market indicated that there had been a number of middle to 
senior managers averaging 10% -15% who left with telecoms acquired specific skills 
and had been re-employed by TKL and the telecommunications industry. However, due 
to the span of control in TKL, these managers had not been utilized in the development 
ofTKL's needed business strategy (FSD, 2004). 
The majority of the unskilled workers who are members of the Workers Union 
constitute the original workforce of 21,000 under KPT&C. The difficulty for TKL, 
which inherited the original Posts and Telecommunications Trade Workers Union 
(PTWU), has been downsizing a workforce of 18,000 without much success. In the 
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research period, the employment levels stood at I9,676 employees. Safaricom had 450, 
POST A with I ,000 and CCK had I 00, with an estimated combined 300 new 
employees. TKL under its 2003 strategy indicated a planned reduction of over I 0,000 
workers during the restructuring period as demanded by the World Bank and a 
minimum of between 3000-5000 before the end of June 2004. This looked unlikely 
with a NARC administration that rescinds on its promises to the electorate and the 
international finance community. Clearly, downsizing is unlikely to be a priority to the 
NARC administration although it is a sound business strategy for TKL and a step that 
ought to be taken in order to increase the price of TKL' s shares. Besides, restructuring 
is one of the conditions ofthe World Bank before it can the release funds earmarked in 
the 2001 agreement for GOK's privatization program. 
The findings indicated that the top officials of GOK agreed privately that the reduction 
of the unskilled workforce in TKL in particular would have to be done albeit in an 
atmosphere of little political will (TKL, 2003). Meanwhile TKL had to deal with the 
reality of an lower increase in proportion of TKL's business between 2001 and 2003 
and an increasing labour wage bill that was eating up the revenue, with an estimated 
90% of the proceeds going to recurrent expenditure ( see tables 5-11 and 5-I7 -18). 
Besides, by the time of this survey new management had not made any positive impact 
on turning around TKL for privatization. In this regard, 89% of the respondents 
revealed that if they were responsible for privatizing Telkom Kenya,76 they would first 
"overhaul" the top management by replacing the CEO as a matter of urgency. The 
sector's top and middle management recycling rate averaged about 30-45% of the total 
managers and has a substantial negative impact on restructuring, and the speed and 
pace of TKL' s privatization. 
The findings indicated that in addition, the 15-50% skilled and experienced middle/top 
managers retained by TKL and POST A were underemployed and underpaid, while 
newly employed and inexperienced middle/top managers were overpaid. Meanwhile 
TLK and POST A spend 20-40% of their revenue taking on new top/middle managers, 
without a clear program targeting training gaps in the levels of staff created in the period of 
76 n=32 see Annex I: section 2: question 19 pages 12 -Questionnaire 
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transition from a monopolistic to competitive environment.77 This indicates that there was 
little adjustment made to match the needs of the restructured enterprises (tables 5-15-
18). In its last mile of privatization, TKL was still stuck with employees under the 
pension scheme who did not match its growth requirements in rebuilding their business 
portfolio (see figure 5-5). 
Closely related to downsizing and new employees, is the popularity and application of 
the disposal methods. The research findings show that the major reason for the 
MEBO/EBO 90% popularity as ownership transfer methods amongst respondents was 
the increasing insecure employment environment for all employees in LDCs. This 
result also confirms the arguments about the negative impact of downsizing as a step in 
restructuring and privatization. Restructuring by infusion of good business practice was 
ranked as important by 60% of the respondents. This was because in restructured 
enterprises very often public money saved through improved productive efficiency 
leads to cost reduction in utility and telecom services, increased supply and 
accessibility (figures 5-5, 5-8 and 5-9 table 5-10) and the savings may be invested in 
poverty-targeted projects for the downsized workers. 
The questionnaire data further generated results focusing on efficiency improvement 
and accessibility; for example, 80% of the respondents indicated an over 60% 
significant improvement in access and supply.78 However, the study also found that the 
cost of telephony services and especially mobile phone handsets had not shown 
significant decrease, confirming, perhaps, Wallsten's (2002) and Shirley et al's(2000) 
concerns about the rate of reforms in the post privatization period in LDCs. The study 
also found that 40% of the respondents argued against access as a single measure of the 
positive impact of privatization, in the sense that those who received subsidized 
services can only benefit from reduction in prices below the levels of the subsidy. The 
government pointed out the importance of access and affordability of service and 
accessories as a major indicator of restructuring TKL and singled out to their credit 
access and affordability as important indicators of the reform process in telecoms. More 
specifically the GOK used this objective to justify the entrance of an SNO and two 
MOs into the market. 
77 Although TKL has made efforts to rationalize its staff as shown in tables 5: 16 and 5: 17 in order to be competitive 
78 See questions 7 and 14 appendix 2 that asked them to rate levels of importance, improvements in services, speed and products. 
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The research reveals that for the overall privatization program, raising revenue in the 
rankings was extremely important for 60% of the respondents. This was a significant 
finding because ofthe concerns advanced by anti-privatization analysts79 on the choices 
and prioritization of objectives by African governments. These analysts have argued 
that the focus on revenue has been for personal gain rather than for addressing the 
budgetary deficits. More importantly, revenue has ranked as being important to 
government but does not contribute to the growth of the telecommunications industry 
because once the government received revenue there was no evidence of checks and 
balances for ensuring that proceeds are infused back into the industry.8° Closely related 
to revenue is the objective of distribution of the public property and wealth creation, 
which was ranked as very important by 80% of the respondents. The development and 
political economy theorists have long supported this objective as a way of enabling 
African economies to breakout of the role of primary producer syndrome (Ake, 1981; 
Dusan and Harold (eds.), 1973; Schusselbauer, 1999). 
Related to the wealth creation objective is the reduction of government involvement, 
which was ranked as significantly important to Kenya's approach to the privatization 
program and process by 51% (n= 18)of the respondents. However, this position 
changes when the respondents are asked to rank the sectors in what is perceived as 
"strategic enterprises" listed in appendix 1 annex Va. In the case of TKL listed as a 
strategic enterprise, just over 55%(n=20) of the respondents ranked financial infusion, 
new technology, new management, reduction of costs, increase in competition and 
access to telecommunication services as extremely important objectives. 
The study also found that in the reforms and liberalization of the banking and insurance 
industries, 51% of the sample respondents ranked new technology, new management 
and increase in competition and reduction in interest rates (costs) as extremely 
important objectives. Wallsten (2002) discusses the importance of these objectives in 
his recent analysis of the post-privatization performances in Uganda and Senegal. In the 
insurance sector, financial infusion and liberalization were indicated as important 
objectives by 60% of respondents as discussed in detail in section 2:1 :2 in chapter two. 
79 Donso, (1999), Nankani (1990) 
80 The PIC lOth report of2002 details the procurement actions in the parastatals that undermine efficiency and output 
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In the sugar industry, the respondents ranked good governance and liberalization as 
important. This is influenced by the method of utilising management contracts to 
restructure the sugar sector and in particular to focus on restructuring agriculture. In the 
transport industry that includes Kenya Airways, Kenya Railways and the Ports 
Authority, financial infusion, restructuring, liberalization and new technology were 
ranked as extremely important objectives for privatizing the transport sector by 70% 
(table 5-9) of the respondents. Introduction of new technology, reduction of costs and 
infusion of new management were ranked as very important by 80% of the respondents. 
On the relationships between the various objectives of government divestiture and 
ultimately privatising, tables, 5-8 and 5-9 show the responses in relation to the three 
extremely important objectives for strategic enterprises. Above 60% of respondents 
were categorical on the extreme importance and linkage of restructuring and the 
introduction and consistent updating of new technology to the fast growing and wealth 
creating industries of telecommunications, airways and banking. At the same time, 
above 50% of the respondents rated the withdrawal of government interest in the public 
enterprises into the hands of the private sector as extremely important; interestingly, 
these included the majority of the strategic enterprises as shown in appendix 1 annex 
Va. 
However, when they were asked whether the privatization process has created new 
businesses, 80% of the public respondents indicated privatization had created between 
50-90%81 new businesses specifically in the telecommunications and banking sectors. 
Chapter 6 concludes on the implications of this contradiction between new businesses 
and employment. This differed sharply from private sector respondents(n=15)82 who 
rated private sector strengthening, wealth creation and reduction of costs as priority 
objectives of any privatization program and linked these priorities to successful 9reation 
of new businesses and employment. Although attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) is, often a controversial objective in the privatization process the world over, it is 
viewed as good objective and rated as important but with indications that it should not 
be the focus objective at the expense of encouraging local investments. FDI is often 
81 Percent levels not numbers the (CEO) respondents estimated these to be between 50-90% of existing businesses. 
82 See appendix 1 annex V 
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viewed as a foreign intrusion and unfair competition in the privatization process, with 
little confidence that the foreign investors would "stick it out "when business does not 
go well, thus causing serious, political, social and economic risks both in the short and 
long run. 
Table 5-7: Levels oflmportance of Major objectives by Sector/Enterprise 
n= 36 Extremely Important KQ, TKL Very Important Not 
KCB, Agric Important 
Objectives 
%83 % % 
Restructuring and New Technology 78 68 26 
Liberalization and reforms 66 56 20 
Government- Divesture Liberalisation 70 50 11 
New management/Restructuring 50 22 22 
Financial Infusion/FDI 80 20 0 
Sources: Author's Compilation from field Data, (2003) 
After the growth progress shown by indicators for the various objectives (figure 5-9), 
the findings indicated that the levels of importance of the major objectives of 
enterprises for privatization are best examined on a case-by-case transaction as 
indicated in table 5-7. In this regard, although revenue is believed to be a priority in 
banking (KCB) and telecoms privatizations, restructuring and introduction of new 
technology were rated as extremely important by 68% and 78% of the respondents 
respectively. 66% of the respondents rated continued liberalization and reforms in TKL 
and KQ as extremely important, whereas restructuring and return to profitability were 
rated as extremely important in government divesture from Kenya Airways by 70% of 
the respondents. Although on paper, the government received a substantive US$ 55.0 
million in foreign exchange from KLM/Kenya Airways joint venture in 1996, 
compared to the US $ 26.0 million (new share sale) of TKL in 1999-2002, it was 
notable that in both cases the Kenya government owed over US $ I billion to TKL and 
KQ in the form of acquired debt. 
83 each objective is rated Independently 
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5:5: Approach and Process: Impact and Importance of Objectives, 
Methods, and Techniques 
The specific findings discussed in this section answer the central research question and 
specifically research questions 3 and 4 reviewing government performance in their 
achievement of objectives ranked in the preceding section. The findings yielded some 
interesting results on objectives, methods and techniques (of national governments in 
the COMESA) that shape respective approaches to the privatization process. The data 
analyzed rated the GOK's overall levels of performance in its major objectives as 
shown in table 5-8, notably however, no approach scored an excellent rating. Revenue 
and speed as major objectives of privatization were poorly rated, indicating that the 
government experienced dismal performance in their major objectives. 
Table 5-8: GOK Approach and Strategy: Performance Levels to Privatization Transactions 
Methods and OBjectives ~ ¥ ''.'~,.11' if'::;. IF w ·r:w ,.. "' '' ·:; ""' .,,. y; " 
Excellent Good Average Very Poor 
·¥ . r~ '•1 % % % ' % .. , 
Revenue to exchequer - - - 98 
Speed of program - - - 95 
Efficiency in enterprises - - - 65 
Reducing subsidies 
- -
50 
-
Attracting FDI 
- -
48 -
Fair wealth distribution 
- 87 
Radical change in socio-economic system - 95 
Fairness and equal opportunity 
-
85 
Methods ·~+ @1 · ~ ~~x.,,;;,;;, ' 0f ' +,,; ·•vfu h'r.r• " • 
Strategic investor sale (STIS) 
- 95 - -
Direct sale - 60 - -
Capital infusion - 98 
Source: Author's compilation from field interviews (2004) 
This thesis research analysis shows the importance of goals, objectives and motives of 
privatization to the public, investors and to the transactions as adopted by the GOK. 
Although the literature, the World Bank report (2002) and interview responses argued 
that attracting maximum revenue is a central objective to most governments, in the 
Kenyan case evidence shows disappointing revenue performance with a total of $370 
million raised by 200 l/02 fiscal year, as indicated by table 4-1 and 4-2. Indeed, in 
addressing the central research question one; this thesis argues that revenue would 
85 
see Shafik, (1993);Gomu1ka (1993), Jermakowicz, (1995); Ba1cerowicz, (1993); Toy and Flynn (1993); 
Rondinelli and Y urkiewicz ( 1996) 
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remain an important objective and strategy for the GOK's privatization program, and 
that it would however change depending on the importance of the sector and enterprise. 
However, by January 2004 Kenya's overall proceeds were speculated at between$ 300-
400 million over the last ten-year period the program has been underway, a dismal 
performance of an annual average of between $ 30-40 million. Table 4-1 shows Zambia 
and Uganda's proceeds as much higher although their privatization programs started 
much later with fewer enterprises but have been more rapid. In applying the major 
socio-economic policy objectives of a multiple nature often advanced by African 
governments, development analysts and political economists like Kiggundu (1989), 
Nakani, (1990) and Cook and Kirkpatrick (1999), these findings corroborate their 
arguments that equitable wealth distribution and provision of social services remain the 
preserve of government. But Vickers and Yarrow,(1986; 1989, pp.35-39) indicate that 
if the private sector's objectives for privatization could be more effective in motivating 
managers and entrepreneurs then privatization may be more efficient, and able to 
provide both social and economic services. Indeed, this argument is supported by the 
discourse on restructuring by downsizing and change ofCEOs (page 271-275). 
However, Mukandawire, (1995), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1974) and Keynes, (1974), 
indicate that the effects of IMF intrinsically inflexible economic models versus the 
practical development priorities of the countries forced into reforms reluctantly or 
unprepared would be a recipe for poor performance on objectives and goals that are 
termed as priority. For example, the GOK performed especially poorly on fair wealth 
distribution and radical socio-economic change objectives, which the IMF and the 
World Bank rates in its agreements with donor agencies as a priority. For a priority that 
would help maintain an acceptable level of service provision, in an environment of high 
poverty levels and unemployment, the government scored between 87-95% poor 
performances rating by respondents, as shown in table 5-8. Further exploration of levels 
of satisfaction with Kenya's approach and strategy in some of the major elements of 
their privatization process resulted in a 65% "very dissatisfied" rating for the poor 
management of process/program by the GOK, with respondents citing absence of 
strategy, coherence, transparency and organization as major deficits. 
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In addition, the study revealed that lack of a public information process leading to a 
non-transparent due-diligence process was rated as highly dissatisfying by 70% of the 
respondents. Related to public information, were the methods of financial mobilization 
to enable management and employees to buy out shares of enterprises to be privatized, 
as was the case in transitional economies that included privatizations in Russia, the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Turkey.85 The responses indicated an 80% 
"highly dissatisfied" rate by respondents, with 70% of respondents remaining neutral 
on commercialization and IPO (stock options) methods of privatization, only rating 
them as neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied. This was an interesting result since policy 
makers, managers, and politicians favour these methods as the 'best' way to proceed 
with privatization. This confirms this thesis research questions, the interview responses, 
and the literature arguments by Young, (2003), Estache, (1997) and Vuylsteke, (1988) 
which indicate that the government did not bother to explain to its potential investors 
the merits of these methods by creating capacity for public information.86 For example, 
when the public raise objections to the sale of TKL to foreigners, what they imply is a 
need for public involvement in the sale; that is, the need for dialogue on objectives, 
methods and techniques of proceeding with the sale, that give preference to employees 
or management whom they perceive as nationals, and immediate stakeholders. Thus, 
this result shows a gap in public information on privatization clearly, there was no 
public program for information on methods of disposing of assets and the approach to 
the privatization process, unlike in other COMESA countries where some form of 
public information program exists that educates the public on privatization activities. 87 
The findings indicate that some of the original major objectives/goals for the 
privatization program (see GOK, 1996) can be dynamic during the process and may 
change when designing specific objectives for strategic sectors, as evidence in the 
literature review in chapter two sections 2:1:2 may show. To address the 
metamorphosing nature of its objectives, the GOK designed a two-phased strategy for 
Telkom Kenya privatization. In the first phase unbundling and restructuring was used 
into three enterprises as described in detail in section I before the divestiture program as 
a means of attaining the intended objectives rather than a straightforward objective in 
86 
see White and Wissman, (2002 
87 Egypt, Uganda, Mauritius, and Tanzania have public programs mostly through the radio, and internet 
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itself. According to the GOK, the major goal was to reduce telecoms costs and attain 
greater access by the population to telecoms services and products by 2000 while the 
major objectives in the first phase were infusion of capital, new technology and new 
management. 
In the second phase, the objectives focused on infusion of good governance, greater 
access, reduction of transport/telecommunications costs, increase of efficiency, creating 
businesses, increase in investor confidence and broadening the share holding through a 
strategic investor/partner. By focusing on broadening the shareholding, the government 
hoped to address the public concerns on redistribution of wealth and inclusion of local 
investors in the privatization process. In response to the second phase specific sectors 
made marginal but important gains in reduction of costs, increasing access to services 
and products, increasing efficiency and creating new business opportunities. Amongst 
the objectives surveyed in the second phase the government changed its ranking to 
increase in competition, reduction in communications costs, access to services and new 
management as extremely important objectives in raising the performance levels of 
TKL, specifically focusing on attracting a good price and a strategic partner. In 
particular, GOK favoured enhanced access to services and improved service delivery to 
increase competitiveness and to attract the private/public investors to the TKL IPO. 
Table 5-9: Major Objectives for Privatization 
' 
n-=36 and %=too" 
Extremely Very Important Not Total 
Important Important Important 
Major Privatization Objectives and Motives % % % % % 
Reduction in costs and Greater access to telecoms 98 1 1 
-
100 
Restructuring, Commercialization and Contracts 74 0 yJ!i h 20 6 - 100 
Employment and Business creation 1.aeJtallk '", • 4 
- -
100 
New management 5 tNt "'~'" .·:& "' - - 100 
Increase competition /New technology 5 H :; "" - - 100 
Financial infusion-and FDI H .,, 2 3 - 100 
Private sector development 5 t1 4 - 100 
Revenue and income 
-
10 80 30 100 
Wealth distribution 
-
40 4 H ' 100 ' 
Efficiency improvement 15 15 45 25 100 
Increase competition 38 20 17 25 100 
Liberalization and reforms 8 40 52 "' - 100 
Government- divesture from PEs 10 30 10 10 100 
Source: Author's comp•latJOn from field mtei'VIews (2004) 
88 The emphasis in this table is based on the percentage of responses totals not on numbers of respondents Note that 
respondents have to rank the 13 objectives in four possible categories 
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Table 5-9 gives a summary of the overview of the major objectives of Kenya's 
privatization as ranked by the research respondents with each objective ranked by all 
respondents individually. The study results of the rankings of the major objectives for 
GOK 's overall privatization program are herein summarized: Reducing communication 
costs and greater access to products and services were ranked as extremely important 
by 98% of the respondents and were indicated as a major goal of privatization by the 
government. Employment and business creation were ranked as being extremely 
important objectives by 86% of the respondents and 95% ranked new management and 
increase in competition as very important. Ninety-five per cent ranked financial 
infusion as extremely important to a successful privatization, with 91% ranking private 
sector development as very important. The results also show that although revenue as 
an objective was highly favoured in the privatization literature as a major objective of 
LDCs as argued by Wright and Perrotti (2000, p.13 7) and others, 89 60% of the 
respondents ranked it as merely important to the process of privatization. Along with 
this, 30% of the respondents indicated that it was not an important objective in the end 
and 10% indicated that it was very important. This contradicts the perception created by 
the World Bank (1999) of revenue as an important objective/goal. Indeed, to confirm 
that this perception is not common, the study revealed that the GOK regarded greater 
access and reduction of telecommunications costs as their priority objective for 
attracting investments from the COMESA and matching regional competition from 
Uganda, Egypt and South Africa. This research also noted that there was a significant 
difference in the rankings of the private and public sector respondents reflecting the 
private and civil society participation in the process (FSD, 2004). 
Additionally, on job creation or employment objectives, 100% of the respondents 
agreed that overall privatization has created new business opportunities. The findings of 
national, regional and international new business creation estimates ranged between 50-
100% levels, with some responses indicating that in telecoms new businesses nationally 
could be over 200%.90 Indeed privatization and liberalization processes have 
contributed to new business opportunities, private sector development and regional 
89 See Shirley, (1997), Shirley and Nellis, (1991); Kikeri, et at (1992); Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and OECD 
(1998:2000), reports on privatization revenues (1998:2000) ILO National Framework for Globalisation (2002) 
90Specifically the Investment Centres of CO MESA, Telecoms public, and private sector CEOs indicated that 
200% to be a conservative figure in the absence of proper documented figures. 
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trade expansion. As indicated by over 70% of respondents there were new business in 
supplies, new technology and skilled workers were re-employed into the 
communications sector.91 These results indeed echo the pro-privatization arguments as 
advanced by the World Bank and other academic analysts who include Samuel (2002), 
and Kirkpatrick, ( 1998) who claim that privatization has more gains than loss. 
The findings also revealed that the process of restructuring92 which was ranked as 
extremely important (by 74% of the respondents) in enabling enterprises to acquire new 
technology (i.e. TKL and KQ) forced movement of skilled workers across sectors, 
implying that most of them had to acquire new technical/operational skills especially 
technology and computer related skills, marketing and sales. These skilled workers' re-
entry into the communications industry helped speed up the introduction of new 
services and products. In voice and data communications, TKL and POST A did benefit 
by diversifying their portfolios. For example, POST A introduced commercial 
letterboxes charged at a premium, financial payment outlets for teachers, schools and 
cooperatives and increased improved EMS services, internet services for customers and 
expanded overnight parcel services to the rural areas. POST A managers indicated that 
restructuring and unbundling of POST A has enabled them to make business decisions 
faster and more profitably than when under KPT &C. Restructuring is credited with an 
increase of about 30% of the new businesses in POST A. 
This field research further found that in the process of expansion Telkom Kenya 
acquired four subsidiaries namely:93 Safaricom which operates a cellular phone 
network in partnership with Vodafone Air-touch; Gilgil Telecommunication Industries, 
manufacturers of telecommunication and postal products (i.e. telephone handsets, 
PABX systems; Kenya Postel Directories Ltd (which publishes the yearly telephone 
directory); and Kenya College of Telecommunications Technology, which offers 
training to the communications sector. Telkom Kenya also offers a satellite-based 
communication service (VSAT hub), Kensat (VSAT services) and operates Jambonet, 
which links local internet service providers to the rest of the world. Other facilities 
91 Questions 12 and 13 appendix 1 and 9, 10 of appendix which targets percentage levels which do not indicate 
number of business. This is because there is no government agency that keeps the exact numbers of business created 
by sector. 
92 Schusselbauer G, ( 1999). 
93 Discussed in detail in chapter five 
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include a digital leased line service, Kenstream and an analogue packet switching 
service, (KENPAC). Additional new businesses were generated in the privatization 
process in areas of accessories, supplies, subcontracting and internet outlets ISP 
provision and increased backward linkages amongst a number of small businesses in 
technologies, supplies and Internet cafe sprung up in large numbers. 
The research figures for COMESA indicated that liberalization, restructuring and 
reforms in the air transport, telecommunications and banking sectors has increased the 
number of flights to the COMESA region (COMESA, 2003). Kenya Airways (KQ) 
privatization contributed to this increase with an introduction of regional competition 
on the Southern/Eastern Africa route with South African Airlines. A major 
accomplishment of the COMESA-led reforms has been the increase in daily flights to 
the Southern Africa region from one Kenya Airways (KQ) flight a week to Lusaka and 
Lilongwe in 1998 to approximately three flights a day in 2004.94 British Airways (BA) 
and Regional Air (RA) also introduced daily flights to Lusaka, Lilongwe and 
Johannesburg. This growth translates to multiple businesses in airports, telecoms 
services and road transport estimated at 80-150% new businesses generated out of the 
privatization of telecommunications, airways, railways and ports. These businesses are 
very crucial for the growth and integration of the region by the estimated 380 million 
consumers of the COMESA market with further increase in new businesses and 
products still anticipated with the completion of TKL, ZAMTEL (Zambia Telcom) and 
ZIMTEL (Zimbabwe) privatizations (COMESA, 2002). Furthermore, the Investment 
Promotion Centre and COMESA secretariat Secretary General indicated that 50% of 
the benefits of increased jobs and air transport could be directly be attributed to 
privatization oftelecommunications (FSD, 2004). 
More significantly, the increase of flights into Nairobi has enabled Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport- (JKIA) to acquire "a regional hub" status (4 hours stopover) in 
the region and contributed to a direct increase in businesses in air, and road transport, 
hotels and airport related businesses. In this regard, the focus in the literature review in 
chapter two turned to the role of the state in the privatization process (Gibbon, 1992; 
94 The capital of Zambia and headquarters of COMES A secretariat 
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Kusi, 1991; Killick, 1993; Champy, 1998).95 The findings further indicated that 75% of 
the respondents expected the government to provide an enabling environment for the 
process instead of controlling the process; as one of the respondents stated; "since the 
government and its officials are not able to transact business in a transparent and 
accountable manner, they should create a Privatization Commission urgently." 
In further pursuit of the goal for increased competition and quality services, along with 
ranking objectives, levels of performance and number of business opportunities, figure 
5-5 and Table 5-l 0 show the impact of privatization on service provision, with 84 % of 
the respondents indicating a positive effect on quality, quantity and speed of service 
provision in TKL and in the industry and 16% indicating no marked improvement. The 
quality of service provided by TKL and the mobile providers experienced a large 
improvement as indicated by I 0% of the respondents. While 90% the respondents 
indicated that the quality, quantity and speed of provision of services within Telkom 
Kenya showed a small improvement (information based on question 7 appendix 2 
annex II). There was a zero percentage or no change in large improvements in quality, 
quantity and speed of service 
Figure 5-5 the Impact of Privatization and Service Provision 
Quality, Quantity, and Speed of Service Provision Improved 
Quality, Quantity, 
and Speed of 
Service Provision 
Improved, no, 5, 16% 
Sources: Author's compilation, (2004) 
95 see sections 2:0, 2: 1 and 2:2 
Quality, Quantity, 
and Speed of 
Service, Large 
Improvement 0% 
Quality, Quantity, 
and Speed of 
Service, No Change, 
, 0% 
Quality, Quantity, 
and Speed of 
Service Provision 
Improved, yes, 27, 
84% 
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While responding to specific improvements in TKL's service provision as shown in 
table 5-I 0, 23% respondents saw a large improvement in new products as opposed to 
II% who indicated a large deterioration. Fifty two percent of respondents indicated a 
noticeable small improvement or no change in the quality services, against 3I% and 
38% who indicated a large deterioration in quality and quantity of service respectively. 
At the same time there was a total of 33% marked small improvement and small 
deterioration in quality of service, and a 31% no change in speed of service with a 
significant 39% of respondents indicating a small deterioration. 
Table -5-10: TKL'S Quality, Quantity and Speed of Service Provision during Privatization 
N=36 
Service-
Provision during 
Privatization 
Quality 
Quantity 
Speed of service 
Sources: Author's compilation, (2004) 
Large Small Small Large 
Improvement Improvement/or and Deterioration Deterioration 
% No. Change % % % 
52 31 
23 9 38 
31 39 
Publicity and Marketing Program 
In relation to a good and effective publicity program, the findings indicated that 89% of 
those interviewed stated that Kenya had no strategy for marketing its privatization 
program. Indeed, the World Bank was reminded occasionally by civil society96 on the 
importance of informed decisions on privatization and investments in LDCs. Indeed, 
the World Bank acknowledges this state of affairs when one of its officials states that 
"privatization hasn't been explained to people, how can they benefit? Mrs. Thatcher 
made sure everyone knew how they benefited. "97The findings further emphasized the 
lack of an information strategy as 86% (n=31) confirmed that the privatization program 
was prescriptive rather than empowering or facilitative.98 This is a significant finding as 
96 See various Multinational Monitor reports 2000-2003, Jubilee 2000 Debt relief organs and Tradecraft reports 
97 White and Wessman (2002, p.6) 
98 see question 17 appendix 1, annex I 
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Stiglitz (2003) and Moore (1986) argue that IMF and the World Bank prescribe the 
majority of privatization programs in Africa. Stiglitz's (2003, pp.25-26) further incisive 
discussion on Ethiopia's gallant response to IMF's persistently wrong policy and 
approach to Ethiopia's objectives on banking reforms and sector priority for 
investment, illustrates this point. In the case of Ethiopia, the World Bank economists 
were insisting on prescriptive measures while Ethiopian economists needed the World 
Bank to be facilitative in their choice of reforms and restructuring policies. In Ethiopia, 
as was the case in Kenya and Nigeria in the mid 1990s, the World Bank initiated 
reforms in the banking sector and was unwilling to let the countries come up with 
homegrown programs. The World Bank insisted on the application of their prescribed 
program. The result was that many of the 'indigenous' businesses went under 
administration and eventually wound up. The economics repercussions are still felt to 
this day; thousands of businesses, homes, and jobs lost. In Nigeria, alone 356 banks 
were liquidated in less than three years (World Bank, 2005; Kisero, 2003; The Standard 
Newspaper, 2004; KNA, 2003; and O'pon, 2001). 
The thesis research confirms the prescriptive nature of the IMF program and the 
responses to the central research question, and the purposes and aims of this research, 
and illustrates how prescriptive programs carry financial support as an incentive to 
governments to engage in privatization. As an example of the prescriptive nature of the 
World Bank's program, Kenya's program came to a halt in 1997-2000, the same period 
that IMF and World Bank suspended their financial program to Kenya, and resumed in 
2002. However, 20% of the respondents indicated that the program was facilitative, 
mainly government officials who perceived this to be the case but could not illustrate. 
The aforementioned findings of this thesis also adequately respond to the central 
research question and research questions 2, 3 and 4 discussed in chapter one. The 
discussion shows that it is important to have the right objectives , motives and goals 
since they play a major role in determining not only the outcome of the transactions like 
that of TKL but ultimately determine the approach to the privatization process (FSD, 
2004). 
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Figure 5-6 Approaches Important for a "Good" Privatization 
Approaches For 'Good' Privatization 
Very Good Good Average Poor 
0 6. Voucher prlvatlsatlon 
• 7.MEBO/EBO 
Ratings of Approaches 
Very Poor 
1::1 5. Sale to Domestic and Foreign Investors through Different Methods 
• 4. Restitution -Denationalization 
• 3. Liquidation of companies and sale of their Assets 
112. Direct Sale to STI (Private placement), 
1211. Public offering (IPO), 
Sources: Author's Compilation from field Interview Data, (2003) 
Along with the choices of objectives and performance of methods discussed earlier, and 
importance of methods shown in table 5-9, the GOK decides on the methods of disposal. In this 
regard, this research sought to fmd out which methods are good and desirable for' a 
good' privatization but have not been actively applied by the GOK or have simply been 
ignored and yet are popular among investors. The findings indicated that although 
management employee buyouts and employee buyouts (MEBO/EBO) have been poorly 
utilised by GOK, they were at the same time two methods rated as highly likely to 
make for a good and successful privatization. In figure 5-6 the x-axis the ratings from 
very good to very poor. The y-axis shows the levels of popularity by respondents in 
percentage. This figure further shows that public offering was rated at as very good by 
30% of the respondents and 72% respondents rated sale to local and foreign investors 
through various methods as a good approach. Management and employee buyouts were 
rated as a good approach by over 75 percent of the respondents; however, it is notable 
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that the GOK did not use this method of disposal. Indeed these result indicated that the 
local investors were willing to buy the enterprises under privatization, through MEBO 
and EBO since these are the only methods that can guarantee employee participation. 
Along with quality and good methods, is the progress and growth of selected indicators 
of service provision and new products, ( see figures 5-5, 5:7, 5-8 and Table 5-10), 
which relates to choice of methods and affects service provision. Growth impact by 
indicator (figures 5-8 and 5-9) shows that there was tremendous progress in line growth 
of mobile business while in fixed line business there was very small improvement 
(figure 5-7). 
500000 
1400000 
Figure 5-7: Growth in Fixed Lines 
Fixed Line Growth 
i 300000 -1----"------=-~-::--~---:-~~--+~::-c~~~~~----,_,...--,,--
~200000 +---------~----~~~~~--~--~~~~~-=~~--~ 
1100000 ~~--~--~~:--:--~~~~--~:--:--~~--~~~~~~~~ 
0 -k='=*'ft-.....;.+~ ....... . 1""!! 
1897-1898 1898-1889 1188-2000 2000-2001 2001·2002 2002·2003 6 year total Total 
Growth 
Annual Growth % 
Sources: Author's Compilation from field Data, (2004) 
In the fixed line growth (figure 5-7), 90% of the respondents indicated that the change 
in size of waiting list was minimal (figure 5-9), in view of an exodus of customers to 
the mobile phone network. The fixed line growth has been quite disappointing growing 
only by 336,00 lines in five years accounting for an overall 11% growth, with an 
average of 1.2% growth per year, representing a 6.3% growth of the total fixed lines of 
540,000 and an approximate installation of6,720 lines per year indicated by figure 5-7. 
This has been a dismal performance by Telkom Kenya, with a monopoly in fixed line 
and voice telephony for over ten years. There were indications in the findings showing 
that TKL had developed a strategy before privatization that would address the poor 
performance of line growth as shown in figure 5-12 
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Figure 5-8: Growth in Mobile Lines 
Mobile Line Growth 
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TKL sought to improve its efficiency and growth in fixed line businesses as shown in 
figure 5-7. Growth in mobile lines is shown in figure 5-8. This thesis field survey found 
that the mobile growth escalated from 20,000 lines in 1998 to 1.8 million lines by end 
of 2003, a massive annual 5 year total growth increase of 300% representing 356,000 
lines per year as indicated by figure 5-8 and in table 5-6. Although TKL's 5 year 
growth shows a 1 00% growth, clearly, TKL was unable to respond to the competition 
challenge from Safaricom and Kencell largely due to bad management and ancient 
technology. Safaricom's use of TKL's basic infrastructure and infusion of new 
technology enabled both companies to increase their customer base but both Safaricom 
and Kencell would not be able to lure fixed line customers away from TKL's because 
of its monopoly status. However, TKL did not take advantage of its monopolistic 
position and its beneficial position of having a subsidiary company in the mobile 
business telephony. In the end, it seemed like Safaricom grew its mobile business (table 
5-12) as a separate entity by spending a total of US $ 70 million on restructuring and 
new product services in the year 2000. In this period, Safaricom invested a substantial 
amount of US $ 30 million in network expansion and US $12 million in new 
technology and transmission in order to respond to competition from Kencell as a new 
mobile operator. 
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Figure 5-9 Telkom's Growth Progress by operating Indicators 
Fixed Line 
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yrs) 5% 1% operator ------..._ 1% 
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time Fixed 
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25% 
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0% 
Redc in waiting 
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26% 
Source: Authors Compilation from Field TLK interview Data (2004) 
There was agreement amongst respondents that service m the fixed and mobile 
telephony had improved by varied degrees. There was a substantial reduction in cost of 
airtime by 25% in mobile line provision and installation-waiting time indicated by 
figure 5-9. Improvement in the fixed line was minimal showing a 1% improvement rate 
with no substantial impact to service provision as shown in figure 5-5 . 
However, there was a substantial reduction of 26% in waiting time for mobile lines as 
compared to 3% reduction in waiting time for fixed lines. Additionally, there was a 
substantial increase of24% in the number of mobile operators, accounting for a mobile 
growth change in size of 25% in comparison to a 3% improvement in TKL as a main 
operator, and 1% improvement in common availability of its fixed lines, as shown in 
figure 5-9. As table, 5-16 shows change in direct exchange lines connected per 
employee was minimal and TKL was aware that it needed to make improvements in 
this area. TKL's connection record is behind the COMESA region as indicated in table 
5-17, 3% respondents noted a substantial restructuring & efficiency improvement in the 
main fixed line operator, TKL. This improvement was seen as below that of its sister 
company Safaricom, the mobile operator especially after Kencell's entry, which put 
pressure on Safaricom to lower its tariffs, increase coverage and advertising. It was not 
surprising then that 100% of the respondents agreed that there was a substantial 
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reduction in cost of mobile phones and in cost of airtime averaging 5-20% in the last 
five years because of competition. However, the tariff rates for fixed line national and 
international businesses are still high. For example, rates for faxing (table 5-12) and 
telex have not been reduced by TKL yet these services compete with emailing and 
mobile text services whose rates are low and service provision efficient and quick 
(FSD, 2004). 
5:6 Financial Restructuring, Debt, Liability Process in TKL 
Who should "inherit" the People's Debt? 
After extensive discussions on TKL liabilities in chapter four, the question remains that 
of how do the GOK and TKL extricate themselves from this quagmire. Chapter four 
provides some options and the findings indicate that TKL needs to act and operate as a 
business and hasten its restructuring and privatization so as to catch up with the 
competition from mobile operators and the SNO. It also needs to make substantial 
profits improvements in order to repay the outstanding tax and pension liability. In the 
words of a senior government official "Telkom Kenya must be ready to face full 
competition by the end of their monopoly period of June 2004 or perish" 
Respondents from the private sector tended to view the restructuring problems of tax 
and pension liabilities at TKL with cynicism. They indicated that the top management 
of the state-owned monopoly was not utilizing the opportunities provided by the 
monopolistic period to their advantage to resolve the financial crisis. According to 
TKL, they developed a strategy for a gradual reduction of its debt burden (pension and 
creditors shown in table 4-13 and 4: 15) and a plan to recover bills owed to TKL by the 
government ministries and parastatals. According to the top management of TKL 
interviewed, they had devised a strategy for debt collection that would force TKL's 
biggest debtor, the GOK to start to pay off its bills, which were previously unpaid. In 
2002/03 TKL disconnected all telephones in government departments with unpaid 
telephone bills, by introducing various products that included calling cards, and dialling 
pin numbers. However, in spite of these efforts, TKL had no long-term strategy for debt 
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collection and bill payments and the government still owed TKL Sh3.5 billion and had 
no specific documentary or verbal evidence for the reduction of a debt with a time scale 
arrangement (Okwatch, 2004; FSD, 2004). 
Despite its financial position, TKL plans to go out to the stock exchange to convince 
investors to invest in TKL purely based on an anticipated growth potential in the 
telecommunications sector, while noting that telecoms stocks were on a downward 
trend. This creates a big challenge posing the question of whether this option was 
workable. Opinion was divided but unfortunately for TKL, having been a monopoly for 
a long period, investors had watched as the company underwent a decade of 
mismanagement, corruption and a predatory culture that saw senior employees 
squander company resources (Okwatch, 2004; Opiyo, 2004). For example, there are 
cases of employees owning companies that were competing for services or products 
with their employer (TKL). In some instances, the managers were also suppliers to 
TLK, and drove expensive cost ineffective cars at the expense of TKL causing conflict 
of interest as discussed in section 5:4:1. In addition, high inefficiency (figure 5-13), 
rising costs of telephony and diminishing quality and quantities of services (table 5-10: 
figure 5-9) caused by misplaced priorities had affected performance negatively (FSD, 
2004). 
As a result, TKL was put under a microscope after the mobile companies moved into 
the market with a business focus of cutting on operational and tariff costs, increasing 
efficiency, providing quality services and announcing high profits in 2001-2004. TKL 
over the years had developed a bad reputation (World Bank, 2000) and it stood out 
among the various troubled state-owned companies as the most mistrusted company 
eliciting non-performing and non-delivery perceptions from target investors,99 as 
indicated by thesis findings. As an example, before the floating of its 51% of shares 
into a 25% IPO and 26% strategic partner, 85% of the would be investors indicated 
they would take a "wait and see" position before the sale. 101 TKL did not act swiftly to 
redress this investor indifference perception to its first Request for proposals (RFP) in 
2000 and paid the price with no response from a strong strategic investor. 
99 See Annex Xla the various analytical articles in the East Standard Financial standard, 
101 Nairobi Stock Exchange Report; Sunday Standard January 2002 
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What Telkom needed was a delicate balancing of acts of public relations for investors 
and consumers on the one hand and a focused strategy of reducing debt, creating 
efficiency and effectiveness, on the other. At the time of data analysis (2004), the 
investor perception was still highly sceptical ofTKL's management and GOK's ability 
and capacity to utilize the substantial monthly cash flow of Kshs. 1.6 billion (US$ 20.5 
million), with an estimated annual revenue of Kshs. 20 billion ( US $ 256.4 million, 
indicated in figure 5-1 0), to tum around the company quickly enough. This was 
compounded by the reality that TKL seemed to be struggling financially (figure 5-10 
and table 5-14), it owed creditors nearly Kshs. 20 billion and in tum customers were 
owed Kshs. 18 billion worth of phone and related services. Rapid change therefore on 
all the aforementioned major issues was pivotal to a successful sale and transition of 
Telkom into the private sector. 
The research also found that on advice of the World Bank/GOK, (200 1) the TKL 
management was instructed by the GOK to lay-off employees numbering between 
3000- 5,000 whose work is not related to Telkom's core business before June 
2004/2005. Some of its services of catering, cleaning and security had to be out-
sourced. This retrenchment program is to provide savings to the tune of over Kshs 2 
billion and frees up the desperately needed resources to upgrade the telephone 
exchanges and cables (table 5-13). However, interview evidence showed that the 
NARC administration lacked the political will to implement the downsizing since the 
GOK moved the date to June 2005. 
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5:6:1 What Telkom Kenya Has To Do To Survive Competition? 
TKL Options 
The preceding discussion focused on the creation of efficiency and increasing 
profitability through various restructuring strategies. However, the reality was that 
competition had come and TKL and GOK needed to do more to survive. The 
government and TKL's strategy of off-loading 26% of the company to a strategic 
investor and the other 25% to the general public through an IPO, was envisaged to be a 
quicker and smoother way to increased revenue, profits and a good reputation under a 
new privatization law for TKL. In this regard, TKL hoped that the Commission's set-up 
expected in June 2005, would give control to TKL's management, in order to grow the 
compilny's business portfolio allowing it to concentrate on repositioning itself into the 
market as a competitive player. Meanwhile TKL had to revisit the valuation and image 
issues discussed in chapter four in view of both the IPO and the strategic investor, and 
as indicated by respondent evidence herein (FSD, 2004). 
The findings indicated that to further improve its competitive advantage and address the 
image problem TKL made changes to its management structure, with two general 
managers overseeing local, international and data services divisions in order to take on 
the 'run-away' growth and competition in cellular phones. At the same time, they 
needed to maintain their competitive position in the businesses where they had 
automatic or partial competition. This includes international commercial KEN SAT 
VSA T network operators, internet backbone service and local access /regional telecom 
operators, long distance telecom operators and international telephone operators as 
indicated in tables 4-6 and 5.13 respectively. 
On the revenue side this field research survey found that over the last three years (200 1-
2003), both Safaricom and KenCell Communications have had revenues that surpass 
fixed line telephony. In 2003, Safaricom was expected to gross nearly Kshs 20 billion 
and surpass TKL in revenues and profitability, a scenario that would not have been 
imaginable three years earlier. The subscriber base for mobile telephones stands at 2. 7 
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million (FY 2003/04) and outnumbered TKL's installation of 330,000 landlines by a 
factor of six. Even if Telkom was to supply enough telephone lines to 330,000 people 
on the waiting list, it would be less than their capacity and over half of their current 
connected customers102, forcing the company's subscriber base to still lag far behind. 
Moreover, there was no guarantee that the revenues from the new telephone lines 
would grow fast enough to compete with mobile lines or even help to reduce the pay 
back period of the capital expenditure incurred in the expansion. As alluded to earlier, 
the company already faces heavy fines from the telecoms regulator (CCK) for failing to 
roll out additional lines, one of the conditions set out for the granting of the five-year 
monopoly and as rationale for the introduction of an SNO. 
Therefore, the issue of fast growth and efficiency of fixed line services becomes vital 
for TKL's competition strategy. As regards quality and quantity of services (indicated 
by figure 5-4) respondents agreed that the qualities oflandlines are poor due to the state 
of infrastructure, this forces many customers to underutilise their fixed line connections 
because of lack of a dial tone. However, TKL responded with a strategy to undertake a 
70 % upgrade of their network to a digital format (table 5-13). In this connection, for 
over a one-year period (2003-2004) TKL was to spend Sh5 billion (figure 5-9 and 
Table 5-13 and 5-14) to convert the remaining 30% of the analogue exchanges to 
digital format and expand the connection capacity. This money was used to repair the 
existing cables and install a fibre optic line extending from the Coast of Mombasa to 
the Malaba border. Telkom hoped to borrow funds from the financial markets to meet 
the costs of this investment programme, a difficult task to accomplish given its 
unfavourable credit rating occasioned by the relationship between Safaricom/TKL and 
the Citibank credit arrangements, which involves GOK's refusal to relinquish its 11% 
shareholding in Safaricom (FSD, 2004). 
102 
asserts that the accurate number for the waiting list is 55,000 customers and not 330,000 But there are no 
documents to clarify 
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Indeed, according to TKL's technology manager, a digital exchange would help TKL to 
increase its product diversification program and enable a review of its product pricing 
which had not been done under a monopoly. In addition, fibre-optic technology would 
also greatly improve the slow internet connections in the country, whose ineffective and 
congested backbone service operated by Jambonet was blamed (Annex VIb) for 
Kenya's poor and unreliable internet connection. 
Once the modernisation was, complete TKL rolled out a new suite of data services in 
2004 that included a virtual mailbox that allowed internet users to connect to their 
accounts from anywhere in Kenya at the cost of a local call (table 5-4). It was also 
strategising to bundle its telephone services with an automatic internet connection that 
would allow TKL to send its customers one bill for voice and internet services. This 
plan has the potential of increasing the number of paying internet subscribers and 
connections from 30,000 to 330,000 instantly, thus revolutionalizing the internet access 
business in Kenya and the COMESA region. 
In response to this strategy, Telkom increased the cost of local calls and reduced the 
charges for long distance calls in 2002, in order to attract more customers to make 
national, regional and international calls and provide competition to texts and email 
services. At the same time, though local calls account for 70 % of the voice traffic and 
are heavily subsidised by the huge margins charged for long distance calls, revising the 
pricing structure would dramatically improve Telkom's profitability and help to boost 
the volume of trunk and international calls. However, as a strategy in response to 
mobile competition, respondents indicated that it fell short, because in the price "war" 
TKL competes with a better call completion rate, quality of connection and efficient 
service provided by mobile providers. TKL may have the perception of cheaper price 
but the mobile telephony provides convenience, efficiency and quality albeit at higher 
cost. TKL's marketing and customer service strategy had to reverse this perception 
quickly to be competitive. As one ex-Telkom Kenya CEO retorted "They (TKL) 
management have to put together a powerful customer service strategy to counter 
mobile business or go down" 
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According TKL management, to counter perception and competition Telkom 
management devised a strategy that included reducing internet costs by launching a 
new system that was expected to slash the cost of internet services to businesses by 
85%. This new system was estimated to cost US$5,000 to install, down from 
US$35,000, which had been the charges by KENSAT, Kenya's VSAT (Very Small 
Aperture Terminal) Network arm. These changes were expected to provide the market 
with price sensitive products; as the brand manager states; "with our installation of 
KENSAT's VSAT network which consists oftwo hubs, a C-hand hub in Kericho and a 
KU-Band hub in Nairobi, we have lowered the entry point levels and made it 
affordable. Because we want small organizations to look at VSA T as an alternative 
means of sorting out their communication needs." Among the benefits offered by 
KENSAT's VSAT terminals included giving support to two way data voice, 
multimedia and provision of one-way video communications. 
Safaricom and Telkom Kenya's Performance 
This research revealed that, Safaricom was launched in 1997 as a fully owned 
subsidiary ofTelkom Kenya, with Vodafone Pic, the world's largest telecom company, 
having a stake of 40% in the firm. In May 2000. Safaricom embarked on a four phased 
annual expansion programme that was still on course. In the fiscal year 2004 Safaricom 
set aside Kshs.8 billion (US $ 103 million) for network upgrading and expansion (as 
indicated in table 5:11). This investment included installation of new receivers and 
more than 14 new Base Trans-ceiver Stations (BTS) to better serve the sub-region. The 
aim was to extend the company's geographical coverage to key rural markets that are 
"too remote" to be covered by traditional infrastructure profitability. InterW AVE 
Communications, a compact wireless communications systems firm, had won a 
Kshs.98.8 million (US$.3million) contract to expand Safaricom's mobile telephone 
network. The California based firm provides highly portable mobile, cellular networks 
and broadband wireless solutions to companies in over 50 countries. Interwave's 
specialized GSM network extension solution was to allow expansion into markets faster 
and in a cost-effective manner. Safaricom embarked on the fourth phase of its 
expansion deployment project with InterWAVE. 
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Table 5-11: Levels of Investments by TKL, Safaricom and Ken cell 
Source: Author's compilation from field data (2003/4) 
The research further found that the Safaricom management was confident with its 
regional expansion programme that extended its mobile phone services to North 
Eastern Kenya to cover four major towns of Wajir, Mandera, Dadaab, and Moyale in 
the semi-arid province of North Eastern. According to Safaricom management, this 
program would help TKL and GOK attract investments and business owners who had 
previously feared to invest in North Eastern Province, citing a lack of a reliable 
telecommunications infrastructure, security and a weak policy on future developments 
in these areas. 
103 internet facilities to provide ISP services to the private 
sector will cost to US $ 5,000 to install down from $35,000 
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5:6:2 Postal and Telecommunications Services 
Postal sub-sector complements and is closely linked to the telecommunications 
services. According to the government statistics, the performance of the sub-sector 
postal communications showed a slow but significant improvement (table 5-12; GOK, 
2003). The POST A CEO indicated the performance of POST A had gone through a 
rocky restructuring period; Respondents reported that the slow improvement 
wasoccasioned by stiff competition from courier and money agency services that 
mushroomed courtesy of the liberalisation of the financial and communications sectors. 
However, POSTA's money and postal orders businesses continued to diminish by 24.3 
percent and 47% respectively in 2002. Correspondence business grew by only 1.2 per 
cent from 172 million in 2001 to 17 4 million in 2002. During restructuring the number 
of post offices was reduced from 893 in 2001 to 889 in 2002 while the express mail 
services stations were increased from 0 in 2001 to 75 in 2002.This was in response to 
increased demand for direct delivery services for parcels as carried out by competitors 
(KP&TC, 1999). 
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Table 5-12 Performance of Postal and Telecommunications Services 
Data Source: Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey, 2003 
The CCK registered courier outlets increased by 8.1 percent from 296 in 2001 to 320 in 
2002 in response to the demand in the market. Meanwhile, though POST A continued to 
increase the installation of private letterboxes its demand continued to decrease, falling 
to 304 thousand in 2002 from 323 thousand in 2001. POST A nevertheless registered a 
gross profit of Kshs. 11 million in 2003. The findings show that there were serious 
problems with business strategy, portfolio and management rationale when POSTA 
employed a set of new managers paid at unaffordab1e rates that the corporation could 
not afford while retaining the old experienced managers at lower salaries. The existing 
managers were underpaid and had an increased workload of training the new managers, 
a strategy that attracted a demotivated workforce and dissatisfied workers' union (FSD, 
2004). 
In relation to telecoms business growth, table 5-12 shows telephone connections 
recorded a marginal growth of 1.7 per cent to 332 thousand connections in 2002 from 
326 thousand in 2001, due to poor call completion rates, and poor facilities. Although 
this is attributed to the sluggish growth and to competition from mobile phones, this 
study showed that, the real problem was lack of focus and priority for the TKL 
investments. For example, the expansion of the exchange capacity from 446 thousand 
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lines in 2001 to 508 thousand lines in 2002 (table 5-11), did not include the last mile 
(i.e. the infrastructure that connects the customer). Secondly, there was no increase in 
technical capacity to manage the connecting process of the exchange lines resulting in 
low connection, and poor call completion rates. The concern for poor facilities and 
other marginal performance was more related to the poor management of response time 
and capacity to faults, Bills and reconnections. 
The study showed a substantial drop of over 24.2 per cent in the telephone connections 
to 250 thousand in 2002 and not 330 thousand (as indicated in table 5-15 and figures 5-
7-8 on line growth). 104 The coin/card pay phones also registered a substantial decrease 
with the introduction of pre-paid phone card service that increased to a record high of 
2,493 thousand in 2002. This research showed that the majority of the coin phones were 
not user friendly; half of the time they did not work, the response time for any faults 
reported and customer service was at zero. According to 89% of the respondents, the 
coin phones, which have not grown since 1999 as indicated by table 5-12 have been 
inefficient, often there is no dialling tone and its coin usage was poor, accounting for a 
65% failure rate and non-completion of all calls made. There were no specific and 
instant services on long distance pricing and customers were taken by surprise on 
dialling long distance destinations; they were faced with lack of enough coins to 
complete a call with no provision for change booths. There was no proper warning on 
how long the call would take when using coins and in most cases, the coins were 
rejected with no text alert for voice or screen option. The phone booths and coin 
telephone technology installed widely in 2000 were poorly managed and were not 
adaptable to Kenya's environment. 
104 There is a difference between the TKL figures and those given by respondents, as explained in the analysis 
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This research further found that with a poor and inefficient public telephone system, the 
fixed line customers have moved to mobile lines substantially. The number of 
combined subscribers of national telephony increased from 630 thousand in 2000 to 1 
million in 2001, to above 2.3 million in 2003, an increase of over 100% in less than 
three years. Over 80% of the towns now have access to cellular phone service networks 
and several major roads and highway areas have transmitters installed for access and 
clarity. Kencell also introduced a wireless access protocol (W AP) service in 2001102, 
for customers to make network connections to further rural areas and increasing the 
network coverage for its customers. Safaricom was limited to the operational areas of 
TKL' s transmission connections and did not introduce W AP in selected areas until the 
end of2002. 
304 
Chapter Five: Study Findings and Data Analysis : General Research Findings on the Privatization Process, Institutional and Legal Framework 
5:7 Expansion and performance of Telkom Kenya 
5:7:1 New Products, Services and Market share 
According to TKL management having realized the decrease in interest to a strategic 
partner option, the GOK!fKL focused on an IPO and had to make urgent service and 
product improvements to increase market share and improve financial performance. The 
financial year 1998/1999 was a very difficult year for TKL's financial performance with 
the immediate effects of unbundling and the resulting restructuring and settling down to 
an actual privatization. Despite this, the first financial year of operation saw a revenue of 
approximately US $ 245 million, with a subsequent average annual increase of US $ 26, 
million, giving a total of Kshs. 89.7 billion (US $ 1.15 billion). In total, revenue for the 
first five years of implementation of the privatization program was improved at a total of 
US $1.2 billion with an estimated profit of $734.6 million and an estimated annual profit 
of US$ 146.9 billion as indicated in figure 5-10 and table 5-14. Telkom's management 
contend they have been able to retain and maintain staff from KP&TC 105 by undertaking 
improved staff training, including front office staff training on customer services to cover 
for the new products and services introduced during this period which allowed for capital 
investments of about Kshs.15 billion to be generated through internal funds. 
Figure 5-10 Revenue Trends 1999-2002 (Kshs. Billion) 
Revenue trend from 1999 to 2002 
(Kshs. Billions) 
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 
Data source: TKL reports, (2004) 
105 Inherited 20,025 workers in I 999 decreased to 18,994 in 2003 
2001/02 
2001/02 is 
oroiected 
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However, as discussed before, TKL's creditors account stood at Kshs. 20 billion (US$ 
256.4 million), with customers owing Kshs.18.1 billion (US $ 232 million) to TKL. 106 
The trend in revenue between each period illustrates the unpredictable nature of the 
restructuring and privatization process. For example, in the first period of 1998-2000 
which saw the unbundling process of KPT &C and the setting up of subsidiary 
enterprises that included Safaricom, Kensat and Jambonet, TKL still improved revenue 
by Kshs. 2.4 billion (US $30.8 million). The second period of 2000-2001 saw 
readjustments and setting up of ''new" departments, products and services, streamlining 
procurement, personnel, financial and employment processes. The fall in the revenue 
trend indicated by figure 5-10 from Kshs 2.4 billion, to Kshsl.4 billion (US $17.9 
million) reflects this period. This was also the period that TKL implemented a "golden 
handshake" program extended by the GOK (through a World Bank agreement) to all 
state enterprises listed for privatization. In this program, they offered a negotiated 
voluntary package to employees who opted to take early retirement. These payments 
affected revenue for that period, since the numbers of individuals taking the "golden 
handshake" could not be planned for, as it was a voluntary program. 
The third period of 2001-2002/3 saw another large leap from Kshs.1.4 billion to Kshs. 
3.7 billion profits (US$ 47.3 million). This was the period of sale of the 49% of shares 
to the strategic investor (MKC) and the introduction of a second mobile operator 
Kencell into the market which paid a license fee of over Kshs. 300 million (US$ 3.8 
million), this explains the revenue trend. 107 Besides, internally, TKL had settled down 
to its core business and was beginning to take advantage of the exclusivity and 
monopoly position by introducing new products and services into the market. These 
included an intelligent network, a prepaid card service, free phone link to corporate 
customers call (similar to 0800 service), premium rate services call (mainly in 
broadcasting and marketing) and a public relations marketing image and re-branding of 
TKL. 
106 The US Dollar exchange rate is calculated at Kshs. 78 to one dollar in 2003/04 
107 The sale to a Strategic Investor was suspended in December 2002 in the last stage when fee is already paid. 
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5: 7:2 Expenditure and Payments 
This thesis research further found that with a record revenue base of US $ 1.15 billion 
in 2002 (figure 5-10); Telkom had to respond to competition from cellular businesses 
entering the market through liberalization of the communications industry. Faced with 
pressure to restructure in readiness for privatization and response to competition from 
cellular businesses, TKL had to pay Kshs. 2.8 billion of Kshs. 3.8 billion corporation 
tax, and customs and excise duty and Kshs. 1.471 billion all inherited from KP&TC, 
totaling to Kshs. 8.167 billion for current and past VAT and telecoms tax liability. This 
included VAT and telecoms tax arrears of Kshs. 1.310 inherited from KP&TC, as 
indicated in (table 5-14). In addition to this, TKL embarked on the expansion and 
modernization ofNetwork systems as indicated in table 5-13 {TKL, 2003:2004). 
Meanwhile, expenditure continued to escalate totalling to an estimated US $310.5 
million in ongoing and planned projects for the financial periods of 1999-2003 as 
indicated in table 5-14, driven by a desire to level out technological and capacity levels 
to match the competition from cellular phones and a fixed line phone operator in 2004. 
In addition, the high expenditure was driven by the overburdening labour costs caused 
by inaccurate billing and weak collection processes108 compounded with lack of 
capacity and political will to collect debts, thus experiencing low revenue levels. In 
2002-2003 TKL continued to experience collection problems compounded by the 
NARC government's109 outright delays (see Shirley, Tusubira, Gebeab, and Haggarty, 
2002) in paying its telecoms bills and TKL's inability to keep accurate accounts of the 
government's indebtedness. As a result, the company's profits could not stabilize 
because expenditure and revenue controls were still under capture by GOK through the 
CEO and there was a lack of serious capacity for debt collection. TKL still practiced 
the pre-privatization informal practices of "netting off' debts between KPTC&C and 
other government agencies that left balances owed to KPT &C and seldom paid 
(Laidlaw and Parkinson 1995). 11° For example, TKL provide hotline services to the 
108 World Bank. (1996: 1999) 
109 NARC government had promised not to delay the sale ofTKL 
110 see also Uganda's Privatization ofUganda Posts and Telecommunications (UPTC) 
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government of Kenya without any contract and payment agreement, a service that is not 
offered to other customers (TKL, 2003; FSD, 2004). 
TKL spent quite a substantial amount of their operational budget on new technology, 
new products and services (Table 5-13). The research data suggested that TKL over a 
period often years (1993-2003) had spent an estimated Kshs 4 billion (US$ 50 million) 
annually on modernization a substantial income that would have enabled TKL sharpen 
its competition strategy, increase efficiently and profitably. 
Table 5-13 Expenditure Statement and Modernization of the Network Systems 1999- 2003 
Modernization of the Network Systemsl999- 2003 
Project Capacity Cost (US$) Remark 
International exchange 1,800 to 12,000 4.3 million 666%Growth 
Trunks 
International facilities (modernization 15.3 million Transmission & Earth Station 
and Systems 
Installation of interconnection facilities 54,820 Trunks 21.2 million 6- Toll Switches 
Installation of 7 new local exchanges 128,500 Lines 55.7 million Nairobi & Mombasa 
Intelligent Network Platform (INP) 6.0 million Calling Card, Premium rate, 
Free phone, VPN, UPT 
Transmission & Data Networks 17.1 million SOH Ring Nairobi, 
Mombasa, Ken stream 
upgrade 
Planned and on-2oin2 projectsl999- 2002 
Replacement of analogue, expansion 153,820 Lines 47.8 million 
and modernization of exchanges in /trunks 
Nairobi 
Replacement of analogue, expansion 61,411 15.42 million 
and modernization of exchanges in Lines/trunks 
Mombasa 
Additional exchange capacity in Nyeri, 31 ,000 Lines 3.15 million 
Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldoret 
Nairobi - Nyeri Panaftel Upgrade 5,670 trunks 4.6 million 
Mombasa- Malindi SOH Radio 5,670 trunks 3.2 million 
Wireless Local Loop (WLL) 6,000 Lines 10 million 
Nairobi SOH Ring Phase 2 30,000 trunks 4.2 million 
EA Digital transmission 30,000 trunks 11.5 million 
Access network, Copper, OFC, 62.3 million 
Wireless for Mombasa and Nairobi 
Ku band VSAT 1.7 million 
Source: TKL Reports (2002:2003:2004) 
The modernization plan was implemented along with the marketing and customer 
service strategy, whose major elements were the establishment of a corporate identity 
through twenty-two telecare centres in operation countrywide to improve customer 
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service. The marketing and customer service strategy included, tariff reductions in 
order to ensure service affordability, improved modes of Bill payment that included 
prepaid and credit card (VISA) facilities, and Improved communication with customers 
through integrated media and promotional activities. In addition, introduction of 
itemized billing for mobile calls to reduce disputes with customers and setting up an 
external evaluation of customer feedback were undertaken. Along with this, TKL 
planned to respond to the competition from the SNO and TMO by introducing products 
and services that were customer driven by providing, for example, fully automated 
customer service processes. TKL intended to work in partnership with customers in 
order to introduce new product and services that match the competition. It also planned 
to avail high-speed access and value added services, improve on the prepaid phone 
services, maintaining customer loyalty, expanding and retaining the customer base and 
ensuring growth in revenue and profitability. However, TKL did not quite articulate 
what exactly they were planning to do against tough competition from an SNO and 
cellular companies in the event that the competition offered the same or better products 
and services (TKL, 2003:2004). 
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5:7:3 Financial Strategic Plans Planned Options 
In response to the financial options and difficulties outlined in chapters four and five, 
the TKL management outlined a business and financial strategy to back up its 
modernization program. TKL's new business plan for the period 2002/05 included 
financial and marketing customer services plans. On the financial side, the company 
took initiatives to reduce its liabilities and increase its revenue as shown in figures 5-9 
and 5-10 in response to the financial scenarios proposed in chapter four. Specifically on 
the expenditure side, expansion and modernization of the network were expensive; 
nevertheless, TKL needed to undertake the modernization plan to be competitive and to 
increase its image for credit rating for banks and would-be shareholders. 
In this regard, TKL had embarked on projects to achieve 100% digitalization in the 
shortest time possible. TKL installed cost effective, scalable and flexible network 
systems to meet (table 5-13) customer requirements; it migrated towards technologies 
offering integrated voice, data and video (multimedia) improvement, and expansion and 
modernization of its exchanges (Nairobi & Mombasa) totaling 197,231 trunks/lines at 
an estimated cost of US$ 61.5m. TKL intended to install transmission systems at a cost 
of US$ 25.2m and install an access network at a cost of US$ 72.3m. To achieve this 
strategy and maintain profitable revenue levels, TKL was focusing on utilizing 
alternative sources of funding as a major aim for the company. Specifically, the 
company hoped to tap into offshore lending (borrowing), deferred payments, and 
supplier credit, and to tap new revenue streams by introducing new services in 
information technology. It also planned to improve business processes to enhance 
service delivery, to offer an integrated customer service, a billing system, and 
improvement of the management information system. In response to image and 
marketing, TKL embarked on introducing products and services that were customer 
driven as indicated in table 5-13 confirming that the modernization and expansion of 
the network was a vital part of a more effective, efficient and responsive strategy to a 
competitive market and an increasingly educated consumer (FSD, 2004; TKL, 
2003:2004). 
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5:7:4: Financial and Business Performance111 
Table 5-14: Telkom Kenya (TKL) Financial and Business Performance (Kshs. Million) 
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001102 2002/03 
Turnover I 9,391 21,325 22,767 24,749 21,479 
(Kshs). Million 
Profit after Tax 582 3,204 1,782 314 (2,084) 
(Kshs. Million) 
Exchange Capacity 390,180 420,370 446,302 452,460 508,198 
Lines Connected 288,251 304,636 321,482 328,104 330,202 
Capacity Utilization 74 72 72 73 65 
Staff Population 20,998 19,828 19,337 18,900 18,500 
Lines Per Employee 14 15 17 17 18 
Source: TKL Reports 2002/2003 
The expansion of the network and the enlarged scope of activity escalated along with 
an increasing financial performance ofTKL's (figure 5-10 and tables 5-14 and 5:15); 
revenue and business performance indicating that the turnover increased by over 30% 
and the value added doubled. The increase in profit in the period preceding 
privatization was notable. It seems to correlate with a fall in the number of employees 
and of employees per main line, along with efficiency gains in improvement in capacity 
utilization. Indeed, the decline in profits to Kshs. 314 million in the FY 2001/02 is 
explained by a fall in employees who had to be paid their "golden handshakes." It can 
also be explained by the settlements in large payments made by TKL to the pension 
union and to the tax authority (Okwatch, 2004; GOK/TKL, 2003; TKL, 2003) 
However, it should be noted that though telephone exchange connections in Kenya rose 
from 271,000 in 1997 to 305,000 in mid-2000, the exchange capacity was forecast to 
more than double from 446,000 in 2001 to 943,000 in 2008. Kenya's teledensity is at 
1.5 % in the East African Community and in COMESA. The expansion and good 
financial performance along with an SNO was hoped to increase telephone facilities in 
the rural areas increasing the tele-density from the current one line per 100 persons to 
10 lines per 100 persons by the year 2010. By comparison, Tanzania's telephone 
111 Note: The Auditor General publishes financial reports for TKL but none-was available, the last published financial 
statement was in I 996, contained in chapter five table 4-8 
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density is very low at only 0.3 per cent, while Uganda's teledensity is only 2.8 lines per 
I 000 people. In Egypt, two million new lines were functional by December 2001, 
increasing the number of fixed telephone lines in Egypt to 9.2 million. With the 
installation ofthe new lines Egypt's te1edensity grew from around I0.5 per cent to 13.6 
per cent, accounting for I3 lines per I 00 people. The increase was expected to cost 
some US$ 643 million and was part of a broader US$ 3 million five-year plan for the 
development of Egypt Telecom's network and services. In Zambia, the teledensity was 
2 lines per 100 people and in South Africa; the teledensity was 11.6 lines per 100 
people as indicated in table 5-17. COMESA has been working towards harmonization 
of its telecommunications program in its member countries. 
Telkom Kenya's expansion program and the financial and business performances 
indicated in figures 5-10, 5-11 and Tables 5-13-I4 made a significant contribution to 
the country's telecoms reform and restructuring program and contributed significantly 
to the country's GDP/GNI 112• Its value added was estimated to have accounted for 2.5% 
of GDP in 2001/2002 (GOK, 2002). This figure should be noted with caution because 
of the 20-30% additional domestic product generated in the communications informal 
sector and in parallel trade that was probably unrecorded in the official data. 
Interestingly, the number of employees fell in the period of TKL's due diligence 
process in 2001 from a high of 20,998 to 18,500 and maintained the levels after the 
negotiations failed in December 2002. 
However, the field data analysis show that this marginal fall may also be attributed to 
natural demise caused by HIV aids and voluntary resignations rather than the actual 
privatization transaction. TKL's management was unwilling to release these figures, 
but industry analysts estimated a loss of five employees a month (Kenya Financial 
Standard, December 2002) in total. To compound this situation TKL is still servicing 
two huge debts one to the telecoms pension fund and the other to Citibank- for an 
equity loan obtained for Safaricom. TKL's total financial expenditure in investments 
translate to between 0-70% of its total investment budget in specific areas of service, 
technology, competition, increasing efficiency and broadening their market share in 
readiness for the expiry ofthe monopoly ofTelkom as indicated in table 5-5. 
112 GNI- Gross National Investment 
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The TKL portfolio's strength is in voice telephony (figure 5-11) which accounts for 90 
per cent of their portfolio and should be at 49% in a competitive market as indicated in 
figure 5-12. TKL worked towards improving services in voice telephony by investing 
in new technology and increasing the number of fixed lines using wireless technology. 
The quality of services marginally improved as the numbers of successful phone calls 
(last mile) increased from 49% to 65% for local calls and from 43% to 55% in STD or 
intercity calls. However, the improved services in figure 5-5 do not translate to real 
indicated improved quality, quantity and speed of services and like faults response, 
which remain much below the international standards set out by ITU, which specifies 
over 70% as the target for local calls and 60% for inter-city calls, and which are 
implemented by regulatory agencies (i.e. CCK). 
In an effort to address this gap, TKL implemented the numerical network at 97%. It 
dramatically reduced tariffs for local, long distance, and international calls by regional 
standards, however, these gains were cancelled out by the more accessible, convenient, 
efficient and prompt mobile lines introduced into the market, which despite offering 
higher tariff rates than the fixed line proved more popular for elements of service 
delivery stipulated above (TKL, 2003). 
Figure 5-11: TLK Business Portfolio Management 
Business Portfolio I 998/J 999 
Data Source: TKL Reports, (2003) 
hony 
Telkom Kenya's business portfolio by 2003 comprised of90% voice telephony and 3% 
of data services, telex telegraph, and mobile cellular respectively as shown in figure 5-
10. It was quite apparent that TKL could not maintain this portfolio in the wake of 
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competition from mobile phones and specifically from the SNO. TKL's strategy 
addressing the imbalance was to specifically double the data services business, 
increasing the mobile cellular business to about 40% of the total. This is important 
because it was anticipated that there would be a decrease in voice telephony business to 
create better balance of its business portfolio with the entrance of the second national 
operator (SNO), as indicated in figure 5-11; thus, TKL would position itself for stiffer 
competition ahead. 
TKL's business portfolio (figure 5-11) divided into international long distance and 
local, with the Emergency Mail Service (EMS) business going to POST A operated as a 
separate business competing with DHL and Federal Express. TKL's challenge was to 
move its portfolio into a viable business by improving and expanding products and 
services from the ratios in figure 5-11, to one that includes data and EI of 
telex/telegraph services shown in figure 5-12, into core business areas with a ratio of 
49% voice telephony, 36% mobile cellular and 12% data and EI services. These may 
include backbone services, international telephony, long distance and local telephony, 
leased lines and premium numbers, radio beepers and telephone cards. 
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5:7:4:1 New Products and Competing Market share: TKL's Dilemma 
Figure 5-12 Business Portfolio 2000/2002 (Share of 1999 business and Revenue) 
2002/2003 Business Portfolio 
Others 
illobile cellular 3% Voice 
Data Source: TKL Reports, (2003) 
However, despite the opportunities offered by the expansion program discussed above, 
the findings show that TKL had no strategy to compete with mobile operators (MOs) in 
the short-run. TKL did not take advantage of its strength; for example, TKL has a niche 
as a broadband provider through fibre optics, 113 that it can exploit through electronic 
media business to compete with the mobile operators, instead of trying to get into the 
mobile sub-sector market, which according to industry specialists would take a longer 
period to get into. Accordingly, for TKL to upstage the SNO competition and increase 
its market share and product diversification into the new area of broadband, it needs to 
enter the TV and home base internet connection service rather than staying in voice 
services where the mobile sector commands both comparative and competitive 
advantage. In introducing new products TKL should also invest in new technology to 
help improve its record in call completion, efficiency and timely response to customer 
inquiries, repairs, fault response time (figure 5-13), line connections, and reduced 
waiting time (figure 5-9) and lists for connections. Efficiency and effectiveness in 
11 3 Optical fibre is a plastic or glass (silicon dioxide) fibre no thicker than a human hair used to transmit information 
using infrared or even visible light as the carrier (usually a laser). AT&T is working on a world network to support 
high volume data transmission, international computer networking, and electronic mail and voice communications. A 
single fibre can transmit 200 million telephone conversations 
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products and services was the only way that TLK could improve performance, increase 
revenue and ultimately receive a high price for IPO at the NSE (TLK 2004; Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1985; Coffee, 1999; Aggarwal and Mjstrik, 1992). 
Figure 5-13: Fault Response Rate 
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Data source: TKL Reports, (2003) 
5:7:4:2 Staff Rationalization Strategy 
Staff rationalization is an option the TKL management had to address in its effort to 
improve performance and increase revenue. Discussions and analysis in chapters two, 
five, and six indicate how difficult the process of staff rationalization and downsizing 
can be in the privatization of parastatals in Africa and the world over (Schusselbauer, 
1999). To increase its sale price and maintain its market share in the face of 
competition, TKL put in place radical strategies for enhancing its staff management, 
through rationalization, rather than merely downsizing (TKL, 2003; FSD, 2004). 
Furthermore, strategic initiatives in staff productivity to 45 lines per employee by 
2006/07 need to be operational. To address rationalization and productivity of staff two 
scenarios as considered by TKL management are outlined in tables 5-1 5-16. Scenario I 
in figure 5-15 shows a position of TKL where growth in lines is not rationalized with 
actual lines connected and staff available. Scenario II shows an increase in lines 
connected in order to address staff rationalization, although falls short of COMESA 
figures in table 5-17. 
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Table 5-15 Staff Rationalization versus Growth in Lines 
SCENERIOI: Assume Zero Growth in Number of lines 
2003/04 2006/07 
Lines Connected 330,000 330,000* 
Lines connected & operational 250,000* 330,000 
Lines Per Employee 18 45 
Number of Employees 18,109 7,300 
Source: TKL Reports, 2003 
It is notable that whereas TLK's records show 330, 000 lines are connected, the study 
revealed that only an estimated 250,000 of this total were operational and should be the 
number accounted for in revenue calculations. In addition, there was no evidence from 
the financial or business performance (table 5-14 and figure 5-10) to indicate how this 
figure can be increased to TKL's targets of 330,000 (June 2004) and 600,000 by 
2006/07. This was reinforced by evidence in figure 5-13 showing inability to reach the 
regulatory targets for faults response and repairs. There was also lack of capacity in key 
short-term ingredients to attain the performance target of 330,000 lines connected, 
functional billing and fund collection (table 5-15). Furthermore, TKL's staff 
rationalization strategy of cutting their workforce into half (a condition of the World 
Bank) directly conflicts with the strategy to increase connected and operational lines. It 
was not clear what the strategy for staff rationalization entailed, which level and types 
of staff were to be downsized and what positive implications this would have on the 
financial and business performance of the company. TKL expected to clearly spell out 
these contradictions in the revised 2004/05 strategy (TKL, 2003:2004). 
Table 5-16 : Staff Rationalization & Growth in Lines Connected 
SCENARIO II: Increase Number of lines Connected to 500,000 
at Least 60,000 per year 
2003/04 2006/07 
Lines Connected 330,000 500,000 
Lines Per Employee 18 45 
Number of Employees 18,109 11,100 
Source: TKL Reports, (2002:2003) 
On staff productivity, it was quite apparent from the statistics contained in 
table 5-17 that TKL had no competitive advantage compared to the other 
countries in lines per employee (table 5-17) and needed to remedy the 
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situation before a second national operator enters the market. It was 
noticeable that Safaricorn!Kencell staff productivity line per employee was 
way up at 2000 after barely two years of operation ( 1998-2000). 114 
Table 5-17 Comparative Lines per Employee 
Comparative Staff Productivity Line per employee (year 2000) 
Country 
Egypt 50 
Uganda 49 
Zambia 43 
South Africa 113 
Swaziland 70 
Tanzania 48 
Mozambique 37 
Zimbabwe 30 
Telkom Kenya 18 
Safaricom/Kencell 2000 
Source: Field Survey Data (2003) 
114 The 2003 waiting list is estimated at 150, 000 people by customers and industry players. Although, TKL 
maintains that the waiting list is about 50,000. There is no accurate figure on this figure because TKL does not keep 
proper records of waiting lists and disconnected lines. 
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5: 8 Third Mobile Operator and Second National Operator 
The survey also sought to inquire the objective for the introduction of a third mobile 
operator (TMO) and an SNO. Ninety percent, of the respondents agreed that a third 
mobile operator (TMO) would introduce further competition in the sector by offering 
new and competitive tariff rates to customers, new price levels for handsets and 
expanded products and services. Besides, it was estimated that the Kenyan telephony 
market could absorb four operators or competitors. ECONET, the lead company in the 
Mount Kenya Consortium (MKC) that bid for strategic partnership in TKL's 
privatization Phase 1, won the tender process as a third mobile operator and was to start 
operations after June 2004, when TKL's monopoly expired. The third mobile operator 
had the difficult task of starting without a subscriber base, unlike Safaricom's 
experience. In the case of an SNO, CCK and government agreed that its entry into the 
fixed telephony market provides needed investments to expand the sector, especially to 
fill in the regional services which KPT &C and now TKL had been unable to provide. 
Secondly, the SNO introduces a duopoly situation that creates some competitiveness 
and tension that reduces prices, widens the range of services, introduces an updated and 
new technology, innovations and hence improves the quality of services. This achieves 
the major GOK objectives of liberalization and privatization, "greater access" 
"reduction in communications cost" and "introducing more competition in the market" 
(FSD, 2004; TKL, 2004). 
However, whereas there was unanimous agreement as to what the economic rationale 
of a second national operator would be, the argument against SNOs is that in the 
COMESA region it was difficult to explain to investors the need to realise profitability 
in SNOs due to the regional services provision requirement, which has traditionally 
attracted subsidy and thus been unprofitable. There was also the problem of a 
subscriber base in rural areas with low populations and limited purchasing power 
reflected in the poor licence fee payments by the Regional Telecommunications 
Operator (RTOs), and confirming the arguments that economically, local calls were 
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unprofitable, and this could explain the delay in fee payments. There was also the 
concern from TLK strategists that for an SNO to be profitable it would have to engage 
in subcontracts after June 2004, hence providing international telephone call diversions 
from stateless Somalia through the northern part of Kenya, which already had an RTO 
and had not started operations (see Shirley et al 1999). According to industry analysts, 
this argument is supported by the so far inactive nature of RTOs awaiting the entry of 
an SNO to facilitate sub-contracting. 
In response to this potential absence of an SNO and RTOs, Safaricom management 
devised market strategies to "subsidize" the mobile connections by packaging their 
pricing together with that of handsets. This strategy recognises that the price of 
handsets was not substantially reduced worldwide and in low-income areas (regional 
coverage); it had become a big impediment to connections, specifically in sparsely 
populated areas of Kenya (i.e. North Eastern). This strategy did in fact increase 
Safaricom's market share by 20% in low income and low population areas in FY 
2003/04. 
5:8:1 The Parent -Child relationship between TKL and Safaricom? 
The then KP&TC founded Safaricom in 1997/1998 during the unbundling to capture 
the cellular market. The acquisition of Safaricom from Kenya Posts and Telecoms 
Corporation (KPT&C) involved three parties; Telkom Kenya Limited, Vodafone 
Airtouch PLC and Vodafone Kenya limited (VKL), a publicly traded corporation with 
quarterly and annual reporting requirements imposed by U .K securities laws and by the 
stock exchanges with 30% of the share capital. The shareholding was at a 51 %:49% 
ratio in accordance with the Kenyan investment laws of 51% for a local investor and 
49% for a foreign investor. Safaricom Company was incorporated on the 3rd of April 
1997, with a share capital of Kshs. 20,000 divided into 1,000 shares of Kshs. 20 each 
and seven shares ( 1997) for TKL, three shares ( 1997) for Vodafone Kenya Limited and 
five shares (1999) for KPT&C. When KPT&C transferred the cellular business to the 
company (Safaricom) in 1999, KPT &C had 70% of the issued share capital of the 
company. KPT&C agreed to indemnify all costs and keep each of Vodafone Kenya 
Limited costs separate. The VKL as a company is indemnified against all liabilities that 
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include the pension debt and bank loans which either VKL or the company may incur 
because of any claims 117 brought in connection with the Transfer of Businesses Act in 
relation to all transactions contemplated by the acquisition agreement, not taken into 
account in the valuation. Control and management of the company lies with the Board 
of Directors, appointed by shareholders in collaboration with the geneml manager, who 
is a secondee, being an employee of an affiliate i.e. Vodafone Group PLC). For every 
15% of the share capital held by the shareholder, he/she is entitled to nominate and 
have appointed one director to the board (subject to a maximum of four directors) as 
indicated in Table 5-18. The GOK had an 11% shareholding and was therefore not 
qualified to elect a director, a positive factor for operations at Safaricom. The 
shareholding ratio thus has major implications for governance in the privatization 
process and plays a major part in the administration of privatized firms 
(TKL/Safaricom, 2000). 
Table 5-18: Ratio of Director Appointments 
% of Shareholding Number of Directors 
Less than 15 0 
15 to 29.9 1 
30 to 44.9 2 
45 to 59.9 3 
60 to 100 4 
Data source: TKL Reports 
Practically though, Safaricom is 60% TKLIGOK and has $ 150 million in assets. With 
regard to the network, TKL had only 300, 000-customer base compared to Safaricom's 
1.3 million in 2003. Safaricom's business was licensed as a GSM and ETACS 
(although the latter is obsolete) cellular telecommunications system on a commercial 
basis. It has also been licensed to provide telecommunications services, international 
roaming services and value added systems and services. The company distributes its 
products and services direct to its customers through licensed main dealers, sub-dealers 
and leasing of local transmitters (i.e. leases land from farmers to install receivers). The 
initial capital into Safaricom Company Limited was $33 million, comprising of 
117 Initially through Barclays and then Citibank 
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$7million (20%) from Vodafone, $ 3 million from TKL in equipment and $26,000 
million for network rollout (from commercial paper). 118 
Safaricom's Head -Start Highlights 
Safaricom had a remarkable success in Kenya as the first single mobile operator on the 
market and was considered a real national Kenyan company (i.e. a home-grown 
'jewel'); viewed as a complete subsidiary of Telkom Kenya. This helped Safaricom 
increase its subscriber base to an estimated 1.3 million subscribers from 20,000 in 
1999/2000 (table 5:2 and 5-6). Safaricom had a head start after it took over TKL's 
twenty thousand mobile subscribers in 1999-2000 and in four years (2000-2004), it 
increased its subscriber base substantially to 1.8 million benefiting from the parent 
company (TKL) relationship by sharing its national segment of the market since its first 
operation in July 2000. It squarely depends on the transmission and technology capacity 
of TKL; that was seen as an advantage at the beginning, however, with competition 
from a TMO this became a disadvantage. This disadvantage was due to the slow pace 
of improvement in infrastructure, technology levels, and the human resource and 
management capacity of TKL to provide transmission fibre-optic service to non-urban 
regions (table 5-14), where Safaricom had competitive advantage to expand (FSD, 
2004; TKL, 1999). 
Safaricom management estimated in 2003 that it would take close to two years to 
rollout the national network that TKL delayed to put in place. For this Safaricom would 
use its own technical capacity and financial resources. During this time, Kencell was 
able to take advantage of the gap provided by lack of infrastructure for Safaricom and 
expanded nationally, since it was prepared to rollout new infrastructure as a new 
entrant. This explains the superior national coverage (network reception) by Kencell 
communications as opposed to Safaricom. However, Kencell still had to deal with 
customer loyalty and improved value added services. Industry respondents indicated 
that this is an area with which both Kencell and Safaricom would have had problems 
when TKL 's privatization was to be finalized in 2005 and a SNO licensed in the same 
year. This is because the nature of mobile telephony services is that it depends entirely 
118 See annex VII 
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on cost and coverage, whereas fixed telephony really depends on access. There was a 
possibility that when TKL and a new SNO rolled out their new services and coverage, a 
number of customers might switch back to fixed line telephony, presenting a big 
challenge to MOs and providing for further empirical research on the process of 
competition. It was also evident from the research that the pressure to delay an SNO 
entry and TKL's privatization was intentional on the part of GOK (Opiyo, 2004; The 
Nation Newspapers, 2004; FSD, 2004). 
The study further reveals that at first Safaricom was exempted from the Corporation 
Act, 119 which is very restrictive for all state corporations in order to give it a first start, 
but TKL but was subject to the Act by the GOK. The Act is a disadvantage to 
Safaricom particularly because TKL operates on business principles with a separate 
management from the government unlike the other public enterprises, with the 
management reporting to shareholders and directors and not the GOK. Safaricom also 
operates independent accounting procedures and bank accounts from those of VKL and 
KPT&C or any ofthe respective successors or affiliates (TKL, 2003). 
Internal discussions with TKL revealed that Safaricom faced a major problem because 
it had been set up as a company under the Company Act and operating as the business 
arm of TKL in a mobile core business, Safaricom was supposed to act as a core 
business of TKL, making a strategic 'early entry' into the mobile business market. 
However, Safaricom went on to become an independent business causing complications 
as to the actual relationship between TKL and Safaricom. For example, unhappy with 
Safaricom's independence, TKL and GOK 'colluded' to re-subject Safaricom to the 
state corporation act of 1987. This was to restrict operations of Safaricom since the 
GOK was uncomfortable with the fact that the management was accountable to the 
shareholders rather to TKL/GOK,particularly because TKL has a major say in 
Safaricom's operations when ownership and financial operation issues come to the fore. 
This thesis research found that there were concerns as to what the actual position of 
TKL was and what GOK's attitude towards Safaricom would be in the future, as it 
grows. These were clear indications of a frosty relationship (FSD, 2004). 
119 GOK, (1987) and appendix 2 annexes vii and viii 
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Besides, the operational matters there were unresolved investment issues in terms of the 
payments that TKL made periodically to Safaricom and that were not disclosed. There 
was also Safaricom's opposition to the suggested sale by TKL of 11 %of TKL/GOK 
shares in Safaricom on the stock exchange to raise funds, a strategy suggested and 
contained in the privatization roadmap and supported by GOK (TKL, 2003a). 
Safaricom's management opposition is based on the arguments that legally it is a 
breach of the contract between them singling out the fact that the 11% of the shares 
should be offloaded to Vodafone U .K for guaranteeing the equity loan. Safari com was 
aware that the TKL and GOK as majority owners had pre-emptive rights, which they 
could use and may be taking over from Vodafone U.K. The Safari com management 
itself was also controversial since the contractual agreement stipulates that the CEO 
representing Vodafone be expected to hand over to a Kenyan CEO within a period of 
two years. However, due to unresolved financial equity debt obtained through 
Barclays/Citibank, it became necessary for Vodafone's CEO to continue as (secondee) 
general manger for purposes of securing the financial position of the company 
(TKL/Safaricom 2000). 
On the privatization of TKL, Safaricom's CEO argued for further restructuring to 
enable TKL's management to make bold decisions; the Safaricom management further 
argued that it was only in a climate of freedom that business decisions could be done 
quickly and urgently. For example, the completion of restructuring and opening up of 
Jambonet, as an ISP attracted more players, these were pressing for more restrictions to 
be removed and a level playing field created so as to enable TKL to face competition. 
"These could have been done faster and profitably if TKL was a privately owned and 
operated enterprise," concluded the Safaricom CEO. 
On financial and human resource performance, Safaricom management was 
apprehensive of TKL 's handling of the pension liabilities and a VAT debt in excess of 
$250million. Safaricom argued that there was need to restructure this debt and inject 
funds for development of the transmission network and for building the long distance 
and international linkage businesses that provide competitive advantage to the cellular 
business. Safaricom has had problems with coverage as stated above, which was key to 
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its market growth; its strategy is to build on TKL's customer's base, rollout nationally 
in order to consolidate its national coverage and then concentrate on cutting prices 
competitively, building a truly national and recognised nationwide network. Safaricom 
realised that expanding coverage would take the majority of the shareholding 
investments and it estimated that it would take from 0-8 years before it registered 
profits and an average of 10 years to be able to pay dividends. Although Safari com is 
profitable, it has not been able to pay dividends so far and has invested $ 175 million to 
get to the current price point level (FSD, 2004). 
In conclusion, 100% of respondents 120 indicated that, although there is a lot of work 
before TKL's monopoly expires in June 2004 coupled with the challenges ahead for 
TKL's privatization, rescheduled for completion in June 2005, TKL seemed committed 
to prioritizing its financial restructuring program. This would enable TKL to continue 
its expansion of technology, product innovation, improving the connections, creating 
efficiency, and lowering prices. However, private sector and industry respondents did 
not share this optimism and viewed TKL as lacking in political support, will, and 
managerial capacity, to resolve financial and expansion issues. Some TKL managers on 
request of anonymity shared this view; as one of the respondents stated: "how can TKL 
claim progress in line connections when 90% of those customers are either 
disconnected or do not pay their bills." On managerial capacity and investor perception, 
one manager responded: "how is one expected to take the Government's comments on 
investor confidence seriously when they keep bringing into TLK CEOs that are 
intended to maintain the GOK's interests rather than expand and grow TKL?" 
However, despite these views TKL and the GOK were confident that their strategy of 
going to the Nairobi stock exchange for an IPO to raise funds was key to TKL's 
financial stability (FSD, 2004; TKL, 2003a). 
Notwithstanding the complicated prospects, this research sought to find what leading 
industry players would do if "given the opportunity to privatize TKL." This question 
drew enthusiastic responses from respondents (see Question 19 appendix 1 annex I and 
14 in annex II ) who agreed on almost all basic strategies: Firstly, divestiture of 
government shares in TKL and Telecommunications business in general, whether it 
120 See appendix 2: annex V n=l9 
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was strategic or not, was v iewed as quite important. Secondly, revamping the top 
management through advertising the top positions, branding TKL, and getting 
management's commitment to the financial restructuring was considered as an 
important step, along with a publicity program to change the negative perception of 
TKL's management by the public and investors. Thirdly, with a solid strategically 
focused private sector oriented management in place, corporate governance should be 
instituted in order to introduce business solutions in a systematic manner, as argued by 
Safari com's management. The respondents concluded that TKL needed to perform as a 
private sector business first and show its potential through independent management 
before seeking an IPO or STI. More importantly, TKL needed to show independence by 
highlighting its direct linkage to Safaricom as a subsidiary. This strategy of 
consolidating TKL as a potential growth led and profitable company would be the best 
way forward in privatising TKL (TLK, 2003a: 2003; FSD, 2004). 
5:8:2 Conclusions 
This chapter concludes by addressing this research's central question of exploring 
Kenya's approach to privatisation as a first empirical study on Telkom Kenya in the 
sub-region. This chapter's field survey data (FSD) analysis illustrates the thesis' 
generation of theory of Kenya's approach to privatization through the eyes of TLK's 
privatization, with insights that can be applicable to the COMESA region and the larger 
sub-Saharan Africa.ln general, the findings conclude that in cases where there has been 
a large number of SOE's in operation for a long time, the objectives for methods of 
privatization should be based on the social, economic and social political realities of 
each sector in order to avoid mistakes during the privatization process. In addition, the 
data analysis concluded that the impetus and focus of approaches depend largely on 
each case's prioritised objectives, methods, strategies and the capacity of institutions to 
implement an 'outside' program by adopting it to the local environment. This could be 
done by measuring the commitment to economic growth and social development of the 
people nationally, regionally and particularly of the administration in power. Whereas 
the literature and this research show the levels of government involvement in the SOE 
divestiture as unavoidable, investors have tended to view the government as strongly 
326 
Chapter Five: Study Findings and Data Analysis: General Research Findings on the Privatization Process, Institutional and Legal Framework 
partisan (Nyong'o, 2000). This analysis ofthe thesis findings focus on the dynamics in 
the exploration of an approach to privatization. 
The findings have clearly shown that GOK's approach to privatization and TLK's 
privatization present challenges faced by public enterprises in their transformation 
process (Schusselbauer, 1999, pp.64-66). It has also shown that during the 
transformation process, some sectors are more complicated than others are. 
Consequently, suitable methods and techniques need to be applied by sector and 
enterprise to fit the restructuring and privatization strategies. For example, in the case 
of the telecoms sector and TKL in particular, the process enabled entrance of new 
businesses, products, equipment, software, ISPs and Cyber cafes. TKL capitalized on 
this growth expansion and strengthened its portfolio from that of figure 5-11 to that in 
figure 5-12 and as discussed in sections 5:4 and 5:5. 
Indeed, due to the complicated relationship between GOK and TKL as a public 
enterprise, TKL' s management could not make swift and appropriate decisions for 
restructuring TKL for privatization. For example, TKL's equipment, business processes 
and technology remain old and un-reengineered (Kitiabi and Kuzmak, 1998) due to its 
public sector uncompetitive attitude. TKL still operates old cabled technology prone to 
breakdowns and requiring a substantial work force for cable repair and response to 
faults (figure 5-13). On the business side there was no clear customer segmentation, 
market segmentation and sales representation that match the competition with the three 
national cellular providers, the Second National Operator (SNO) and other companies 
in the COMESA region. This research clearly shows that TLK still had a lot of 
restructuring to be done before it was ready for privatization and for it to achieve a 
maximum financial, market, product and management transformation, and to be an 
attractive enterprise as KQ was in the long term. 
More specifically, the empirical data collection and analysis process generates a first 
attempt at sketching Kenya's approach to a privatization process as discussed in 
chapters five and six. Figures 5-1 -5-4 and table 5-1 present a chronological approach to 
Kenya's privatization process with the specific discussions on the privatization of TLK 
giving the details of transactions. The findings clearly show the importance of any 
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approach in paying close attention to building a regulatory capacity, and in not only 
institutionalizing the process (Young, 2003) but also in increasing the value ofthe firm 
and attracting investors (Stiglitz, 1999). The evidence in this chapter further concludes 
that there has been tremendous growth in the telecommunications and related industries 
(table 5-5 and figure 5-7) after KPTC's unbundling; however, this growth has not 
translated into attracting investors and a solid privatization approach. 
More importantly, the knowledge of an exploration of Kenya's approach developed in 
this thesis has implications for the different approaches to privatization advocated by 
the World Bank and donor agencies, which are current in the literature. The arguments 
of the World Bank and Vickers and Yarrow (1988, p.185) on revenue as a major 
objective for divestiture by LDCs falls short of evidence on the ground. This thesis 
findings concluded that although Kenya along with her counterparts in COMESA made 
a direct positive relationship between total raised revenue to government and 
liberalisation, with 93% of the respondents indicating that the main reason governments 
agreed to liberalise was to raise revenue to the exchequer, this did not drive the choice 
of major objectives and strategy. For instance, although 93% of respondents and the 
World Bank thought that revenue was a major objective and goal in divestiture to the 
GOK and CO MESA, 121 the government rated technology, restructuring and 
liberalisation as extremely important to the success and privatization of "strategic 
enterprises" that included, KQ, TKL and KCB amongst the list of the thirty-three 
strategic enterprises. Notably, the revenue goal argument had been used by the World 
Bank to encourage further privatizations as was clearly stated by the revised 
Kenya/World Bank/ IFC agreement (GOK/World Bank, 2001) and the PSDS program 
(GOK, 2000) approved by the World Bank Executive Board in 2002. 122 
The major concern generated by this research, and discussed at length in the literature, 
was the creation of legal institutional frameworks that would provide for checks and 
balances in the utilization of the privatization revenue i.e. infusing it back into the 
relevant sectors. For example, the respondents argued that most African governments 
saw the amounts in revenue accrued from privatized entities but did not factor the costs 
121 See Appendix 1: Annex V A list of "Strategic Commercially Oriented " State enterprises 
122 
see also section 2:5 in chapter two figures 2:1-2:3 on Privatization revenue trends 
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of liberalisation and reforms into the strategy at the beginning and as such found their 
budgets still short of the anticipated revenue levels. In the case of TKL, after receiving 
revenue from the liberalization and restructuring process (i.e. licences and shares sold 
to a strategic partner), TKLIGOK still owed the workers' pensions (Okwatch, 2004; 
FSD, 2004). 
Furthermore, the findings did not indicate that the governments themselves had 
priorities drawn out to influence privatization to benefit development objectives and 
programs that were articulated in the UN, World Bank and donor agencies development 
programs menu. For instance, the wealth creation, private sector strengthening, cost 
reduction, and new business creation objectives were rated by the public policy 
respondents as merely being important and had a cumulative percentage of only 20% of 
respondents. Yet these objectives are stated by the World Bank as important to the 
success of a privatization program implemented by Kenya, thus addressing the issues 
raised in the central research question and supporting research questions. 
In summary, this analysis of the thesis data based on the responses from the findings 
imports the intricate ongoing debate that centres upon approaches, strategies, objectives 
and methods of privatization transaction argued in the literature review of chapter two 
(2: 1 :2) and discussions on analysis on secondary data in chapter four. In this regard, 
this thesis-generated theory adds and relates to some of the theoretical basis that defines 
privatization in LDCs, and Africa in particular, in relation to economic and socio-
political privatization policies and operations that makeup an approach. Indeed, the 
research presented in this thesis extends the privatization models presented by Vickers 
and Yarrow, (1985); Cook and Kirkpatrick, (eds) (1988); Shafik, (1993); Stiglitz, 
(2000) and Ramanadham, (1995; 1999) adding to their in-depth theoretical arguments 
on the reasons, objectives and approaches to privatization and the basis of the 
government's approach, assuming that these objectives were externally influenced. 
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6:1 Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This chapter concludes with a summary of the research findings of this thesis. It 
presents a brief outline of the major contributions of the findings to the privatization 
process and their implications for privatization policy and practice for both Kenya and 
the developing economies (DEs). The chapter also outlines a summary and conclusions 
on the major outcomes of the research. The research generated new empirical data 
which is useful for analysis of 'best practices' of the process and provides an 
opportunity for further regional research and publication. The unfolding nature of the 
study makes this research unique as it provides for one major contribution of generating 
new information on a privatization approach in Kenya through the eyes of Telkom 
Kenya's privatization and provides an actual 'model' case sketch. 
6: 1 : 1 Contribution of the Research to the Field of Privatization 
This thesis research contributed to privatization theory and practice. First, is the 
unfolding nature of the study making this research unique in its contribution of a 
documented case of a privatization in the region using new data unavailable elsewhere. 
In the analysis process this thesis generates new theory that helps explain the dynamism 
in the approaches employed in the region, adding to new information specifically in the 
field of telecommunication policy with the example of the transaction of Telkom 
Kenya Second, it contributes comprehensively to the records of an LDC's systematic 
approach to the privatization process. Earlier attempts noble as they may have been, 
took a global exposition of various approaches, strategies and techniques as reviewed in 
the literature (see Nyong'o, 2000; Ramanadham, (ed.), 1995). 
Third, the research analysis contributes to the existing literature through generation of a 
body of knowledge on the privatization of public enterprises and an exploration of 
approaches to privatizing telecommunications in the region. In the process the thesis 
sets the stage for increased dialogue globally, regionally and nationally in the 
exploration of the socio- economic, and social-political dynamics of the privatization 
process as outlined m the former chapters. Fourth, the expansive 
review of the literature in chapter two and the critical discourse of the theories arising 
provides the field of privatization, public enterprise administration and private sector 
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development with an important reference source for understanding the theory of 
privatization m LDCs. The literature and field findings further indicated that 
privatization ts a tool for attaining institutional reforms and liberalization 1 of 
development and socio-economic structures and not a goal in itself. Indeed, the 
literature review and secondary data analysis of telecommunications concluded that 
privatization, like globalization2, has become a reality in Africa and the world-over, but 
the approaches and processes remain the issues of focus in the literature.3 For instance, 
issues associated with cultural, economic and institutional infrastructure differences 
between western countries and African countries flag up further potential research 
questions related to applying the same privatization process in different environments. 
Fifth within this expanstve literature, this research concludes that significantly few 
empirical based studies on the approaches and processes of privatization in developing 
countries have been undertaken (see Shirley et al 2002 on Uganda and Wallsten, 2000a: 
2001 analysis on Senegal). Indeed, the conclusion is that two streams of literature were 
identified. The first comes from the World Bank development policy research groups-
mainly based on technical research papers within and from related sister agencies. 
These are highlight various experiences of privatization in LDCs and other parts of the 
world (see Samuel, 1999; Schusselbauer, 1999; Wallsten, 1999; Stiglitz, 1996; 
UNCTAD, 1995; Wellenius, et al. 1992; Shirley and Nellis 1991; Shirley and Elliot, 
1987; Ramanadham, ed. 1989; and Vuylsteke, 1988). The other stream comes out of 
academia and is largely institutional and consultancy based. It has been strongly 
influenced by abstract economic arguments based on theories of development and 
market economics (see Stigilitz, 2003:2001: 1993; Ramanadham, 1993; Killick, 1991, 
Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). In general the World Bank 
based accounts of approaches to privatization in LDCs focus on institutional policy 
reforms through liberalization, and restructuring that are expected to lead to substantial 
performance improvements in public enterprises (PEs) through cost reductions, access 
to services and products, regulated competition, efficiency, revenue diversification and 
creation of new business opportunities, as outlined by this thesis study. 
1 See research question 3 
2 See Stigilitz, (2003) 
3 
see sections 2: 1-2:2: 1 - chapter two 
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6:1 :2 Summary and Conclusions on Policy, and Transactional issues 
Sixth, the purpose, aims and objectives of the research stated in chapter one are 'tested' 
by the analysis in chapters four and five which gives research questions meaning and 
provides insight into the approaches and strategies to privatization in Kenya. This was 
particularly evident in the extent to which the government selected objectives, goals, 
techniques, methods and utilized government led institutional frameworks to determine 
outcomes and complete TKL's privatization transaction along with those of Kenya 
Commercial Bank (KCB) and Kenya Airways (KQ). In particular, the analysis of the 
various factors that account for engagement and completion of the process by 
government itself, give rise to a unique approach that contributes to institutional 
building and interactions of the aims and objectives for Kenya. This has strong 
relevance within the telecommunications service sector in the sub-region with possible 
applicability to the surrounding countries with similar socio-economic and political 
contexts that affect the process. 
Seventh, the study findings summary and conclusions presented in chapters four and 
five included; 1) the conclusion that the objectives, motives and methods for a program 
(though written) are dynamic and may change during the implementation process. In the 
case of GOK, greater access to telecommunications services and enterprise restructuring 
become major goals (see tables 5-8 and 5-9). 2) This thesis further concludes that 
governments in Africa recognize the need to divest from SOEs shareholding and 
management; however, the clear dilemma of depending on markets to resolve social-
political and economic reform challenges still remains unresolved and the analysis of 
this thesis is a major contribution towards a resolution. 3) The thesis efforts to sketch 
Kenya's approach to privatization using field data from Kenya uniquely contribute 
directly to the 'empirical gap' of a body of knowledge in the literature on the 
privatization process, on telecoms and in the COMESA region as presented in the 
analysis of chapters four and five. 4) The research also extends the privatization debate 
on the effects of the interplay between improved services, greater access, reduced costs 
of services and the increasing challenge of lost jobs, new jobs and job security in 
uncertain economic environments created by privatization.4 5) In addition, the thesis 
submits that this interplay is unique to fast growing sectors like telecommunications and 
4 Evidence in chapter six shows 50% lost jobs in divested SOEs but 60-200% new opportunities across the sectors 
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responds to the objectives and aims of research questions one and two which indicate 
that in some cases as stated the dynamics overwhelm the larger objectives and motives 
for privatization. 5 
Eighth, From the analysis of the secondary and primary data it was indicated that TKL 
has potential to beat the competition through rapid expansion, realise big profits and 
remain the largest operator in Kenya and in COMESA. The conclusion made on this is 
that for the GOK and TLK to accomplish this status, they have to do several things: first 
they have to adhere to business principles at policy and practical levels by reducing the 
political priorities. For example, the parastal top management (and TKL's in particular) 
have to be sourced from the market and not selected. Second, more specific internal 
restructuring has to continue i.e. TKL needs to maintain a high interconnection rate (as 
set by CCK). This includes; !)improving on its last mile by raising its tariffs (as in 
2004) in order to attain comfortable revenue levels, and 2) improving its net 
interconnect revenues (receipts less out-payments) by maintaining revenue levels in 
TKL's favour, clearing its liabilities by implementing the social safety-net 
recommendations,6 in order to enable space for realignment and growth through an IPO. 
These realignment have to be fast tracked as discussed in detail in chapter four and 
sections 5:5 through to 5:7 of chapter five. In particular TKL ought to improve its 
performance in revenue and staff rationalization in order to attract a good price (IPO), 
face-off anticipated competition from the Second National Operator (SNO) and deal 
with uncertainties created by the dynamics of business and politics of government 
divestiture. These specific tasks are replicable to other PEs in Kenya's completed and 
up coming privatizations of infrastructure, utilities and banking shown in table 5-l and 
also to other COMESA countries. 
Ninth, as to whether the central research question has been addressed by the study, this 
research concludes that the thesis's literature review and the research analyses have 
adequately responded to the central research question and the four supporting questions. 
In addition, the purpose, aims, objectives and goals have been addressed adequately 
through the identification and documentation of an approach to Kenya's privatization of 
TKL. The results show the GOK's approach to privatization has been done through a set 
5 detailed in section II of chapter six 
6 Discussed in chapters 2,5 and 6 
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of guidelines developed into an approach7 whose structure is documented for the first 
time by this thesis and clearly outlined in the TKL process and figure 5-1. 
Tenth, this thesis summarizes how the GOK implements its privatization program by 
using a set of guidelines from a divestiture policy framework8 developed and reviewed 
by the Investment Secretariat in the Ministry of Finance. This framework outlines the 
objectives and goals of the privatization program, and lists enterprises for restructuring 
and privatising. The divestiture secretariat team initiates strategies for privatization and 
then sets in motion rather haphazardly the creation of a set of new institutions and 
methods to form an approach to the privatization process as indicated in figures 5-l, 5-
3,5-4 and table 5-9. The case study (in response to the central question and questions 
three and four) however concludes that GOK's privatizations, in particular the 
transaction of TKL, involved an hitherto undocumented close collaboration and cross 
functional way of proceeding to form a unique model of a national approach to a 
privatization process, and represents a unique way of working in LDCs to that of 
western countries. For instance, the TKL approach largely used government controlled 
unwritten divestiture policies to manage the privatization priorities leading to a strategy 
falling into place like a jigsaw. This framework has proved to have a formative 
influence in the identification, understanding and documentation of Kenya's unique 
approach to the privatization process as anticipated by the central research question in 
chapter one page 8. 
Eleventh, in answering the central question and questions 3 and 4, the analysis ofTKL's 
privatization in chapter five and the objectives of the research indicated that specific 
legal and policy institutional frameworks for driving the privatization process are still in 
their infant and creation stages (see Young, 2002 and Wright and Perroti, (eds.) 2000). 
The study concludes that there are serious resource and capacity deficiencies in 
applying privatization elements in an environment whose development priorities do not 
include privatization (GOK, 1997).9 In this regard, dynamics involved in the legal 
institutionalization of the privatization process, through the enactment of the 
Privatization Bill discussed in section 5:1:3:3, indicated lack of capacity, resources and 
political will by the ruling elite, for institutionalizing the privatization process, in 
answer to the central research question. 10 
7 see sections (4 9 and 5:1:1 and figures 5-1 5-3, and 5-4) 
8 see GOK 1996 
9 As an example, Kenya's Development plan of(1995/l998) do not include the privatization program 
10 What, why, and how are the approach(es) of Kenya's Privatization Program in a developing Economy? 
334 
Chapter Six: Summary Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Twelfth, still on objectives, goals and process, the study concludes that the process is 
closed and is non-participatory as evidenced by the different prioritizations of the 
objectives, methods and techniques by the various stakeholders involved in the process 
of privatising Telkom Kenya. The study suggests that the GOK's objectives 
fundamentally differ from those of the public, the business community and the World 
Bank. Indeed where the government agrees with these three groups its actions tend to be 
contradictory to public opinion, especially in cases of policy reversals and contract 
cancellation by politicians instead of by the regulatory body and the judicial system (i.e. 
the case of ECONET). In this regard, this thesis recommends that the GOK needs to 
provide a public information program that would enable citizen participation at policy 
and investment levels. In some instances, the GOK is so desperate to maintain control 
of the top management of the parastals listed for privatizing that it contradicts its own 
objectives and goals for privatising by selecting partisan management. For example the 
objective of introducing new management and reducing the workforce in order to attract 
more revenue and a strategic partner before the IPO (Schusselbauer, 1999; 
Shirley,l988) was overlooked during Telkom Kenya's restructuring monopoly period of 
December 2002 to June 2004. 
Thirteenth, this thesis is a further illustration of the dynamics of the relationship 
between government's (politician's) role as a manager of the public enterprises and the 
private sector as a 'takeover' agent. The analysis indicates that the objectives of the 
privatization program are determined by political motives seeking votes to employ their 
constituents, and political allies and to maintain control over SOEs. This action pushes 
operating costs at state enterprises (airlines and telecoms) higher than in the private 
sector. For instance the findings showed that TKL's operating costs were found to be 
extremely high, with a wage bill of Kshs. 0.5 billion a month (in December 2002). 
Therefore, with an uneconomical wage bill, along with a perception of political 
intrigues and patronage this thesis concluded that TKL as a public enterprise has been 
more focused on pursuing political goals11 rather than the socio-economic goals, as 
stated in the Roadmap (2003) and the GOK divestiture objectives of 1996. 
Fourteenth, the primary data analysis over-whelming by confirmed the correlation 
between pubic enterprise reform and restructuring to secure increased jobs and business 
11 Ibid and (Shirley, 1992: Megginson et al, 1994) 
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opportunities. There was agreement amongst all respondents that due to the process of 
privatizing of telecoms in general there was a marked increase of between 50% to 
150% in jobs in the transport and communications sector in Kenya and across the 
COMESA region. 12 This answered the research questions two and three (RQ2 &3) on 
whether privatization can yield employment and new business opportunities. In 
agreement with the literature these constitute two major objectives or motives of 
privatising that all stakeholders and 86% of the respondents ranked as extremely 
important in this research, particularly in the telecommunications industry where high 
levels of technological growth have been closely linked to job and investment 
opportunities 13 
In summary, this thesis research, in its attempt to 'trace the footsteps' of a privatization 
approach or strategy for a developing economy14reveals that the government's "laxity" 
in enacting a privatization law critically delays the transaction process (as indicated in 
figure 5-2). Instead of the estimated 18 months period, Telkom Kenya's privatization 
took 24 months). The findings further indicated that there were no serious efforts to 
build legal and administrative institutional frameworks that are crucial to successful 
privatizations. In the case TKL, the delay of the enactment of the Privatization Bill and 
the investment code into law further exacerbated the delays. In this respect, the findings 
of chapter five show that the government of Kenya did not engage in any considerable 
preparations for the sale of large enterprises like Kenya Airways, Telkom Kenya and 
Kenya Railways, preferring to rely instead on the international financial agencies who 
provide financial and technical assistance, while failing to build local and national 
institutions for privatization. The thesis notes that this position is changing, however, 
with the introduction of regional economic blocs (i.e. COMESA and EAC), whose 
focus is on regionalization of privatization programs and approaches that require the use 
of regional rather than national strategic policies for attracting regional investment and 
integration. 
In addition, the successful outcome of the privatizations of large enterprises reviewed 
and analysed by this research lies in a government's (i.e. GOK's) internal dynamics of 
breaking the entities into competitive and manageable units, bringing in ownership of 
assets, dynamic private sector managers, settling past liabilities (i.e. KQ and TKL), and 
12 data on jobs, and employment creation and business opportunity was collected using questions 12 in section one and 
~uestions 9 and 10 in section 2 of the questionnaires and was volunteered. 
1 see RQ4 
14 See central Research question. 
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shedding excess labour (as in TKL and KR). Yet, evidence in chapters four and five 
show that the progress made on GOK's privatization approach proceeded on a 
'management by crisis' basis under the watchful eye and prompting of the World Bank, 
IMF, donor agencies, bilateral governments and now CO MESA. Related to this is the 
controversial objective of enterprise restructuring which is a pre-privatization step that 
governments in the developing world manipulate to delay privatization. Schusselbauer, 
(1999, p.9) has reported that this process should be brief and specific, limiting itself to 
the balance sheet and organization changes related to workforce issues. This research 
concluded that the government favoured restructuring in the case of TKL because they 
did not have to relinquish control of the top management and had the power to 
manipulate the process, whereas TLK's management favoured restructuring because in 
a full sale to a strategic partner or in an IPO the managers risked losing their jobs as 
government nominees. This explains why governments and PE top management 
intentionally delay instituting legal and institutional frameworks necessary for fast 
tracking transactions, as discussed in the policy and operational strategies section in 
chapter five. 
Indeed, this thesis's conceptual framework reviewed in chapter two and the field 
findings in chapter five confirm the importance of the interaction between theories 
(raised in chapter two), indicating that privatization in LDCs is often a political process. 
The practice of privatizing in a highly political and complex social-economically 
environment adding to the various government justifications and perspectives is 
heightened by social-economic differences in the benefits of privatization to the 
political elite. 15 
This thesis provides an insight into the necessity and importance of the process of 
institution building, strengthening and transparency in the approaches taken to privatize. 
Evidence in chapters four and five leads this thesis to conclude that the sale of 
enterprises could be made transparent by adopting competitive bidding procedures, 
developing objective criteria for selecting bids, and creating a clear privatization focal 
point (i.e. the Privatization Commission to replace CCK16 shown in figures 5-1 and 5-2) 
with minimal bureaucracy to monitor the overall program. 17 Lack of transparency can 
result in a political backlash that often delays the process or brings it to a halt. Some of 
15 See sections 2:1,2:1:2 on motives and rationalization and section 5:0 and 5:5 on study findings 
16 
see figures 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 and table 6-9 
17 Case of TKL and see the bill in page 246 
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the relevant cases have been the case of Kenya Re, and TKL delays (this research, 
2005) and also cases in telecoms in Senegal, Guinea, Uganda and Zambia (Shirley, et 
al. 2002) and water privatization in Tanzania (World Bank, 2004). A comprehensive 
public program to address information and transparencies issues is desperately needed 
in the sub-region. 
Lastly, this thesis has traced an outline of Kenya's approach to privatization through a 
comprehensive case study ofTKL and data analysis of the GOK's implementation of its 
divesture program. Discussion on telecommunications and the prescriptive literature 
suggests it is easily replicable regionally amongst the countries that share similar 
economic and political environments with Kenya. Significantly, the findings herein 
attempt to identify and document Kenya's approach through an explorative study of 
TKL. The sketched approach in this thesis to transactions needs further review and 
consolidation. Besides, there is need for Telkom Kenya, CCK, and the Privatization 
Committee at Treasury to be brought under one Privatization Commission. This will 
help in understanding and applying the important steps in any privatization transaction 
shown in figure 5-2 especially for a public offering followed in a 'case' privatization 
like that ofTKL (Welch, and Fremond, 1998). 
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6:2 Policy Implications and Future Research Agenda 
6:2:1 Summary Implications 
A major implication of this thesis findings to privatization policy is the objective of 
building and strengthening the institutional framework. To do this the GOK first needs 
to restructure and improve the operations of public enterprises (PEs) by outlining their 
approach and process clearly and tangibly in order to attract local and international 
investors. The Kenya government should also divest the PEs that are earmarked for 
restructuring and privatization. Evidence from this research shows the importance of 
divestiture to allow for substantial restructuring before privatizing. Second, the GOK 
ought to institute a privatization commission independent from government and from 
international financial institutions, its role would be to coordinate the privatization 
activities together with the regulators. The importance of building institutions and a 
legal framework is shown by the findings in chapter five and also as argued by Ogus, 
(2002), Schusselbauer, (1999), Young, (2003), and Wellenius, (1997). 
Third, after institutionalization of the process, the commission needs to build alliances 
with the private sector, civil society and other governrrient institutions in order for the 
government to be able to develop special programs that provide information to the 
public and to the investors. In the process it must develop a social safety net, to deal 
with the negative short-and long-term effects of privatization. Fourth, GOK needs to 
consider utilising some of the methods available for creating safety nets that include: 
1) using a voucher method to spread out the public shares to the larger population 
through MBO and MEBOs creating a semblance of equity as indicated by study 
respondents in chapter five and in the literature review. 18; (2) continuing to use the 
'golden handshake" generous severance packages to encourage voluntary retirements 
and reduce the need for outright dismissals; (3) along with this, providing counselling 
and investment service, to employees who would not know how to utilize the generous 
pay-outs (4) converting the debt into equity shares especially in the case of telecoms and 
insurance; (5) encouraging employee/management ownership schemes through 
access/affordable credit; (6) creating unemployment benefits; (7) using retraining-
18 
see discussions by Mayer and Meadowecroft, (1985); Calker, (1996); Finance Weekly, (2002, p.48) 
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redeployment programs to ease the social costs of privatization, and (8) considering 
using case by case privatization as argued by the world Bank (1998) 
Fifth, while a qualified non-intervention policy appears to be the safest bet in labour 
retrenchment before privatization, another policy might be to set up a social safety net 
or labour reallocation program before privatization, and then let the new private owners 
decide on redundancy levels. Sixth, setting up a public awareness program before 
privatization may help with the political viability of the process, and letting the new 
owners manage the retrenchment may help avoid adverse selection. In most cases 
however, the governments in developing countries do not want to let the new owners 
undertake retrenchment due to the political control and political motives discussed 
earlier. In fact as the secondary data show on TKL, the main reason for the breakdown 
of the transaction negotiations was the outstanding pension for the workers and the 
retrenchment of an estimated ten thousand employees, viewed by interested investors as 
a burden to initial profits. Besides, incoming strategic partner investors made it clear 
during the due diligence process that the union problem of downsizing was to be taken 
over by the government before privatization. This is because the cost of downsizing for 
an incoming investor can prove to be too costly to sustain in a new market. 
Seventh, this thesis suggests that TKL should find innovative ways to settle the debt 
because of the uncertainty created by labour and financial liabilities. Chapter four 
further outlines in-depth details of the historical perspectives of the unbundling of the 
former KPT &C, to the rebirth of Safaricom and Telkom Kenya. The focus on Telkom's 
performance as a fixed telephony operator and as an enterprise undergoing privatization 
further reveals the difficulties experienced by TKL in trying to operate in different 
regulatory scenarios and with different financial options. In this respect, the downsizing 
and the pension liability (estimated at Kshs. 15-17 billion in 2003) matters reviewed at 
length still remain an obstacle for the GOK in receiving good value for TKL. 
Lastly, the GOK needs to review its policy on sector and industry regulators and 
regulatory frameworks. The thesis findings emphasize the importance of building and 
strengthening regulatory frameworks. The theoretical and field findings suggest that 
privatisation in Africa accompanied by proper regulation and backed by strong political 
commitment to expenditure redistribution is a valuable alternative to state management. 
A tool can ensure increased access for consumers and overall improvements in quality. 
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This was demonstrated in Uganda, Egypt, Ghana, Senegal and South Africa, 19 where the 
privatisation of the telecommunications and electricity companies led to substantial 
extension of their networks.20 
This thesis has outlined Kenya's approach to privatization. However, overall the 
African privatisation process is still developing its own approaches. It will continue to 
do so given that it has been facing significant bottlenecks in terms of lack of a clear 
approach, a poor regulatory framework, and a general lack of human and resource 
capacity in operation. The lessons learned from the past ten years (1993-2003) of 
privatisation can be used to improve divestiture methods for the companies that remain 
to be privati sed. In a number of countries, these include some of the largest and strategic 
companies.21 Moreover, the way privatisations are managed has a considerable impact 
on public opinion and the attitude it would take towards further privatisations and more 
generally towards any kind of structural adjustment programmes. The outcomes of 
privatisation should thus be a major concern for policy makers and especially for 
international donors who are the main instigators of privatisation programmes in 
Africa22• 
20 Minges M., (ITU, 2003); Harggsrty, Shirley, and Wallsten, (2002); Azam and Dia, (2002) 
21 For example insurance, Rail, mining, water and Health related companies in Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and Egypt 
22 Mail and Guardian, September 28, 2004 
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6:2:2 Future Policy Agenda 
This thesis further indicates that Kenya's privatization program urgently needs to 
implement four major aspects of a 'good' privatization program; 1) Institute a visible 
strong public information strategy/process that will be able to respond to the perception 
concerns raised in the findings, because investors care about perception. (2) Strengthen 
the capacity of public institutions and individuals involved in the divestiture process. (3) 
Strengthen the private sector's capacity to respond to the tendering processes, 
procedures and objectives of privatization by participating in the introduction of 
competition into the market, (as was the case with Regional and Second National 
Operators) to avoid creating 'private monopolies'. 23 (4) Along with institutionalizing of 
the privatization process, this thesis forwards the fundamental principle of transparency 
underlying the Privatization Bill (PB) of 2003 and the Communications Act of 1998. 
Public participation through inquiries and industry forums is recommended good 
practice. More extensive notions of transparency are desirable and possible as advised 
by Welch and Fremond (1998), since the Ministers for Finance, Transport and 
Communications ultimately determine the extend and pace of the key regulatory policy 
decisions.24 
23 Vickers and Yarrow, 1995, pp.S0-84) 
24 Stigilitz, (2003) 
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6:3 Limitations and Future Research 
6:3:1 Limitations of the thesis 
This thesis has addressed the limitations of the research in chapter three (section 3:4). 
However, the major limitation to the study and thesis process that the field research, as 
a first study to be undertaken, suffered was a substantial 'deficit' of documentation 
evidence on the approaches to the privatization process. Secondly, the challenge of 
dealing with a study on approaches and strategies of the case of an unfolding 
privatization of Telkom Kenya whose transaction was dynamic could have occasioned 
missing out important information that could have affected the findings. Thirdly, 
Kenya's and indeed COMESA countries' approaches have not been documented 
making it difficult to obtain systematic and coordinated information that would have 
made analysis expandable. Fourthly, government departments often arbitrarily decided 
what was confidential, and this could be the cause of "gaps" in some information used 
for analysis. However, the private sector individuals who were willing to fill in the gaps 
helped in the process. Fifthly, as an academic thesis study there were serious limitations 
to the financial and physical resources that caused substantial delays in time and 
capacity to analyze and present quality results in the given time of 36 months. 
On the possible reflexivity and subjectivity of the qualitative research - this research 
aimed at eliminating the researcher's impact on the research process through the short 
time of the study. The field research was undertaken in Nairobi in a less than four 
months period, the researcher was based in the U.K. This ensured that the researcher 
was not continuously interacting with those being researched, to risk influencing the 
process. In this regard the researcher was not in a position to influence the research 
structure outcome through personal and professional characteristics. In addition, the 
sample respondents involved CEOs, senior government officials and private sector 
individuals who had no time to interact with the researcher to the level that they would 
subjectively influence the outcome of the research. The interactions between the 
respondents and the researcher were strictly based on their official capacities, in their 
respective research fields and within the interview times only. In this regard this study, 
was not in any way seriously influenced by the research respondents. More importantly, 
this researcher did not work in a public sector environment and had not previously 
worked in the field of study, therefore eliminating the threat of collecting prejudiced or 
trivial data. The researcher had little time to engage in unnecessary or 
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invalid discussion, information collected was non-contaminated, valid, and reliable 
knowledge. Similarly, the study period and the professionalism of the researcher did not 
allow for influence on the research outcome by the respondents. 
6:3:2 Future Research- Recommendations 
The field findings provide some interesting areas of consideration for future research. 
First, this study requires further empirical work on the privatization approaches and 
strategies in four major COMESA countries, in order to record the process, and study 
the relationships between strategies and the outcomes of the privatization programs. 
This 'gap' in the literature and knowledge needs to expand from this thesis to a larger 
study. 
The second research area would involve targeted empirical work on estimated and 
actual annual value and performance of the public enterprises before and after 
privatization, noting that this was not the focus of this research. This was a serious gap 
within the theoretical and field studies analysed by this thesis. Most of the PEs were last 
valued in the 1960s creating a debate on the estimated value. This would provide basic 
information that is necessary for a privatization transaction sale without governments 
spending public funds to undertake non-credible (partisan) valuations and business 
performance audits. The impact of the relationship between the final value and the sale 
value on performance related variables such as capital mobilization and utilization, 
human resource, expansion, growth, and national and regional characteristics should 
also be studied. 
A third area of research suggested would be the separation of 'badly' performing 
variables in pre-and post privatizations and their study in order to find the linkage with 
the privatization approaches. Fourth, an empirical study on the treatment of contentious 
issues in the privatization process; some of these include: labour and finance liabilities 
and their impact on pre/post privatization especially for the for CO MESA region. Future 
research would have to look at the transaction processes across sectors and indicate the 
differences, investigating whether all sectors and countries can be treated in a similar 
way. Fifth, research on the role and contribution of privatization to trade and regional 
integration across borders by country and industry is long overdue. Empirical studies in 
this area are urgently required and are very important to the economic regional 
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integration efforts and agenda across African trade and economic blocs (ECOWAS, 
COMESA, NAEC, and SADC). 
Sixth, the majority of new jobs and business opportunities have been in 
telecommunications. Research that empirically targets their enhancement needs to be 
undertaken in the COMESA region to quantify these figures. This would help the 
governments and COMESA attract telecoms investments into the region. Seventh, 
urgent research on the relationship between entrepreneurship and the new industries and 
businesses arising from privatization across COMESA should be undertaken by member 
states. This would help in planning and investments in small businesses. In addition, 
research on the impact of privatization of selected "social sectors" to the overall 
development of a country and the ability of its investors to compete regionally is 
desirable. This research would also investigate the role of the 'third sector' (charitable 
organizations) in the provision of public or social services. 
In conclusion, this thesis indeed has outlined Kenya's approach to privatization, 
knowledge that did not exist before, along with challenges for privatising Telkom 
Kenya. The thesis has further shown that there is need to periodically catalogue, 
monitor and update the privatization transactions by objectives, sector, approaches, 
proceeds and their impact on the developing countries economies. It was evident that 
such basic statistical data was unavailable in any form. 25The exploration of TKL is 
about constructing a tangible approach to the privatization transaction in Kenya and is 
about the management of the privatization process which seeks to integrate related 
activities. New knowledge and analysis of the privatization of Telkom Kenya process 
adds to the debate of the approaches discussed throughout this research. More generally 
there is a trend in the literature towards a convergence of various approaches in western, 
transitional and LDCs economies, and the discussion recognises overlapping linkages. 
The thesis research provides an insight into a process which has to date remained 
unexplored from an academic perspective. The need for further research has been 
highlighted in order to build upon and develop this knowledge. The contribution to the 
current debate and literature 'gap' and the field study as a source of credible records for 
reference in the field of privatization has been outlined and areas of further investigation 
suggested. 
25 World bank listings were last updated in 1999 
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Glossary 
Gll.ossary2 
African Development Bank- A regional bank started in 1966 to support the 
development of independent African States though loans and assistance. Its main 
portfolio is in infrastructure. 
Asset Sale or Long-Term Lease. An asset sale is the transfer of ownership of 
government assets, commercial type enterprises, or functions to the private sector. In 
general, the government will have no role in the financial support, management, or 
oversight of a sold asset. However, if the asset is sold to a company in an industry with 
monopolistic characteristics, the government may regulate certain aspects of the 
business, such as the regulation of utility and telecom tariff rates. 
Leasing Arrangements- are forms of public-private partnership. Under a long-term 
lease, the government may lease a facility or enterprise to a private-sector entity for a 
specified period. Maintenance, operation, and payment terms are spelled out in the 
lease agreement. Under a sale-leaseback arrangement, the government sells an asset to a 
private-sector entity and then leases it back. Under a sale-service contract or lease-
service contract, an asset sale or long-term lease is coupled with an arrangement with 
the purchaser to furnish services for a specified period. Leases in which the government 
leases a facility (e.g., a building lease) are considered a form of contracting out, rather 
than a public-private partnership. In most cases a government enters into long-term 
leases for assets such as airports, gas utilities or real estate to private firms, thus turning 
physical capital into financial capital. 
Assets- are anything having commercial or exchange value that is owned by a business, 
government, institution, or individual. Assets are any possessions that have value in an 
exchange. The primary classifications of assets are: current assets, long-term assets, 
prepaid and deferred assets, and intangible assets. - Factoring terms I Accounts 
Receivable 
Auctions or open bidding- Auctions are more common and more transparent than 
negotiated sales. These are done through agents through a preparation of a 
memorandum containing general information for potential investors. The memorandum 
is send to potentially interested parties. 
Budget Deficit- A situation where government expenditure exceeds government 
income. Government incomes comes from taxation and other revenue and where this is 
less than the money the government is spending on defence, education, health, welfare 
and so on, this is called a budget deficit. 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) - arrangements the private sector designs, finances, 
builds, and operates the facility over the life of the contract. At the end of this period, 
ownership reverts to the government. A variation of this is the Build-Transfer-Operate 
(BTO) model, under which title transfers to the government at the time construction is 
completed. 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO)- arrangements the private sector retain permanent 
ownership and operate the facility on contract. During the implementation of the 
privatisation programs, the types and forms chosen may differ from government to 
2 Definitions are based on the business dictionary (Pass, C., Lowes, B., Pendleton, A., and Chadwick, L., (1995) and on 
conventional business usage of terminologies 
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government and the uniqueness of the sector to be privatised it may differ from region 
to region. 
Commercial Paper - the technical term used to describe domestic short-term 
promissory notes issued as evidence of debt. The issuer/ seller/ borrower raise the funds 
for a fairly short period (one to six months) most likely with periodic rollovers. Funds 
raised this way are usually used for working capital and liquidity. In Australia, 
promissory notes, commercial bills and non-bank certificates of deposit are types of 
commercial paper. 
Commercialization is an important mechanism in transferring ownership and 
management from public to private, and in achieving better performance and efficiency 
gains for the enterprise during partial privatization. Kenya Ports Authority and The Port 
of Dar-es-Saalam have been divested using this method. 
Common Market- A customs union, which permits the free movement of capital and 
labour between member states, and harmonizes trading policies and tariffs across 
boarders. 
Comparative Advantage- This exists when a country produces a good service at a 
lower opportunity cost than its trading partner. 
Competition- Competition occurs when two or more parties independently attempt to 
secure the business of a customer by offering the most favourable terms. Competition 
in relation to government activities is usually categorized in three ways: (1) public 
versus private, in which public-sector organizations compete with the private sector to 
conduct public-sector business; (2) public versus public, in which public-sector 
organizations compete among themselves to conduct public-sector business; and (3) 
private versus private, in which private-sector organizations compete among themselves 
to conduct public-sector business. 
Concession (method) refers to any arrangement in which a firm obtains from the 
government the right to provide a particular service under conditions of significant 
market power. The design of the concession should ensure that guidelines for 
policymakers on how to define the contracting parties, the purpose and extent of the 
concession, allocating risks and the appropriate level of certainty versus flexibility are 
well designed. Kenya Railways is a case for the concessioning. 
Contracting Out- Contracting out is the hiring of private-sector firms or non-profit 
organizations to provide a good or service for the government. Under this approach, the 
government remains the financier and has management and policy control over the type 
and quality of services to be provided. Thus, the government can replace contractors 
that do not perform well. 
Corporatization. Government organizations are reorganized along business lines. 
Typically tl'ley .. tu"e. requlred~t() pay __ taxes,-"_rcpse~,capitaC.ott.the_~rnarkeL (with ,no.-- ... 
- government . i:>ackini=-explidt -or impliCit), . and operate according to commercial 
principles. This is a common method in the transportation sector especially ports and 
rails; Kenya and Tanzanian seaports have utilized this method. 
Defining the new Oligopoly-The term denotes a situation where there are few sellers 
for a product or service. The members of an oligopoly change the nature of a free 
market. While they cannot dictate price and availability like the one a monopoly can, 
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they often turn into friendly competitors, since it is in all the members' interest 
to maintain a stable market and profitable prices. It is common in the telecoms sector 
operating in weak private sector environments, with two or three major players. 
Deregulation- This is the loosening of restrictions on the entry or exit from a market 
and on the setting of prices 
Developing Economies (DEs)- This often specifically refers to a developing country's 
economy and private sector. These are economies that are not considered as 
industrialised or developed, neither are they economies in transition (like the Eastern 
\European countries). However, some of these DEs are sometimes referred to as 
emerging economies (i.e. Egypt, South Africa and Asian countries). However, the 
emerging economies often have a strong stock market infrastructure and an active and 
sustainable private sector 
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis. (DCF) is a method of evaluating an investment by 
estimating future cash flows and taking into consideration the time value of money? 
Also called capitalization of income 
Divestiture- Divestiture involves the sale of government-owned assets or commercial-
type functions or enterprises. After the divestiture, the government generally has no 
role concerning financial support, management, regulation, or oversight. 
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) - EBIT is calculated by subtracting costs 
of sales and operating expenses from revenues. EBIT is often used to gauge the 
financial performance of companies with high levels of debt and interest expenses, like 
Telkom Kenya. 
Employee buyout (EBO)/ Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP)-. Existing 
public managers and employees take the public unit private, typically purchasing the 
company through an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Under an employee 
stock ownership plan (ESOP), employees take over or participate in the management of 
the organization that employs them by becoming shareholders of stock in that 
organization. In the public sector, an ESOP can be used in privatizing a service or 
function. Recently, for example, the Office of Personnel Management established an 
ESOP for its employees who perform personnel background investigations. 
Franchising Of Internal Services- Under the franchising of internal services, 
government agencies may provide administrative services to other government agencies 
on a reimbursable basis. Franchising gives agencies the opportunity to obtain 
administrative services from another governmental entity instead of providing them for 
themselves. 
Franchising-External Service- In the franchise-external service technique, the 
government grants a concession or privilege to a private-sector entity to conduct 
business in a particular market or geographical area, such as concession stands, hotels, 
and other services provided in certain national parks. The.g<:)y~gm!_~ULrn~y_r~gulate.the-
. -serviceJevelorcprice;·"buteusers'ofthe 'se..Vice pay d1eprov{der directly. 
Free Market economy is an idealized form of market economy in which most 
allocations of resources occur as a result of interactions between buyers and sellers of 
goods and services. They are permitted to carry out transactions based solely on mutual 
agreement without intervention in the form of taxes, subsidies, regulation, or 
government provision of goods or services beyond simply the protection of property 
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rights and enforcement of contracts. This is mainly a theoretical concept as every 
country, even capitalist ones, places some restrictions on the ownership and exchange of 
commodities. 
Government Corporations/Parastatals- Government corporations are separate legal 
entities that are created by central government, generally with the intent of conducting 
revenue-producing commercial-type activities and that are generally free from certain 
government restrictions related to employees and acquisitions. In the US and U.K these 
are created by Congress and Parliament respectively, are have much more autonomy 
than the Parastatals (also known as SOEs) created by central government in East and 
Central Africa. 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises- Government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) are 
privately owned, federally/local government chartered financial institutions with a 
nationwide scope and limited lending powers that benefit from an implicit federal 
guarantee that enhances a GSE's ability to borrow money in the private sector. They are 
not agencies of the national government but serve as a means of accomplishing a public 
purpose defined by law. These are mainly found in the west, especially in the US. 
An ISP, or Internet Service Provider-, is a company which provides Internet access 
for individuals, organizations, and companies. An Internet Service provider usually has 
multiple access methods, including dial-up, DSL, cable modem, ISDN, Tl, and 
sometimes T3 
Least Developed Countries (LCDs)- Countries who generally characteristics by low 
levels of GDP and income per head. LDCs usually have a heavy dependence on the 
primary sector of the economy. In the case of Kenya and Uganda this is true with 
dependence on the Agriculture and in the case of Zambia heavy dependency on 
Agriculture, copper and Cobalt mining. 
Liberalization- The opening up of Markets to the free market forces of supply and 
demand. In privatization and restructuring terms, this also refers to introducing 
competition within the public enterprises earmarked for divestiture by governments 
Managed Competition-Under managed competition; a public-sector agency competes 
with private-sector firms to provide public-sector functions or services under a 
controlled or managed process. This process clearly defines the steps to be taken by 
government employees in preparing their own approach to performing an activity. The 
agency's proposal, which includes a bid proposal for cost-estimate, is useful to compete 
directly with private-sector bids. 
Management and employee Participation- an employee/management share ownership 
plan can provide shares and often share financing for employees. 
Monopoly- A situation in which a single company owns all or nearly all of the market 
J2C'! g!:veJ1_type_9fprodu~Lor seryice.~,Ihi~~woulcLhappenjn.case_,there,is.a ,barrier--tO----
entry in ilie Industry that allows the single company to operate without competition (for 
example, vast economies of scale, barriers to entry, or governmental regulation). In such 
an industry structure, the producer will often produce a Volume that is less than the 
amount, which would maximize social welfare. 
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Natural Monopoly -is an enterprise or an industry where the most efficient production 
is only possible through a monopolistic status. 
Negative Externalities- Impacts on 'outsiders' that are disadvantageous to them and for 
which they receive no compensation. The externalities are occurring where the actions 
of firms and individuals have an effect on people other than themselves. In case of 
negative externalities the external effects are costs on other people. They are also known 
as external costs. There may be external costs from both production and consumption. If 
these are added to the private costs we get the total social costs. An example of 
Negative externalities would be the side effects of production processes e.g. the 
pollution (noise, dust, vibration) endured by people living next to a quarry. 
Neo-classical theory- The view that markets operate efficiently and that the way to 
increase output and employment is to raise aggregate supply. 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)- These are international, national and 
regional institutions privately owned by citizens or charitable/civil society groups, 
involved in providing financial, social political, economic and technical assistance to 
governments or citizens directly. They often cover the 'gap' left by international 
financial institutions and governments. 
Outsourcing-Under outsourcing, a government entity remains fully responsible for the 
provision of affected services and maintains control over management decisions while 
another entity operates the function or performs the service. This approach includes 
contracting out, the granting of franchises to private firms, and the use of Volunteers to 
deliver public services. 
Performance Based Organizations- Under a performance based organization (PBO); 
policymaking is to be separated from service operation functions by moving all 
policymaking responsibilities to a Presidential appointee. The service operations are 
moved to an organization to be headed by a chief executive officer (CEO), hired on a 
competitive contract for a fixed term. The CEO's contract defines expected 
performance and in exchange for being held accountable for achieving performance, the 
CEO is granted certain flexibilities for human resource management, procurement, and 
other administrative functions. As of March 1997, several PBOs had been proposed but 
no PBO had been authorized in the federal government. 
Pricing and Distribution- These are two hardest issues to manage in a share flotation. 
The government and its brokers should agree early in the sales process on how pricing 
will be managed. Because pricing is set late in the sale-after other sales processes have 
been completed and the sale of shares out to begin-officials must be ready to react 
quickly for approval and the financial advisors or sales agents should be able to provide 
government with the trade-off costs of changes to the sales structure (i.e. if the 
government wants to increase the share of retail shares or sell more shares domestically) 
Private Infrastructure Development and Operation. The private sector builds 
fin?!!£~_aJ1Q_Qp~,rates~PcUQli~jnfrastructure~such .. as-roads-and-,airports,recovering-costs-
through user charges. Several techniques commonly are used for privately building and 
operating infrastructure. 
Privatization (sometimes: denationalization, privatisation or - especially in India -
disinvestment) is the economic process of transferring Property, control/management, 
from public ownership to private ownership. An opposite process is nationalization. In 
theory, privatization helps establish a 'free market,' as well as fostering capitalist 
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competition, which its supporters argue will give the public better choices. It is also a 
term that 'has generally been defined as any process aimed at shifting functions and 
responsibilities, in whole or in part, from the government to the private sector'. 
Privatization sale transaction Elements include: Prospectus, Share instrument, and 
timing- the success of the issue depends on the choice of the share instrument and the 
timing of the sale and payment (i.e. investor perception) 
Public-Private Partnership/ Joint Ventures- Under a public-private partnership, 
sometimes referred to as a joint venture, a contractual arrangement is formed between 
public- and private-sector partners, and can include a variety of activities involving the 
private sector in the development, financing, ownership, and operation of a public 
facility or service. It typically includes infrastructure projects and/or facilities. In such a 
partnership, public and private resources are pooled and their responsibilities divided so 
that each partner's efforts complement one another. Typically, each partner shares in 
income resulting from the partnership in direct proportion to the partner's investment. 
Such a venture, while a contractual arrangement, differs from typical service contracting 
in that the private-sector partner usually makes a substantial cash, at-risk, equity 
investment in the project, and the public sector gains access to new revenue or service 
delivery capacity without having to pay the private-sector partner. 
Pure Monopoly -A market in which one company has control over the entire market 
for a product, usually because of a barrier to entry such as a technology only available 
to that company. Telecommunications products and components are prone to be pure 
monopolies, be it for a short time, due to the speed of technological change in the 
sector. 
Regulation- in the context of government and public/private services regulation (as a 
process), is the control of enterprise activities by rules and regulations governing the 
operations in a given market, as opposed to its prohibition? In economics, it is part of 
the government relationship with markets, often seen as the opposite of deregulation. 
Regulatory body- is an independent agency, commission or government department 
that has responsibility over the legislation (acts and regulations) for a given sector of the 
public and private sector business operations. 
Residual shareholdings- If a public offering leaves the government with a residual 
shareholding, the market will want to know how it plans to manage (actively or 
passively), and how and when it plans to divest its remaining holdings. This should be 
addressed in the prospectus for the share floatation. (For example, the government may 
decide to hold onto its residual shares as an investment but not exercise its voting rights. 
As the case in Kenya Airways (KQ) 
Secondary Offerings- This is a public offering of shares already traded on domestic or 
foreign markets 
Service Shedding- Divestiture through service shedding occurs when the government 
reduces the level of service provided or stops providing a service altogether. Private-
sector businesses or non-profit organizations may step in to provide the service if there 
is a market demand. 
State owned Enterprises (SOEs) or Public Enterprises (PEs) are those enterprises 
that operate under the control and management of the government and receive subsidies 
Glossary 
from the state. They often have a monopoly of the market with little or no competition. 
In Developing countries, they are referred to as parastatals and are a big source of 
finance for the incumbent governments who often need money to pay over- employed 
Parastatals 
Structural Adjustment Programmes- a programme of free market and supply side 
reforms that multilateral agencies such as IMF use as conditions for lending funds. 
These often conflict with the quest for industrialization and remaining s primary 
producers of products for trans-national corporations (operating in more than one 
country, i.e. Coca cola) who process and re-sale to the developing countries. 
Subsidies- The government can encourage private-sector involvement in accomplishing 
public purposes through tax subsidies or direct subsidies, such as the funding of low-
income housing and research and development tax credits. 
Sustainable Development - Development where consideration is given to the quality 
of life of future as well as current generations 
Teledensity - is the number of landline telephones in use for every 100 individuals 
living within an area. A teledensity greater than 1 00 means there are more telephones 
than people are. Developing countries may have a teledensity of less than 10. 
Alternatively, it is a term commonly used to describe the number of telephone lines per 
some unit of the population (often per 100 people); the density of telephone lines in a 
community. 
The new oligopoly is made up of multinational corporations that have chosen specific 
product or service categories to dominate. In each category, over time, only two to four 
major players prosper. Starting a new company in that market segment is difficult, and 
the few that do succeed are often gobbled up or run out of business by the oligopolies. 
Few multinationals aspire to be monopolies. Monopolies attract government regulation 
and consumer anger (i.e. Microsoft). Small oligopolies (such as Coke, Pepsi, and 
Cadbury-Schweppes) make plenty of money and avoid the constant attention of the 
regulators. 
Trade (Third party) sales- there is two types of trade sales for privatizations: auctions 
(open bidding) and negotiated sales (table 6-2) 
Trade Creation- The increased trade that occurs between member countries of trading 
blocs usually resulting from economies of scale following the enlargement of the market 
Trade Liberalization- The removal of barriers to trade such as import quotas and 
tariffs. 
User Fees- User fees require those who use a government service to pay some or all of 
the cost of the service rather than having the government pay for it through revenues 
generated by taxes. Charging entry fees into public parks is an example of a user fee. 
Volunteer Activities- An activity in which Volunteers provide all or part of a service 
and are organized and directed by a government entity can also be considered a form of 
outsourcing. Volunteer activities are conducted either through a formal agency 
Volunteer program or through a private non-profit service organization. 
Vouchers- Vouchers are government financial subsidies given to individuals for 
purchasing specific goods or services from the private 9U1!IJ?li~.~c~,<;-!or.~1:Il~.govemmentc.-­
-gives'individuals ·rede-emabltf(£rtificates or-"voucliersto -purchase the service in the open 
market. Under this approach, the government relies on the market competition for cost 
control and individual citizens to seek out quality goods or services. The government's 
financial obligation to the recipient is limited by the amount of the voucher. Forms of 
vouchers are grants, which can be given to state and local governments that may use the 
funds to buy services from the private sector. 
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Appendix 1: Annex 1: Field Questionnaires -for the Survey of Privatization 
of Public 
SURVEY OF PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES. 
Interviewer's introauction: 71ie o6jective of tfiis empiricaf survey is to prO'Vitfe a motfe{ case for privatisino in 
a tfevefopino regiona[ economy, fil{f tfiat of'l(Jnya, 6y e:x:_aminino tfie approacfies, processes, ana 
impfementation of privatizations in 'l(Jnya ana tfie C09dPS)f. -PT)f.. 71ie responses to tfie questions fiere in 
wiff 6e usea for acatfemic researcfi purposes, ana wiff 6e an important input in contri6utill[J to new 
infonnation tfiat wiff infonn tfie prescription ana approacfi of privatisation poficies. P.ffectivefy, tfiis survey 
in its ex:pforation of tfie privatisation approacfies, metfiocfs ana strategies, progress ana peifonnance of 
privatizea entities, wiff provid'e for an 'a regiona[ motfe[ case of privatisation. In refation to approacfi, tfie 
survey see~ to recortf tfie strategy, metfiocfs, pro.fita6ifity, investments, empfoyment, capacity utifization 
ana 'success' rates of'l(enya 's Program. 
71ie infonnation o6tainea fiere wiff 6e treatetf as strictfy confiaentia~ ana neitfier tfie respontfent 's name, tfie 
name of tfie enterprise on any aiscussions ana infonnation coffectea wiff 6e printea or usetf in any tfocuments 
in attri6ution to tfie person, unfess agreetf to. 71ie responses to tfiese questions wiff 6e usetf for acatfemic 
researcfi purposes. 
Background Information 
CR.f!spond'ent 's position (optionaO 
f!)pe of entetprise (sector preferrecf) 
'Wfiat is tlie nature of your entity? (J>rivate sector D (J'u6fic sector D cfvi{ society/Non-
oovemmentaf 
}lny otlier information 
ftlv.fott&N~~fot~,..~·,-,.~-
... -.. c-·'~cE~n.4149~--- ,,.·-. --,~- ~·;-7• --------
--- ------~~~;(f~Jr&tiVGa-~.....-~-
MAILING ADDRESS 
~~~~SdiooC~~~Hifl~~Ot]@(l..JL.ca 
~~ 
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SectiO,D 1 : General Information on Privatisation 
1 What is the role of you/your ministry/firm department in the privatization process? How does this 
differ from the prescribed role in the parastatal reform policy or legal document? 
2. What is your main area of activity? D Manufacturing DService D Other-------------------------
3. Is your firm a privatised or restructured/commercialist entity? YesD NoD if yes, what has been the 
outcome in i.e. revenue and structure. 
4. Why privatize? Give a detailed explanation below 
5 What is the scale (numbers/turnover) of the privatisation program (in terms of sectors, and 
enterprises)? Give a detailed explanation below: 
2 
Specific information on the process of Privatisation 
---- -----,: 
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6. What is the schedule and approach of transactions? Summarize information in the table below 
detailing dates and what was done. 
Enterprise 
Proposed Timetable 
Appointment of 
Advisors 
Submission of EOis 
from core investors 
Selection process of 
Core investors 
Was due diligence done 
by whom and what was 
the outcome 
process 
Conclusion of process 
7. What are the major objectives for divesting in the above enterprises? Rate them from highest to 
lowest (Rating on a scale of 1 to 5: 1 =extremely important, 2= very important, 3= Important, 4= Not 
very important, 5= Not important). 
Objectives KQ TLK KCB KEN-RE Sugar KR KPA Other 
Revenue to government 
Liberalization and reforms 
Global new Technology 
New management 
Financial Infusion 
Unbundling and restructuring for 
efficiency & _profitability 
Redistribution of Wealthy 
Speed up process 
Fair Wealth distribution 
Private sector development 
Change in socio-econ system 
FDI 
Other (List) 
3 
8. What approach have the Kenyan privatisation taken? State the sectors in ascendancy order ranking 
the major approaches as; I= Most popular 2= More popular 3= relatively popular 4=popular 
S=less popular 6= unpopular with a maximum of six 
0 Commercialization DManagement contract 
------·, 
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D Unbundling of various entities 
D Comprehensive restructuring 
D Sale through IPO/Strategic Investor 
D Strategic investor 
Appendix 1• Annex I 
Dchange of management 
Drestructuring by downsizing 
D direct sales method 
Dcapital (cash infusion) 
D Ownership transfer to managers and employees (MBOIEBO) 
D Voucher/coupon 
D Spontaneous privatisation 
D Mass privatisation 
9. What are the criteria and strategy for selection for entities to be privatized? 
Give a detailed explanation 
10. What is the overall restructuring and privatization outcome of Kenya's divesture program in the last 
five years ( 1999-2003)? 
Give a detailed explanation 
11. Looking at the objectives in question number 7, will the overall privatization program in specific 
sectors reduce Costs, increase efficiency and create business opportunities? Yes D NoD 
Give a detailed explanation 
12. Does/has privatisation contributed to new business opportunities, private sector development, and 
regional trade expansion Yes D NoD Not Entirely D 
Give a detailed explanation 
Appendix 2: Annex I 
13. Which of the following indicat()rs of_p~iv_atisationhelp yield new,opportunities and are vital t<f · 
---Kenya's'privatisatioli'progrmn?c-Rlmkthem in order of importance 1= extremely important 2= very 
important 3= significantly important 4= important 5= less important 
0 Raising Revenue, 
0 Reducing subsidies 
0Generating additional employment 
0Raising domestic savings 
0Raising public investment, 
0 reducing GOK involvement 
0 restructuring public services 
0 Distribution of public property 
0 restructure and infusion of good practice 
0 reducing government deficit 
4 
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D Other ....................... . 
Additional detailed Comments 
AppendiX 1• Annex I 
14 "Yet, the strategies and approaches adopted for the privatisation programs have been sporadic, non-
committal and slow, focusing on the listing of potential divesture enterprises, rather than development 
of a solid inclusive strategy for reforms, restructuring and privatisation of the specific sectors and 
enterprises for the full benefit of the economy". Do you; D Strongly agree DAgree D 
Strongly disagree DDisagree 
15. How would you rate the performance ofGOK's objectives and methods in relation to those outlined in 
Parastatal reform document of 1996 and those in questions 8-13 on a scale of 1 to ten 9-10 = 
Excellent 7-8= Good 6-5 =Average 4--=Poor 2-1 very poor and why? 
L Objectives 
A - Private Sector development 
B - Efficiency 
C- Speed 
D - Privatisation revenue 
E - fair distribution 
F - Foreign direct investment 
G -reduce subsidies from the state budget 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
H -radical change in socio-economic system. D 
I - ensuring fairness or equal opportunities D 
2. Methods 
J- Direct sales method D 
K-Strategicinvestor D 
L- Capital privatisation D 
M- Ownership transfer to 
Managers and employees D 
N- Spontaneous privatisationD 
0-Voucher/coupon D 
P- Mass privatisation D 
Q-Small privatisation D 
5 
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Appendix 1• Annex I 
16. The public and developmental goals for efficient, reliable, quality, affordable, and sustainable services 
or products have been said to elude state enterprises. Can/has privatization achieve (d) the 
development and public service goals that eluded state enterprises? Yes D NoD Why? 
I Additional detailed Comments 
17. In your opinion has/does the various forms ofprivatisation addressed a fair wealth re-distribution 
issues, introduced efficiency, reduced costs etc? If yes describe which of the following measures1 has 
been applied 
Facilitative, D 
Prescriptive D 
Empowering D 
18. Experiences in privatisations all over the world show that a Public information strategy is important 
towards achieving a successful privatisation program. Does Kenya have a publicity program (i.e. 
informing the public) on its privatisation program? Yes D NoD don't know D 
I Explain 
19 Generally, which of the methods/approaches/techniques below would you ranks as most important in 
making for a "good" privatization? PLEASE TICK -t' UP TO SIX 
Various methods of Mass privatization: Transformation of enterprises into corporations through sale of shares using 
different techniques: 
I. Public offering, 0 
2. Direct sale to strategic investors (private placement), 0 
3. Management buy-outs etc 0 
4. Liquidation of companies and sale of their assets to private natural or legal entities 0 
5. Restitution of nationalised property (denationalization) 0 
6. Sale to domestic and foreign Investors through different methods 0 
7. Voucher privatisation 0 
6 
20. Does the government have prepared privatisation strategy/analyses for the enterprises in particular 
sectors of the economy? YES 0 No 0 
Note: It is facilitative to unbundle a single large company into a number of smaller enterprises. Prescriptive measures may involve governments giving 
employees or other specified stakeholders a first purchase option. Empowering privatisation could involve boosting the financial capacity of entrepreneurial 
investors through deferring payments by instalments. In practice, these various forms have often been combined 
W University of Durham 
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21. What can you sum up as the major accomplishments, problems and Plans of the privatization of 
"strategic enterprises" e.g. that ofTelkom Kenya? 
I Bri<f d<t•ll• 
22. "Everywhere, the initial periods are characterised by great optimism and strong belief that privatisation 
would solve most economic problems in these countries and that it could be carried out very quickly. 
Soon, problems are encountered in formulating the strategy and, even more so, in implementation of the 
programme and then realistic expectations for example: that privatisation will be a long-lasting process, 
which will in some cases require restructuring of companies (at a faster pace) prior to privatisation." Does 
this statement reflect on the privatization of TLK Do you; D strongly agree DAgree D 
strongly disagree DDisagree 
Why? 
23. "Many countries are facing a period of the so-called wild privatisation. The absence of legislation and 
inadequate supervision leads to bad management of the privatisation process, if such situations persist, 
the public may assume a negative attitude towards privatisation and then it will be very difficult, in an 
atmosphere of general lack oftrust, to carry out asuccessfulprivatisation programme". Do you; 
D Strongly agree DAgree Dstrongly disagree DDisagree 
Why? 
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S,ection 2,~ PRIVATIZATION oFTELKoMKENYA 
A: Information on the process 
1. What is the current ownership structure of Telkom Kenya (TLK), and POSTA? What is the proposed ownership 
structure for privatisation? Outline in the box below 
2. What are the major objectives for TLK divesture? Rank the five most important from highest to lowest (Rank on a 
scale of 1 to 5: 5 =extremely important, 4= very important, 3= Important, 2 =Not very important, 1= Not 
important). 
Objectives Ran kings 
Revenue to government 
Liberalization and reforms 
Global new Technology 
New management 
Financial Infusion 
Unbundling and restructuring for 
efficiency & profitability 
Redistribution of Wealth 
Private sector development 
Create new businesses (wealth 
creation) 
Increase provincial/national 
competitiveness by reducing 
communications costs 
EmpJoyment creation 
3. How does this divesture differ from that of KCB or Kenya Airways? 
8 
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4. The GOK and Telkom Kenya Management, seem to favour restructuring over direct sale ofTLK, why? And what 
is the difference between restructuring before privatizing and after privatization (e.g. the case of Kenya Airways)? 
5. What do you hope to accomplish by restructuring Telkom Kenya for an additional one and half years 
(i.e. December 2002- June 2004? Before full-scale privatisation? Outline three major reasons below 
6. What are the major objectives for divesture programs in Telecoms in general? Rank the five most 
important in order from highest to lowest (on a scale of 1 to 5: 5 =extremely important, 4= very 
important, 3= Important, 2= Not very important, 1= Not important). (Note: more than one 
objective can be ranked as a 5, 3, etc) 
Objectives Regional Telecoms Privatisation Programs 
Government divesture from business 
Revenue to government 
Liberalization and reforms 
Global new Technology 
New management 
Financial Infusion 
Unbundling and restructuring for 
efficiency & profitability 
Redistribution of Wealth 
Private sector development 
Create new businesses (wealth creation) 
Increase regionaVnational 
competitiveness by reducing 
communications costs 
Employment generation 
<EmpitWl Surwy af ~ ~ 'l1ie Ctue IJ'riflatizalion af'Iifi.pm 'l(pJya 
7(jtia6i ~!M.7(; a>ritu:ipa('l(pearr:/ier: Vtriwmty af<Dtu6am ..tJJusitless Scfioo{ -'Vniutf'l(jngtlinn 
Octo6er --4)emn/ier 20()3 
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7. What is the progress of selected indicators in the last five years in Kenya and CO MESA? (Rate them 
in tenns of their importance from, lowest to highest 5= Large improvement, 4= Small improvement, 3= 
No change, 2= Small deterioration, l=Large deterioration 
a) Line growth, change in size of waiting list, D 
b) Substantial reduction in line provision and installation waiting time D 
c) Change in direct exchange lines per employee D 
d) Substantial restructuring & efficiency improvement in main operator, D 
e) Number of mobile operators, and customer base D 
t) Substantial reduction in cost of mobile phones D 
g) Substantial reduction in cost of airtime D 
i) Improvement in communication availability and installation D 
j) Other D 
8. What is the progression oftelecom activities? Polic~egulatio~egal framework,~beralization 
restructuring ..,.. privatisation~ 
9. Has privatisation ofTKL contributed to new business opportunities, private sector development, and 
regional trade expansion Yes D No D Not Entirely D 
Why and why not 
10. If yes what is the level ofbusiness opportunities created by the process ofprivatising Telkom Kenya 
created so far? 0-5% D 10-30% D 30-50% D 50-70%0 70-100% 
11. What is the total number of people employed/re-employed by the company since the process of 
restructuringlprivatisation? Please give reasons for the staff reductions if any 
~I...__ .. ·_--------_-··---=-----_--------_-------~--_--------·.-_--_-_------·_.I-
'EmpitW(Sutwy ofiPriwti&in{J axEs: '1M Ct~U  of'l'e/zytn ~ 
'l(jtia6i ~~'1(; ~~ Vniwnity ofiDurliam 4huinus Scfioo{-'Vrritd'l(jngtfom 
Octofier --'Deamfier 2003 
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12. What is the company's annual wage bill before and after? What percentage of this is attributed to 
privatization or/and restructuring? 
13. Did the company have to retrain the employees that stayed on after the enterprise was privatized/restructured? 
DYes NoD 
If so what skill gaps were targeted by the training programs? 
Objective and Focus of Investment Level of Investments 
,.::.: .. ~'J,~~:'i:''f;•'15,t,)tl; ,,;;; ~"1 1994-1996 1997-1999 2000-2003 Other 
New technology/equipment 
Downsizing/New employees 
Public relations 
/marketing/image/branding 
New services/products 
Expansion (i.e. Location) 
Other (List}_ 
14. Has the quality, quantity, and speed of service provision by TLK enterprise changed since restructuring or/ and 
privatisation? (Rank in order on a scale of I to 5) D Yes No D 5= Large improvement, 4= Small 
improvement, 3= No change, 2= Small deterioration, 1=Large deterioration): Quality of service Provision 
D Quantity of services provided D Speed of service provision D 
15. The absence of legislation and inadequate supervision leads to abuses and fraudulent behaviour by 
management if such situations persist, the public may assume a negative attitude towards privatisation 
and then it will be very difficult. in an atmosphere o(generallack oftrust, to carry out a successful 
privatisation programme. 0 Strongly agree 0Agree Ostrongly disagree 0Disagree 
Comment on this statement In relation to telecoms 
16 Strategies and approaches adopted for the privatisation programs have been sporadic, non-committal and 
slow, focusing on the listing of potential divesture enterprises, rather than development of a solid inclusive 
strategy for reforms, restructuring and privatisation of the specific sectors and enterprises for the full benefit 
of the economy. 0 Strongly agree 0Agree Ostrongly disagree 0Disagree What is your comment 
on the above statement? Does it apply to the case of Telecoms in the FTA? 
'Empiriai(SutWy ofq>,iwti&in£1 ¥&: '11ie CtiSI ~tion of'Te~ 'l(prya 
'1(fti46i ~!M.?(; ~~rr:lier: 'Vniwrsity ojtDurfiam -4Jvsi1less Sclioo{ -Vnitd'l(jngtfom 
Octo6er --4>ecem6er 2003 
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B: Information of on: Investment, Production, Costs and Sales in Telecoms 
17. The table below deals with the firm's investment since it was earmarked for privatisation/or since privatisation? 
How much have invested since coporatization and restructuring ofTelkom Kenya on tabulated items in (Us 
dollars)? 
18. What is the maximum production level/installed capacity for the products/services that you offer? 
19. Given an opportunity to privatize Telkom Kenya, (e.g. in relation to objectives set-out in question 6), what 
approach would take to privatize Telkom Kenya? 
20. How important is liberalisation of telecommunications in the region and in particular that ofTelkom 
Kenya to your industry and business in Particular? D Extremely important D Very important D 
Important D Not important 
21. Please indicate whether you are satisfied or dissatisfied with each of the following elements of Kenyan 
Privatization process 
PLEASE TICK.,/ ONE BOX FOR EACH Very fairly neither Fairly 
Satisfied Satisfied dissat- dissat-
Isfied isfied 
Restructuring and unbundling .......... D D D D 
Corporatization D D D D 
Management of the process D D D D 
Public Information dissemination D D D D 
Selection (SP) and Due diligence D D D D 
IPO (stock Option) process D D D D 
Commercialisation D D D D 
IGive Details 
- ~-·------ -·-o 
- ------ --
'EmpiricalSun;ey ojfl>rifNltizitvJ arEs: '11ie CtJU ~ of'Ii~ ~ 
'l(jti46i ~!M. '1(; tPrin&ipa( ~lin: Vniwrrit;y of~ 4Jvsitrus Sclioof -Vnitetf'l(ftr8tfom 
Octo6er --'Dicem6er 2()(JJ 
Very Don't Know 
dissat- N/A 
isfied 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
I 
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Appendix 1 Annexe II: 
Semi- Structured Questions: 
What is the role of you/your ministry/finn department in the privatization process? How does this differ from 
the prescribed role in the parastatal refonn policy or legal document? 
2. What is your main area of activity? Is your finn a privatised or restructured/commercialist entity? If yes, 
what has been the outcome in i.e. revenue and structure? 
3. What is Privatization? In addition, why privatize? Give a detailed explanation 
4. What is the scale (numbers/turnover) of the privatisation program (in tenns of sectors, and enterprises)? 
Specific infonnation on the process of Privatisation 
5. What was/is the schedule and approach of transactions? For safaricom 
6. What can you sum up as the major accomplishments, problems and Plans of the unbundling of Kenya Postal 
Corporation in relation to privatization of a" strategic enterprise" Brief details of specific problems of 
Safaricom 
7. The GOK and Telkom Kenya Management, seem to favour restructuring over direct sale ofTLK, why? And 
what is the difference between restructuring before privatizing and after privatization (e.g. the case of Kenya 
Airways)? 
7. What have you accomplished since the 'unbundling' and fonnation? What is your current business relation 
with the restructuring ofTelkom Kenya for an additional one and half years (i.e. December 2002- June 
2004? Before full-scale privatisation? Outline three major reasons below 
8. Has privatisation of telecommunications (TKL) contributed to new business opportunities, private sector 
development, and regional trade expansion 
9. If yes what is the level of business opportunities created by the process ofprivatising Telkom Kenya created so 
far? 
10. What is the total number of people employed/re-employed by the company since the process of 
restructuring/privatisation? Please give reasons for the staff reductions if any 
II. What is the company's annual wage bill before and after? What percentage of this is attributed to privatization 
or/and restructuring? 
12. Did the company have to retrain the employees that stayed on after the enterprise was privatized/restructured? 
13. How much have invested since coporatization and restructuring ofTelkom Kenya on tabulated items in (Us 
dollars)? 
14. Given an opportunity to privatize Telkom Kenya, (e.g. in relation to objectives set-out in question 6), what 
approach would take to privatize Telkom Kenya? 
15. How important is liberalisation of telecommunications in the region and in particular that of Telkom Kenya 
and Uganda Telecom To your industry and business in Particular? 
16. What is the current legal institutional framework for Kenya's privatization program and in particular that of __ 
Telkom Kenya? -~ -"-~~--~--------------- ~ -- ~--- --- ·- · ------------- -
-- 11~ ---What·can')'o\Csum upasttiemll_jor-accomplishments, problems and Plans of the privatization of "national 
jewels"? 
18. How Has/does the separation from Telkom Kenya helped the growth of POST A (diversification, freedom to 
plan and of make quick decisions)? 
19. What is the current status of your organisation/Business, and what are your future plans/strategy 
20. Has infusion of new managers helped tum-around the company 
II 
Appendix 1: Annex III Sample list of Institutions in that Participated in the Study 
1. Africa Telecommunications Union (ATU) 
2. African Academy of Sciences- (AAS) 
3. Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
4. Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK) 
5. Export Promotion Zone (EPZ) 
6. Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) 
7. Internet Access Kenya- Telecom Services 
8. Investment Promotion Centre- IPC* 
9. Kenya Airways (KQ) 
10. Kenya Communications Co. Ltd- Kencell 
11. Kenya International Freight Forwarders Association (KIFWA) 
12. Kenya Leadership Institute 
13. Kenya Private Sector Alliance 
14. Ministry of Finance- Investment Secretariat* 
15. Ministry of Industry Commerce and Trade 
16. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development 
1 7. Ministry of Transport and Communication 
18. Nairobi Stock Exchange 
19. Postal Corporation ofKenya (POSTA) 
20. Parliament- Public Investment Committee (PIC) 
21. Power Gen and Power Energy Ltd. 
22. Private Sector Foundation 
23. Private sector Network 
24. REMPAI 
25. Safaricom Company Ltd. 
26. Telkom Kenya Co Ltd 
27. TOEPOK-Access Kenya 
28. Transit Transport Coordinating Authority (TTCA 
:\phdkitithesisfmalprintsept21 05\institutions.doc 
Appendix 1: Annex IV: Sample Field Interview Request Letters 
III 
Our Ref: PRIV/ FIELDRESACH/TLK/25/Sept/03 
John Waweru 
The ChiefExecutive 
Telkom Kenya 
P.O Box , Nairobi 
Dear Eng. Waweru, 
September 25, 2003 
KITIABI R.M.K 
PhD Candidate Durham University Business School, 
P.O Box 66752 Nairobi 
Tel: 254-2-714-749 
Fax: 254-20-2-713788 
U.K Cell: +44-7761-719-757 
Email: r.m.k.kitiabi@durham.ac.uk or kiti@yahoo.com 
RE: REQUEST FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF THE 
PRIV A TISATION OF TELKOM KENYA 
Following several meetings with the immediate Managing director and various officers of Telkom Kenya 
last year ( 2002), I am commencing the final phase of PHD research on the case of privatising Telkom 
Kenya. I would like to inform your esteemed office that I am in the process of collecting empirical data on 
further developments in privatization of Telecommunications. This field research commences October 28, 
2003. In this regard, I kindly request for a discussion opportunitv with you in your capacitv as the 
Managing Director Telkom Kenya. I am available between the dates of October 28, 2003 and November 
28.2003. 
Kindly let me know the schedule for an appointment between these dates. The discussions may include the 
use of questionnaires, which I will avail to you in advance by both email and post in the next few weeks. 
Kindly confirm to me your availability at your earliest convenience (preferably by email) via my telephone, 
email or fax contacts provided above for Nairobi and The U.K. 
Indeed, these discussions will accord me the insight and privilege to advance the course of the process new 
approaches, strategies and developments for Kenya's privatisation program. 
Yours Faithfully, 
KITIABI R.M.K 
PhD Candidate Durham University Business School 
Original Copy by Mail 
_.:;c··--
Appendix 1: Annex IV 
Our Ref: PRIVI FIELDRESACH/IVESTFIN/25/Sept/03 
September 25, 2003 
KITIABI R.M.K 
P.O Box 66752 Nairobi-Kenya 
Tel: 254-20-2714-749 Cell: 722-800943 
Fax: 254-20-2-713788 
U.K Cell: +44-7761-719-757 
Email: r.m.k.kitiabi@durham.ac.uk or kiti@yahoo.com 
The Investment Secretary 
Ministry of Finance and Planning 
Treasury Building, Harambee Avenue, 
P.O. Box 30007, Nairobi, 
Tel. (254-020) 338111 
E-mail: in(o@treasury.go.ke 
Dear Mrs, 
RE: REQUEST FOR BRIEF DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF THE 
PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN KENYA AND IN PARTICULAR THAT OF 
TELKOM KENYA 
Following my last meeting in July 2002 in Nairobi with The investment Economist in your 
organisation, I would like to inform your esteemed office the commencement of the final phase of my 
research on Privatization of Public Enterprises: The Case of Telkom Kenya. This will include a process 
of empirical data collection on the developments in privatization of Telecommunications. This field 
research commences October 28, 2003. In this regard, I kindly request for a discussion opportunity 
with you in your capacity as the Investment secretary for Parastatal reform and divesture. I am 
available between the dates of October 28, and November 28, 2003. 
Kindly let me know the schedule for an appointment between these dates. The discussions may include 
the use of questionnaires, which I will avail to you in advance by both email and post in the next few 
weeks. Kindly confirm to me your availability at your earliest convenience (preferably by email) via my 
telephone, email or fax contacts provided above for Nairobi and The U.K. 
Indeed, these discussions will accord me the insight and privilege to advance the course of the process 
new approaches, strategies and developments for Kenya's privatisation program. 
Yours Faithfully, 
KITIABI R.M.K 
PhD Candidate Durham University Business School 
I. ~,!Jr~j%}~r!lt~!~IW~~,'!i!t~:~!lM~':Ys~.~!mil!~!iw!i!~i~~§~!!~A«t~;:l!:J~r~H~!~®•r~~9~n::~iim~J~~Yi=Wii~:<rq£to.~~t:~qq~:r;,-ti!!!!!~~J~R~!Ii;;l'{l:;1~KJStitii~l;1f 
I Respondents/ Institution Sector Type of interview and/or Questionnaires 
'1 Date of Interview Number of ].\;_; 
1:'. Interviews 
l Telkom Kenya Public/Private 06/11/2003 !4:30AM Face to face interview 1 
2 Telkom Kenya* Public/Private 31110/2003 10:30AM Consultations 
~ Telkom Kenya Public/Private 16/0112004 14:00 PM Face to Face interview 2 
4 Telkom Kenya Public/Private 16/01/2004 10:00AM Document review 
Telkom Kenya Public /Private 23/0112004 14:00 PM Face to face interview 1 
5 Ministry of Finance- Investment Secretariat* Public/private 7/11/2003 14:30 PM Face to face interview 5 
6 Safaricom Company Ltd. Private 18/1112003 !O:OOAM Face to face interview 1 
7! Ministry of Transport* Public 18/1112003 17:00 PM Face to face interview 
8, POSTA Public/Private 20/11/2003 15:00PM Face to face interview 2 
9: POSTA* Public/Private 25/1112003 14:00PM Consultation 
POSTA Public/Private 25/11/2003 !6:00PM Face to face interview 
i POSTA Public/Private 28/1112003 , !1:00AM Face to face interview 
10 Communication Commission of Kenya Public/Private 21/0112004 15:30 PM Face to face interview 
11 ICDC Public/Private 24/1112003 12:30 PM Face to face interview 1 
12 African Telecommunication Union- ATU Private 25/1112003 12:30 PM Face to face interview 
13 Investment Promotion Centre- IPC* Public/Private 11/1112003 11:00 PM Face to face interview 3 
! 01112/2004 !5:30PM Face to face interview 
14 COMES A Public/Private 26/09/2003 13:00 PM Telephone-Email interview 3 
l COMES A Public/Private 06/11/2003 !O:OOAM Telephone interview 
CO MESA Public/Private 04/12/2003 14:00 PM Consultation 
CO MESA Public/Private 26/01/2004 16:00 PM Telephone interview 
IS; KIFWA Private 12/1112003 15:00 PM Face to face interview 
}61, rrrcA and Communications Ltd. Private 03/1112003 16:30PM Face/Telephone interview 
17i Kenya Private Sector Alliance Private 18/1112003 08:00AM Face to face Interview 1 
18/11/2003 12:00Noon Face to face interview 
181 Ministry ofTrade Public 08/0112004 !5:00PM 
191 African Academy of Sciences Public 27/11/2003 14:00PM Face to face/Consultation 
20~ TOEPOK-Access Kenya Private - - -
21! Nairobi Stock Exchange Private 17/11/2003 14:00PM Telephone consultation 1 
22:! Kenya Leadership Institute Public/private 28/1112004 16:30 PM Telephone/face consultation 
23 ~ Kencell Private 19/0112004 10:30AM -
24,\· Internet Access Kenya- Telecom Services Private November 2003 Not applicable Questionnaire 
25\1 REMPAI Policy Research November 2003 Not applicable Questionnaire 
26 :i Power Energy Ltd Public -Power Ind. November 2003 Not applicable Questionnaire 
27\ Power Energy Ltd Private -Power Ind. December 2003 Not applicable Questionnaire 
28l Private Sector Foundation Member Telecoms December 2003 Not applicable Questionnaire 
29 ;1 REMPAI-Trade Regional Trade December 2003 Not applicable Questionnaire 
30 ;! Agriculture Trade Analysis Regional Policy December 2003 Not applicable Questionnaire 
31 \ Keah and Co. Ltd Stocks-accounting January 2004 Not applicable Questionnaire 
32 :i Chief Economist Economic Planning a Government policy January 2004 Not applicable Questionnaire 
33 ;{ External Trade Department Exports-Promotion January 2004 Not applicable Questionnaire 
34 ·~ Kenya Airways Airlines-Banks January 2004 Not applicable Questionnaire 
35 Corporate Governance Public/Private November, 2003 Not applicable Questionnaire 
36 :: Kenya Power Public/Private November 2004 Not applicable Questionnaire 
37 Kenya Railways Public/Private November, 2004 Not applicable Questionnaire 
38 PowerGen Public/Private November03/Jan, 04 Not :l!'J'licable Questionnaire 
39 !PC -Parliament Public/State November03/Jan, 04 Not applicable Questionnaire 
40 EPC Public/Private November 03/Jan 04 Not applicable Questionnaire 
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Appendix 1: Annex Va: Sample List of strategic Commercially Oriented 
enterprises to be retained by GOK (1996) 
1. Agricultural Development Corporation 
2. Agriculture Finance Corporation 
3. Development Finance Company of Kenya 
4. Development House Ltd. (AFC) 
5. East African Development Bank of Kenya Ltd 
6. Industrial Development Bank of Kenya Ltd. 
7. Industrial &Commercial Development Corporation 
8. Jomo Kenyatta Foundation 
9. Kenya Broadcasting Corporation 
10. Kenya Industrial Estates Ltd. 
11. Kenya Literature Bureau. 
12. Kenya Petroleum Oil Refineries 
13. Kenya Pipeline Co. Ltd. 
14. Kenya Ports Authority 
15. Kenya Post Office Savings Bank 
16. Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation 
17. Kenya Power Co. Ltd 
18. Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd. 
19. Kenya Railways Corporation 
20. Kenya Seed Co.Ltd 
21. Kenya Tea Development Authority 
22. Kenya Tourism Development Corporation 
23. Kenya Vetnary Vaccine Production Institute 
24. National Cereal & Produce Board 
25. National Housing Corporation 
26. National Oil Corporation of Kenya 
27. Nyayo Tea Zones Development Authority 
28. Nyayo Tea Zones Development Authority 
29. Post Bank Credit Ltd. 
30. Rehabilitation Advisory Services Ltd. 
31. School Equipment Production Unit 
32. Small Enterprise Finance Co. (SEFCO) 
33. Tana River Development Co. 
Appendix 1: Annex Vb 
Appendix 1: Annex Vb: 
Table 6-23 Levels of investments in Objectives annually in Kenya Shillings 
relations 
/marketing/image/brand 
New 75% 
• Intelligent Network 
• Prepaid card service 
• Free phone link- to corporate 
customers call (similar 
to 0800 service 
• Premium rate services call and 
give opinion (private 
sector 
Expansion (i.e. Location)-
Liberalisation 
• Telephone exchanges 
• Line cabling 
• Installation and repair 
0% 35% 35% 
35% 
35% 
5% 
0% 
0% 
other 
35% 
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Appendix 1: Annex VI: Sample List of Public Ownership' (Direct And Indirect) In Non-
Strategic "Commercially-Oriented" Enterprises To Be Privatised( Disposed) By GOK 
1. African Diatomite Industries Ltd. 
2. African Marine General Engineering Co. Ltd 
3. African Tours and Hotels Ltd. (Div) 
4. Agro-Chemical and Food Corporation 
5. Ark Ltd 
6. Associated Battery Manufacturers Ltd 
7. Associated Vehicle Assembly Ltd. 
8.Avon Export Ltd. 
9. A von Marketing Ltd. 
10. A von Marketing Ltd. 
II. A von Rubber Co. Ltd 
12. Bamb uri Portland Cement Co. Ltd (Div)) 
13. Booth Manufacturers 
14. BAT Development (K) Ltd. (Div) 
IS. Buffalo Springs Lodge Ltd. 
I6. Busia Hotel Ltd. 
17. Bomas Of Kenya Ltd. 
18. Chebut Tea Factory Ltd 
19. Chemilil Sugar Co. Ltd. 
20 Chloride Exide (K) Ltd. 
22. Clarkson Notcutt Ltd. 
23. Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd. 
24. C.M.B. Packaging Ltd. (Ex Metal Box) 
25. C.M.C. Holdings Ltd. 
26. C.P .C. Industrial Products Ltd. 
27.Dawa Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
28. East Africa Industries Ltd. ) 
29. East African Fine Spinners Ltd. 
30. East African Oxygen (Kenya) Ltd. 
31. East African Portland Cement C. Ltd. 
32. East African Sugar l OOOstries Ltd. 
33. Embu Hotel Ltd (Izaak Walton Inn). 
34. Eslon Plastics of Kenya Ltd. 
35. Everready Batteries Ltd. 
36. ESA Bookshop Ltd 
37. Firestone (E.A.) Ltd 
38. Galana Game Ranching Ltd 
39. Game Lodges Ltd. 
40. Gathuthi Tea Factory Ltd. 
41. Gatunguru Tea Factory Ltd. 
42. General Motors (Kenya) Ltd. 
43. Githambo Tea Factory Ltd. 
44. Githongo Tea Factory Ltd. 
45. Gitugi Tea Factory Ltd. 
46. Go" Hotel Ltd. 
47. Grindlays Bank International (K) Ltd. 
48. Highlands Paper Mills Ltd. 
49. Hola Ginnery Ltd. 
50. Homa Bay Hotel Ltd. 
51. Horti Seed Co. Ltd. 
- -52: Hotel ln~e~t~~ 'Ltd.~- ---
53. Hotel Span Ltd. 
54. Housing Finance Company of Kenya 
Ltd. 
55. ICDC Investment Co. Ltd 
56. Ikumbi Tea Factory Ltd. 
57. Imenti Tea Factory Ltd.- t c) 
58. Industrial Promotion Services Ltd. 
59. Infusion Kenya Ltd. 
60. Intemation-1 Hotels (Kenya) Ltd. 
61. Iriani Tea Factory Ltd. 
62. Kabamet Hotel Ltd. 
63. Kagwe Tea Factory Ltd.-
64. Kambaa Tea Factory Ltd 
65. Kangaita Tea Factory Ltd 
66. Kanyenyaini Tea Factory ltd. 
67. Kapkoros Tea Factory ltd 
68. Kapset Tea Factory 
69. Kebirigo Tea Factory Ltd. 
70. Kenatco Taxis Ltd. 
71. Kenchic Ltd. ' 
72. Kencom House Ltd. 
73. Kenya Airfreight Handling Co. Ltd. 
74. Kenya Airways Ltd. 
75. Kenya Bixa Ltd .. ,. 
76. Kenya Bowling Centres Ltd. 
77. Kenya Breweries Ltd. 
78. Kenya Cashewnuts Co. Ltd. 
79. Kenya Chemical & Food Corporation (R) 
80. Kenya Coffee Auctions Ltd. 
81. Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd. 
82. Kenya Commercial Finance Corporation 
83. Kenya Cooperatives Creameries Ltd. 
84. Kenya Drilling Co. Ltd. 
85. Kenya Engineering Industries Ltd. 
86. Kenya Fibre Corporation Ltd. (R) 
87. Kenya Film Corporation 
88. Kenya Fishnet Industries Ltd. 
89. Kenya Flamingo Airways Ltd. 
90. Kenya Fluorspar Co. Ltd. 
91. Kenya Fruit Processors Ltd. 
92. Kenya Furfural Ltd. (R) 
93. Kenya Grain Grower Cooperative Union. 
94. Kenya Horse Studs Ltd. (R) 
95. Kenya Hotel Properties Ltd. 
96. Kenya Industrial Plastics Ltd. 
97. Kenya Meat Commission 
98. Kenya National Assurance Co. Ltd. 
99. Kenya National Capital Corporation 
100. Kenya National Properties Ltd. 101. Kenya 
101 National Shipping Lines 
102. Kenya National Trading Corporation 
103. Kenya Peanut Co. Ltd. 
104. Kenya Reinsurance Corporation-" 
105. Kenya Re-Properties Ltd. 
106. Kenya Safari Lodges & Hotels Ltd. 
107. Kenya Seed Driers' Co. Ltd. 
I 08. Kenya Shipping Agency Ltd. 
-109. Kenya Hiite£M'iils Ltd.-c- --- --~-- -
110. Kenya Tea Packers Co. Ltd. (KETEPA) 
Ill. Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers 
I12. Kenya Wine Agencies Ltd. 
II3. Kerio Valley Ginnery Ltd. 
II4. Kiamokama Tea Factory Ltd." 
II5. Kibos Ginnery Ltd. 
I16. Kiegoi Tea Factory Ltd. 
I17. KimunyeTea Factory Ltd 
118. Kinoro Tea Factory Ltd. 
119. Kisii Bottlers Ltd. 
120. Kisumu Cotton Mills Ltd. (KICOMI) 
121. Lands Limited 
122. Lion Hill Camp Ltd." 
123. Litein Tea Factory Ltd 
124 LncomLtdc' 
125. Makomboki Tea Factory Ltd. 
126. Makuem Glnnery Ltd .. 
127. Malindi Fruit Processors Ltd. (D 
128. Maralal Safari Lodge Ltd 
129. Marsabit Lodge Ltd 
130. Mataara Tea Factory Ltd. 
131. Mepa1 Plastics Ltd. 
132. Meru Ginnery Lt.d. 
133. Meru Mulika Lodge Ltd. 
134. Milirnani Hotels Ltd. 
1'3 5. Milling Corporation of Kenya Ltd. 
136. Minet ICDC Insurance Brokers Ltd. 
137. Mogogosiek Tea Factory Ltd.-
138. Motor and Pedal Cycles Ltd. 
139. Mountain Lodge Ltd 
140. Mt. Eigon Lodge Ltd. 
141. Mt. Kenya Bottlers Co. Ltd. 
142. Mt. Kenya Textile Mills Ltd (MOUNTEX) 
143. Mumias Sugar Co. Ltd. 
144. Mungania Tea Factory Ltd. 
145. Mutuality Investment Trust Ltd. 
146. Mwea Ginnery Ltd. 
147. Mwea Rice Mills Ltd. 
148. Nairobi Oil Products Ltd. (R) 
149. Nak-ru Chrome Tanning C,.,. Ltd. (VL) 
150. NAS Airport Services Ltd. 
151. Nation Printers and Publishers Ltd. 
152--- National Bank of Kenya Ltd. 
153. Natational Agricultural & Chern- I 
Fertilizer Corporation (D) 
154. Ndima Tea Factory Ltd. - .2-; 
155. Nestle Foods (K) Ltd. 
156. Njunu Tea Factory Ltd. 
157. Notcutt Longaroni Ltd. 
158. Nyamanche Tea Factory Ltd. 
159. Nyank9ba Tea Factory Ltd. 
160. Nyansiongo Tea Factory Ltd. 
161. Nzoia Sugar Co. Ltd. 
162. Ogembo Tea Factory Ltd.- '3 <f 163. Pan 
Vegetable PrDcessors Ltd. 
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164. Panafric Hotel Ltd. 
165. Panafrican Paper Mills (E.A.) Ltd. 
166. Pearl Dry Cleaners Ltd. 
167. Pollman's Tours and Safari Ltd .. 
168. Polysynthetic E.A. Ltd. 
169. Ragati Tea Factory Ltd. 
170. Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. 
171. Rift Valley Bottlers Ltd. 
172. Rift Valley Textile Mills (RIVATEX) 
173. Robinson Hotels (Msa) Ltd. 
174. Rukuriri Tea Factory Ltd. 
175. Safari lodges & Properties (K) Ltd. 
176. Salt Manufacturers (K) Ltd. 
177. Sanganyi Tea Factory Ltd.- D-
178. Sanyo Armco ltd. 
179. Savings and loan (K) Ltd. 
180. Seracoatings Kenya Ltd. (R) 
181. Simpson and Whitelaw Ltd. 
182. Sirikwa Hotel (Kenya) Ltd. 
183. Sokoro Fibre Boards ltd. 
184. Sonatels (K) ltd. 
185. South Nyanza Sugar Co. Ltd. 
186. Sunset Hotel ltd. 
187. Synthetic Fibre (K) Ltd. 
188. Tegat Tea Factory Ltd 
189. The Tea Hotel, Kericho 
190. Theta Tea Factory ltd. 
191. Thika Cotton Mills Ltd. 
192. Thumaita Tea Factory Ltd. 
193. Tiger Shoes Co. ltd. 
194. Tom be Tea Factory ltd.-
195. Tourism Promotion Services 
196. Town Properties ltd. 
197. Transport and Tourism Services Ltd. 
198. Uchumi Supermarkets Ltd. 
199. United Finance Company of Kenya 
200. Uplands Bacon Factory (R) 
201. Utalii Investment Co. Ltd. 
202. Wananchl Saw Mills ltd. 
203. Warehouse & Forwarding Co. Ltd. 
(WAFCO) 
204. Wedco ltd. 
205. Wire Products ltd. 
206. Yuken Textiles ltd. (R) 
207. Y-Fashk>ns ltd. 
(R) - In Receivership 
(D) - Dormant company not trading 
(Div) - Divested 
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Appendix 2 : Annex IX: Sample Summary pages of The Postal Act 1998 
THE POSTAL CORPORATION ACT, 1998 .I No.3 of 1998 j Date of Assent: I st October, 1998. 
Date of Commencement: By Notice 
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS 
PART I- PRELIMINARY 
1.Short title and Commencement 
2.1nterpretation. 
PART II - ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE CORPORATION 
3.Establishment of the Corporation. 
4.Headquarters. 
5.Functions of the Corporation. 
6.Establishment of Board of Directors. 
7.Powers ofthe Board. 
8.Conduct of business and affairs of the 
Board. 
9. Delegation by the Board. 
10. Remuneration of Board members. 
11. Postmaster General 
12 Secretary to the Board. 
13. Staff of the Corporation. 
14. The common seal ofthe Corporation. 
15. Protection from personal liability. 
16. Liability ofthe Board for damages. 
No.3 Postal Corporation 1998 
SCHEDULE (s.8) 
PART III FINANCIAL 
PROVISIONS 
17. Funds of the Corporation. 
18. Financial year. 
19. Annual estimates. 
20. Accounts and audit. 
21. Investment of funds. An A 
22. Annual Report. 
PART IV MISCELLANEOUS 
PROVISIONS 
23. Exemption ofthe Corporation from liability. 
24. Limitation of actions. 
25. Restriction on execution against property of 
Corporation. 
26. Service of notice, etc., on Postmaster General. 
27. Service of notice, etc, by Postmaster General. 
PROVISIONS AS TO THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS AND AFFAIRS OF THE BOARD 
An Act of parliament to provide for an establishment of the postal corporation of Kenya, to provide for its 
powers and functions, and for connected purposes 
ENACTED by the government of Kenya as follows:-
PART I- PRELIMINARY 
1. This act may be cited as the postal Corporation of Kenya Act, 1998 and shall come into operation on such a 
date as the minister may, by notice in the Gazette, appoint 
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
"Board" means the Board of Directors ofthe Corporation established under section 6; 
"corporation" means the postal Corporation of Kenya Established under section 3; 
"minister" means the Minister fro the time being responsible for mattered relating to communications 
PART II: ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE= CORPORATION 
· ·3 .·o )~ ~ .. - ~Th~ere-iS"esiaillisil~<fa=coFporiltiofi1()lJ'; I{fi"Q~~;·~sth({Posia!'corp~~ii(;~~····· or'KeriY!l~ ·-
(2) The Corporation shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall, in its 
corporate name, be capable of-
( a) suing and being sued 
(b) taking, purchasing or otherwise acquiring, holding, charging and disposing of movable and 
immovable property 
Communications 
Commission 
of Kenya 
Form AF2 
Appendix 2: Annex Xa- Sample Summary Of Telecoms Licensing and CCK Forms 
APPLICATION FOR LICENSING AS A TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDER/OPERATOR 
1. NAME OF COMPANY/PERSON TO BE LICENCED 
(fhe Company or 
persons name should 
be stated in full) 
2. ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE COMPANY/PERSON 
TO BE LICENCED 
(The physical address, postal 
address, telephone and 
fax numbers should be stated) 
Physical address: Town ............ Street/Road ..................... LR No ................. . 
Name ofBuilding ............................ Floor .......... Room ....... . 
Postal Address P. 0. Box .......................................... Town ................... . 
Telephone ...................... Fax ......................................... . 
3. INCOME TAX PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (PIN) 
4. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE APPLICANT'S LICENSABLE 
SERVICE 
(A single sentence description 
of what aspect of telecommunication 
service the applicant is applying 
to be licensed in) 
5. COMPANY PROFILE 
(Give full details of the proprietors 
or partners owning the business 
or if the applicant is a Company 
the names of the directors and shareholders 
of the Company.) 
Where the Applicant is not a company 
Name of proprietor Nationality 
1 ...................... .. .............. .. 
Address Passport/ID No. 
················ -~--~-----~--.- --
~--;=- •• --~.- -~- ·--- --..,---
3 ...................... . 
4 .................... .. 
5 ..................... .. 
6 .................... .. 
7 ...................... . 
Where the Applicant is registered under Companies Act (Cap 486) · 
i)Name of Shareholder Nationality No of shares held Passport/ID No. 
1 .................... .. 
2. ······················ 
3 ...................... . 
4 .................... .. 
ii)Name ofDirector Nationality Address Passport!ID No. 
1 .................... .. 
2 ...................... . 
3 ...................... . 
4 .................... .. 
6. SHARE HOLDING 
i) Local ........................... % Foreign ....................................... % 
ii) Authorised Shares ...................... .Issued Shares .................................... . 
iii) Is the company listed in the Nairobi Stock Exchange ? If yes state the date when it 
started trading. 
7. REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE 
No ............................................ Date ............................................. .. 
-- ~----::-- ----;- ---= -------..-
2 
8. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE BANK OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
WHERE BUSINESS ACCOUNT IS MAINTAINED. 
3 
9. PERSONAL DETAILS 
i) State whether any of the partners/ directors/ shareholders is undischarged 
bankrupt. (If so indicate the names) 
ii) State whether any of the partners/ directors/ shareholders have a beneficial 
interest in any other business licensed to provide or operate telecommunication 
services. 
iii) Has any previous application by you been rejected under the Act? (If so give 
details) 
iv) Has any previous license granted to you under the Act been cancelled, suspended 
or modified?( If so give details) 
4 
10. DETAILS OF THE SERVICES/NETWORK PROPOSED AND MARKET 
TO BE SERVED. 
(Use separate sheet where necessary) 
5 
11. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
(The applicant should 
describe briefly 
his network configuration, 
location or site, coverage or 
service ,area interfacing 
requirements etc; 
a black box 
mode of the network 
showing 
all circuits on the 
network and 
their capacities. 
Give details of 
circuit requirements for 
interconnection 
to the public 
network and also 
specifY points of 
interconnection) 
and detailed 
diagrams showing 
network layout 
and components.) 
(Use separate sheet where necessary) 
6 
12. TERMINAL EQUIPMENT 
(State what terminal equipment 
or customer premise equipment (CPE) 
may be connected to the network 
and to what standards they 
must conform (if any) 
13. INTERNATIONAL GATEWAYS/FACILITIES NETWORK TO BE USED 
BY APPLICANT. 
(Use separate sheet where necessary) 
14. MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS 
i) Certified copy of proof of shareholding from the Registrar of Companies 
ii) Certified copy of proof of registration or incorporation in Kenya 
iii) Certified copy ofPIN card 
iv) Non-refundable license application fee ofKshs. 10,000/= 
v) Letter of application with Company seal (where applicable) 
(All copies of documents a/lached to this application should be certified as true copies o[the originals) 
15. DECLARATION 
1/We hereby certify the information we have provided in this application is true and 
correct to the best of my/ our knowledge. 1/We also understand that it is an offence under 
the Penal Code to give false information in support of any application. 
Name .................................................................................................. . 
Designation ............................................................................................ . 
Signature ............................................................................................... . 
Date ..................................................................................................... . 
7 
16. REFEREES 
The following details shall be completed by two different and independent referees who 
would vouch your competence to operate a business as a telecommunication service 
provider or operator. Persons who may not understand what is involved in running the 
business cannot be accepted as referees. 
(i) 1st Referee 
I certify that the information given in this form is true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge 
Full Name .............................................................................................. .. 
(Block letters, Surname first) 
Occupation ............................................................................................. . 
Postal Address ....................................................................................... . 
Telephone ....................................... Fax ................................................. . 
Date ............................................ . 
Referee's Signature 
(ii) 2"d Referee 
I certify that the information given in this form is true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge 
Full Name .............................................................................................. .. 
(Block letters, Surname first) 
Occupation ............................................................................................. . 
Postal Address ........................................................................................ . 
Telephone ....................................... Fax ................................................. . 
Date ............................................ . 
Referee's Signature 
8 
17. COMPLETED APPLICATION FORMS SHOULD BE RETURNED TO:-
Director-General 
Communications Commission of Kenya 
Wayaki Way, opposite Kianda School 
P. 0. Box 14448 
Nairobi. 
Tel: 254-2-49111 
Fax. 254-2-448418 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
The applicant MEETS/ DOES NOT MEET the Commission's requirements and is 
hereby RECOMMENDED/NOT RECOMMENDED for approval of licensing as a 
The reasons for not recommending the applicant are as follows:-
Name .................................................. Designation ........................ .. 
Signature .............................................. Date ........................................... .. 
Official stamp 
9 
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Appendix 2 : Annex Xb: Sample Summary pages of Communications Regulations: 
Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 33 
Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 33 4th May, 2001 (Legislative Supplement No. 21) 
LEGAL NOTICE No. 68 
THE KENYA COMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS, 2001 
ARRANGEMENT OF REGULATIONS 
PART I- PRELIMINARY. 
I. Citation. 
2. Interpretation. 
PART II 
PROCEDURES 
3. Protected Information. 
OPERATING 
PART III- FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
4. Payments to the Commission. 
PART IV- FAIR 
COMPETITION AND 
EQUALITY OF TREATMENT 
5. Acts of unfair competition. 
6. Licensees to offer non-preferential 
service. 
7. Complaints of unfair competition. 
8. Disputes between Licensees. 
PARTY-
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
LICENSES 
9. Licenses required. 10. Licensing. 
I 0. International Conventions. 
12. Transfer of License. 
13. Lapse and renewal of license. 
224 Kenya Subsidiary Legislation, 2001 
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 
14, Basis and purpose. 
15. Definitions ofterms. 
16. National spectrum management 
policy. 
17. Application criteria for approval.. 
18. Assignment of frequencies 
19. Obligations of the licensee. 
20. Ownership of frequencies. 
21. Transfer and assignment of station 
authorization. 
22. Temporary authorization. 
23. Change in equipment. 
24. Station identification. 
--2s.ctwi"iiPJ)nfviif~tlrispectio!L- --
26. Monitoring and inspection. 
27. Inspection and maintenance of towers 
and control equipment. 
28. Misuse of frequencies. 
29. Discontinuation of station operation. 
30. Measures against violations. 
31. Revocation of licenses. 
P ART VII - INTERCONNECTION 
AND PROVISION OF FIX} LINKS 
32. Basis and purpose. 
33. Power to review. 
34. Interpretations. 
35. Rights and obligation to interconnect. 
36. Contents of interconnection 
agreements. 
37. Basis of Interconnection. 
38. Non-discrimination and transparency. 
39. Quality of service. 
40. Good faith negotiations. 
41. Interconnection charges and charging 
structure. 
42. Interconnection procedures. 
43. Establishment and location points of 
interconnection. 
44. Calling line identity. 
45. Modification, suspension and 
termination. 
46. Confidentiality. 
47. Interconnection disputes. 
48. Approval of Interconnection 
agreements. 
49. Leased capacity. 
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225 PART VIII - TYPE-APPROVAL 
OF TERMINAL EQUIPMENT 
50. Purpose. 
51. Categories of network and terminal 
equipment requiring type approval. 
52. Type approval procedure. 
53. Applications for type approval. 
54. Language. 
55. Submission of samples of equipment 
for testing. 
56. Provisional type approval. 
57. Final type approval. 
58. Revocation oftype approval. 
59. Complaint procedures. 
60. Import and sales restrictions. 
61. Exemptions from type approval. 
~-NUMBERING~~--~.~--~------
62. Management and administration of 
national numbering plan. 
63. Considerations when assigning or 
publishing numbers. 
PART X - POSTAL AND CURRIER 
SERVICES I 
64. Application. 
65. Interpretations. 
66. International and regional 
arrangements. 
67. Delivery of postal articles. 
68. Licensing of postal services operators. 
69. Applications for license. 
70. Conditions of license. 
71. Non-discrimination. 
72. License fees. 
73. License terms. 
74. License modification and renewal. 
75. Suspension and cancellation of 
licenses. 
76. Transfer or lease of license. 
77. Lapse and renewal of license. 
78. Operation of reserved postal services. 
79. Tariffs for unreserved postal services. 
80. Tariffs for reserved postal services. 
81. Unreserved postal services fees and 
operations. 
82. Consumer complaint procedures. 
83. Universal service obligation. 
84. Issuance of postage Stamps. 
85. Reporting Requirements. 
86. Production of records and Inspections. 
87. Suspensions or Cancellation of 
Licenses. 
88. Interconnection. 
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89. Disposal of undeliverable postal 
articles .. 
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PART XI- TARIFF REGULATION 
90. Scope. 
91. Price Cap. 
92. Applications for approval of tariffs I 
93. Notice on tariffs. 
94. Decision on Tariffs 
95. Investigation and suspension oftariffs. 
96. Tariffs (file and use) 
PART XII REPORTS, 
INVESTIGATIONS, INSPECTIONS A 
ENFORCEMENT 
97. Annual reports. 
98. Investigations. 
99. Inspection. 
100. Enforcement of license conditions. 
PART XIII MISCELLANEOUS 
PROVISIONS 
101. Roaming agreements. I 
, 102. Registration of telecommunications 
contractors and vendors .. 
103. Fees. 
THE KENYA COMMUNICATIONS ACT (No.2 of 1998): IN EXERCISE of the powers conferred by 
sections 27,38,39,40 and 66 of the Kenya Communications Act, the minister for Information, Transport and 
Communications In consultation with the Commission makes the following Regulations -
THE KENYA COMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS, 2001 
PARTl-PRELIMINARY 
1. These regulations may be cited as the Kenya communications regulations, 2001. 
2. In these Regulations, unless the context otherwise requires-
"Act" means the Kenya Communications Act; 
" Basic telecommunications service" means a service to subscribers which provides such subscribers with a 
telephone connection to, and a unique local telephone number address on a licensed local access provider and 
which enables such subscribers to place calls to, or receive calls from, other telecommunications stations on 
those systems and shall include residence and business line services 
" Basic telephone service" means a service provided to the public which allows end users to transmit and 
receive real time voice communications, including voice telephony service, public pay telephone service, 
operator assisted services, local domestic and international long distance telephone services whether by wire 
or wireless means as well as basic, non-packet switched data communication such as facsimile transmissions 
but does not include advanced or enhanced telephone services or dedicated data communications services 
such as paging services; 
-----.,.-~.----~--~-,----~-~-. --,-----.. -. 
-,""Bisicteiepho·ny" means-fixed-~r mobii~~~-o-;;.;;~;~~~~ s~k~-i~~which a two-way connections are 
established without any deliberate removal or addition to the information content transmitted over that 
connection or any additional service having been provided thereof; 
"Circuit" means the physical connection or path of channels or conductors and equipment between two 
given points through which an electric current may be established; 
Appendix 2: Annex X 
"Contract" means any agreement, arrangement, bond, commitment, franchise, indemnity, indenture, 
instrument, lease, concession, license or understanding, whether in writing or not in writing 
"communications" shall, where use ion these regulations refer to telecommunications, postal and radio 
communications services; 
"commission" means the communications commission of Kenya established under section 3 of the act 
"confidential business information" means a proprietary information for Trade, commercial or financial 
nature that is-
(a) of a kind that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it is obtained 
and; 
(b) the disclosure of which is likely to impair the Commission's ability to obtain similar necessary 
information in the future or to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from 
whom the information is obtained 
-- -~-· -.---::-·: 
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Appendix 2 : Annex XI: Approved Telecoms Market Structure- Table 5-5b 
SERVICE j REQD COMPETITION POLICY EXCLUSIVIT i LICENCE Y PERIOD 
~~-~ 
"" " 
" 
"" 
- ---
Local >Yes Telkom Kenya and Local Network Operators Up to 2004 
covering geographic service areas based on for Nairobi 
provincial administrative boundaries except only 
Nairobi which will be exclusively Telkom 
Kenya 
National Long Distance Yes Restricted to Telkom Kenya initially and later Up to 2004 
other long distance operators after period of 
exclusivity. 
-- -·····-"" """ ---- "" "" 
International Gateway and Services Yes Restricted to Telkom Kenya initially and later Up to 2004 
other international gateway operators after 
exclusivity period. 
--·-- ----
Global Mobile Personal Yes • Telkom Kenya and other licensed Up to 2004 
Communications by Satellite ' network operators to provide I 
(GMPCS) GMPCS service. Nil 
• Full competition in the provision of 
GMPCS user terminals under class 
license. 
GSM/ETACS Yes Initially duopoly between Safaricom and Nil 
Ken Cell. 
--- -
--
"'"-
" 
""""" --- ---- "" -----
Other mobile services (e.g. PCS, Yes Limited competition based on spectrum None 
Trunked Radio System) availability and demand for mobile services. 
"" --- --··-
- -- - -
Paging Yes Full competition depending on radio None 
spectrum availability 
---·-- ----- - --·-··-
"" "" 
--- --· 
VSAT Yes Restricted to private networks and services Nil 
for intra-corporate data communications. 
Up to 
International Commercial VSA T ! 2004 
networks and services to be restricted i to Telkom Kenya. Other 
i 
infrastructure providers to be licensed 
in line with market growth. 
" -· 
. --· -----· ----- " ". " ----- .. - " 
Internet Node and Backbone Yes Initially to be provided by Telkom Kenya. Up to 2004 
Other infrastructure providers to be licensed ' 
in line with market growth. 
" """ 
Value Added Services e.g. Generic/Class Full competition Nil 
Licenses 
• Electronic Mail 
• Voice Mail 
• Store and Forward Fax 
• Internet Service Provision 
• Video Conferencing 
0 EDI 
------.=---- - ----
·---· 
1---~. ~ ----- ---
--:---------,-;"':~--.,_..,.-.,-o--.,.----:-,----~-~---~~---~ ,~------ ------"""""'"'~'-
-· 
"" ---------- -· 
Public Telephone Service Resale Yes Full competition Nil 
e Customer Telephone Service Certificate and Full competition Nil 
Resale Type Approve 
e Internal/External Wiring - of Equipment 
-- -- -- ··- """ "" "" 
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Appendix 2: Annex XII: Summary Sample of The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes 
Bill, 2003 
A Bill for An Act of Parliament to provide for the prevention, investigation and punishment of corruption, 
economic crime and related offences and for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith. 
ENACTED by the Parliament of Kenya as follows: -
PART I-PRELIMINARY 
1. This Act may be cited as the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003, and shall come into 
operation on such day as the Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, appoint. 
Short title and commen-cement. 
2. (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:-
"benejif' means any gift, loan, fee, reward, appointment, service, favour, forbearance, promise or other 
consideration or advantage; 
"Investigator" means a person authorised by the Director under section 19 to conduct an investigation on 
behalf of the Commission; "Minister" means the Minister responsible for integrity issues; "private body" 
means any person or organisation not being a public body and includes a voluntary organisation, charitable 
organisation, company, partnership, club and any other body or organisation howsoever constituted; (2) 
Words and expressions used in this act and which are defined in Chapter VIII (a) of the Constitution have the 
same meaning in this Act as in that Chapter. 
(3) For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be in possession of any record, property, 
information or other thing if the possession of it is under his control. 
Definitions 
3. 
(I) For the purposes of paragraph (g) of the definition of "corruption" in section 113A (1) of the 
Constitution, an offence under any ofthe provisions of sections 31-37,39 and 40 shall constitute corruption 
for the purposes of Chapter VIII (A) of the Constitution. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (b) of the defmition of "economic crime" in section 113A(l) of the 
Constitution, an offence under section 38 shall constitute economic crime for the purposes of Chapter VIII 
(A) of the Constitution. 
Corruption and economic crime 
Arrangement of Clauses 
PART I-PRELIMINARY 
1. Short title and commencement. 
2. Interpretation. 
3. Offences constituting corruption or economic 
crime. 
PART II-KENYA ANTI-CORRUPTION 
COMMISSION AND ADVISORY BOARD 
A-Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
4. Co-operation with other bodies. 
5. Financial arrangements. 
6. Accounts and audit. 
7. Annual report. 
B- Director and staff of the Commission 
-8 .. Qualifications~for·-appointment·as·Directot-or·· 
Assistant Director. 
9. Term of office of Director or Assistant Director 
10. Vacancies. 
11. Resignation of Director of Assistant Director. 
12. Removal of Director or Assistant Director. 
13. Other provisions relating to staff of the 
Commission. 
C-Kenya Anti-Corruption Advisory Board 
14. Constitution of Advisory Board. 
15. Committees of the Board. 
16. Chairman and Vice-chairman. 
17. Secretary. 
18. Procedures of the Advisory Board. 
PART III-INVESTIGATIONS 
19. Investigators. 
20. Identification for investigators. 
21. Complaint not investigated. 
22. Statement of suspect's property. 
23. Requirement to provide information. 
24. Production of records and property. 
25. Search of premises. 
26. Admissibility of things produced or found. 
-27~cSurrenderof travel documents:~·- ~- ------
28. Arrest of persons. 
29. Disclosure that may affect investigation. 
30. Impersonating investigator. 
PART IV -OFFENCES 
31. Meaning of "agent" and "principal". 
32. Bribing agents. 
33. Secret inducements for advice. 
34. Deceiving principal. 
35. Conflicts of interest. 
36. Improper benefits to trustees for appointments. 
37. Bid rigging, etc. 
38. Economic crime. 
39. Abuse of office. 
40. Dealing with suspect property. 
41. Penalty for offence under this Part. 
42. Custom not a defence. 
43. Impossibility, no intention, etc. not a defence. 
PART V-COMPENSATION AND RECOVERY 
OF IMPROPER BENEFITS 
44. Liability for compensation. 
45. Liability for improper benefits. 
46. Liability- miscellaneous provisions. 
47. Compensation orders on conviction. 
48. Forfeiture of unexplained assets. 
49. Order preserving suspect property, etc. 
PART VI-EVIDENCE 
50. Unexplained assets, etc. As corroboration. 
51. Presumption of corruption if act shown. 
52. Certificates to show value of property, etc. 
53. Rule, etc. relating to accomplices. 
54. Certificates to show office and Compensation. 
Appendix 2: Annex XII 
PART VII -MISCELLANEOUS 
55. Suspension, if charged with corruption or 
economic crime. 
56. Suspension, etc. If convicted of corruption or 
economic crime. 
57. Disqualification if convicted of corruption or 
economic crime. 
58. Protection of informers. 
59. Obstructing persons under this Act, etc. 
60. Conduct outside Kenya-offences. 
61. Regulations. 
PART VIII-REPEAL, TRANSITION AND 
AMENDMENTS 
62. Interpretation. 
63. Repeal of Chapter 65. 
64. Offences under repealed Act. 
65. Temporary continuation of former Advisory 
Board. 
66. Initial nominees for the Advisory Board. 
67. Initial Chairman and Vice-chairman of 
Advisory Board. 
68. Temporary Director, etc. 
69. Transfer of assets, etc to Commission. 
70. Amendment of section 42 of Chapter 22. 
First Schedule: 
Provisions relating to the Staff of the Commission 
Second Schedule: 
Provisions relating to Members of the Advisory 
Board 
Third Schedule: Provisions as to the Conduct of 
Business and Affairs of the Advisory Board 
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Appendix 2: Annex XIV: Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA)-
1 ____ ----::::::::::::::::::;~-----------~Member States 
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Appendix 2: Annex XV: Country Breakdown of (Developing Countries) Global Amount Raised from 
Privatization ($ million) 
Australia 
Austria 
.Belgium 
1997el 
7,1001 
1,600! 
9001 
2,000! 
7001 
lOOt 
1001 
5,3001 
200' 
3,5001 
3,5001 
11,5001 
1,1001 
4100: 
3,300 
7001 
~~~ ---------~~-~ ~~ --~ 
I 
~ppendix 2: ANNEX- C: Status ofPrivatization Programme: List of Privatized Enterprises 
A.: LIQUIDATIONS 
I Company , Year Public Share Public Share Sector Buyer Procee 
Before(%) After(%) ds 
I (Kshs) 
1 I 
I Nakuru Chrone Tanning Co. Ltd 1992 20 0 Leather Volutary woud- Up 800,000 
2 Kenya Peanut Co.Ltd 1992 46 0 Agro-processing - -
3' Kenya Horse Studs Ltd 1992 50 0 Livestock - -
4 Kenacto Transport Ltd 1992 100 0 Transport - -
5[ Horti Seed Kenya Ltd 1992 100 0 Agriculture - -
6: Seed Driers Ltd 1992 100 0 Agriculture - -
7 Simpson & Whitelaw Ltd 1992 100 0 Agriculture - -
81 BAT Development (K) Ltd 1993 20 0 Poultry - -
9 Town Properties Ltd 1994 100 0 Services - -
10 Motor & Pedal Ltd 1995 40 0 Transport F.X.co.Ltd 500,000 
11 Uplands Bacon Factory Ltd 1995 100 0 Agro-processing - -
12 Kenya Film Corporation 1995 100 0 Entertainment - -
B.RECEIVERSHIPS 
Company Year Public Share Public share Sector Buyer Proceeds 
Before(%) After(%) (Kshs) 
1 Nairobi Oil Products Ltd. 1992 29 0 Oil Recycling Various Indiv 8,750,000 
2 Tigers Shoes .Ltd 1993 16.7 0 Leather Lento Agencies 9,000,000 1 
3 ' Yuken Textiles Ltd 1993 100 0 Textile Yuken Mills Ltd 14,000,000 I 
4 Sirikwa Hotel Ltd 1993 21 0 Tourism Akamba lnves. Ltd 70,000,000 
5 Kenya Drilling Co. Ltd 1993 100 0 Services Kenacto & Various 21,700,000 ' 
6' Kisumu Cotton Mills Ltd 1993 80 0 Textiles Caneland Ltd 17 4,961,000 
7 Seracoating Kenya Ltd 1994 34 0 Plastics Local shareholders 82,000,000 
8 Pan vegetable Processors Ltd 1994 100 0 Agri -processing Homegrown (K) 95,000,000 
9 Kenya Textile Mills Ltd 1995 81 0 Textiles Kifaru Mills Ltd 81,000,000 
10 I Kenya Furfural Co. Ltd 1995 51 0 Chemical V. Shareholders 55,800,000 
111 Kenya Engineering Industries Ltd 1995 50 0 Engineering Ashut Engineers 52,505,555 
12 Synthetic Fibres Kenya Ltd 1995 100 0 Textile Sunrise Textile Ltd 50,000,000 
13, Ea.St African Fine Spinners Ltd 1995 70 0 Textile Bedi Inves. Ltd 282,000,000 
14' Kenatco Taxis Ltd 1996 100 0 Transport - -
............................... u. .... am ............ ---------------
C. PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS 
Company Year Public Public Sector Buyer Proceeds 
Share Share (Kshs) 
Before After(%) 
" 
(%) 
1 ~Td Hotel Kericho ** 1991 60 0 Hotel & Tourism Sololo Invest. Ltd 15,000,000 ' 
2 $ Hhlhland Paper mills Ltd 1992 17 0 Pulp & Paper Shareholders 875 000 
3 ,(' Y -Fashions Ltd 1993 75 0 Textiles Shareholders 4,000,000 
4 t Panafric hotel Ltd 1993 31 0 Hotel & Tourism Sarova Hotels 63,855,000 ( 
,1. Ltd I' 
5 I• , 1993 10 0 Hotel & Tourism Robinson Hotels 50,234,274 ~ Robinson Baobab Hotel Ltd 
Intl 
6 j A von Marketing Ltd 1993 18 0 Services Existing 8,078,400 
Shareholders 
7 ·~·.Avon Rubber Co. Ltd 1993 20 0 Rubber Existing 11,949,470 
r Shareholders 
8 [ A v~>n export Ltd 1993 14 0 Services Existing 55,000 
I Shareholders 
9 I' Nestle Foods (K) Ltd 1993 13 0 Food & Beverages Nestle S.A of 18,347,750 
Swiitzerland 
10 
I , 
1993 49 0 Tourism Touristik Union 25,024,895 1 Pollman's Tours & Safaris Ltd 
I 
lntl I L 
-- - - ---- ·---- -------
I 
J 
l·l 
2-
-.1 
1 
:1 
11! 
I' 
121" 
I 
l 
t 
13\: 
:( 
14 . 
15 : 
16 ·: 
17 
1: 
18'-1; 
'!'' 
it; 
19 t 
20i'l 
" 1.~ 
![ !, 
I. 
'· 
21 :i 
22\t 
l 
23 ·,1 
24 ~-
(· 
I' i'!' 
25' 
26 I! 
•' I 
27 J 
28 I 
29 
30 :q 
!· 
31 ! 
Salt Manufacturers Kenya Ltd 1993 56 0 
Kenchick Ltd 1993 12 0 
Firestone (EA) Ltd 1994 20 0 
Chloride exide_(K) Ltd 1994 18 0 
As'sociated Battery Manu f. Ltd 1994 20 0 
Kenva Fishnet Industries Ltd 1994 43 0 
CRC Industries Producers Ltd 1994 18 0 
Kenya Cashewnut Ltd 1994 76 
African Marine & Engineering Co. Ltd 1994 33 
Sanyo Armco Ltd 1995 34 
Booth Manufacturing (A) Ltd 1995 29 
Wire Products Ltd 1995 30 
Camaud Metal Box Ltd 1995 19 
Kenya Bixa Ltd 1995 51 
So~oro Fireboard Ltd 1995 26 
Embu hotel Ltd 1995 29 
Kenya Bowling Centres 1995 26 
Lion Hill Camp 1995 30 
Kenva Fruit Processors Ltd 1995 35 
NAS Airport Services Ltd 1995 27 
Elson Plastics 1995 17 
Chemical Saltec 43,922,724 
International 
Poultry NASAirport 4,600,000 
Services, Credit 
Finance Corp. 
Mawara 
Investment 
Rubber Sameer Invest. 100,000,000 
Ltd 
Services NAS Holdin~s 5 154125 
Automobiles NAS Holdings 28 141 200 
Textiles Afro Meat Ltd 2418750 
Agri-Processing CPC 29,523,530 
International 
0 Agri-Processing Kilifi District Co- 78,203,446 
op Union 
0 Engineering First Chartered 30,712,500 
Securities 
0 Electronics Former 2,251,080 
Employees 
Sanyo Electric 
Co. oflaoan 
0 Engineering Kenya Aluminum 9,993,060 
Industries Ltd 
0 Engineering Industrial 8,336,250 
Promotion 
Services 
0 Packaging C.M.B of UK 39 188 000 
0 Food & Beverage Kenya 35,598,000 
Plantations & 
Products 
0 Timber Other 22,007,700 
Shareholders 
0 Tourism Other 3,117,690 
Shareholders 
0 Entertainment Other 3,220,000 
Shareholders 
0 Hotd & Tourism Sarova Hotels 14,500,000 
Ltd 
0 Al!ri-Processing Passi Ltd 8 645 000 
0 Services Other 62,920,000 
Shareholders 
0 Plastics Other 
3 
- 'II-
'!- Shareholders 
' 
'1 
Associated Vehicle assemblers 1996 51 0 Vehicle Assembly Kenya Motor 154,336,000* 
Handling Co. Ltd 
& Marshalls E.A 
Ltd 
33 Wananchi Sawmills Ltd 45 0 Saw Milling Other 15,444,707* 
t Shareholders 
34 Brollo Kenya Ltd 1996 10 0 S tee! Rolling Zambezi 35,666,631 * 
I~ Establishment 
35'· Kenya Shipping Agency Ltd 1996 80 0 Transport Southern Credit 38,416,000 
'!. Finance Ltd 
361 K~nya Industrial Plastics Ltd 1996 33.3 0 Plastic Caramel 4,224,438* d.: 
'I Chemicals 
37[ Raymond Woolen Mills 1996 11 0 Textile Other 94,023,438 
Shareholders 
38(f Kenya National Properties 1997 34.1 0 Real Estate ICDC 124,850,000 
Investment Co. 
39~ Polysynthetic E.A 1997 30 0 Chemical HoechstE. A 50,289 030 
40~ D~wa Pharmaceuticals 1997 40 0 P harrnaceu ticals Other 4,988,382 
Shareholders 
41'1 General Motors 1997 51 20 Motor vehicle Other 333,492,750 
r, 
Shareholders 
.I 
42'{ Minet ICDC Insurance Brokers Ltd 1997 47 26 Insurance Other 21,275,880 
,,, 
Shareholders 'I', 
43,\' East Africa Industries Ltd (EAI) 1997 29 20 Other 200,214,975 
:' ~~· Shareholders 
44:[ Eveready Batteries Kenya Ltd 1997 24.87 20.87 Battery Other 23,041,200 
·i Shareholders 
45''1 Milimani Hotel Ltd 1997 49.12 0 Hotel Industry Other 80,010,000 
'i' Shareholders 
46 J Warehousing & Forwarding Company 1997 25 0 Clearing & Forwarding Other 2,437,360 
'· Shareholders 
47 :~' Kenya National Shiping Lines Ltd 1997 70 45.12 Shipping Mediterranen -
J Shipping Company 
48; Infusion Kenya Ltd 1997 13 0 Pharmaceutical Ever Investment 8,000,000 
.rl· Co 
49 ;', Stanbic Kenva Ltd 1997 40 23 Banking Sinclair (SB I CJ Share Dilution 
50 :1 Ma!alal Lodge 1997 Tourism Other -
Shareholders 
51 : Kenya Vehicle Manufacturers Ltd 1997 35 0 Automobile Other 57,750,000 
Shareholders 
52' Mount Kc:nva Bottlers Ltd 1997 Bottlinl!' Other -
4 
'f 
I L 
I 
53 Kisii Bottlers 1997 
J 
'j 
I 
*{ Pre-programme transactions 
*'·Price ,still under negotiations (this is the offer price) 
I ' D. PUBLIC FLOATATIONS 
I 
11 
? L1· 
_;,t .. 
3 ~-
4 'fi 
,I 
I 
i'l•"· 
5;:! 
I 
:c 
61 
7 l 
8 '~; 
i·': 
9 i,j, 
i 
i 
I 
I 
Gompany 
B'amburi Pordand Cement Co. Ltd* 
E~A. Oxygen Ltd 
CMC Holdings 
National Bank of Kenya 
Kbtya National Capital Corporation# 
Kenya Aitways 
K~nva Airfreig_ht Handlin_g_ Co. ** 
K~nya Flamingo Airways# 
Milmias Sugar Company# 
** J?re-programme transactions 
# Kenya,Aitways subsidiaries 
\ E. COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
1 
f Company 
rl 
'1 ~~ 
1 ;! ESA Bookshop 
2 11 Mutuallv Investment Trust (Golden 
Year 
1991 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1996 
1996 
2001 
Year 
1993 
1993 
26.1 
Public 
Share 
Before 
(%1 
26 
15 
20 
(1" issue-
1001 
(2nd issue-
42.5) 
100 (GoK) 
70.76 
Public 
Share 
Before 
(%) 
49 
100 
Shareholders 
Bottling Other 23,848,470 
Shareholders 
-
-~ 
Public Sector Buyer Proceeds 
Share (Kshs) 
After(%) 
Minin~ NSSF -
0 Chemical Various Investors 42 472 080 
0 Services /Vehicles Various Investors 20,074,810 
Assembly 
42.5 Banking Individuals & 400,000,000 
Other Investors 
22.5 Banking Individuals & 600,000,000 
Other Investors 
20 Transport Individuals & 2,643,750,000 
Institutional +US$ 26 
Investors Million 
I 
38.13 Agriculture Individuals & 954,936,425 I 
Su~r~owcrs 
Public Sector Buyer Proceeds 
Share (Kshs) 
After(%) 
0 Services Mr. N.M. Rajani 75,000 
0 Hotel & Tourism - -
5 
'I 
I 
.ll' 
3 ,[. 
l 
! 
4,1>, 
5:.1 
,I 
\l• 
6 ·\. 
:r 
7 'I 
8 1,,. 
:F:. 
9 r 
:1' 
J 
10'' 
·I 
,,!:' 
ttJ 
.11 
12;; 
t 
B'w 
14'i_ 
3 I. 
B'each Hotel) 
Xfrican Diatomite Industries Ltd 1994 
MEP AL plastics Kenya Ltd 1994 
Milling Corporation of Kenya Ltd 1994 
H.ola Cotton Ginnery 1995 
Salawa Cotton Ginnery 1995 
Mwea Cotton Ginnery 1995 
Homa Bay Hotel Ltd 1995 
Golf Hotel 1995 
Meru Ginnery 1995 
Kenya Fluospar Co. Ltd 1996 
Sunset Hotel Ltd 1996 
I 
Kibos Cotton Ginnery 1996 
4 :11! F. MANAGEMENT / EMPLOYEE BUYOUT 
.r-,, 
'J Company 
:\ 
i 
1 :,_ Ark Ltd 
!I ,,, 
Price being negotiated 
,':! 
II 
1 
'i I 
'f 
::1 
;:\ 
Year 
1996 
I 
100 0 Mining Crown Berger Kenya 45,000,000 
I Ltd 
100 0 Plastics Minolta Ltd 17,000 000 
100 0 Agri-Processing Premier Flour Mills 150,000,000 
Ltd 
100 0 Textile Malindi Cotton 10,000,000 
Ginneries Ltd 
100 0 Textile Kerio Farms 10000000 
100 0 Textile Rift Valley Products 15,000,000 
Ltd 
99 0 Hotel & Tourism Samvir Management 22,000,000 
Services Ltd 
80 0 Hotel & Tourism Buvika Corporation 70,000,000 
Ltd 
49 0 Textile Mugongai Farmers 30,000,000 
Ltd 
50 Mining M/ s Mineral & 72,500,000 
Chemicals 
Manufacturers Ltd (In 
FormationO 
95 0 Hotel & Tourism Travel Handling 115,000,000 
services Ltd 
Cotton Ginning Salome Farmers 8,000,000 
Group 
Public Public Sector Buyer Proceeds 
Share Share (Kshs) 
Before After(%) 
(%) 
U talii Staff 8,500,000 
Investments Co. Ltd 
---- ---
6 
q 
F. PARTIAL DIVESTITUTRES 
Company Year Method of Public Public Sector Buyer Proceeds I 
Privatization Share Share (Kshs) 
Before(%) After 
(%) 
1 :1 Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd** 1998/90 Public 100 35 Banking Individuals 447,000,000 il /97/98 & Other 
I (a) Kencom House Ltd# Investors + 
[I (b) Kenya Commercial Finance 1998 594,000,000 Cqrporation# (GoK) 
I (c): United Finance Company of Kenya# + 1,820,000,000 I. 
:~. (d), Notcutt Longaroni# 
··\. 
(e)1 Savings & Loans Kenya Ltd# 
1!; (f) Investment Promotion Services# 
I 
II ~ 
' 2 ,, Mt. Kenya Textile Mills 1992 Receivership 100 48.5 Textile DFCK& Share Dilution 
J DEG 
3 r Uchumi Supermarkets Ltd 1992 Public 90 44 Retail Individuals 232,000,000 
,;[, (I CDC) Floatation Trading & other 
:I investors 
I cdmpany Year Public Share Public Sector Buyer Proceeds 
,t Before(%) Share Mter (%) 
4 r General Motors (K) Ltd 1992 Pre-emptive 51 46.5 Vehicle ITOH& Share Dilution 
I (IDB) rights assembly ICDC 
',!' 
~r Investment 
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ANNEX4: 
REVISED LIST OF STRA1EGIC COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES TO BE RETAINED UNDER GOK 
OWNERSHIP 
A. Development Finance Institutions * 
1. Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) 
2. Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation 
3. Kenya Tourist Development Corporation (KTDC) 
4. Kenya Industrial Estate Limited 
5. East African Development Bank 
B. OTHER COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT ORIENED STATE CORPORATIONS 
1. National Housing Corporation 
2. Agricultural Development Corporation 
3. Kenya Post Office Savings Bank 
4. Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) 
5. Jomo Kenyatta Foundation 
6. Kenya Literature Bureau 
7. Kenya Veterinary Vaccine Production Institute (KEVEV API) 
8. School Equipment Production Unit (SEPU) 
9. National Cereals & Produce Board. 
Notes: *'Ibe Ministry of finance has initiated a comprehensive review of the DFis. This review has indicated that a 
strategy for increasing access to credit to support development objectives which relies only on commercial lenders is 
not adequate to meet Kenya's present need for increasing access to credit. The review recommended, among other 
things, the need to: reduce the number of government owned DFis; redirect DFI activities to areas, which are 
relatively poorly served by commercial lenders (agricultural development loans, small farmer crop loans and small 
enterprise development loans especially in start up situations); and to improve the DFI's corporate governance. 
Based on this initial review, the Ministry of Finance is currently developing a DFI strategy. Meanwhile the DFis (or 
their functions) will continue to operate under Government ownership and control. 
5 ANNEX5 
6 SHAREHOLDING IN COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
1. Agro Chemical and Food Corporation- (ADC: 28.2%; ICDC: 28.8%) 
2. ChemeW Sugar Company- (GOK thro' ADC: 96.21 %; DBK: 1.42%) 
3. South Nyanza Sugar Company- (GOK: 98.8%; ICDC:0.7%; IDB:0.3%) 
4. Mumias Sugar Company- (GOK: 38.04%) 
5. Kenya Coffee Auctions Limited- (Coffee Board of Kenya: 65%) 
6. Mwea Rice :Mills- (National Irrigation Board: 55%) 
7. Nzoia Sugar Company- (GOK: 97.93%) 
8. Kenya Seed Company- (ADC: 52% - 1990; 40% -2002) 
9. Pyrethrum Board of Kenya (commercial function) - 100% GOK owned. 
10. Western Kenya Rice :Mills Limited- (National Irrigation Board: 71.9%; Ahero, Bunyila and West 
Kana irrigation schemes: 14.01%, 6.83% and 7.27%, respectively 
11. Kenya Commercial Bank- (GOK: 26.2%) and subsidiaries :Kencom House Limited 
12. Development Bank of Kenya- (!CDC: 89.3%) 
13. Consolidated Bank- (Deposit Protection Fund: 50.2%; State Corporations: 47.9%;Local 
Authorities 0.6% ) 
14. Kenya Reinsurance Corporation- (GOK: 100%) 
15. Wananchi Sawmills Limited- (!CDC: 44.4%) 
16. Kenya National Trading Corporation- (!CDC: 100%) 
17. Funguo Investments Company Limited- (I CDC: 36.5%) 
18. Kenya Wine Agencies- (!CDC: 72.66%) 
19. Kenya Power and Lighting Company- (GOK:40.41%; NSSF: 10.81%) 
20. Kenya Electricity Generating Company- (GOK: 100%) 
21. Kenya Railways Corporation- (100% GOK owned) 
22. Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited- (GOK: 50%) 
23. Kenya Pipeline Company- (GOK: 100%) 
24. National Oil Corporation: (GOK: 100%) 
25. Kabarnet Hotel Limited- (I<TDC:98%) 
26. Mt. Elgon Lodge- (KTDC: 72.92%; Kitale Municipal Council: 13.54%; Transnzoia County 
Council: 13.54%) 
27. Telkom Kenya- (100%) 
28. Safaricom Limited- (Telkom Kenya: 60%) 
29. Industrial Development Bank- ( GOK 58.2%, ICDC 12.1%, State Corporations 29.7%) 
30. Golf Hotel limited- (KIDC:80%; Kakamega Municipal Council: 20%) 
31. Sunset Hotel Limited- (KTDC: 95.4%; Kisumu City:4.6%) 
32. Kenya Safari Lodges and Hotels Limited- (KTDC:63.42%; KWS:0.02%) 
33. Kenya National Shipping Line- (KPA: 70% reduced to 44% but shares not issued) 
34. East African Portland Cement Company Limited- (NSSF: 27%; GOK: 27%) 
35. Eveready Batteries Limited - (!CDC- 24.87%) 
36. General Motors (Kenya) Limited- (!CDC- 20%) 
37. Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya- (GOK: 7.3%) 
38. ICDC Investments Company Limited - (!CDC: 23.5%) 
39. Industrial Promotion-Services Limited- (GOK: 5shares only) 
40. International Hotels (I<) Limited- (Hilton, Nair~IJi)- ~TDC: 33.11l(o) 
-_;~-:----:·------· -·-· -·. -·~-,..,.,'-:-=-~~,...=~· ... . .·-:·_ -~~ . --- . --·~.-.7-.-~-'-~:-:"-_-.. -·.--.----
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41. Kenya Airways Limited- (23%); and subsidiaries- Kenya Flamingo Airways Limited and Kenya 
Airfreight Handling Company Limited 
42. Kenya Breweries Limited (0.95%) 
43. Kenya Grain Growers Cooperatives Union- (2% ADC shareholding) 
44. Kenya Hotel Properties Limited (Hotel Intercontinental, Nairobi) - (KTDC:33.8%) 
45. Kenya National Assurance (2001) Ltd- (GOK: 100%). 
46. Kenya Vehicle Manufactures (ex-layland)- (GOK: 35%) 
47. Kisii Bottlers Limited- (ICDC: 29.25) 
48. Mountain Lodge Limited- (KTDC: 39.7%) 
49. Mt. Kenya Bottlers Limited- (ICDC: 19%; IDB: 2.8%) 
50. Nyayo Tea Zones- (GOK: 100%) 
51. Panafrican Paper Mills (EA) Limited- (GOK: 34%; ICDC: 6% & DBK: 2%) 
52. Rift Valley Bottlers Limited- (ICDC: 29%) 
53. Simba Products Limited- (ICDC: 100%) 
54. Thika Cloth Mills Limited- (IDB: 5.8%) 
55. Uchumi Supermarkets Limited- (ICDC: 32%) 
56. Kenya Airports Authority- (GOK: 100%) 
57. African Export Import Bank- (IDB: 0.3%) 
58. Acacia Fund Limited- (IDB: 0.3%) 
59. Aon Minet Company Limited- (ICDC: 20%) 
ANNEX? 
LIST OF NON-COMMERCIAL STATE CORPORATIONS 
8 A. Regulatory 
1. Betting Control and Licensing Board 
2. Capital Markets Authority 
3. Central Agricultural Board 
4. Coffee Board of Kenya 
5. Electricity Regulatory Board 
6. Export Processing Zones Authority 
7. Cotton Board of Kenya 
8. Film Censorship Board 
9. Horticultural Crops Development Authority 
10. Hotels and Restaurants Authority 
11. Kenya Bureau of Standards 
12. Kenya Dairy Board 
13. Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services 
14. NGO Coordination Bureau 
15. Pests Products Control Board 
16. Pharmacy and Poisons Board 
17. Pyrethrum Board of Kenya (has some financial functions) 
18. Radiation Protection Board 
19. Sisal Board of Board (has some financial functions) 
20. Tea Board of Kenya 
21. Kenya Tea Development Authority 
22. Communications Commission of Kenya 
23. Presidential Commission on Soil Conservation 
24. Kenya Sugar Authority 
25. National Environment Management Authority 
9 B. Research institutes 
1. Coffee Research Foundation 
2. Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
3. Kenya Forestry Research Institute 
4. Kenya Industrial & Research Development Institute 
5. Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research & Analysis 
6. Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute 
7. Kenya Medical Research Institute 
8. Kenya Trypasonomiasis Research Institute 
9. Tea Research foundation 
10. Kenya Veterinary vaccines Production Institute 
10 
11 c. Educational/Professional 
1. Cooperative College of Kenya 
2. Council of Legal Education 
3. Egerton University 
4. Higher Education Loans Board 
5. J<:>rno KeJ:!yatta Ulliver§~ty Qf Agriculture and Technology 
6. Kenya Institute of Administration 
__ -~-•. c-. ~~~-?.,,~Kenya-Medical Training-Center:-• . ....,.,..~~ ., ... _ .=-:.cc- ··- .- -"~~- ~~...,. .. c--.cc-••. -.... --
8. Kenya National Examinations Council 
9. Kenya Utalii College 
10. Kenyatta University 
Pagel 
11. Moi University 
12. University of Nairobi 
13. National Council for Science and Technology 
14. Maseno University 
u D. Development/Promotional agencies 
1. Cost Development Authority 
2. Ewaso Ng'iro North River Basin Development Authority 
3. Ewaso Ng'iro South River Basin Development Authority 
4. Kerio Valley Development Authority 
5. Lake Basin Development Authority 
6. National Irrigation Board 
7. Tana Athi Rivers Development Authority 
8. Export Promotion Council 
9. Investment Promotion Center 
10. Kenya Tourism Board 
11. Kenya Wlldlife Service 
13 E. Culture/Social service 
1. Kenya National Library Services 
2. Kenyatta National Hospital 
3. Local Authorities Provident Fund 
4. Moi Referral and Teaching Hospital 
5. National Health Insurance Fund 
6. National Social Security Fund 
7. Presidential Music Commission 
8. Bomas of Kenya Ltd. 
9. National Museums of Kenya 
10. National Aids Control Council 
14 F. Revenue collection 
1. Catering Levy Trustees 
2. Kenya Revenue Authority 
